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INTRODUCTION

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM

Modern Revisionism is a form of Social Democracy.

In an article written in 1967, an American philosophy professor discussed the "Great Debate" between Russia and China. According to him:

"revisionism may be conceived as any effort to moderate the critical and revolutionary thrust of Marx's method. Verbal adherence to philosophy without corresponding practice is one of the more subtle instances of contemporary revisionism ... interpreted ... as masking a fear and dislike of revolutionary action."¹

This boils down to saying that, for Marxist-Leninists, Revisionism is any theory or practice which, in the name of Marx or Lenin, changes or distorts certain basic unalterable principles, among which – regardless where scientific socialism may function – the following are indispensable:

1. *A complete body of scientific theory* guides all action, especially that directed toward revolution. It is universally applicable, and it is the duty of those who espouse it to apply it where they function by "interpreting their own world" so as "to change it."

On the theoretical side: called *dialectical materialism*, this theory amounts to *a science of change*. It postulates material conditions (especially, but not solely, society's economic life) as basic to all happenings, with ideology derivative. Under certain conditions and for specific periods, ideological factors may supersede material ones as the major motive force in society. In addition, though derivative, ideas always affect material conditions. Dialectical materialism's theory of development holds that every material phenomenon, including history, contains inner contradictions and external ones, the struggle among all of which (with inner contradictions primary) causes motion. At each given period, one contradiction internally, and

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one externally, will be the main ones in each sphere. The development of these main contradictions leads to revolution – the changing of the old to the new – resulting in attainment of a new level wherein former, once-lesser, contradictions now become the main ones, leading to another (higher) stage of development, and so on, ad infinitum. Marxism holds that, besides main and subordinate contradictions, there are also antagonistic and non-antagonistic ones, the latter likely to become antagonistic when not understood and properly dealt with.

For Marxism, theory is never an end in itself, but *the chief means toward revolution* (social change), leading to emancipation; primarily, for the "proletariat," but through it, for all oppressed classes and people internationally.

On the practical side: Marxist insistence on the need for scientific theory to guide all action implies that, in implementation, (a) the theory must fight for and maintain its *basic principles intact* against any and all distorters; (b) unity with distorters is impossible; (c) the *theory itself must be* consciously and assiduously *spread among oppressed classes and peoples* in order to enable them to understand their own conditions and, applying to them Marxist principles, thus free themselves; (d) *vigilance* must be strict *against alien ideology*, with *emphasis on being able to counter bourgeois dual tactics*: force and violence as ruling class main tactic, with "killing revolution by kindness" as the other.

Furthermore, Marxist theory not only can be universally applied, but must be, before action is taken. Application, that is, derives from a class analysis of existing material and ideological conditions and forces and their inter-relations. Failure to make such an analysis constitutes "spontaneity," leaving revolutionaries at the mercy of laws which operate in favor of the bourgeoisie, whether such laws are understood or seen or not.

2. **The need for a vanguard party.** **In theory:** To ensure the fruition of revolutionary theory as emancipation, *it is indispensable* for the revolutionary class to organize a vanguard party, based on the industrial working class, in alliance—

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primarily with any working peasantry; but also, from time to time, with any class which, in any given epoch on any major issue, takes a historically progressive stand. This party leads the political revolution. Thereafter, it guides that revolution into its economic and ideological stages. Since, objectively, the working class is international (see 3, below), it follows that its vanguard party must be likewise.

In practice: to guarantee revolution's success, (a) the existence of the vanguard party must be protected against "liquidators;" (b) to maintain ideological "purity," *no one whose ideas oppose Marxism may be a member*; (c) as long as antagonistic classes exist (especially, as long as imperialism exists), such a vanguard party must continue to guide and protect the revolutionary class and its revolution, meaning: *until after the victory of communism*. The practical result of the vanguard party's internationalism is mutual cooperation between national parties: NO party is, or can be, the source of all wisdom, nor "marches at the head" of the international working class movement.

3. **Attitude toward class struggle.** **In theory:** for Marxist science, history is based on real events and the study of these is called *historical materialism*, which declares that *social history is the*

chronicle of class struggles. Each class society is divided into opposing classes, struggle between the major two of which, for the given era, decides the direction of history. Class struggle includes the ideological plane, which becomes decisive whenever "ideas seize hold of the masses." Until the victory of socialism, all ruling classes have been *minority* classes, reigning by ideologically dividing the subjugated majority. Socialism, however, for the first time in history, produces a majority ruling class – the proletariat. No longer pretending like its bourgeois predecessors to give "democracy" to the old class enemy, this *majority now suppresses the former ruling minority by armed force*: "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

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The proletariat itself is composed of and based on industrial workers who, in capitalist society, were the principal but not the only subjugated. Class struggle does not die away with the triumph of socialism; *class antagonisms continue*, in a new form, *inside the new society*; also outside, influencing internal events by the pressures of an antagonistic, moribund social system as long as imperialism exists.

In practice: implementation of these principles requires recognizing the irreconcilability of opposing class forces (implying that not all non-working-class classes are necessarily hostile to the proletariat). Class analysis decides which classes are hostile in any given society; which means that, under capitalism, no compromise with the bourgeoisie on principles is allowable (though other compromises may be made as required). It then follows that *class collaboration with the bourgeoisie is specifically rejected*. That, in turn, determines when to make agreements with any class, as well as what kind to make.

While irreconcilable vis-a-vis any antagonistic class, toward its own class and all those closely allied, the proletariat practises proletarian internationalism, which is world working-class brotherhood. This includes support for the just demands and struggles (including wars) of all oppressed classes and for national independence for all subjugated peoples.

4. **Ownership of the social means of production.** **In theory:** Historical materialism proves that the material basis on which minorities were able to rule whole societies was their ownership of the social means of production: in slave society, the slaves; in feudal society, the land; in capitalist society, land, factories and machinery.

When *socialist revolution* triumphs, it *expropriates* from the ex-rulers the social means of production; i.e., it takes them away *without compensation*, replacing formerly private with social ownership via the proletarian state. This is *not synonymous with government ownership*, even though that is the general form social ownership of means of production has taken under socialism thus far. Included with—

government ownership, *the products of government-owned production must also be the property of the new ruling class* if the system is to qualify as socialist. This must be stipulated because "government ownership" is also used to save capitalism, as in Britain and elsewhere.

In practice: this theory demands *a complete, even if gradual, break with capitalist economics:* the withering away of commodity production and the market mechanism; central planning, to engender rational use of socially-owned means of production; absolute control of social distribution; and the substitution of collective for individual methods throughout production, distribution and consumption. All these are measures without which ownership of means of production will inevitably revert to former owners and revolution will be destroyed.

5. Theory of the state; the dictatorship of the proletariat. **In theory:** Marxism holds that *all states are aggregate apparatuses of force, designed to protect ruling class ownership of social means of production by suppressing the ruled*, so ensuring continued political, economic and social power for the rulers. *Government not only is not the same as the state*, but only a subordinate segment thereof. *The major content of any state* is its instruments of force: *the army, police, prisons and laws*. Therefore, *there is no way to make a revolution without violence*. Corollary: having triumphed over the old state, the new ruling class must *smash it and substitute its own*, serving its own interests.

With the success of the socialist revolution, the absolutely indispensable aggregate apparatus of force of the new, majority, ruling class is *the dictatorship of the proletariat*. Its principal content is *the armed people*.

Since the existence of any state expresses the irreconcilability of opposing classes; since expropriation of the social means of production increases the determination of the former ruling class to bring about counter-revolution; and since the former ruling class can draw upon the enormous resources of parasitic imperialism,¬

the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be dispensed with before the achievement of communism.

In general, the requirement to smash the old state means that under very few conceivable circumstances can power be won by bourgeois-controlled elections.

In practice: to implement the Marxist theory of the state, conditions are: *immediate recallability* of any elective representative; absolutely *no special privileges* or immunities for such representative; and the *reduction of all payment* to "servants of the state" to the level of those earned by the highest-paid non-state worker. The new state must also, immediately on formation,

destroy the old standing army and replace it by the armed people. It must then destroy the bureaucracy.

6. **Attitude toward wars.** **In theory:** Marxism accepts the dictum of the famous bourgeois military genius Clausewitz that "wars are continuations of politics by other means." Imperialism's major contradictions make *wars of all kinds inevitable as long as* that "highest stage" of *capitalism exists*. As with the state, this fact merely again expresses the irreconcilability of contradictions in class societies. Each war must be specifically examined in terms of the politics it serves: as corollary, scientific socialists must support all those which serve revolutionary politics and oppose those serving reactionary politics. In this context, while imperialism lasts, *peace can never be an end in itself, but always a means toward* the main objective: *overthrowing the international bourgeoisie*. Only universal revolution can guarantee real peace. Similarly, peace treaties and the struggle for disarmament are subordinate aims because they always grow out of wars and/or prepare the way for new wars under imperialism.

In practice: This theory results in the practical rejection by Marxists of pacifism ("peace at any price"). Yet, Marxists definitely should lead the struggle for peace, but in the same way as they support reforms of the existing system: (a) in the interests of the working class; and (b) by *informing the workers of the limits – without overthrowing the*

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system – of such struggles, which must be seen as incapable of solving working class problems created by imperialism.

7. **Attitude toward imperialism and colonialism.** **In theory:** because economic parasitism never stops growing as imperialism decays, Marxism pin-points *colonialism as imperialism's main method of operation*, whereby the rulers most rapidly increase their profits: (a) by *exporting capital*, which squeezes super-profits from colonial labor power; and (b) uses part of these super-profits *to bribe* a portion of "its own" working class so as *to split* the main antagonistic class threatening its continued control of society. The resulting *labor aristocracy* then acts as *imperialism's splittist agent inside the world working class movement*.

A supplementary principle is that *Marxists must support without qualification the right of every oppressed nation to self-determination, up to and including its right to separate from the "mother" country*, but not making the break itself into a principle. It is, instead, *only a means* to that eventual *international comity* which will finally eliminate nationalism as we know it.

In practice: this part of Marxist theory, plus those on class struggle and the state, determine which practical measures of foreign policy the working class should support before and after the triumph of socialism, in principle opposing and completely unmasking all racist and/or chauvinist ideology or practice.

If these are the main Marxist principles of theory with their practical expressions, then it also has to be stipulated that failure to support any single one of the theoretical positions immediately brands the proponents of such failure as unscientific and non-Marxist in toto.

We shall, therefore, examine modern revisionism in the light of each and every one of them. But first, we will establish the positions of Social Democracy on them, in order, when the examination of revisionism has been completed, to prove our original statement that modern revisionism is a form of Social Democracy.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

As treated in this text, Social Democracy is by no means just a "simple, honest" ideological trend in the working class movement. It is, rather, a major agent of the class enemy – the bourgeoisie – operating inside the working class emancipatory movement along specific clearly-defined lines.*

But since Social Democracy speaks (mainly, nowadays, in "Third World" areas) with certain "Marxist" pretensions, it is also necessary to examine how it stands on each of the test principles of scientific socialism outlined above.

1. *On theory as a guide to action*

From the beginning of its betrayal of the working class movement in 1914, Social Democracy's "theory" has been and remains a bombastic eclecticism, mentioning Marx only where convenient.**

In reality, this theory warps and distorts all Marx's major principles, with the aim of thwarting the latter's main objective: working class revolution, especially (today) anti-colonial liberation as the world's current stage of that same revolution.

Lenin had established his famous condition:

"Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement... This thought cannot be insisted on too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity."¹

In practice, far from defending Marxist theory, Social Democracy became and remained its principal distorter. But —

* See Page 384, below, for criteria establishing an ideology as Social Democratic.

** See writer's previous book, *Labor Aristocracy, Mass Base of Social Democracy* (Aurora edition, Stockholm 1978), (hereinafter referred to as *Labor Aristocracy*) Section C: "The Western Left and Social Democracy."

not always recognizeably so. Lenin taught that any adulterator of Marxism had to be fought relentlessly. But, he had added, because

"Marxism was right ... it (is) necessary to fight against (it) hypocritically, not to oppose the principles of Marxism openly, but to pretend to accept it and at the same time to emasculate it by sophistry, to transform Marxism into a holy 'icon' that is harmless to the bourgeoisie ... and makes it suitable for justifying all sorts of concessions to opportunism."²

So, even where it "espouses Marxism," Social Democracy is merely cloaking its main aims and will never lead workers to action that is revolutionary or in their own basic (as opposed to short-term) interests.

The real material base of Social Democratic ideology is (a) the needs of the labor aristocracy as they fit into (b) the requirements of the imperialist ruling class. This is the real theory that Social Democracy always implements.

2. *The need for a vanguard party*

Lenin castigated Social Democrats on this subject because a segment of them wanted openly to do away with the vanguard party Lenin was building. This group was then known as "*Liquidators*." Their liquidationism took the form, not of wanting to do away with the vanguard party itself, but with its illegal or underground side, which repressive Russian conditions made necessary.

Lenin made clear that this aberration in theory was *basic to Social Democracy*:

"Liquidationism is ideologically CONNECTED* with ... OPPORTUNISM... But Liquidationism is not ONLY opportunism ... it ... is THAT BRAND of opportunism that goes to the length of RENOUNCING the Party...

"Liquidationism means not only the liquidation (i.e., the dissolution, the destruction) of the old Party of the working-

* In all quotations, emphasis IN CAPS is in the ORIGINAL; *spacing* represents the author's emphasis.

class, it also means the destruction of the CLASS INDEPENDENCE of the proletariat, the corruption of its class consciousness by BOURGEOIS ideas."³

For this reason, Lenin's position throughout the struggle for socialism in Russia had been that, whatever happened, *the vanguard must fight to keep distorters of Marxism out of their party*:

"it is IMPOSSIBLE to tolerate the existence of SUCH A TREND WITHIN the Social-Democratic Labor parties* ... Socialism ... has ... entered the stage of revolutionary action; and there can be no doubt that the time has come for a complete rupture with opportunism and its expulsion from the workers' parties."⁴

3. *Social Democracy and class struggle*

In its theory, Social Democracy fulminates endlessly against class struggle. It pretends that, were it not for "communists," it (Social Democracy) could "reason with intelligent" sections of the bourgeoisie, whereby progress for the working class would then be achieved peacefully.

Social Democracy has conceived its main role to be that of calming any class struggle which might erupt. However, it will fight, up to a point, for the gains of the labor aristocracy whenever these are threatened; and, especially, if it is "out of office," as in Britain since 1971.

So, far from recognizing the bourgeoisie as the main class enemy, and irreconcilably so at that, Social Democracy assures labor that its "interests" lie in making capitalism "work better."

"Class collaboration" in the Social Democratic lexicon includes not only "peaceful agreements" with "benevolent" capitalists, but also specific and inevitable (though usually unspoken) Social Democratic ties with *Fascism*.**

On the practical side, having accepted the "inevitability" and the "progressive nature" of imperialism, Social Democracy quite logically makes class collaboration the very center of its program. ▯

* Today, read "Communist."

** See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XIX, dealing with the *size* of the *modern* labor aristocracy.

This, in turn, usually leads to "agreements" that, while they usually bring concessions of some sort, are nevertheless harmful to the long-run interests of all workers, *even the labor aristocracy which gets them*.

Lenin had clarified the difference between reformists and Marxists in their respective positions on making agreements. The basis for deciding whether or not to make an agreement and what kind to make or when, Lenin showed, must be the unalterable attitude of workers toward their class brothers everywhere: *proletarian internationalism*. On numerous occasions, he exposed how opportunists violate this precept because of their economic position in society:

"an attempt to defend narrow craft interests ... is the same aristocratic spirit one finds among workers in some of the 'civilized' countries. They are in a privileged position, enjoy certain benefits, and are therefore inclined to forget the need for international class solidarity."⁶

Lenin contrasted the reformist with the Marxist attitude to internationalism:

"... the internationalism of (opportunism) amounted to this: to demand reforms from the imperialist bourgeois government, but to continue to support it...

"Theoretically, this shows a complete inability to dissociate oneself from the social-chauvinists and ... politically, it means substituting petty-bourgeois nationalism for internationalism, deserting to the reformists' camp and renouncing revolution."⁷

Here, Lenin had explained in advance the betrayal by Social Democracy of the workers' interests which led inevitably, by the 1930s, to its open association with and support for counter-revolutionary Fascism.

Finally, Lenin had emphasized the intimate connection between world revolution and proletarian internationalism:

"The Bolshevik tactics were the ONLY internationalist tactics, because they were based on ... a correct ... ESTIMATION of the revolutionary situation in Europe ... because they did the utmost possible in one country FOR—

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the development and support and awakening of the revolution in ALL COUNTRIES."⁸

Social Democrats, Lenin charged, did not take this approach because of their

"cowardly fear of a world revolution ... a philistine lack of faith in it ... not 'caring a hang' about all the rest (of the working class)..."⁹

4. *Ownership of the social means of production*

In theory, Social Democracy has equated any type of nationalization of any industry or part thereof by any government as "social ownership of the means of production," regardless who has

benefited from the "take-over." The British Labour Party, in or out of power, prates of "British Socialism." Many workers, including a great number of those in subjugated areas, are taken in by this.

Lenin challenged the specific view that "state ownership" constituted any kind of socialism:

"...what is most essential in the theoretical appraisal of the latest phase of capitalism, i.e., imperialism (is) that capitalism becomes monopoly CAPITALISM. The latter must be emphasized because of the erroneous bourgeois reformist assertion that monopoly capitalism or state-monopoly capitalism is NO LONGER capitalism, but can already be termed 'state socialism,' or something of the sort."¹⁰

On the practical side, the Social Democrats fought tooth and toe-nail at all times to protect existing ruling class ownership of the social means of production. Where this position led them in practice was illustrated, for example, in Italy.

There, in September 1920, responding to a lockout, Italian workers occupied factories in the northern section of the country. Soon a half million workers were in

"unchallenged occupation of the factories, establishing their own workers' committees and armed guards. The government and employers were powerless. The troops could not be counted on to act against the workers. The classic conditions of revolution were present.

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"...What neither the employers nor the Government, nor the police, nor the armed forces could effect ... was effected by the reformist leadership – to get the workers out of the factories and hand them back to the capitalists."¹¹

Social Democracy knows who the rightful owners of the social means of production are and, when the chips are down, protects their ownership.*

The resulting influence of Social Democracy's theoretical and practical stance on this crucial matter could be clearly seen in the attitudes of political leaders in colonial (usually neo-colonial) areas who, upon attaining political independence, promised the imperialists not to expropriate their property "without compensation."** Certainly, African countries have given examples of this.

5. *Social Democracy and the state*

Lenin had noted that the Second International, even when it "came right up against this question (of the state)," tried "TO EVADE it or else failed to notice it."¹² He had added:

"In general, it may be said that EVASIVENESS as regards the ... relation of the proletarian revolution to the state – an evasiveness which was to the advantage of opportunism and fostered it – resulted in the DISTORTION of Marxism and its complete vulgarization."¹²

Lenin therefore fought a long tough battle against Social-

* Compare the role of the Communist Party of France during May 1968.

** See, for instance, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*: Feb 12-19, 1972; P 25097, about Libya's "Revolutionary Command Council" nationalizing British Petroleum "with compensation ... to the company." Mar 12-18, 1973; P 25773, about Uganda action against 54 British companies whereby the Minister of Finance was required to set up "a board of valuers to determine the amount of compensation." And March 4-11, 1961; P 17973, about Ghana Government offering to pay for the entire share capital of five of seven U.K. gold mines taken over when they threatened to close down as "uneconomical" because of a Government wage rise.

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Democracy everywhere on this vital matter. As always, he started with fundamentals: the Social Democrat, he said,

"fails to see the CLASS nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of state ... the petty-bourgeoisie ... believes that 'after all is said and done' the state is something outside of classes, or above classes."

On the contrary, Lenin proved that

"The state is the product and the manifestation of the IRRECONCILABILITY of class antagonism. The state arises when, where and to the extent that class antagonisms objectively CANNOT be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that class antagonisms are irreconcilable."¹⁴

In contrast, Social Democrats, having denied "irreconcilable class antagonisms," Lenin noted,

"accepted the bourgeois political forms of parliamentary democratic state as the limit which should not be overstepped ... and denounced ... all desire to smash ... these forms."¹⁵

And what happened the moment they got a foot inside such a parliament? Precisely at this point entered the question of whether or not it was possible to utilize the old state machine. Lenin had declared that

"all the revolutions which have occurred up to now *perfected* the state machine, whereas it must be ... *smashed*."

*"This conclusion is the chief and fundamental point in the Marxist teaching on the state. And it is precisely this fundamental point which has been ... completely FORGOTTEN by the dominant official Social-Democratic parties."*¹⁶

From this "chief and fundamental point in the Marxist teaching on the state" followed the problem of what should replace the old state machine once it had been smashed. Lenin had stipulated that

"the old executive apparatus, the bureaucracy, which is—

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connected with the bourgeoisie, would simply be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletarian state."¹⁷

What was fit to "carry out the orders of the proletarian state," as dealt with in Lenin's writings, was, as shown by the Paris Commune,

"the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors."¹⁸

This process, Lenin had also made clear, could be implemented only by instituting certain specific measures to provide the people with "cheap government." These included the suppression of the old standing army,¹⁹ the removal of "allowances" for "high dignitaries of state,"²⁰ and the rendering of judicial functionaries subject to election and recall.²¹ The very measures, in a word, which would remove Social Democratic – and bourgeois – snouts from the public trough.

Yet it was against this dictatorship of the proletariat that the Social Democratic advocacy of the "peaceful" assumption of power was directed. Invariably, the opportunists opposed and finally sabotaged the whole concept.

Of the recommended actions to guarantee "cheap government," the key one, ensuring success of revolution once power had been seized, consisted in Lenin's view in

"the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people."²²

Instead, interested in the sizeable crumbs dropped by the ruling class into the laps of "its" labor aristocracy, the Social Democrats "extended" the "theory" and practice regarding the state to mean *class collaboration*, proposing peaceful, i.e., the electoral, paths to "socialism." Governments like those of Ramsay MacDonald in the 1920s or of Harold Wilson after 1964 illustrated this. Therefore, of course Social Democrats abhorred and feared the dictatorship of the proletariat, although they "justified" their hatred by using the name of "democracy."

6. *Attitude toward wars*

As the First World War loomed, the Social Democrats began more and more loudly to wail how "impossible" it was that "peace may be broken." Lenin scoffed:

"Such simple-mindedness ... is not surprising ... IT IS IN THEIR INTERESTS to pretend to be so naive and to talk 'seriously' about peace under imperialism."²³

Again, their general stance amounted to negating the class struggle. They ignored the Marxist method of judging each war according to the kind of politics it served (either condemning it as reactionary or supporting it as revolutionary). Rather, they came out for "disarmament" *in general*, for "peace" *in general – except* (significantly) in the case of the main – imperialist – war. They claimed that the growth of interlocking directorates and international cartels made disarmament a real possibility under capitalism because such cartels would have "the same interests" everywhere. To these arguments in particular, Lenin had replied:

"To deduce an economic tendency towards disarmament from the combining and interlocking of various national capitalists into one international whole means substituting the pious, philistine wish that class antagonism could be blunted for the actual sharpening of these antagonisms."²⁴

But the crunch of the Marxist attitude on war lies just here. Peace, in and of itself, is primarily a *means*: and even when it becomes an end, it is still a *revolutionary* end, leading to the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie.

Such an outcome the Social Democrats wanted to avoid at all costs, as their position on disarmament proved. For, Lenin had specified that

"An exploited class that does not STRIVE to acquire arms, to master their use and the art of warfare, is a servitor class. Those who advocate disarmament in contradistinction to a people's militia ... assume the attitude of small-country petty bourgeoisie, pacifists and opportunists. For us, on the other hand, the decisive factor should be the

standpoint of ... the REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE (WHICH IMPLIES ALSO CIVIL WAR)."²⁵

7. *Attitude toward imperialism and colonialism*

The Social Democratic position on both these topics proves that *support for colonialism* is (because Social Democracy represents the labor aristocracy) *the specific, material foundation of opportunism* in our time.

Lenin had frequently tangled with opportunism in his day on its attitude toward imperialism. Taking Kautsky as a leading spokesman of these, Lenin had said:

"K. Kautsky ... refuses to regard imperialism as a 'phase of capitalism' and ... defines (it) as the POLICY* 'preferred' by finance capital, as a *tendency* on the part of 'industrial' countries to annex 'agrarian' countries.

"Kautsky's definition is thoroughly false from the theoretical standpoint. What distinguishes imperialism is the rule NOT of industrial ... but of finance capital, the striving to annex NOT agrarian countries particularly, but EVERY KIND of country. Kautsky DIVORCES imperialist politics from imperialist economics, he divorces monopoly in politics from monopoly in economics in order to pave the way for his vulgar bourgeois reformism, such as 'disarmament,' 'ultra-imperialism' and similar nonsense.

"The purpose and significance of this theoretical falsity is to obscure the MOST PROFOUND contradictions of imperialism and thus to justify the theory of 'unity' with the apologists of imperialism, the outright social-chauvinists and opportunists."²⁶

Actually, it was around the question of *colonialism* that Social Democracy played – and to this day continues playing – its most characteristic role.

Reproving Kautsky for "obscuring the deepest contradictions of imperialism, which inevitably becomes the embellishment of imperialism," Lenin had noted:

"The result of these tendencies (for domination) is reaction all along the line, whatever the political system, and—

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XXV, "Relationship between Western and Colonial Workers."

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an extreme intensification of existing antagonisms... Particularly intensified become the yoke of national oppression and the striving for annexation, i.e., the violation of national independence."²⁷

Lenin inveighed against chauvinism, noting that colonial countries, as well as those industrialized, have workers whose struggles need support. "But," he had added,

"even in those colonial countries where there are no workers, only slave-owners and slaves, etc., the demand for 'self-determination,' far from being ABSURD, is OBLIGATORY for every Marxist."²⁸

So, what did the Social Democrats do? First, they refused to see imperialism as it was. Lenin had referred to opportunist

"efforts to make capitalism look more attractive, an occupation in which all the reformists are engaged."²⁹

Their position had an aim: Lenin had exposed how

"the OPPORTUNISTS (social-chauvinists) are working hand in glove with the imperialist bourgeoisie PRECISELY towards creating an imperialist Europe on the backs of Asia and Africa, and ... objectively the OPPORTUNISTS are a section of the petty bourgeoisie and of certain strata of the working class who HAVE BEEN BRIBED out of imperialist super-profits and converted into WATCH-DOGS of capitalism and CORRUPTORS of the labor movement."³⁰

Because of the crucial nature of support for anti-colonial revolution, Lenin incorporated, as Point 8, among his "Conditions for Affiliation to the Communist International," the following:

"Parties in countries whose bourgeoisie possess colonies and oppress other nations must pursue a particularly distinct and clear policy in respect to the colonial and oppressed nations ... (they) must support – by actions and not merely by words – every colonial liberation movement, demand expulsion of the imperialists from the colonies, educate the workers in a spirit of brotherhood with the laboring population of colonial and oppressed nations, and conduct systematic agitation among the armed forces against all colonial oppression."³¹

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Pursuing on the practical level the consequences of such an ideological position for the working class *in power*, Lenin had showed how *foreign policy* in any country fully exposes the real attitude of that country's ruling class toward oppression:

"The Soviet government has torn the veil of mystery from foreign policy in a revolutionary manner. Kautsky has not noticed this, he keeps silent about it, although in the era of predatory wars and secret treaties for the 'division of spheres of influence' (i.e., for the partition of the world among the capitalist bandits) the subject is one of CARDINAL importance for on it depends the question of peace, the life and death of tens of millions of people."³²

Thus, on every count by which any alleged socialists can be tested for their relation to revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, Social Democracy from its inception and right down into our own epoch has failed to qualify. *Neither its theory nor its practice* (but only an occasional verbal pretension) *has even the most superficial connection with scientific socialism.*

The record of Social Democracy since Lenin's day, whether in Singapore or in Britain, has served to confirm Lenin's diagnosis of and polemics against them: no revolution has alleviated those oppressed by the minority imperialist ruling class in localities where Social Democrats thrive. Rather, an elite – its size depending on where in the world it lives – has been evoked by Social Democracy. That elite – a labor aristocracy in the West; an imperialist-tied comprador group in the world's Singapores – has grown under Social Democratic influence and assistance, and has added to the numbers of parasites leeching the international working class.

We shall return to this assessment of Social Democracy after having fully examined the theory and practice of Modern Revisionism in order to demonstrate the truth of our initial assertion: Modern Revisionism is a form of Social Democracy.

In the course of such demonstration, we shall attempt to document both the theory and practice of the leadership in the—

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Soviet Union and its adherents, the designation "Modern Revisionism" referring to them collectively.

Because the Chinese and Albanian Communists parties have been the main critics of Modern Revisionism, we shall frequently have occasion to quote them. But we contend that their charges are easily proved or disproved by testing the actual positions of the current Modern Revisionist leadership against the basic tenets of real Marxism-Leninism set forth above.

The writer is unaware of any summary in a single work of all such testings, regardless by whom done in part. This work is, therefore, an attempt to delineate a complete portrait of what we believe History will prove to have been the most important negative political development of our era.

DEFINITIONS, DISCLAIMERS AND EXPLANATIONS

In pursuing this investigation and exposé of Modern Revisionism, certain underlying positions have not specifically been stated. This fact could be used to deny some of the author's basic beliefs, some of which are long-standing but others of which have evolved from an extended investigation of the labor aristocracy, applying the findings specifically to the U.S.*

Hence, let us specify:

1. The principal contradiction in the world today is between the socialist and imperialist world systems. This contradiction expresses internationally the irreconcilable antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which, in turn, is the concrete manifestation of the principal intra-imperialist contradiction: between the forces and relations of production.

2. However, a contradiction, which was a minor one in Lenin's day, that between the labor aristocracy and the proletariat out of which the former sprang, has escalated over the years to the point where, today, it has become one of the principal contradictions among the world's people.

This contradiction expresses in material terms the *fact* that there is a contradiction between exploitation and *super*-exploitation. Its material expression is that whole national (mainly Western) sections of the world working class have *benefited*, and *still benefit* even under crisis conditions, from *super*-exploitation. They benefit *at the expense* of their brother workers in colonies.

It will be recalled that Chairman Mao teaches that non-antagonistic "contradictions among the people" *can* be solved step by step and amicably. But he says this is true *provided* – and only provided – that such contradictions are *recognized, analyzed and dealt with in good time*. *Otherwise*, he declares, *non-antagonistic contradictions can and do become antagonistic*.

* See *Labor Aristocracy*.

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3. Because most of the world Left denies the deepening of this contradiction since Lenin's day – or often, its very existence – the principal aspect of the contradiction between the proletariat and the labor aristocracy *at the moment* is *an alliance*, temporarily, between the labor aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Left denial of the contradiction results almost completely from not having investigated the perimeter of the labor aristocracy nationally or internationally. Instead, this Left continues to mouth mechanically Lenin's statement, completely valid for his time, that "the labor aristocracy is only a tiny minority of the working class."

The effect in the West has been *to cover up without in the least affecting* real exploitation of the labor aristocracy. The "cover" has been a "style of life" and an "entire outlook" of large numbers of workers, most of whose wages can be – and often are – shown to be entirely "proletarian," but who are, by Lenin's own stated criteria, actually part of the labor aristocracy.

All this has come about because, in the world Left, either (a) a majority ignores the negative aspect of the labor aristocracy's class relations in the West (first visible in the U.S., but now building up in Western and Eastern Europe); or (b) pretending that the negative example does not exist in the class relations of the labor aristocracy; that is, that the labor aristocracy does not cooperate with the bourgeoisie.

Acknowledgement that the labor aristocracy at least objectively assists the bourgeoisie is usually always given, because reality is such that it would render the denier ridiculous; and because it is equally obvious and observable that the labor aristocracy does get rich *while* the oppressed "Third World" people grow poor. What is denied is that this process is integral: that the labor aristocracy flourishes *because* oppressed people languish. It may not be the labor aristocracy's fault that this is so; it does not exploit. But it is the super-profits from its brother workers in colonies, super-profits which qualitatively more greatly impoverish those workers, which furnish the material benefits given by the bourgeoisie to the labor aristocracy, benefits which—

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that labor aristocracy not only accepts but actively fights to retain. The fact that the ruling class flourishes far more and far better than the labor aristocracy is used to deny the remainder of the related truth.

A further effect of being deliberately blind to the current temporary alliance between the bourgeoisie and the labor aristocracy is, perhaps by covering up exploitation, to turn all struggles into a purely economic direction, which helps imperialism. This is because everybody on the Left today is either (a) ignoring the negative aspects of the labor aristocracy in the West and in Western and Eastern Europe (a majority position); or (b) pretending the negative example is all there is and that the main contradiction, that between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, does not exist.

It is necessary to expose the negative aspects of the Western labor aristocracy, to show their economic base in the persistence of real colonialism (now called "neo-colonialism" because it often lives behind a mask) and the political results in (a) the current dominance, in the Western Left inhabiting metropolitan citadels, of bourgeois ideas; (b) the substitution of economic for political goals in most Western labor struggles; and (c) the temporary abeyance of proletarian internationalism under the negative leadership of the Modern Revisionism.

The purpose of such exposure must be to show any honest ones among the Western Left that the labor aristocracy-colonial worker contradiction exists; its role; how and why the labor aristocracy responds to Modern Revisionist lies; and what the labor aristocracy's real job as workers must be before any of this can be altered.

It is cowardly if not counter-revolutionary to wait till imperialism hopefully folds up before tackling this problem. For, as long as imperialism has peoples to super-exploit (even under fascism, if it comes to that) there will be sizeable funds available to the bourgeoisie to split the international working class. If we don't hit this reactionary development, it won't fall. No optimistic statements from any headquarters can substitute for *our* job of exposing this contradiction.

That has been my purpose in making this attempt.

At this point, it is necessary to specify the sense in which Lenin's writings are being quoted: in this text Marxist source material is used to test Revisionism not as "gospel" but as scientific formulae still applicable because the conditions to which they allude still exist, despite historical differences which can be assessed.

Neither is it pretended that any material thus reproduced herein is unknown to the Revisionists now in power in the USSR. In fact, the volume from which most of them were taken was published in Moscow in 1959 under Revisionist rule. Their excuse for their "new principles" has been that modern weapons are now so "lethal" that (a) the "sensible" bourgeoisie "realizes" that, in the event of war today, "the ruling classes will not be spared, either;" (b) under no circumstances, at any price (up to and including the mass sacrifice of colonial peoples to continued colonialism in the name of "not rocking the boat") must such weapons be used; and (c) because of this particular "advance in technology," Lenin's arguments *do not apply to the current situation*.

However, Lenin had long before anticipated even this dodge, for he said that

"...general and fundamental aims (of Marxism)...do not change with turns in history *if the fundamental relations between classes remain unchanged*."¹

The chapters on the working class, the modern bourgeoisie, and modern imperialism in this text show that "the fundamental relations between classes" today, as in Lenin's day, do, indeed, remain unchanged. Contradictions have deepened and sharpened; they have not disappeared.

London, April 1972

I | REVISIONISM TODAY

The year 1914 produced the first major development in the ideological field for modern working class history: through its betrayal of Marxism over the issue of whether or not to support "one's own" bourgeoisie in an imperialist war, Social Democracy became transformed from a trend within the world working class into an outright enemy thereof. It revealed itself as a new and vital mask for colonialism.

This was where it stood in 1917, when Russia broke from the capitalist system to form the world's first enduring proletarian state.

Lenin had described such opportunism as "the social product of a whole historical epoch."

Has that epoch ended?

In Western industrialized nations, a labor aristocracy arose, created *at that time* among a *small minority* of the working class of such areas, when the ruling class shared with that then-minority super-profits from "overseas" colonies. In this way, imperialism extended its influence inside the working class.

At the same time, a world war for redivision of colonial spoils among the major imperialist powers had brought on the break-away from the imperialist system of a significant portion of the earth. The major contradiction of that system, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, now took on a new and sharper aspect in that where before there had been "one" world, there were now "two:" the imperialist (including the colonial world), and the socialist. This immediately intensified the internal contradictions of the imperialist system, especially its major one.

After World War II, there were further splits away from—

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capitalism: in Eastern Europe and in Asia. Now, in more than one country, the labor movement in such places was elevated to the position of ruling class in a socialist system. That system was now clearly the embodiment of the *world's* future.

Nevertheless, on the majority of the earth's surface, imperialism still held sway, albeit daily more moribund. Centuries-imbedded ideological supremacy of bourgeois ideas continued, and they — as powerful remnants of an era only just left behind — pervaded also even the new socialist world.

The *decay* of imperialism was epitomized in the growth of its *parasitism*, and that included the Western labor aristocracy and, hence, the latter's political spokesman, Social Democracy. The

attainment of power by that section of the world labor movement did not, therefore, signal a decrease in bourgeois influence. If anything, rather, bourgeois pressure and influence (the bourgeoisie now being itself under vastly increased pressure from the new socialist world) increased in the event manifold.

What had happened since Lenin's time seemed to be that those conditions so clearly visible in his day had now *escalated*, without altering the main characteristics of the system.

The world is *still* in that "whole historical epoch" of which Lenin had said Social Democracy was "the social product." But the unrolling of history has speeded up. And with the end of World War II, again splits appeared, comparable to the Social Democracy-Communism dichotomy that followed World War I.

In or around 1949 – that is, shortly after the end of World War II – the World Federation of Trade Unions, an organization then embracing all the world's organized labor except America's AFL, was split. Formed by dissident imperialist-oriented "labor leaders" of the West, the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) broke away from the world working class. This new trade union body signalized the specific historical context:

Had not the *Vietnamese* in 1945 beaten an 800,000-strong French army to win the world's *first successful anti-colonial victory*? Was 1949 not the year when the Chinese revolution in turn triumphed over the combined Kuomintang, Japanese and American imperialist forces, to create the

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first large-scale anti-colonial liberated area? Didn't *Korea* follow close on China's heels? Hadn't *U.S. imperialism*, under the United Nations flag, picked up, in 1950, in Korea, the flung gauntlet of anti-colonial liberation, only to be *defeated for the first time* in its history?

Hadn't this military defeat of the "mighty" United States been followed by upsurges in Africa? Did 1957 not witness an apparent breach in the very "strongest" colonial wall when Ghana, upon gaining full independence, announced its intention of "going socialist"?

Was it accidental that these same late 50s were the years when the *labor aristocracy in the U.S.* became for the first time in capitalist history a *majority of a nation's* working class, thus producing a significant change in the political position of that class, both internally to the U.S. and internationally?*

All these events had forced, and continued forcing, the world's revolutionaries to take a clear stand for or against complete anti-colonial revolution. This had been the issue around which the ICFTU had split the world's trade union movement, speaking openly on formation of its intent of interfering in colonial revolutions, especially in Africa: openly, it opposed even the right of colonial peoples to freedom.¹

This was both due to and made more difficult by the fact that, by the mid-1950s, anti-colonial revolution had advanced far enough that imperialism and its agents badly needed a new tactic to meet it: imperialism's old agents, Social Democrats of various stripes, had completely discredited themselves among the world's revolutionaries and had no significant influence among the world's down-trodden.²

But "new circumstances" confronted both the "down-trodden" and their rulers: the defection of a significant portion of the earth's population from the capitalist system, to the accompaniment of upsurges in the colonial hinterlands of Asia, Africa and Latin America. "New circumstances" confront ruling classes with "new requirements" for maintaining themselves in power. ▸

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XVIII through XXIII.

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After 1949, those "requirements" were for some as-yet-undiscredited *demagogy* which could help reverse the new socialist revolutions, and hold anti-colonial liberation back.

At first, Yugoslavia's Tito had seemed like the answer. But by 1966, one revolutionary had had to record that even

"the agent Tito...can no longer completely satisfy the needs of the imperialists, particularly the U.S. imperialists. Tito and his gang have been exposed."³

But elsewhere, a new answer had been maturing for imperialism.

At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union not long after the death of Josef Stalin, there arose for the first time in the world of socialism-in-power the now-all-too-familiar cry of "peaceful coexistence," of "peaceful transition to socialism," of "peaceful economic competition" with an imperialism now seen as "changed."

That had been in the year 1956. By then, the CPSU had become widely known and respected as the Party which had led the world's first successful workers' and peasants' revolution; had led it and kept it in power against all that the capitalist system could fling against it to overthrow it. It had developed into the beacon of the world's oppressed, contingents among whom from time to time, right from the start, had risen to its defense, saving its life. Later, this state and this Party, almost single-handedly, had stopped Hitler's hordes, representing the spearhead of international Fascism.

A man named Kruschov had stood up at that Party's 1956, 20th, Congress and had enunciated the anti-Stalin cult and the policy of peaceful coexistence with imperialism. Coming as they did from the mouth of the leading spokesman of this beloved Party and government, such words and ideas were, as we shall soon see, a godsend for imperialism, especially for ambitious, greedy, devouring – because dying – Wall Street monopolies.

The practical meaning of Kruschov's words soon began to appear.

At the 1957 meeting of 81 Communist Parties, a declaration—

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of principles had been drawn up in Moscow. Their side of the story of that meeting was not told by the Chinese Communists until 1963, after they had been publicly challenged by the CPSU leadership through an "Open Letter" which claimed for the CPSU full credit for the 1957 document.

The original draft had, the Chinese conceded, been submitted by the CPSU. But, they added, that draft had been loaded with non-Marxist ideas; for instance, not even mentioning non-peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism.

The Chinese commented that the Soviet Draft had, in fact,

"substituted the 'parliamentary road' advocated by the opportunists of the Second International for the road of the October Revolution and tampered with the basic Marxist-Leninist theory on the state and revolution."⁴

The Soviet draft statement on "peaceful transition" immediately brings to mind Karl Kautsky's phrasing of long ago:

"The aim of our political struggle remains, as hitherto, the conquest of state power by winning a majority in parliament and by converting parliament into the master of the government."⁵

But Lenin had characterized that position thus:

"Reformism, in general, means that people confine themselves to agitation for changes which do not require the removal of the main foundations of the old ruling class, changes that are COMPATIBLE with the PRESERVATION of these foundations."⁶

Was the Chinese diagnosis correct or not? An instrument for testing the "new" Soviet theory was thoughtfully provided and lies conveniently to hand: in 1961, led by Kruschov, the Soviet rulers brought out their "Program of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU," wherein the positions of the (1956) 20th Congress were already notably developed. Here are statements, agreed by the ruling sectors of Soviet society, which can be matched, point by point against the test principles of scientific socialism.

II | REVISIONISM AND THE NEED FOR THEORY TO GUIDE ALL ACTION

Throughout this Soviet document we are about to make use of, the method of presentation was, first to state a generalized truth or an accepted Marxist position; this was then followed by a conclusion in no apparent way related, a not terribly original *modus operandi*, but one required by the situation.

A. *In Theory*

A great fanfare extolling Marxist theory opens the pertinent section of this document:

"A grim struggle is going on between two ideologies – communist and bourgeois – in the world today...a reflection, in the spiritual life of mankind, of the...transition from capitalism to socialism. "The more victories the world socialist system achieves, the deeper the crisis of world capitalism and the sharper the class struggle, the more important becomes the rule of Marxist-Leninist ideas in unifying and mobilizing the masses to fight for communism."¹

Marxism-Leninism has always engaged in continuing and sharp controversies with alien bourgeois ideology. What evidence of this "grim struggle" was offered in the CPSU Program? Here are its thoughts on that:

"Marxism-Leninism has gripped the minds of progressive mankind. Bourgeois doctrine and schools have failed in the test of history...

"The bourgeoisie is no longer in a position to put forward ideas that will induce the masses to follow it. More and more people in the capitalist world are renouncing the bourgeois world outlook."²

Elsewhere, the Soviets trumpeted

"the ideological break-down of reformism."³

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Or, again, they announced that

"Today, the international Communist movement is so powerful that the combined forces of reaction cannot crush it."⁴

In a word, the alleged "grim struggle" was virtually portrayed as already behind us; victory had already been won.

The Program listed various bourgeois attempts to win the masses ideologically: anti-communism; fascist ideology; chauvinism and racism; clericalism; and "a search" by "anti-popular circles" in "the countries which have gained their freedom from colonial tyranny" to tone down the "general content of nationalism." Social Democracy was specifically mentioned only three or four paragraphs from the end of the entire section dealing with ideological struggle.

But this writer has already shown that all these ideological types (with the possible exception of clericalism) are inextricably bound up with Social Democracy, which, in turn, is associated with all of them.*

Our enquiry into the specific positions of the Program on all the basic tenets of scientific socialism will reveal why the "new" CPSU leadership was so reticent on the subject of Social Democracy, and about the latter's entanglement with all other bourgeois ideological trends.

B. *Revisionist Practice on Theory as a Guide to Action*

If Lenin had been right in saying, as he did in *What Is To Be Done?*, that without a revolutionary theory there could be no revolutionary movement, then the practical result of erring theory in a revolutionary movement has to be counter-revolution.

If we look into current and recent Soviet practice in the field of theory, this idea is fully borne out.

Professor Donald Clark Hodges, examining Soviet theory, reported:

* See *Labor Aristocracy*.

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"Marxist philosophy in the Soviet Union is divided into (1) a scientific world-view or general theory of the universe (dialectical materialism); (2) a scientifically-based theory of knowledge and corresponding method of inquiry (materialist dialectics); and (3) a scientific theory of social structures and the historical process (historical materialism)...

"...Soviet philosophy is judged to be a primarily theoretical activity focused upon the basic substance and structure of reality...In the Soviet view, dialectical materialism is...a means of class struggle on the cultural level for winning over the intelligentsia to socialism...(for) Soviet philosophers...emphasis lies...(on) a professional line in philosophy."⁵

Professor Hodges compared this approach to that of Karl Marx:

"The point of Marx's revolution in philosophy...was not to interpret the world scientifically so much as to revolutionize it in practice...the most important contribution of Marxist

philosophy is not its theory of the general laws of conflict nor its function as a revolutionary guide to action and instrument of practical decision, but rather revolutionary action itself...Marxist philosophy is for the masses rather than for a small minority of intellectuals...As Marx noted in his THESES ON FEUERBACH, the new materialism is practical rather than contemplative."⁶

In these two quotations, the professor has described the longstanding schism between philosophical materialism and idealism, wherein the latter splits thought from its material base.

Through the following illustrations, this split can be shown to be the least common denominator of all current Soviet practice. And, sure enough, the end result is invariably – counter-revolution.

First of all, was it consonant, as alleged in the CPSU Program, with fact, that the bourgeoisie today was "no longer in a position to put forward ideas that would induce the masses to follow it?" Or that people in capitalist countries were "renouncing the bourgeois world outlook"? Such developments, if real, would be of great assistance to the world revolutionary movement.

1. By "the bourgeoisie," can only be meant the imperialist→

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ruling classes headed by the U.S. variety. In that context, the late Kwame Nkrumah's description of the far-flung U.S. propaganda machine is worth re-reading.⁷ It suggested that that machine still commanded limitless money, innumerable personnel and concentrated attention from every branch of American "Intelligence," attaining slick effectiveness among the world's masses via ubiquitous monopolised cinema, magazines, books, "houses of culture," and all the rest; and – through forced agreements with new governments by threat or otherwise – keeping out propaganda from countries still calling themselves socialist.

If the bourgeoisie is, then, still in a position materially far better than socialism's (including the latter's "shining examples") to "put forward ideas that will induce the masses to follow it," plans for revolutionary counter-propaganda would be effective only if they recognized these facts and included them in the form and content of their counter-measures. Playing the ostrich does not achieve that goal. Imperialism's hold on the mass mind reflects the failure of the World Left to admit the simple facts: the "contemplative approach" – which substitutes wish for reality – always winds up objectively in the service of imperialism.

2. Furthermore, it is not apparently imperialism, but Revisionism, which has sustained loss of influence among the masses. For example, a review of "the Western Communist press" reported the latter to be "fast becoming a victim of good times." This, the review added, created for such papers the problem of

"how to sustain their traditional fervor while appealing to workers no longer interested in Marx, Lenin or revolution."²

Resulting circulation drops in self-styled Marxist papers in the West were summarized:

"Combined circulation of New York's WORKER, Rome's UNITA, London's MORNING STAR, and Paris's HUMANITÉ has declined from a postwar peak of 1.2 million to 300,000 today."¹⁰

It cited in particular 17,000 possible New York WORKER readers, 33,000 for the British MORNING STAR, 100,000 for Italy's

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UNITA, and 150,000 French people now reading HUMANITÉ."¹¹

3. Another reflection of Soviet drift from the Marxist position on theory was suggested in a polemic against Mikhail Sholokhov, well-known Russian novelist, for accepting the Nobel Prize for literature. Even "the French bourgeois writer Jean-Paul Sartre,"¹² said this diatribe, had refused this prize, which is given only to those

"'talents' among Russian writers who resolutely oppose communism and the October Socialist Revolution, whom (the bourgeoisie) approve..."¹³

The polemic cited the bourgeois SATURDAY REVIEW as exemplifying ruling class satisfaction with Sholokhov's anti-Red Army position during the Russian Revolution. It cited his hero, Grigory, in the prize-winning novel *And Quiet Flows the Don* as vindicating this view inasmuch as Grigory

"had frenziedly fought the Red Army and had committed many bloody crimes" while "the 'inhumanity' of the class struggle...crushed the 'fine soul' of Grigory and robbed him of everything that could connect him with the world he lives in."¹⁴

Others also condemned Sholokhov for accepting the Nobel Prize. Indonesian Communists took a crack at him, excoriating his "reactionary 'humanism'":

"The example of Sholokhov is not...confined to...literature. To us, writers of Asia and Africa...dedicated to the revolutionary cause, the Sholokhov issue is in the first place a political issue...

"The people of Indonesia, for instance, have their own bitter experience about the disastrous effects of this 'universal humanism' and have waged a relentless struggle against it...The idea of 'universal humanism' was widely spread by the Dutch colonialists following their

occupation of Djakarta and some other regions in Indonesia in the years 1946-1947. By advocating the idea of 'pacifism,' this 'universal humanism' was intended to extinguish the burning hatred of the Indonesian people against the Dutch colonialists...

"How shameless: a Sholokhov, in his conception of-

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'humanism,' has revived the shaken pillars of Dutch colonialism!"¹⁵

4. Erosion of Soviet ideology became visible in many other areas. One was the notorious extension of "Western culture" among Eastern European socialist youth. Bourgeois writings seized upon that development with delight. For example, one article dealing with monetary and other incentives used by the Russians to "compensate" their workers who had to live in Siberia:

"the average age is about 30...they enjoy such bourgeois pastimes as the twist no less than their contemporaries back in European Russia."¹⁶

The "twist" was a dance which invariably reached colonial (or "newly-freed") areas in the company of Coca Cola as more or less the price of a new factory to produce this latest "missionary" for Uncle Sam (which has lately been oozing into Eastern Europe, as well). Maybe the French have a point when they refer to "Coca-colonization"!

5. *Revisionist education*, supposedly the agency for producing "new revolutionaries" to carry on under "Communism," also suffered from Revisionist attitudes toward theory.

The first such example, historically, was in *Yugoslavia*, where

"education, its substance and subject matter, are not other than means of spiritual domination and assimilation of the various nationalities by the Serbian and Croatian bourgeoisie...culture, art and historical sciences...present the role of the chauvinistic bourgeoisie...at the time of the monarchs as a progressive factor."¹⁷

As far as the *Soviet Union* was concerned, their 1961 Program had discussed in general terms the "new principles" of education required in their "new era." They had seen the prospects as:

"The system of public education is so organized as to ensure that the instruction...of the rising generation (is)-

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closely bound up with life and productive labor, and that the adult population can combine work in the sphere of production with further...education in keeping with their vocations and the requirements of society. Public education along these lines will make for...the elimination of substantial distinctions between mental and physical labor."¹⁸

But the CPSU Program had claimed that

"the one-time antithesis between...labor by hand and by brain has been abolished."¹⁹

Why then was it necessary to set up an educational system aimed at eliminating "substantial distinctions" between mental and physical labor?

At any rate, immediately after the Program came out in 1961, Soviet schools did in fact start requiring that students do manual labor part-time as an integral part of their curricula. And how did it work out?

"Experiment they (Soviet schools) gave up was system of giving public and high school pupils 'labor experience' – doing actual work (farm, industry) several hours weekly. Didn't work out. They couldn't provide work that was varied enough to suit the many individual abilities of children. And large number of schools were too far from suitable factories and farms. It's been stopped."²⁰

This return to bourgeois educational concepts did not go unnoticed. Albanian Party leader Enver Hoxha took note that the Soviet leadership

"are now worshipping university skill, which leads to the creation of a special class in society composed of...technocrats...in this revisionist-ruled country mental workers without ideological education have been appointed as the unchallenged overlords of enterprises...manual workers are...looked upon as workers whose sole concern is only to receive orders."²¹

Indonesians were among the leaders in testifying to the repercussions of such "worship." They described what happened as a result to the education of PKI cadres in their "vanguard party:"

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"In this (4-year) Plan (of the Party), the stress was...on the education of the intellectuals to serve...in the united front with the national bourgeoisie, and to supply cadres for...the state institutions...

"To raise the prestige of the PKI in the eyes of the bourgeoisie...all cadres of the higher ranks must obtain academic education, and cadres of the lower ranks lower middle school education...all Party leaders and prominent figures of the popular movements were obliged to write four theses in order to obtain the degree as 'Marxist Scientist'."²²

So, revising proletarian theory did not affect solely the revisers!

6. Increasing amounts of *advertising* in publications of European "socialists-in-power" testified to more ideological limpness: advertising has long been recongnized as capitalism's chief contribution to the barely-disguised forced sale of goods, doubling as a "hard sell" for the system itself. In the USSR, this growth was the logical result of "peaceful economic competition" with capitalism, to be discussed in greater detail later.

Socialist Yugoslavia was as always first to start this particular trend. Chinese critics went into detail, basing themselves on *Yugoslav* sources:

"...all economic departments and enterprises in Yugoslavia are locked in fierce capitalist competition. It is quite common for the enterprises...even to attack one another in the press or over the radio in rivalry for markets and profits."²³

The result was the closing down not so very long ago by Yugoslav courts of "500-600 enterprises...every year."²⁴

A mouthpiece of U.S. Big Business also commented on mushrooming adverts in the USSR, especially those through agreements with American agencies. It recorded a new Soviet attitude:

"Increasingly, the new Kosygin-Brezhnev regime is cultivating advertising as a sort of opiate of the masses to boost sales of consumer goods at home and to expand trade abroad."²⁵

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After reporting how "the old-line imperatives" against spending large sums on advertising "are gradually fading out as...domestic agencies mount Western-style campaigns to push...merchandise," this source noted that

"The two biggest national newspapers, PRAVDA and IZVESTIA, still do not deign to carry advertising. But most local newspapers now budget part of their back pages for small ads. And TRUD, the national trade union newspaper, started accepting ads early this year."²⁶

Another U.S. source confirmed the last bit:

"Last week, in TRUD, a trade union official named Lazukov, suggested that Russians should learn to advertise capitalist-style, with TV commercials, trailers in movie houses, and professional Madison Avenue men."^{27*}

This source also reported that

"During the past two years...the number of foreign ads (in Soviet publications – HE)...has increased by 150 percent."²⁸

While most U.S. businessmen were reportedly slow in starting to advertise inside the USSR, *Maidenform, Inc.*, the New York brassiere-maker, proclaimed via its 79-year-old chairman, Mrs Ida Rosenthal, a different view:

"It's an investment in the future...Russia is a big market and we just want our name to be known when it does open up."²⁹

7. At Zabaykalsk, a town at the border between the Soviet Union and China, Soviet officials confiscated more than 500 pieces of literature from a delegation of CLARTÉ, a Swedish student organization, which had just concluded a visit to China, in the Fall of 1966.³⁰

According to the report, these publications were mainly books by Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung;¬

* This admonition was seen by the author on Hungarian TV, Dec. 1971, to have been heeded.

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but they also included North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese NLF writings.

In its protest to the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm, the Swedish delegation further charged that

"Books which members of the delegation classified as 'American propaganda' for the information of the Soviet border officials were promptly returned together with Leon Trotsky's works."³¹

8. One of the most portentous evidences of further ideological degeneration came in the rise of Russian jingoism. Kudos began gushing forth for "Mother Russia." For instance, one article described "the major role played in Europe's destiny by Russia."³² The editor commented:

"It must be noted that this theme has appeared frequently (in Russia) in the course of the last few months."³³

One such example is discussed later in the text in detail.*

9. As "profits" became the main aim of enterprise, a resulting gradual debasement of socialist culture had to follow. For example,

"Russia's film-going millions are to have their own Western-style film stars. Leading actresses may soon get level billing with Siberian dairymaids and other heroes of Socialist labour, thus winning, with the help of the magic word 'profitability,' a remarkable victory in their fight with party propagandists...

"But this will mean...the admission that stars are the main attraction of films, not the morally uplifting party messages they convey."³⁴

10. Sometimes, evidence of Soviet ideological deterioration verged on the ridiculous:

"Telling a political joke may soon land a Russian in jail for up to three years under new penalties introduced in the Soviet Union.

* See discussion of the poem "Walkie Talkie" by Soviet poet Andre Voznessenski, Pp 112 ff, below.

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"The penalty for 'the spreading of deliberately false fabrications defaming the Soviet state and social structure' was announced with other new measures in the Russian Federation's Parliamentary Bulletin."³⁵

The dispatch explained that

"Political jokes are a common feature of the Communist world where the press is strictly controlled...Observers here see (these penalties) as mainly legal simplifications making it easier to convict dissident elements..."³⁶

"Dissident elements" in the "State of the whole people"?

11. The position of "religious elements" in the Soviet Union has changed noticeably since Lenin's day in the softening ideological atmosphere there:

"...contrary to propaganda over here (Canada), the Soviet Government has never set out to 'crush' the Churches. And today, what situation do you actually find in the USSR?

"Well...Churches are not growing. But – neither are they in crisis! ...as older believers have died, middle-aged people have joined...There is even a fairly stable percentage (small) of young people...What's more, you don't find any HYPOCRITES in Soviet Churches...Soviet churchgoers are FULLY DEVOTED BELIEVERS, who arrived at a religious approach to life through their own convictions. This applies to YOUNG Soviet church members, also.

They get no clubs, dances, parties or sex-talks when they go to Church – THEY GO FOR RELIGION, AND THEY GET IT."³⁷

In the German Democratic Republic, as well,

"No statistics on church attendance...are available, but observers estimate...roughly the same percentage of regular church-goers as in Britain."³⁸

These two examples are more than ordinarily interesting in view of the Marxist position on religion, which Lenin more than once discussed when expounding on "the ideological content of revisionism." Dealing with "the domain of philosophy," Lenin said—

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that

"revisionism...repeated the banalities that priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism...The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and 'critical' systems to the dominant medieval 'philosophy' (i.e., to theology) – and revisionists drew close to them and endeavoured to make religion a 'private affair,' not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class."³⁹

And the Soviets lost no time in spreading their anti-Marxist approach to religion into the subjugated world, especially Africa. An article in post-coup Ghana testified:

"...Soviet ideologists...adapt themselves to the requirements of the 'Third World.' Now they say...'socialism can also be developed with believers;' 'whereas Christianity is generally the religion of the colonisers, Buddhism and Islam are religions of the oppressed peoples' and 'only anarchistic elements declare war on religion.'

"The new policy of accommodation in the religious question is expressed by V. Tyagumenko, Soviet expert on developing countries. He writes, 'It is well known that in the national struggle of liberation, religion can encourage the masses to unite. Certain social demands are clothed in religious garb...In the liberated countries in which the religious factor is an important side of true reality, it would be adventurism not to consider it. To oppose the practice of religious rites under these conditions would mean offending the believers' religious feelings, isolating oneself completely from the masses, and discrediting the idea of social liberation."⁴⁰

Lenin had had more faith than this in the "believers" among the superstitious Russian peasants and others to whom he urged anti-religious propaganda to be made. Nor did he distinguish between "religion of colonisers" and those of "oppressed peoples" in his anti-religious polemics.

In sum, Modern Revisionism, as regards its theory and practice on the role of theory in the revolutionary movement, is characterised by the following features:

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a. Abandonment of dialectical materialism by dividing theory from practice and abolishing acknowledgement of motivating inner contradictions, in general.

b. In particular, ideology is made the property of an intellectual *elite*, while guarding it from "ordinary workers."

Theory is seen as an end in itself; especially separated from the making of revolution, now (in any case) considered mostly "unnecessary."

d. Far from fighting for the purity of Marxist theory, Modern Revisionism has altered it beyond recognition along lines of *non-struggle* in all fields.

e. From at first merely permitting adulteration of basic theory, Modern Revisionism has gone on to positions invariably convenient for the bourgeoisie: it has moved into the category of a "TOLERATED opposition" because it carries bourgeois ideological influence into the very socialist world itself and has had and continues having an ideologically debilitating effect within the international working class on the other two-thirds of the earth.

III | REVISIONISM AND THE VANGUARD PARTY

Section A. In Theory

Marxist theory advocates the need for a vanguard party as implementer and guardian of revolutionary theory and its resulting action.

About this, the CPSU Program says:

"Soviet experience has fully borne out the Marxist-Leninist theory that THE COMMUNIST PARTY PLAYS A DECISIVE ROLE in the formation and development of a socialist society. Only a Party that steadfastly pursues a class, proletarian policy and is equipped with progressive, revolutionary theory, only a party solidly united and closely linked with the masses, can organize the people and lead them to the victory of socialism."¹

But, as we have seen, to the authors of the Program, the victory of socialism is already "final and complete" in the USSR.² Hence, its "new" position on the vanguard party quite logically follows:

"As a result of the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the consolidation of the unity of Soviet society, the Communist Party of the working class has become the vanguard of the Soviet people, a Party of the entire people."³

Long before these words appeared, Lenin had discussed renunciation of the vanguard party by the people he dubbed "Liquidators." He said their position was a result of the fact that "the entire bourgeoisie turned." It "turned" because it had become "mortally frightened by the popular movement."⁴ As a partial answer to its fright, it gave privileges to opportunism, which thereby became a "TOLERATED opposition."⁵

Since then, hasn't there been a "new historical turn" by the bourgeoisie in the imperialist system? Yes, there has. In fact,¬

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Chapter I, above, more or less suggested the shape of that turn.*

The question now is, what is its nature? It seems to us that the following answers at least partially apply:

a. Today – continuing a drawn-out historical process begun in 1914 – the international bourgeoisie becomes less and less liberal; yet, to function, it requires more than ever a liberal facade, for the world revolutionary upsurge has also escalated into every continental backwash: the bourgeoisie is more "mortally frightened by the popular movement" than ever.

b. Hence, it develops a growing dependence on the world labor aristocracy as its "liberal front" – a wedge, specifically, into the world labor movement. Opportunism becomes an *internationally* "TOLERATED opposition." Our epoch has thereby been marked by a heightened role for imperialism's labor arms: Social Democracy and the Trade Unions. These are the bodies which directly helped "their" ruling classes to fasten colonialism onto struggling subjugated areas. This enhanced "labor" role resulted from the attainment in the U.S. and approach to attainment in the entire West of majority status for the Western labor aristocracy.**

c. At the same time, as parasitism in the international metropolis continually has been growing, empire was becoming ever more fruitful for the world's minority ruling class. The international exploiting hierarchy*** was growing increasingly complex, until agricultural laborers began to appear as almost the sole sector of the world working class completely untouched (as yet?) by imperialist bribery. But ever-new nooks and crannies continued to open inside the system into which opportunism could – did, and does – seep.

d. In this hierarchy, European socialist countries have, objectively, benefited from colonialism, at least via trade, because world markets (hence, prices of colonial commodities) continue to be controlled by imperialism. Down this material channel–

* See Pages 1 through 5.

** See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XVIII through XXIV.

*** *ibid.*, Chapters XI and XII.

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(and others) into such countries has flowed the influence of international imperialism, ideologically disarming their people and fostering the rapid spread of Revisionism.

e. So, in our epoch, the world capitalist rulers – and, more specifically, their agents – require "Liquidationism" in some suitable form. In Lenin's day, the slogan for "an open party" could be regarded as having been a kind of code in which the "Liquidators" assured the then-Powers-That-Be of Liquidator harmlessness. In effect, Lenin suggested that they were saying, "We shall...defend you (the ruling class) five times more 'cleverly', cunningly and 'scientifically' than (others)."⁶

Today, effective neutralization of the Marxist Party inside socialist borders is particularly desirable for counter-revolution. Old contradictions have *escalated, not disappeared*. The old "open party" today has become the CPSU's "Party of the entire people."

Lenin had devoted innumerable pages and arguments to the topic of Liquidationism, consistently combating the idea of doing away with the vanguard party, of replacing it by "an amorphous association...which cannot be called a Party."⁷

How far into its form of Liquidationism the Soviet leadership has gone may be judged by considering the following:

"OVERCOMING THE SPLIT in (socialism's) ranks is an important condition for the working class to fulfil its historic mission...The Communist Parties favor cooperation with the Social Democratic parties not only in the struggle for peace, for better living conditions for the working people, and for the preservation and extension of their democratic rights and freedoms, but also in the struggle to win power and build a socialist society."⁸

It would probably be a noble sentiment, had not the Program itself said, about these same "Social Democratic Parties" (of our day):

"Social-Democratism in the working class movement and revisionism in the Communist movement reflect the bourgeois influence on the working class.

"The contemporary Right-wing Social-Democrats...the¬

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most important *ideological and political* prop of the bourgeoisie within the working class movement...(have) completely broken with Marxism and contraposed so-call democratic socialism to scientific socialism...They...began by advocating social reforms in place of the socialist revolution and went as far as to defend state – monopoly capitalism...Now they openly renounce socialism."⁹

Lenin had described the opportunist parties of his own days as "the most important SOCIAL (not military) prop" of the bourgeoisie.¹⁰ He had, moreover, noted that they operated from both left and right; the right wing carrying the real revisionism; the left, requisite sugar-coating in the form of phraseology.

In any case, the CPSU Program had pointed to these same Social Democratic parties as follows:

"Revisionism, Right opportunism, which is a reflection of bourgeois influence, is the chief danger within the Communist movement today."¹¹

This verdict, at least, history confirms. Upon these cohorts imperialism has been able to rely: through the anti-liberation activities of Social Democracy's labor arm, the ICFTU; through the open alignment of "Labor" parties like that of Harold Wilson with American imperialism in diplomatic and military measures that crush popular revolt all over the world. Just which "wing" of such leading "wings" will – as the Program suggests – help to build socialism?

As far back as January 1916, Lenin had already stated his position on this subject:

"Socialist parties are not debating clubs, but organizations of the fighting proletariat; and when a number of battalions have gone over to the enemy, they must be named and branded as traitors...opportunism...became...so closely associated with the bourgeoisie and the governments, that it is IMPOSSIBLE to tolerate the existence of SUCH A TREND WITHIN the (Communist)...parties...Socialism in Europe has passed out of the comparatively peaceful stage...(and) entered the stage of revolutionary action; and there can be no doubt that the time has come"

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for a complete rupture with opportunism and its expulsion from the worker's parties."¹²

These words still ring with historical truth, as becomes abundantly evidently upon inspecting Modern Revisionist practice in this field.

Section B. Revisionist Practice and the Vanguard Party

When the British Left poet, Stephen Spender, was attending a mid-1963 conference of writers in Poland, he told the assembled authors that what he had most hoped to see there was a Communist. A voice from the back of the hall allegedly called out, "You have come too late for that."¹³

Apocryphal though it may have been, this story neatly summed up the *practical results of Modern Revisionism's theoretical position on the role of the vanguard party* before, during and after the revolution.

Against making the vanguard party a mere opposition, Lenin had inveighed on various occasions. For instance:

"The Bolsheviks indicated to the proletariat their role of LEADER of the democratic revolution...The Mensheviks...were prepared to accept a position in which the role of the proletariat would be subordination to and dependence on the bourgeoisie."¹⁴

What, then, have the Modern Revisionists done along these classical lines?

First, manifestations of virulent Liquidationism reappeared in modern guise in formerly-socialist Yugoslavia. Having studied the record, for example, the Albanian Communist Party declared unequivocally that, during World War II, the Yugoslav Communist Party had established

"a people's democratic state power under the dictatorship of the proletariat."¹⁵

Yet, not so very long afterward, they believed that it became true to say:

"The Yugoslav Communist Party has ceased to exist as such and *has become a fascist party...and rules by unparalleled terror.*"¹⁶

The Albanians said this "terrorism" was being carried out by the "UDB," so-called security section of the LCY, about which the Albanians said that

"Whatever we have said looks very pale in comparison with what Tito's clique said of itself...(when) for reasons of its own, it laid bare some aspects of the criminal methods and deeds of the UDB...during 25 years of their existence the organs of UDB 'have set up their own authority over the people, over the League of Communists, over our society. These negative aberrations have made their way down to the enterprises, factories, various social organizations everywhere'."¹⁷

Thus, starting from "mere" theoretical revisionism in 1949, the proletarian vanguard not only disappeared in Yugoslavia; it was turned into its very opposite, a tool of international imperialism.¹⁸

No sooner had Tito moved down the revisionist path than his practice spread. Immediately following the death of Josef Stalin in 1956, a "noiseless coup d'etat" or "palace revolution" occurred in the USSR under the leadership of the late Nikita Krushchov.

At this point, the influence of Yugoslav experience began to affect Soviet practice:

"Tito's clique...became the forerunner of the Krushchovite revisionist group and a bridge for the imperialist-revisionist alliance, a model for the restoration of capitalism in the European socialist countries where modern revisionists are in power."¹⁹

By 1963, Krushchov was visiting Yugoslavia. There, his speeches were reported in the local press. For example:

"In Krushchov's opinion, the leaders of the CPSU and the Titoites are 'not only class brothers' but 'brothers tied together...by the singleness of aims confronting us.' The leadership of the CPSU is a 'reliable and faithful ally of' the Tito clique."²⁰

This, from a party which, a mere two years earlier, had read words helped into formulation by their Soviet guest:

"The ideology of revisionism is most fully embodied in the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia."²¹

The same booklet had also stated:

"Yugoslavia likewise took the socialist path. But the Yugoslav leaders by their revisionist policy contraposed Yugoslavia to the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, thus threatening the loss of the revolutionary gains of the Yugoslav people."²²

Critics of the Yugoslav Party listed a dozen similarities between "pathbreaking" Yugoslav revisionism and that of the USSR's Kruschov:

1. Both denounce Stalin "in order to oppose Marxism-Leninism in its very fundamentals."
2. Both "repudiate the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism...malign as dogmatists the Chinese and other Communists who firmly uphold Marxism-Leninism, and both describe their own revisionism...as a 'creative development' of Marxism-Leninism."
3. Both "laud...U.S. imperialism."
4. Both play up the horrors of nuclear war "in order to intimidate the people of the world into abandoning revolutionary struggle."
5. Both preach that "a world without weapons...can be brought into being while imperialism still exists."
6. Both espouse "peaceful co-existence" with imperialism.
7. Both proclaim that "the possibility of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism has increased:" Tito talks of "different ways" to socialism; Kruschov, of "the parliamentary road."
8. Both extoll the virtues of "peaceful economic competition" with imperialism.
9. Both sabotage the national liberation movement and its wars in every way: Yugoslavia, having begun in 1949, later becoming more and more blatant about it; the USSR leadership—

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still paying lip service to "national liberation," but "acting betrayal."

10. Tito has denounced outright, and abandoned openly, the dictatorship of the proletariat, while the Soviet Revisionists abandon it by talking of "the state of the whole people."

11. Both deny that the Communist Party should be the vanguard of the working class. Tito says so outright; the CPSU leadership's Program talks of a "party of the entire people."

12. Both repudiate socialist brotherhood under the guise of "being opposed to Blocs" in international relations.²³

Whatever the excuses, these similarities amount to a blurring of class lines. Hence it is not surprising to find that they brought deterioration not only in the Yugoslav case, but also in that of the Soviet Party, even after Khrushchev had disappeared:

"If today (Kosygin's) speeches seem to be very different from those he delivered during the Stalin days, it is not simply because Kosygin has changed but above all because the whole Soviet Communist Party has changed."²⁴

There is support for this claim. For instance, one highly class-conscious American upper-class mouthpiece noted that

"Communism has...made wrenching readjustments. One of the more striking has been the post-Stalin push for respectability."²⁵

How far this "push" has taken the Modern Revisionists surfaced in "improving East-West relationships," sometimes in very personal ways:

"One Czech writer told me, 'You are seeing the beginning of a two-party system in some socialist countries. Just give us time. We, the reformers, already consider ourselves the loyal opposition.'"²⁶

Less than three years later, this prophecy had borne fruit:

"The leaders of Communist countries, led by Mr Brezhnev,...converging on Prague yesterday for what looks like a massed assault on the new Czechoslovak leadership...(have) opened the floodgates...to proposals for democratic reforms which, if implemented, could bring Czechoslovakia—

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back to the high road of democracy...

"...this will be something quite different from the (Communist – HE) system as it was in the past, and...in the neighboring countries. The various political organizations which were once the creatures of the party are beginning to press...for...the right of the people to elect their rulers – and to call them to account...

"This is where every genuine Communist reform movement, from Trotsky onwards, began. Few have ever gone beyond demanding it – except Yugoslavia...(which) has made considerable progress...and this was watched, and more recently, eagerly reported in Czechoslovakia...

"But now the Czechs have gone further than any of their neighbors; the party leadership is discussing a new 'action program' which...would permit the main stress to be laid on democratic decision-making *by society as a whole*."²⁷

So, in a few short years, the vanguard party in Eastern European socialist countries, having tripped down the political primrose path, found itself about to produce a bastard: a "two-party" system, the very embodiment of bourgeois parliamentarianism. Since parties always speak for some class, this development proves the emergence of at least one class requiring political expression that differs from that of the working class. And, in this "splintering of organizations" were foreshadowed still further class divisions that were to be generated by Revisionist reforms. Yes, even when those divisions were "hidden" in a "party of the entire people!"

Oddly enough, as the Soviet Party gave up its vanguard role inside its own borders, it began demanding hegemony over the world Communist movement:

"As a result of the devoted labor of the Soviet people and the theoretical and practical activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union...THE HIGHROAD TO SOCIALISM HAS BEEN PAVED. Many peoples are already marching along it, and it will be taken sooner or later by all peoples."²⁸

This bare hint of "hegemony" in 1961 had, by 1966, developed:

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"Taking advantage of the authority and prestige of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet group of leaders have inserted the idea and method of the 'conductor's baton' and of the 'mother party' in the international communist movement. They have trampled upon Marxist-Leninist norms and principles of relations among fraternal parties...they have launched public assaults...against the Party of Labor of Albania, the Communist Party of China and other fraternal parties, they have backed and incited hostile and anti-party elements for subversive activities against Marxist-Leninist Parties, they have indulged in major dissident activities among international democratic organizations."²⁹

Bourgeois sources were not slow to reflect such accusations:

"Communism may no longer have a single line or direction, but it remains highly organized, aggressively international, and more intensely competitive than ever as a result of Sino-Soviet rivalry...control over the world-wide communist movement is still vested in special

departments of the Soviet and Chinese Central Committees. Of the world's 105 Communist Parties, Moscow can count on 72, as against 21 for Peking. Twelve other Communist Parties – mostly in Western Europe – are vaguely independent...One of the most effective instruments of Communist subversion remains the front organization...Most of these...many launched by non-Communists with the best intentions and then taken over – are dominated by Soviet-line Communism."³⁰

Aspirations for world hegemony in place of proletarian internationalism were, of course, not new. The Marxist-Leninist concept of proletarian internationalism between parties had been dealt with in its practical aspects by Lenin. Discussing the "leading role" of the German Social Democratic (then-revolutionary) Party in the world socialist movement of the time, he had said:

"Due to the advantageous situation, on the one hand, and to the insular peculiarities of the English and the forcible suppression of the French movement, on the other, the German workers have for the moment been placed in the vanguard of the proletarian struggle. How long events—

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will allow them to occupy this post of honor cannot be foretold.

"...If the German workers progress in this way, they will not be marching exactly at the head of the movement – *it is not at all in the interest of this movement that the workers of any particular country should march at its head* – but they will occupy an honorable place in the battleline."³¹

One result of revisionist attitudes toward the vanguard party soon began showing up in *Communist parties in colonial, ex-colonial and neo-colonial areas*. The best example was the *Indonesian Communist Party*, the PKI.

Following the fascist coup of 1965 and the subsequent unprecedented massacre of hundreds of thousands of Communists and progressives there, the PKI undertook a thorough self-criticism and analysis of errors it had made which permitted such a situation to come about.

Made by the PKI Central Committee's Political Bureau, this self-criticism showed how Soviet revisionist influence caused serious revisionist practice among other parties which were still paying lip-service to Marxism. Significantly, much of the PKI document devoted itself specifically to the warping of the party's vanguard role:

"The Party had gradually lost its organizational vigilance and the Party leadership lost their class prejudice against the falsehood of bourgeois democracy.

"The line of liberalism in the organizational field manifested itself in the tendency to make the PKI a party with as large a membership as possible...with a loose organization...called a mass Party...the mass line of the Party can only be maintained when the prerequisites determining the Party's role as the advanced detachment are firmly upheld, when the Party members are made up of the best elements of the proletariat who are armed with Marxism-Leninism."³²

Some of the detailed errors flowing from this "liberalism" were specified, including the fact that

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"The organization of the PKI had been made so loose that practically everyone who had expressed his agreement with the program of the PKI could be accepted as a member. One could no longer clearly distinguish a Party member from a member of a mass organization led by the party."³³

The PKI analysis also revealed how violating organizational rules led the Indonesian Party leadership to engage in adventurism; to carry out a Right opportunist line; to commit "serious deviations from Marxism-Leninism," rendering the PKI

"unable to fulfill its historical mission as the vanguard of the working class and leader of the liberation struggle of the Indonesian people."³⁴

Embracing opportunism also resulted in causing the PKI to succumb, in the ideological field, to subjectivism, source of

"the serious weakness and mistakes of the part in the period after 1951."³⁵

Additionally, such errors caused the PKI to allow

"the penetration of bourgeois ideology along two channels, through *contacts with the national bourgeoisie* when the Party established a united front with them, and through the *bourgeoisification of Party cadres*, especially the leadership, after the party obtained certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions."³⁶

Even more; revisionist influence caused the PKI to approve, after 1956, the revisionist line of the Soviet leadership in its Program of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, opening thereby a channel along which Revisionism penetrated the PKI as a whole;³⁷ to make a principle of the legality of the Party;³⁸ to abandon its position as a proletarian party that had to take an independent attitude towards a bourgeois government, for the PKI "failed...to expose the bankruptcy of bourgeois democracy,"³⁹ and thereby allowed itself to be

"influenced by bourgeois ideology through cooperation so that the ideological weakness in the Party, in particular among the leadership, grew."⁴⁰

In fact, after a time,

"the Party leadership had altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie...and lost its independence in the united front with the national bourgeoisie."⁴¹

The basic practice which the PKI saw as responsible for all its other errors and their consequences was its *failure either to practice or encourage criticism and self-criticism*, thus allowing an atmosphere wherein party cadres felt

"reluctant to air their views...freely...with regard to the line pursued by the leadership which they considered incorrect...the views and feelings of these cadres did not receive any encouraging response from the...leadership."⁴²

From this study of the revisionist errors which eroded the vanguard role of their Party, the PKI Political Bureau concluded that the only way to salvage the Indonesian revolution was, first of all,

"the rebuilding of the PKI as a Marxist-Leninist Party...free from subjectivism, opportunism and modern revisionism."⁴³

Bulgaria furnished another instance where abandonment of the party's vanguard role leads. In early April, 1965, a group of highly-placed officials of the Bulgarian Communist Party tried a coup d'etat against Premier Todor Zhikov – but failed:

"The plot was so widespread that one member of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee has committed suicide, the commandant of the Sofia military garrison had been arrested, and dozens of other important civil and military officials were reported behind bars – including at least two deputy ministers and two other garrison commanders."⁴⁴

What was it all about? Allegedly, some

"of the dissidents were sick of the stodgy Stalin-like grip (Zhikov) still held on Bulgaria and they looked with envy upon the independent political and economic ways of"

neighboring Yugoslavia and Rumania...it quickly became obvious that...plotters had partisan backgrounds and Titoist hankerings."⁴⁵

Other revisionist parties, especially in Western Europe and the U.S., traveled even further into the liquidationist position.

In examining the experience of the post-World-War-I Social Democratic parties, this text has called in Lenin to testify that one subjective root of Liquidationism – the way in which revisionists tried to destroy the vanguard party of his day – was the desire of leading Social Democrats for respectability.⁴⁶ That desire was soon translated into action when the ruling bourgeoisie made of them a "TOLERATED opposition."^{*}

An excellent modern example of this "drive for respectability" has been *the British Communist Party*. And it was not ashamed of this nor the least bit coy about it: at the CPGB's national conference in late 1967, a London reporter declared that it was

"seeking a respectable image: 'People of the extreme Left who use revolutionary phrases are out of touch with reality.' The view of (George) Matthews (editor of CPGB newspaper, THE MORNING STAR – HE) and the Party is that a priority of the new 'Common Front' party once it gained power would be to see that all the men in key positions in the police, Civil Service and armed forces were people 'loyal to the socialist government'."⁴⁷

The *Italian Communist Party* has furnished another example of advanced revisionist deterioration, although others were soon catching up with it in this respect. A study in depth of a speech by its main leader, Palmiro Togliatti, elsewhere, exposes' this charge specifically.^{**}

So, Revisionists who have abandoned Marxism-Leninism *in theory* on the continuing need for a proletarian vanguard party—

* See Page 19, above. Footnote 5.

** See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XXV, passim.

evinced the following *practical* aberrations from Marxism-Leninism:

1. They lose their ties with the working people.
2. They become influenced by bourgeois ideology, with a specific yearning for respectability.
3. They become totally absorbed into the state machinery of the bourgeois democracies, becoming indistinguishable from the opportunists whom they join in high office.

4. They become incapable of criticism and self-criticism, so that errors cannot be detected, let alone ameliorated.

5. Having accepted bourgeois office, they become "Big Men," sucked into the world labor aristocracy in metropolises or into comprador elites in colonies.

The case of Yugoslavia illustrated where they were all headed. In metropolitan areas which had yet to make revolutions, this Revisionism was typified by the Italian Communist Party, while the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries began moving down the path of "transition," not – as the CPSU's Program so grandiloquently proclaimed – to "communism," but rather backward to the restoration of capitalism. Only – now it was being done in the name of "Marxism-Leninism"!

IV | REVISIONISM AND THE ATTITUDE TO CLASS STRUGGLE

Section A: In Theory

Marxist theory proclaims the primacy of class struggle between antagonistic classes as the motive power of each class society throughout history.

Lenin had been emphatic that class struggle does not end even with the triumph of socialism in one or more countries. He said:

"The class struggle waged by the proletariat...does not end with the conquest of political power by the proletariat. AFTER the conquest of power this struggle CONTINUES, but in OTHER forms."¹

Explaining that fierce suppression of the former ruling class would be needed after the revolution, Lenin warned that

"In every profound revolution, a PROLONGED, STUBBORN AND DESPERATE resistance of the exploiters, who for a number of years retain important practical advantages over the exploited, is the RULE...after their first serious defeat, the overthrown exploiters – who had not expected their overthrow, never believed it was possible, never conceded the thought of it – throw themselves with energy grown ten-fold, with passion and hatred grown a hundred fold, into the battle for the recovery of the 'paradise' of which they have been deprived."²

He had added that this "battle for recovery" was not to be lightly waved away:

"If the exploiters are defeated in one country only – and this, of course, is typical, since a simultaneous revolution in a number of countries is a rare exception – they STILL remain STRONGER than the exploited, for the international connections of the exploiters are enormous...

"Never – except in the sentimental fantasies of the sentimental fool Kautsky – will the exploiters—

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submit to the decision of the exploited majority without trying to make use of their advantages in a last desperate battle or series of battles...

"The transition from capitalism to communism represents an entire historical epoch. Until this epoch has *terminated*, the exploiters inevitably cherish the hope of restoration, and this HOPE is converted into ATTEMPTS at restoration."³

Time, in passing, has not refuted Lenin in these prognostications. Rather History has proved that the accession to power in some places of "labor," while it does cause certain changes within the dying imperialist system, does not, until the final triumph of socialism, end the epoch of imperialism as such. Nonetheless, despite Lenin's success as a revolutionist, the Modern Revisionist position on class struggle deviated in a number of ways from that of scientific socialism:

a. Against the postulate that class struggle does not die away until the era of communism is well under way, the revisionists posed their "theory" that antagonistic classes had been "abolished" inside Eastern European socialist lands.

b. Instead of recognizing the irreconcilability of antagonistic classes in all societies until capitalism is overthrown internationally, including the pressures of such class antagonisms from international imperialism against socialist countries with inevitable material reflections inside them, the Modern Revisionists talk of the "unity of the entire people."

c. In contrast to the Leninist position that no compromise on principle is possible with the bourgeoisie, Modern Revisionism speaks of "sections" of the bourgeoisie who "understand" this and that. With these, they advocate "agreements" and "negotiations," even suggesting purchase from them of social property. This stand determines the kinds of agreements or alliances sought.

For example, the CPSU Program of 1961 declared that

"The class struggle in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism was...acute."⁴

What this meant was, impliedly, quickly clarified:

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*"Socialism (in the Soviet Union) has solved a great social problem – it has abolished the exploiting classes and the causes engendering the exploitation of man by man...the onetime antithesis between town and countryside, between labor by hand and by brain, has been abolished."*⁵

From this premise, the Program went on to postulate

a) "the disappearance of class antagonisms in the fraternal family of socialist countries;"⁶ b) that "Imperialism has forever lost its power over the bulk of mankind;"⁷ and c) that "The reactionary forces in individual capitalist countries can no longer cope with the growing forces of democracy and socialism."⁸

In a few well-chosen words, totally undocumented, the CPSU Program of 1961 thus already abolished class struggle: not only within its own borders, but over most of the earth.

Nor did it fear to draw necessary conclusions, announcing that

"In the new historical situation, the working class of many countries can, even before capitalism is overthrown...By uniting the democratic and peace-loving forces...make the ruling circles cease preparations for a new world war, renounce the policy of starting local wars, and use the economy for peaceful purposes."²

Events in the cities and jungles of Vietnam, Congo, Guatemala, Venezuela and other super-exploited areas stand in stark contrast to these words.

Yet finally, the Program tossed class struggle completely out the window:

"In the conditions prevailing at present, in some capitalist countries, the working class, headed by its forward detachment, has an opportunity to unite the bulk of the nation, win state power without a civil war and achieve the transfer of the basic means of production to the people upon the basis of...agreement and political cooperation between different parties and democratic organizations."¹⁰

What a contrast to Lenin's positions, shown above! He insisted that, while imperialism lasts, the era of classlessness – which is called communism – cannot begin.

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What *practice* has resulted from these Modern Revisionist theoretical positions?

a) In Eastern European socialist countries which allegedly have "abolished" antagonistic classes, there has arisen a *new elite* of government officials, intellectuals and technocrats. Behind the screen of "class harmony," a notable *polarization* has occurred in economic and social conditions, leading to sharpening rather than waning class antagonisms. As Lenin long ago warned, the latter have in reality NOT been done away with, because outside pressure from moribund imperialism (still in existence on a majority of the earth's surface) continues to grow – as it must do until imperialism has been *completely* destroyed.

b) Out of the vision of "partial reconcilability" between opposing classes has come recommendation for an alleged "peaceful transition" to socialism – the old "parliamentary road" now "justified" by the fiction of socialism's *current* "decisiveness" internationally, interpreted in an immediate practical sense.

c) From a position postulating "sensible sections" of a brutal international ruling class, Modern Revisionist practice envisions "peaceful co-existence" and "peaceful economic competition" as a means of "winning the minds of the masses" by example, while proletarian internationalism is quietly buried or cynically murdered. Under this shield, all sorts of unprincipled secret agreements and alliances are being concocted with imperialists.

In the following pages, such practice growing out of Revisionism's theoretical aberrations will be examined in detail, using examples from life.

Section B: Revisionist Practice and Class Struggle: Rise of a New Elite

In a number of places, the phenomenon of *a new elite arising under socialism* (or under the wing of a self-proclaimed Marxist party) can be studied: 1. at its most developed, in Yugoslavia; 2. in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European socialist countries; 3. in the Western Left; and 4. in colonial areas, where failure to keep class struggle in mind brought on the most devastating consequences.

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1. The Rise of the New Elite in Yugoslavia

Under the banner of "workers' management" in factories and enterprises, sharpening class antagonisms have developed in this country.

But, if socialism means workers' ownership of social means of production, *what was wrong with expressing such ownership on an individual enterprise basis?* Not one, but all three founders of scientific socialism – Marx, Engels and Lenin – directly or implicitly inveighed against any notion of individual enterprises making decisions, once the socialist revolution had taken place:

"Theoretically speaking...slogans like 'workers' self-government' and 'factories to the workers' have never been Marxist slogans but slogans advanced by anarchist syndicalists, bourgeois socialists and old-line opportunists and revisionists.

"The theory of 'workers' self-government' and 'factories to the workers' runs counter to the fundamental Marxist theory of socialism. It was completely refuted by the classical Marxist writers long ago."¹¹

Among such refutations, the following were cited:

- *The Communist Manifesto* by Marx and Engels, in which the founders of Marxism in 1848 said:

"The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, *to centralize* all instruments of production *in the hands of the State*."¹²

- *Anti-Duhring* by Friedrich Engels, in which Marx's partner wrote:

"The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of production into *state* property."¹³

Early in the Soviet Revolution,

"...when some people advocated handing the factories over to the producers so that they could 'organize production' directly, Lenin sternly criticized this view, saying"

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that in reality *it meant opposition to the dictatorship of the proletariat.*

"He acutely pointed out

'...Any direct or indirect legalization of the possession of their own production by the workers of *individual* factories or *individual* professions or of their right to weaken or impede the decrees of the *state* power is the greatest distortion of the basic principles of Soviet power and the complete renunciation of Socialism.'"¹⁴

In a number of other writings, Lenin reiterated this position.¹⁵

Vindicating these words, and all documented from Yugoslav sources, it has been found that "workers' management" in individual enterprises in Yugoslavia did give rise to a new actual ruling class which disposes of profits, hires labor power and continues to wax fat from exploitation.

For example, one report showed that the regrowth of antagonistic classes inside socialist Yugoslavia became clearly visible after the "new economic reform" of 1961:

"the 'new economic reforms' were...conceived and undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the new bourgeoisie of the northern regions...against the firm opposition, not only the laboring masses...but also of the various rival or discontented leading groups."¹⁶

At the same time, workers' conditions deteriorated: unemployment rose and continued rising; peasants, dispossessed from their small plots, swelled the city jobless; both real and money wages fell while prices of necessities shot out of sight. Meantime, managerial emollument soared.

Yugoslav sources depicted graphically what was happening to Yugoslav working people:

"...the level of national income per capita of the population of the under-developed regions (of Yugoslavia – HE) goes continually down below the average while that of the advanced regions keeps rising...Thus, the level of the national income per capita in the Republic of Slovenia is"

over 80% above the average of the whole country, whereas in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina it is 20% lower than the average of the country."¹⁷

This was reportedly because official

"policy...favors...the various Croatian and Slovenian bourgeois groups...for instance...during the 1956-1963 eight-year period the value of buildings per capita of population in Slovenia was nearly four times as high as in Kosovo (where the oppressed national minority consists of about 1.2 million Albanians – HE) nearly twice as high as in Macedonia and nearly 100 percent higher than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1963, the value of the principal means of production in Slovenia was nearly four times as high as in Macedonia, in spite of the fact that the population is nearly the same. Industrial production per capita in Kosovo is not even one-seventh that of Slovenia."¹⁸

Even in distributing Federal "aid" funds for the "least developed regions," there was allegedly national discrimination:

"...Kosovo and Metohia, as the least developed region...receives 80 million old dinars less than if these funds were distributed on the basis of legal dispositions...Account should also be taken of the fact that the national income per capita in this region has only been 35% of the average of the country, or half as much as that of the other under-developed regions'."¹⁹

Such inequalities persisted, reflected even in the distribution of unemployment in Yugoslavia:

"The less developed regions have been the hardest hit and only a few days ago Mr Crvenkovski, the Macedonia party leader, revealed that there were now some 50,000 unemployed in the republic. He said this figure, the highest in Yugoslavia, would continue to grow unless some way is found for the more developed regions to invest capital in Macedonia. Should they still retain their 'colonial attitude' the Macedonians would have to look for funds abroad."²⁰

The economic conditions of the Yugoslav working population also deteriorated, and the new "workers' management" system in

Yugoslav enterprises was seen in some quarters as the source of these troubles. This system, introduced as a law in June 1950 by the Yugoslav Federal National Assembly, provided that "working collectives" were to manage state and joint private-state enterprises "independently," with power to decide management policy, to dispose of accumulated capital, and the right to hire and fire workers and staff members. The first law was soon supplemented by others, from the end of 1951 until at least 1968:

"Since 1954, (the Tito clique) has set up economic associations in various trades in order to strengthen (its) intervention in the economic activities of the localities, departments and enterprises. It had clamped controls on commodity prices and wages, *reducing the workers' income to increase the profits of enterprises*. The basic aim of all these measures is to get, in the form of taxes and interest, the lion's share of the profits of enterprises into the hands of the state controlled by the Tito clique."²¹

The following economic conditions among Yugoslav workers resulted:²²

Unemployment: Official statistics of year-by-year unemployment showed that, from 81,600 in 1953, the number of Yugoslav jobless had risen to 339,000 by February 1963 and that it continued increasing thereafter. For example, a Yugoslav paper reported that in January of 1964 the Republic of Serbia alone had 130,000 people out of work, more than 40% of them under the age of 25.²³

By 1964, Yugoslav unemployment had risen 3 ½ times since 1955, without counting hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavs forced to migrate to Western Europe for work: 70,000 Yugoslavs went to West Germany alone; Yugoslav authorities themselves acknowledged 180,000 of their citizens in all Western European countries, including Sweden and France.²⁴ Western sources put this figure at 250,000.^{24a}

Later, the following figures appeared in London:

"According to recent statistics there are now 260,000 unemployed registered with the labour offices, not including—

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60,000 university graduates for whom there are no prospects of immediate jobs. Nor does it include the unskilled peasant labour force which, having found temporary employment in the towns, the Government is anxious to reemploy in rural districts. The peasants seem reluctant to go back...

"The figure of Yugoslavs working in western Europe continues to rise and there must, by now, be at least 300,000 Yugoslav immigrants at work in France, Austria, and in west Germany."²⁵

In fact, said one source,

"during the period 1960-62 the number of workers discharged (in Yugoslavia) exceeded the number of unemployed."²⁶

Such Yugoslav conditions brought to mind remarks by Karl Marx:

"The condemnation of one part of the working-class to enforced idleness by the over-work of the other part, and the converse, becomes a *means of enriching the the individual capitalists*, and accelerates at the same time the production of the industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding to the advance of social accumulation."²⁷

Wages: By official admission, an average monthly wage of 20,000 dinars was the minimum subsistence allowance in Yugoslavia, though on this amount, also admittedly, "it is quite difficult for people to get along."

By this criterion, consider the following facts: Between January and November 1962, 20.9% of Yugoslav workers had incomes averaging below 15,000 dinars, while another 25.1% made between 15,000 and 20,000.²⁸ That is, 46% of Yugoslav workers during most of 1962 by Yugoslavia's own standards made insufficient wages for minimum subsistence. This is a condition usually found in colonies.

Real wages, too, continued declining:

EXPENSES: a) *Rent* absorbed from one-third to one-half of monthly wages.³⁰ b) *Food prices* soared: comparing "average"

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prices of retail commodities between 1959 and 1963," the average increase was 28%. Farm produce prices rose 62% and cost of living, 39%. In December, 1963, retail commodity prices were 6% higher than in the corresponding period of 1962; farm produce increased in price 16%.³¹ Price increases in this period allegedly covered food, clothing, knitwear, furniture, building materials and other items.³² Furthermore, price fluctuations were not confined to the time element, differences also existing geographically, even between different shops in a single city. Hoarding was blamed for "acute shortages in building materials" with a corresponding rise of construction prices; for example, timber prices went up 2 - 2 ½ times.³³ The Mirna fishing enterprise in Rovinja dumped 12,000 kilograms of fish into the sea "to keep prices up."³⁴

CONDITIONS: Increasing *working hours*, sometimes, if transport were included from place of habitation, to as much as 15 per day, were causing "most of those between 30 and 50 years old" in certain enterprises to become "worn out and unfit for work." 80% of people working in one famous Belgrade enterprise were said to travel in from the countryside each day.³⁵ Moreover, "in one famous textile mill...in practice a worker usually cannot work for more than ten years." *Labor safety* and workers' *health* were said to have deteriorated noticeably: "accidents have reached alarming proportions."³⁶ Finally, "*the percentage of industrial accidents in Yugoslavia is the highest in the world.*"³⁷

Nor was economic polarization in Yugoslavia confined to urban areas. *Income differences* showed up vividly in the countryside as well. For example, 80% of arable land was the private

property of the small and big landowners, while the rest, "bearing the label of 'cooperatives,' were capitalist farms in the hands of Titoite capitalist groups."³⁸

In sum,

"A new group of exploiters has appeared in Yugoslav enterprises...Capitalist relations of exploiter and exploited have reappeared as between the managerial stratum and-

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the workers in the enterprises of Yugoslavia where 'workers' self-government' has been introduced...

"The only difference between them and private capitalists is: they are the representatives of the Tito regime and while they enjoy the rights of capitalists they don't have to run a risk, which capitalists do, of going bankrupt. As a result, these people are even more adventurous; in competition they are even more hell-bent on strangling their opponents and they are insatiate in grabbing by various means the fruits of the workers' labor."³⁹

This "new group of exploiters," the managers and senior staff of enterprises in Yugoslavia under "workers' self-government," began to enjoy high personal incomes.⁴⁰ For example,

"...in 1958, the Central Committee of the LCY admitted that 'material privileges have greatly increased' for a very small number of people in the enterprises...and that 'in some enterprises, the total amount of awards received by a certain group of leading personnel equals the total wage fund of the entire collective'.

"...The Yugoslav press has revealed that 'the managers are among the few thousand Yugoslavs with the highest living standards'...(that they) 'while away their time in bars and coffee houses,' 'buy jewels for their paramours,' and 'use the money they get from corruption to buy houses, cars, expensive furniture and sometimes even land'."⁴¹

Nor was this all:

"...to this are added the special allowances, funds, traveling expenses and 'gifts' they receive by virtue of their privileged position...*A considerable part of the surplus value created by the workers thus falls into the hands of this managerial stratum.*"⁴²

Just how large a portion?

"A survey of 50% of the industrial establishments in Zagreb, for example, reveals that the Tito group took away 79.5% *of the net output value* of these enterprises in the first half of 1963 in taxes and interest."⁴³

The private expropriation of unearned surplus value by any-

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group in any society is, Marx showed, exploitation, which socialism is designed to end. As history has demonstrated, and as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin taught in their writings, *the institution of exploitation automatically evokes class struggle*.

Reports have been made which illustrate that, if the rise in the number of strikes by Yugoslav workers were any criterion, precisely this has come about in Yugoslavia:

"In less than seven years there have been 1, 365 of them, mainly over low wages or against incompetent management and dismissals, a figure which suggests that whatever legal form may be found in the end strikes have come to stay...

"This, however, is not so simple under a system of communist self-management, for would not the workers be striking against themselves? The workers do not seem to think so. Most of their action has been directed against the decisions of managerial boards or against the principle of pay according to work performed."⁴⁴

There may be a good reason for such a development, if it is, indeed true that in

"Yugoslav enterprises...the *managers have sole control*. Concerned only with their private special interests, these people have turned into exploiters and oppressors."⁴⁵

The following Yugoslav authorities were summoned to support this statement:⁴⁶

UDB (Security) Chief Rankovich; Secretary of the Belgrade City Committee of the LCY Drulovic; and even Tito himself.

How did all this come about? One answer was that

"This privileged social position of the managerial stratum is not a mere 'negative phenomenon' which, as the Tito clique has said, has accidentally cropped up in Yugoslavia; it is an inevitable product of the degeneration of the Yugoslav economy...into a capitalist economy."⁴⁷

The resulting *political condition of Yugoslavia's workers* in such circumstances was described as follows:

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"The Tito clique claims that following the introduction of 'workers' self-government,' enterprises are now directed by workers' councils and workers' management boards, that the workers have become their 'real masters' while the managers have to carry out the resolutions of the workers' councils.

"The facts are, of course, quite different, In those enterprises under 'workers' self-government,' the 'real masters' are none other than the managers representing the Tito clique while the workers' councils and management boards are just for show."⁴⁸

An influential conservative American newspaper corroborated this summation:

"It should not be supposed that workers' councils really run the Yugoslav factories; that is done by state-appointed managers though with the advice from the councils and with the participation by these groups in *some* decisions...On the whole it may be questioned whether the influence of the workers' council is any greater than that of an employee representative on a West German board of directors or of a union business agent with whom an American employer has to bargain."⁴⁹

The American source listed as follows the legal rights of a manager in Yugoslav enterprises:

- a) He could "withhold implementation of any resolution adopted by a workers' council."
- b) If local government vetoed a decision by a workers' council to remove the manager, then there was a re-election of the workers' council.
- c) As in the case with managers in all capitalist countries, a Yugoslav manager of enterprises could punish and discharge workers at will, up to and including LCY secretaries and members of the workers' council in his enterprise who did not go along with him.⁵⁰

So much for the "abolition of classes" in Yugoslavia.

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2. *The New Elite in the Soviet Union*

It was not long before similar reforms, later admitted to have been modeled on the Yugoslav example, began appearing in the USSR. Typical was this:

"Anyone who proceeds not from a subjective standpoint, but from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, must admit that Yugoslavia is a socialist country, and that, moreover, the positions of socialism are going from strength to strength in Yugoslavia."⁵¹

Capitalist sources were not slow to speculate about increased power for individual Soviet enterprises:

"It is a tricky reform, admittedly, for in according factory managers greater autonomy and calling upon them to adjust their production to market demands it is essential to revise certain principles of the centralized economy by which prices, movement of manpower and investment policy are completely planned. Further, this reform implicitly questions the power of the political machine, which would no longer be able to control the economic mechanism, as directly as at present."⁵³

In plain English, the "political machine" – i.e., the Soviet Communist Party, was shedding a large and basic portion of its vanguard role: "economics" began being placed above "politics" to satisfy consumer demand for the new elite, composed of technicians.

Now, too, Soviet sources began confirming such commentaries:

"...the scale of the reform is becoming immeasurably larger..."⁵⁴

And the results for Russian workers?

"...the Party's Central Committee has decided to continue Kosygin's policy, and more than 647 enterprises in Russia are already experimenting with the new system. To put an end to possible objections from the dissatisfied, the Central Committee specified in its resolution of 22 December last (1966 – HE) that the economy calls for the *undivided authority of management*, and—

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that the *workers must show their conscientiousness by carrying out without faltering the orders and instructions given to them*. There is even a hint of threat in the resolution, because it says that the *legal authorities* will be responsible 'for exposing the causes of social conflict and abolishing them'."⁵⁵

This report was specifically confirmed by Soviet sources: one such referred to 673;⁵⁶ another, to 704 enterprises where "economic reform...is being carried out in the Soviet Union," according to PRAVDA itself.⁵⁷ These enterprises, the USSR source added, employed over two million workers.

The capitalist reporter commented drily:

"Some see in the Kosygin line very clear signs of...the 'new class', anxious first of all to satisfy its own sophisticated tastes. All the indications corroborate this charge, including the purchase of the Fiat car factory and the deal with Renault, which are evidence of a real

consumer-goods race for those who have feathered their nests: for the ordinary Russian workers cannot yet aspire to a car which still costs at least £1,400."^{57a*}

What *kind of wages* are implied in the last remark?

According to one non-socialist source, in mid-1965 the *money wage* of the Russian worker was about 63c an hour, placing him on an international scale just after Israel but ahead of Argentina. However, this source confessed:

"Meaningful comparisons are difficult because statistics on pay scales do not take into account the variable purchasing power of wages. Moreover in computing wages, some nations figure in fringe benefits, while other do not."⁵⁸

That the Russian government does not was suggested by a Soviet item where "the average monthly cash wages of factory and office workers" were given as 95.6 roubles in 1965 and 99.0 in 1966, with the added information that

* See Appendix I for an apologia anent the growth of the car industry in the USSR.

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"Taking into account the various payments and bonuses, from the social funds (free medical services, education, pension, etc.) this growth was from 129 to 133 roubles per month."⁵⁹

From this information, calculation shows that about 35% of Russian workers' real wages were actually received in the form of fringe benefits. This would make the above figure for Russian hourly rates 97c per hour rather than 63c, placing the Russian seventh on a world scale where the U.S. still stands first; Canada, Sweden, Britain, Australia and West Germany following in that order.

That is, in *real wages* in 1966, Russian workers enjoyed an actual standard of living higher than that of French or Italian workers but just below that of West Germans. And this still undoubtedly did not include the extremely low rents and practically free utilities received by Russian workers, not to mention variations in purchasing power.

In 1966, *national income* in the USSR reportedly rose by 7 ½%; *profits*, by 16%; and *real per capita incomes* by 6%.⁶⁰ (However, the 1965-66 increase above, from 129 to 133 roubles, cited by a Soviet source, showed not a 6% but a 35% real wage rise for Russia's factory and office workers. This suggests that the larger figure, a full half of the national rise, was accounted for – as in all national statistics – by increases for "others" than workers.) In the same period, *industrial output* rose 8.6% (against a Plan figure of 6.7%).⁶¹

A Soviet source declared that,

"The enterprises which switched over to the new system...increased the sale of products by over 10%, profits by approximately 25%, and labor productivity by 8%."⁶²

So, the biggest increase came in profits, now to be divided between the state and the individual enterprise. Significantly,

"Practice has shown that the new system is effective where...they encourage the workers to make the biggest contribution to the general success of the enterprise.

"The targets of enterprises must be both exacting and, at

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the same time, quite realistic, so that the increase in average wage is accompanied by a still more rapid increase in productivity."⁶³

Only a net increase in productivity can of course invoke rising profits.

A view from Hong Kong charged that Russian workers in the post-Kruschov era were again being exploited:

"'Bonus system' is being widely introduced in the Soviet enterprises where the 'new system' of running the enterprise...has been adopted...

"The Soviet revisionist...in 1965 'Regulations on State Production Enterprises'...invests the enterprise leadership with exclusive powers to decide the bonus scales of their own enterprises...For example, they stipulate that the amount of a bonus is proportional to the wage level. This means that...higher salaries get larger bonuses. In certain cases, a leading member of an enterprise gets 150 times more bonus...than an ordinary worker...In some enterprises...as much as 60 per cent of the total bonus reserve, while...the bonuses secured by the leading personnel of a glass factory in a quarter of a year were 47.2 per cent higher than their...earnings while the workers did not get a penny."⁶⁴

It is, in the face of such evidence, not surprising to learn that class struggle inside the USSR was beginning to take visible shape:

"...Russia's...trials for 'economic crimes'...during 1962-64 sent at least 163 persons to the firing squads...Last week another...nine...(were) charged with a nationwide operation that lifted cloth (and) sold (resulting) garments...at black-market prices."⁶⁵

The official "reply" against calling such occurrences "evidences of class struggle" has been that "a few people are not a class." No, but they certainly represent one! Evidence for this view has become abundant.

For example, testimony appeared in London by 1962. An American whose books had been translated into Russian was seeking a story. He knew the language well enough not to need—

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interpreters and was acquainted with certain aspects of "non-strategic" atomic research deeply enough to qualify for a real job. From 1957 onwards, he commuted between the USA and USSR.

His account of his experiences there clearly defined a) the composition of the new elite; and b) its rise to international respectability. As a foreign worker in a cosmic ray laboratory, he commented:

"The people I knew were of the same strata as I know in the West: writers, scientists, theater people...The guests with whom I played billiards, went swimming, and took long grave walks, were chemists, physicists, biologists, surgeons and historians...The total cost for a large room and three meals was about two guineas a day, yet the guests were among the highest paid in the country. It must be pointed out that such a place is for those men who do not *as yet* have their own private country places. ...What eventually dawned on me was that Soviet formality among the richer and more intellectual classes was simply the European formality of an earlier part of the century. *Millions of aristocrats and wealthy members of the middle class* may have emigrated during and after the Revolution, but many more millions remained behind. After decades of vicissitudes, they *and their children have re-emerged now that their background is no longer held against them*. Today they can be found in the arts, sciences and humanities. It is very possible that *their manner* has persisted and *sets the standard*."66

Evidences of the new elite's growing respectability were also included in this report:

"(At) Lusine, some 40 miles from Moscow...I saw the oldest Academy of Science DACHA community – about 40 very comfortable houses with lawns, garages, a community tennis court, set apart from the surroundings by a tall wooden fence and a grove of trees...the atmosphere is a combination of scholarly decorum and shirt-sleeved relaxation...The children...playing around on the lawns had the indefinable upper-class appearance..."

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of their opposite numbers in Greenwich, Connecticut...the community is outwardly staid and conservative and inwardly strained by the social revalries that plague any ingrown wealthy summer colony anywhere in the world."67

Another report described private meetings between French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville and Soviet authorities at Pitsunda. Although these meetings were described as

"uneventful," it was interesting that "a handful of Western newsmen" had been *asked* to "the vacation hideaway of the men who rule the Kremlin." One of the invitees described what he saw:

"Pitsunda...is the playground of the Soviet power elite...after a five-minute drive through a grove of pine trees allegedly dating back to the ice age, there stand the three main dachas or vacation houses – one for Premier Kosygin, one for Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev, and one for President Anastas Mikoyan...Even the trees, each with a little metal tag, are carefully numbered...Between the Kosygin and Brezhnev dachas is the social hub of the compound – an immense glass-walled swimming pool of heated sea water...for Soviet chiefs...relaxing around the swimming pool, boating, watching television or seeing first-run movies on home projector sets...a bit of angling...occasionally (a) picnic on the pebbly beach..."⁶⁸

Was this just slander by a capitalist mouthpiece? Or was it significant that the "handful of Western newsmen" had been *invited*? What they saw and reported was the new respectability of Soviet rulers who thus began gradually to express their own rising position as a "TOLERATED opposition" on a world scale.

There was evidence that this layer of the privileged in Soviet society was growing. For instance, someone going to Siberia for various major economic projects there

"...Today...live(s) well by Soviet standards...on income of about 250 roubles a month, almost twice what he could earn in European Russia...rows of shops line the main street, most residents have a TV set, and many are saving for an automobile. 'People in Siberia like money,' one resident said."⁶⁹

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Still further evidence on the rise of a Soviet elite was furnished by a pro-Soviet writer.⁷⁰ Based on a personal visit to the USSR, he reported that "Russians stress abundance." He discussed the charge that a new Soviet elite had been forming, and implied that it was not, founding his conclusion on two factors: rising wages among lower-paid Russian workers; and an alleged wages gap of only 3-to-1 between higher- and lower-paid *workers*. He included as counter-testimony the fact that housing was still in such short supply that many higher-paid workers had to occupy premises "no different than those of an ordinary workman."

Other evidence he himself presented also suggested a conclusion contrary to his own:

1. *The lack of revolutionary enthusiasm:*

"It might even be disillusioning that the same kind of heady enthusiasm is not displayed in Moscow for a 50th anniversary that is to be seen in Havana for an eighth."⁷¹

2. The types and categories of people who would *not* be taking part in such "enthusiasm" as there might have been for a 50th anniversary:

"One would probably be the young hooligan beeing tried in a Moscow court (for assault, while inebriated, on a person in authority) and...the inmates of a Colony for Youth Delinquents...about 40 miles from Moscow. Or the 100 or more young men...in training for the Orthodox Church priesthood in...Zagorsk. Or those families of Stalin-era victims who refuse to forget. There are probably others."⁷²

3. The general *complacency* he witnesses *among the people he spoke to*:

"In general, my impressions were of a prevailing contentment *among the vast majority of people*...I was impressed by the enormous calm and confidence of both government and people, based on obvious feelings of strength, of stability, and security."⁷³

One is struck first of all with the easy reference to "the vast majority of people." Clearly, no single outside reporter could—

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contact "the vast majority of people" in the USSR even if he lived there all his life – or anywhere else for that matter. His remark could apply only to "the vast majority" of those to whom he spoke, whose class was not defined. He also had to depend for his conclusions on what these particular people told him – and by his own description, a portion of them were "government."

4. *The relative abundance of consumer goods*:

"Few Russians will turn now to look at Western styles of clothing worn by tourists; they have their own houses of fashion...a *black market*...for Western...appliances and other commodities *has been drying up*: one can get them equally good, sometimes better, in Soviet stores...the *only violent arguments I saw were in queues for items in short supply*, as compared with the friendly atmosphere in stores where commodities were abundant."⁷⁴

Was this the New Socialist Man, clawing his New Socialist neighbor in the start of the same old capitalist consumerism rat race?

5. The fact that certain jobs appeal more to youngsters than others in precisely the fields from which the new elite was being created:

"To most Soviet youth the glamor jobs, the prized professions, are those connected with science and engineering...The ideal communist, as far as these youth are concerned, is not the party functionary but a man such as the physicist Lavrentiev, who built Science City near Novosibirsk, prototype for other science cities under construction in Siberia."⁷⁵

Already, the new elite was setting up its own image as the "ideal."

6. The relatively great size of the new elite:

"Soviet figures list more than 37 million as intellectuals, professionals and highly skilled workers. In the whole classification of office and factory workers there are only 77 million. If nearly half of these are to be called an elite, it is certainly a mass elite."⁷⁶

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What! Intellectuals and professionals listed as "office or factory workers"? This claim very much depended on the Soviet definition of categories specified. But in any event, the 37 million should be measured not against a partial category, but against total Soviet population. If this is done, the elite would be revealed as not so "mass" as the one in the USA by quite a lot! Furthermore, citing a "mass elite" does not wipe out the fact that it is an elite. It seems obvious that in a country with the slogan "overtake and surpass the USA," anything less than a large elite could not fill the bill. Nor do we know what portion of this large "average" or "statistic" was contributing most to the weighting of figures cited.

All the above combined to create a human context in which

"Kosygin...decided to give priority to the claim of the most advanced elements in Soviet society, that is to say to the industrial cadres, the technicians, the scientists – all those who, due to their social position and skills, are most able to develop the country's productive power."⁷⁷

Nonetheless, these "new reforms" were not being accepted without "political fears of the consequences"...fears that have proved to be not without foundation:

"Throughout the last year (1966 – HE) the Soviet press has been drawing attention to, by refuting them, the arguments of some idealists who assert: 'For 50 years we have been inculcating unselfishness, and contempt for money and cash dealings. And here is someone devising the kind of thing in which "I value you if you bring me profit"...it is regrettable that profit and other material incentives are regulating (sic) moral claims to the background.' Others who protested claimed that the considerable extension of the rights of the heads of state enterprise ought to be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the workers' powers."⁷⁸

In sum, though not perhaps as far advanced in 1967 as in Yugoslavia, the clear outlines of a rising new elite in the Soviet Union following Krushov's palace coup had, by that date, become visible. Time since then has not changed the picture, other than filling in some details.

3. *The New Elite in other Eastern European countries*

In these countries a number of changes had been documented:

"From the Baltic to the Black Sea, reforms – in various degrees and diverging directions – are rippling through all Eastern European countries. If the reforms succeed, they will not only break the glacial grip of Stalinist 'command economics' but reshape the societies and political structures of the Continent's entire Communist world."⁷⁹

Yugoslavia, this writer reported, "broke with the Kremlin" in 1948. Next came Poland, where in 1956

"'bread and freedom' riots in Poznan triggered reforms that – on paper, at least – far outdistanced Yugoslavia's."⁸⁰

After that, "Moscow – in the voice of Evser Liberman," began talking of "incentives" and "profit motives," thereby giving

"a green light to the East bloc that soon set Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia to thinking about reform...Out of earshot of the West...Quite independently of one another, the prophets of profit began coming to the same conclusions: rigid Stalinist-style *central planning must cease*."⁸¹

The case of Czechoslovakia, reported in detail, was typical: Under

"Stalinist-minded Czech central planners (called 'oxen' by many Czechs),...By 1963, *Czech economic growth*, which had been booming at 8% in 1949, *had skidded to nothing* – indeed, it actually was in decline, *an unheard-of event in a planned economy*."⁸²

To meet this situation, Czech "economists" instituted a "reform program" which

"In its sweep and good sense...transcends any other reform plan in Eastern Europe."⁸³

"Architect" of this "reform" was Professor Ota Sik, 47, under whose plan

"*the manager will make his own decision* on how much he wishes to reinvest for future development and how much he wishes to pay out to his employees in bonuses.

"The impact on Czech workers will be great...they will share in the profits...and, if their enterprise is highly successful, may receive incentive bonuses up to 20% of their total

wages. On the other hand, Sik's plan guarantees only 92% of the state-set wage, and if their plant grows inefficient the workers will suffer pay setbacks."⁸⁴

Differences in income have, of course, never been "contrary to socialism". In the USSR and other Eastern European socialist countries, the type of "egalitarianism" found in Czechoslovakia did not occur. The background of this condition was explained to the writer by a Czech professor working in Ghana: the Czech trade unions until the advent of these "reforms" had always refused to permit any appreciable wage gap between their own pay levels and those of intellectuals. As a result, workers had no incentive to enter the intelligentsia. They did better for themselves, monetarily speaking, by sticking to their trades. This made it impossible to "proletarianize" the Czech intelligentsia. It also made intellectual pursuits virtually hereditary: one became a scientist, musician, etc., because it was the family tradition.

In any case, past practice was all being changed:

"'Now,' says Sik, 'we encourage people to grow rich'."⁸⁵

Small wonder that this reporter ended his story by noting with satisfaction:

"All that will be left of the Communist system is state ownership of property. The problems and the motives of the entire economy will be enterprising and free."⁸⁶

First-hand observation of some of these Eastern European developments reached the writer in a personal letter from a young man who, in the Fall of 1966, traveled in Hungary and the GDR:

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"I do have one thought on the material base of alienation in socialist Europe, and thus the receptivity to chauvinism...very apparent to us in our trip was the weakness of the currencies and the dissatisfaction felt about the lack of Western frills and diversities (consumer goods, etc.) in Eastern Europe. Their solution was to impose the industrial discipline (based on incentives) that is necessary to produce the quantity and quality goods that would be competitive in the Western market. Surgical instruments from Hungary are produced via incentives and have a world-wide reputation for high quality.

"The question is, what does that do to a worker at the point of production, where alienation originates? Does his labor and creativity become meaningful to him? Or does its disappearance into the 'world market' represent the same self-abnegation as faced by capitalist workers? Can this be explained away by good revolutionary cadres? I don't know if it CAN be, but I do know it is NOT being explained."⁸⁷

4. *The Western Left*

All this erosion of Marxist principles in countries where socialism had gained power had its effect on the Western Left. Surrounded as it was by the benefits of far-flung colonial empires, it needed little pushing to go over the brink into Revisionism.

In this sector of the world Left, the Italian Communist Party embodied the most advanced forms of Revisionism, although an extended study of the American Party would also yield interesting results.

The Sino-Soviet split first came to Western public notice, according to an English report, at the 10th Congress of the Italian Communist Party. This report opened with a description of the Italian party and its liberalism:

"...the Italian CP...is a sort of Church of England – national, independent and non-conformist. I found displayed at the Congress the works of Trotsky, side by side with translations of Soviet hagiography as well as recent works from Britain and the U.S. Newspapers of every political complexion were on sale, too."⁸⁸

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The reporter was interested in the effect of the now-evident Sino-Soviet differences on the Western parties themselves. He guessed the main problem was

"that nobody in the communist world knows exactly where Kruschov is going...Can it be that he has settled for a gradual de-politicalization of Russia, which would become in time a sort of affluent society, closer to America than to his original Marxist-Leninist model?"⁸⁹

The writer added that

"The Italian CP has very similar tendencies..."⁹⁰

and, as 1963 rolled in, this Englishman saw "no danger of a split" there.⁹¹

Another source reported:

"The Italian Communist Party has over 1,700,000 members and is not in crisis. In the April 1963 elections, it polled eight million votes, a gain of a million, which meant that one in four electors voted Communist. Subsequent local and regional elections have shown that the Communists maintain their strength."⁹²

(The Indonesian example in the previous chapter suggests danger rather than "strength" in huge membership.)

Nonetheless, during 1963-65, the Italian Communists had a Party which seemed to be bringing into being that famous old Social Democratic "refutation" of class struggle – or, to put it more politely, a "new form" of class struggle – by "reasoning with sensible bourgeois representatives."

Small wonder! Developments in Italy at the time explained this increasingly conservative appearance of Party members (noted below).^{*} For, the Italian government had pulled its big businessmen out of the doldrums of the 1950s by "a classic example of belt-tightening."⁹³ And the various specific measures adopted had had their effect:

"In 1964, (Italian) imports fell by 5 per cent and exports↯

^{*} See Footnote 97.

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soared 17.6 per cent, and the foundation for genuine domestic prosperity was laid."⁹⁴

This "prosperity" was reflected in Italian realities:

"Car sales are up 10 per cent and bicycle sales 30 per cent; in June, Italy became a steel exporter for the first time in its history. Even tourism...is expected to rise 20 per cent this year...The country's mood is one of cautious satisfaction. 'I haven't noticed any great recovery,' says Mario Briganti, a Roman stonemason who was out of work for five months in 1965. 'But I'm working now and I've got my Fiat back again. That's enough for me.'"⁹⁵

This picture reflected not the "shining example" of "socialist abundance," but another, with which readers of this writer's first book should be familiar.*

In February 1966, more than three years after the 10th Congress, the Italian Communist Party held another. As before, it took to trimming its political line

"to the increasingly prosperous and conservative Italian working classes. Communist Party membership has wilted from its post-war peak of 2,145,317 to 1,615,296 and the slippage among youth groups (off 60%) and in the factories has been even more drastic..."⁹⁶

A description of the physical surroundings was comment enough:

"Could this really be a congress of Italy's Communist Party? There sat 1, 200 delegates, bourgeois and beaming, as their leader talked tolerantly of compromise with the capitalists and collaboration with the Catholics...what hook-nosed Secretary-General Luigi Longo, 65, was promoting was something that he styled 'the Italian road to socialism'."⁹⁷

This, mind you, at a time when the same Italian "Communist leader" was quoted as underlining

"the continuing rise in prices, the dismissals and shorttime-

* See *Labor Aristocracy*.

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working, the problems to be tackled in *reforming* the country's social and economic structure."

So, both the Left and definitely pro-Soviet Ghanaian SPARK (above) and the most rabid Big Business mouthpiece in imperialist U.S. agreed on the "turn" taken by the Italian Communist Party. This has been *typical* of the *Western Left*.

There, in general, ideological illusions about class struggle have always tagged after the closing of wage- and other economic gaps between Europe and America; and have been transmitted like a disease to Eastern Europeans who called themselves "theoreticians of socialism." For example, an Eastern European discussion on the rise of the urban petty bourgeoisie in the West as industry automated arrived at the following conclusions:

"...as time goes on, the petty-bourgeoisie comes more and more under the sobering influence of the proletarian outlook, which tends gradually to give predominance to the 'labor element' in his thinking...As the proletarian outlook penetrates into the petty-bourgeois environment...noteworthy changes can be discerned in the views current in it...a growing gravitation towards the scientific proletarian outlook, and...a striving to adapt it to the class interests of the petty-bourgeoisie...these sections are becoming increasingly receptive to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism...The progressive, and even revolutionary, role of the petty-bourgeoisie, of all the middle strata, has greatly grown in the present-day world."²²

This beatific assessment of the "proletarian evolution" of "all the middle strata" in contemporary society was however, in exact opposition to what Lenin had said of them in his day: discussing the basis whereby to determine in which direction a class was traveling, he had said:

"Marxism judges 'interests' by the class antagonisms and the class struggles which manifest themselves in millions of facts of everyday life. The petty-bourgeoisie dreams and prattles of the blunting of antagonisms and 'argues' that their sharpening leads to harmful consequences'.

Elsewhere, he had emphatically noted:

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"...in every capitalist country, side by side with the proletariat, there are always broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie, small masters. Capitalism arose and is constantly arising out of small production...These new small producers are just as inevitably being cast into the ranks of the proletariat. It is quite natural that the petty-bourgeois world conception should again and again crop up in the ranks of the broad workers' parties...it will always be so *right up to the periphery of the proletarian revolution...*"¹⁰¹

That is, the petty bourgeoisie influences the proletariat (NOT vice versa), who must struggle against such influence. It is Lenin's version, not that of current muddle-headed Eastern Europeans, which has been borne out by life.

In sum, throughout the world, whether in Yugoslavia (the prototype), or in Eastern European socialism, all Modern Revisionists *in power* put their version of the "abolition of class struggle" into operation first of all by re-introducing exploitation in various forms, thus creating a new economic base for old-type class struggle.

In the Western Left, where socialism has yet to achieve power, the same "theory" has been expressed in urging class collaboration as the "peaceful" or "electoral road to socialism;" and in supporting alleged "sensible sections" of "their own bourgeoisie."

But precisely at this point began erosion of revolution, and revolutionary gains began to be destroyed.

Section C: The "Peaceful Road to Socialism"

No socialist revolution thus far has succeeded without violence. However, because an event has never before occurred it does not follow automatically and *ipso facto* that it cannot occur. What must be considered by those wanting to be scientific about it is whether or not material conditions, which hitherto prevented the event, are still extant.

Soviet pronouncements have claimed that material conditions in the world are altered. The postulated changes summed up to a claim that those material conditions on which Lenin based his

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conclusions were now "different:" NOW "intelligent sections" of imperialism's ruling classes knew they were licked, so NOW they would bow to the electorally-expressed "will of the majority." Inside socialist countries, class differences – including those between town and country, between mental and physical labor, and between "fraternal countries" in the family of nations – had been abolished."

Based on these pronunciamientos, which were published in official documents like that of the 1961 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a number of Western and other Communist Parties could – as they did after 1961 – set out to achieve the promised miracle.

But conjuring depends on sustaining illusion.

This text has already shown that Yugoslavia, at least, created a NEW set of antagonisms among classes in an incipient socialist society in the form of a rising new elite, operating as capitalist exploiters through the state apparatus. What was not shown, however, was how this elite had been assisted into its posts of power by its international "friends," chief among whom was Uncle Sam.

1. *How Imperialism Aided the Rise of the New "Marxist" Elite*

The subject of Western "aid" for socialist countries has been the cause of a lot of writing:

"The Tito clique first caught the eye of U.S. imperialism...after it helped...to strangle the people's revolution in Greece in 1949. U.S. imperialism then began to buy it over...Up to January 1963, the Tito clique had received 'aid' from the imperialist countries headed by the United States to the tune of \$5, 460 million, of which \$3, 500 million, or more than 60 per cent, was U.S. ...

"...Minus the more than \$400 million given it before 1948, U.S. economic 'aid' to the Tito clique between 1949 and January 1963 amounted to more than \$2,000 million. This breaks down as follows:

"...between 1958 and the beginning of 1963...over \$1,000 million, averaging about \$200 million per year.

"With the...modern revisionist Program of the League of Nations...

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Communists of Yugoslavia in 1958, the growth of...U.S. imperialist reward to the Tito clique greatly increased."¹⁰²

Highly class conscious organs of U.S. Big Business recorded the same phenomenon in their columns for international consumption:

"In exchange for the loans, Yugoslavia is to soften its Communist economic ways. It will establish a system of tariffs and somewhat more liberal foreign trade systems...probably...early in 1961...

"...Now, officials here (in Washington, D.C. – HE) say (Yugoslav) trade will show a number of free enterprise aspects...Yugoslavia's prices will become adjusted to international levels...

"U.S. diplomats and their colleagues from other nations think the new economic agreement may tie Yugoslavia to Western Europe, gradually wean the nation away from Communism, and remove it from Moscow's potential domination once and for all...

"The West's long-range ambition for Yugoslavia corresponds with that for Spain in mid-1959...At that time, (after)...large credits...Spain...opened the country to more investment and Western trade, and generally agreed to allow more Western influence into that authoritarian land."¹⁰³

Some imperialist spokesmen made even less bones about what U.S. monopoly was up to, not only in Yugoslavia:

"I know you realize that everything America does (or doesn't do) in foreign aid is going to interfere in somebody's internal affairs. So, I trust you will tie a chain on every dime and yank hard if it isn't spent in the clearly-defined interests of the United States."¹⁰⁴

So, the alleged "peaceful road to socialism" turned out, in reality, to be the "peaceful erosion of socialism," pioneered by Yugoslavia but soon guided by the Soviet Communist Party leadership, consciously following in Tito's footsteps.

In countries where the proletariat had not yet come to power, such revisionist developments in lands where power had been—

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seized produced a most debilitating political effect, especially among Western Communist Parties.

Surely, *Greece* was a place where – if ever in the West – supreme tests were made on more than one occasion of the alleged ability of "popular unity" to roll back Fascism without armed struggle. In its actions, the Greek Left was merely following a Program formulated for it elsewhere.¹⁰⁵

Greek radicals were able, over and over, to mobilize virtually the entire population to delay the Fascist tide. But these efforts were aimed mainly at electoral objectives until – with the Greek radicals unprepared for a coup carried out *before* elections – "Greek democracy" was overwhelmed by a neo-fascist military coup master-minded and financed by the CIA and the Pentagon.

As we have seen, the *Italian Communist Party*, ignoring many sobering examples elsewhere, continued to gaze blissfully at its eight million votes.

But perhaps the "parliamentary outlook" had most thoroughly infected the Scandinavians.

Thus spoke the *Swedish Communists*:

"The pessimism of the Chinese proposals...on the question of averting nuclear war...blind to the question of peaceful competition and the possibility of some countries, including Sweden, advancing toward socialism without civil war, is...incomprehensible and unacceptable to us Swedish Communists...the idea of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition...will equip (us) with arguments in its favor and in favor of creating the conditions for social revolution without civil war. These ideas are in tune with the needs of the day." ¹⁰⁶

Even more jolting was a discussion of their own Party's program by the *Norwegian Communists*:

"The parliamentary way to socialism has nothing in common with the reformist concept and practice of parliamentarism. This is not a bourgeois parliamentarism, but *a new, revolutionary parliamentarism*...the need (is) to RENOVATE parliament...*the working people must exercise their majority in Parliament*. This will enable them *to get the*—

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necessary laws passed making all the basic means of production public property...

"Every programme of peaceful transition to socialism is bound to take into account...the well-known Marxist-Leninist precept that the working class cannot simply take over the old machinery of state...it will have to smash it. The basic thesis on this question is...as follows: 'Democratic development and socialist reconstruction require the *reorganization* of the old machine of state...the decisive sectors of the administration, the armed forces, the police, judicial departments and foreign policy bodies must be staffed with men and women who solidly support socialism.

"Naturally, many of the non-coercive institutions of the state...will not be abolished. It will be possible to take over many ready-made forms, but their content will be changed. Everything reactionary will be removed and the respective agencies turned into people's bodies." ¹⁰⁷

Along with these examples goes a later report that, in neighboring Finland,

"there have been more encouraging developments. The present Government...has managed to bring the communists into the Administration without disaster...The optimists would

claim that the communist leadership has been won over to the democratic process and can be regarded as operating as part of the parliamentary system...

"The communists...have been keen to show they can be trusted in the administration of the state. Only comparative moderates were selected for office, and they have been treading warily. The draft program...(for) 1969 comes out in favor of obtaining power by democratic means instead of the old doctrine of the use of force...

"Naturally and reasonably such a brief display of virtue has not convinced all the doubters. If the communists want to remain in the Government they are bound to behave themselves, for the time being at least."¹⁰⁸

Revisionism was the guarantee that "Communists" would, indeed, "behave themselves!"

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2. *The "Peaceful Road" to "Emancipation" in Colonial Areas*

Most interestingly – and of unquestionable significance in understanding Modern Revisionism – *actual trials of these "new socialist principles" as a path to "power" have occurred practically solely in colonial, semi-colonial or ex-colonial areas.**

A few of the most famous colonial or semi-colonial examples of such "experiments" include:

- a) *Guatemala*, where the *successful* "electoral will of the people" was quite easily smashed in the '50s by the United Fruit Company, while the "liberal elected leader" fled for his life.
- b) *British Guiana*, where the "electoral road" was "chosen" by the people not just once but on several occasions, with known *results* – which were in large part *brought about by direct and massive American labor aristocracy assistance*.
- c) *Brazil*, where it was once said that, to obtain a well-paid job, one had to have an "in" with Luis Carlos Prestes, then leader of the Brazilian Communist Party. There, the people were induced to express their "electoral will" in no uncertain terms, Goulart being *their* "elected." What happened is public knowledge, though it is not certain exactly how many Brazilian workers, peasants and student revolutionaries paid in blood for this particular "success."
- d) There is still *Chile*, where – having learned nothing and forgotten nothing – the Communists strained after "power," originally on the coat-tails of one Eduardo Frei (and now under Communist Allende). A Cuban report based on uneditorialized juxtaposition of two reports from Chile suggested the meaning of what was happening:

"The Soviet Union will supply machinery and equipment for the plants to be constructed with Soviet technical cooperation. The Chilean representatives had already expressed their readiness to purchase machinery and—

* See also *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XXIV.

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equipment from the Soviet Union amounting to sixty million dollars."¹⁰⁹

While, from the companion piece:

"Frei designated himself a 'reformist' during his presidential campaign but has carried out no social change whatever. On the contrary he has opposed every type of change in favor of the workers and peasants, and has supported the owners and employers, unleashing a wave of savage repression against strikes and popular protest movements. On the international scene...subservience to the United States..."¹¹⁰

Growing contradictions in Chilean society under revisionist-supported Frei began to be noted:

"About \$130m (more than £54m) a year are spent on food imports, roughly a quarter of total imports when foreign exchange earned on exports ought to be buying capital goods for industrial development...

"...production nationally has lagged and the trend of the past 30 years in Chilean agriculture – a production increase averaging only 1.1% a year against the 2.3% populations increase – has not been reversed...

"...When it came to power in 1964, the Frei Government pledged itself to have conquered inflation by this year, but the 1967 rise on the (limited) official cost of living index promises to be 20%. This compares with 17% last year, and 38% in 1965..."¹¹¹

Nothing daunted, the Revisionists were willing to carry their virus anywhere:

"Under the impact of the adverse results for the Christian Democrats of the Chilean municipal elections last March, the party's left wing organized itself a sweeping victory at the party national council elections in July. The ideological follow-through came when the party unanimously recommended to President Frei using a party study group report on a 'non-capitalist road of development for Chile' as a basis for coordinating this Government's policy until 1970."¹¹²

The drama continues under Senor Allende, now in "power".—

Books have been written about him and his program; delegations from every conceivable revisionist source have traveled to Chile to inspect the "experiment." As far as this writer is concerned, its end is a foregone conclusion. Only the timing thereof is still uncertain.

It was, however, Indonesia's PKI which has given the greatest practical insight into the effect of "peaceful transition even before capitalism is overthrown." The example was the more interesting in that the PKI paid lip-service, to the end, to the "armed people's revolution." It was only *in practice* that it slid further and further toward "cooperation with and reliance on the national bourgeoisie." Participants described in detail the evolution of this aberration:

1. The PKI, especially its leadership, forgot that

"Indonesia is a country of the petty bourgeoisie, where small-owners' enterprises, in particular individual farms, are found in great number...and many Party members have come from this class. The petty-bourgeois method of thinking...proceeds...from subjective wishes...Subjectivism is the ideological root of dogmatism and empiricism in the theoretical field, and of liberalism or sectarianism in the organizational field."¹¹³

2. At the Fifth National Congress of the PKI in 1951, while severely criticizing subjectivism, the PKI still espoused the Manifesto for General Elections which foresaw people's power through this means.

This position reinforced subjectivism, which in turn offered fertile soil for

"...right opportunism...the main feature of the mistakes committed by the PKI in this period."¹¹⁴

3. The PKI self-criticism listed the following factors as causing the cited opportunist errors:

a) Failure to develop criticism and self-criticism within the Party itself, notably among the leadership; or, when it was made, to follow through on it. organizationally.

b) The "penetration of bourgeois ideology" through both "contact with the bourgeoisie" in the national united front, and "bourgeoisification of the Party cadres" by accepting well-paid government positions.

c) The further weakening of resistance to Revisionism when the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Fifth National Congress

"...supported the line of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and adopted the line of 'achieving Socialism peacefully through parliamentary means' as the line of the PKI."¹¹⁵

This approval was reiterated at the Sixth National PKI Congress.

Even after the PKI realized intellectually that the CPSU leadership was becoming revisionist, it did not correct "having swallowed the CPSU leadership's line:"

"The main consideration for such a stand did not start from the independent interests of the proletariat, but rather from the need to save the alliance with the national bourgeoisie."¹¹⁶

That is, there was a failure on the theoretical side to recognize that antagonisms in a class society are irreconcilable. Real class struggle, which is expressed through recognition of such irreconcilability, was abandoned.

The consequence was that the "parliamentary road" began to dominate all PKI activities and decisions. The possible need for armed struggle by the Indonesian people was still mentioned, but never implemented:

"...the Party leadership cultivated in the minds of Party members, the working class and the masses of the working people, the hope for a peaceful road which in reality did not exist."¹¹⁷

In fact, the PKI leadership

"took the opportunist line that gave rise to the illusion among the people about (the benevolence of) bourgeois democracy."¹¹⁸

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How the wish for a peaceful road became translated into action directly opposed to revolution was illustrated in PKI reactions to unilateral peasant action against the local landlords:

"the PKI had committed the same error as the petty bourgeois democrats and opportunists who, according to Lenin, 'instill into the minds of the people the false notion that universal suffrage in the modern state is really capable of ascertaining the will of the majority of the toilers and of securing its realization'. (From *The State and Revolution*)."¹¹⁹

For, at that crucial point,

"these actions were not encouraged to develop into a higher form, but were...transformed into various actions...not directed against the landlords, such as the 'New Culture Movement'...Naturally it is not wrong for a revolutionary peasant movement to launch campaigns to increase production...But all of this should serve the main objective of the revolutionary peasant movement, namely, the anti-feudal agrarian revolution."¹²⁰

Again, an attempt to harmonize irreconcilable class antagonisms resulted in the destruction of revolution.

The PKI's post-coup self-criticism described the course actually followed:

1. The PKI

"was able to draw the national bourgeoisie into a united front and prevent the formation of reactionary administrations."¹²¹

2. This, of course, was a favorable development. But

"subsequently, the PKI...failed...to expose the bankruptcy of bourgeois democracy...(It) took (uncritical – HE) part in the first parliamentary general elections...for...a Government of National Coalition, a united front of all democratic elements, including the communists."¹²²

3. Further ideological erosion resulted:

"...in the course of the co-operation with the national

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bourgeoisie,...in particular among the Party leadership...The Party gave too many concessions to the national bourgeoisie and lost its independent role of leadership."¹²³

4. The resulting loss of independence extended to the *lack of criticism of President Sukarno* and to his acceptance by the PKI as their "real leader."

5. Another concession which destroyed principle was that, in accepting bourgeois leadership, *the PKI gave up all those parts of its own revolutionary program which the bourgeoisie found inconvenient*, retaining only what was acceptable to the bourgeoisie.

6. What the PKI called "the climax of the deviation" came in a specifically "Indonesian development:" the "theory of the two aspects in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia." The PKI's conclusion bears on the irreconcilability of antagonisms in any class society:

"It is unthinkable that the Republic of Indonesia can be jointly ruled by the people and the enemies of the people."¹²⁴

7. The point behind all this was the fact that,

"Whether it is wrapped in beautiful names like 'national and democratic economy'...etc...the position of the national bourgeoisie could not in any way be interpreted as representing the

interests of the people, and that is why it could not be called the 'people's aspect' in the state power."¹²⁵

8. From these theoretical positions, *PKI leaders took on certain functions in the "National Coalition" government*. These positions, the PKI Political Bureau pointed out, *never embodied any real power but were offered as*

*"a political concession from the national bourgeoisie who needed the support of the people in their contradiction with the comprador-bourgeoisie and, to a certain extent, also with the imperialists."*¹²⁶

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9. By this time,

*"The Party leadership...overestimated far too highly these developments and...altogether merged themselves in the interests of the national bourgeoisie."*¹²⁷

Thus, the peaceful road of class collaboration completely tamed the leadership of the Indonesian revolution and became a channel for delivering the people into the hands of the class enemy.

And the end result, the PKI's "Polit Buro" declared, was that, by May 1965, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress of the PKI, the so-called "General Line of the Indonesian Revolution" put forth there

*"had not even the faintest smell of revolution."*¹²⁸

Section D: Revisionism and Class Struggle at the International Level

If, "even before the overthrow of capitalism," it was possible, as the CPSU leadership maintained, to "force" the bourgeoisie in various countries to accede to "the will of the majority," this would of course extend to a world scale. For the bourgeoisie today is nothing if not international.

And indeed, the *Yugoslav* ruling clique, the *Soviet* Party leadership, the socialist moguls of *Eastern Europe*, and *Western Communist Parties* have all proven quite willing to accept this logic:

*"The Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems always has been, and remains, the general principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet State."*¹²⁹

The *practical consequences on the international level* were:

1. "Peaceful co-existence" with, specifically, U.S. imperialism;
 2. Abandonment of proletarian internationalism.
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The following pages will, therefore, examine these two factors in detail.

1. *International Consequences of "Peaceful Co-Existence"*

The actual record of *Yugoslav collaboration with the United States* has been enlightening.

Between 1945 and January 1963, as we have seen "according to incomplete statistics," the U.S. and other imperialist powers gave Tito's group "aid" to the tune of \$5,460 millions, of which about \$3,500 millions – over 60% – came from the U.S. itself.¹³⁰ The greatest part of the U.S. contribution was made after 1950, and

"has been the mainstay of Yugoslavia's finances and economy...in 1961 the loans the Tito clique obtained from the United States and U.S.-controlled international financial organizations totaled U.S. \$346 million or 47.4% of the federal income of Yugoslavia in that year...from Western countries in 1961 totaled U.S. \$493 million, or 67.6% of the (total) federal budgetary income that year."¹³¹

This financial dependence was soon expressed in a "series of traitorous treaties" with the U.S.:

a) 1951, "Agreements Relating to Mutual Defense Assistance:" gave U.S. officials "freedom...without restriction" to "observe and supervise the receipt and distribution in Yugoslavia of U.S. military aid material," and also "full access to communication and information facilities." Yugoslavia was to supply "strategic raw materials" to the U.S. and provide troops for the United Nations. The U.S. military mission sent into Yugoslavia under this agreement was "directly to supervise the training of Yugoslav troops."¹³²

b) 1952, the "Economic Co-operation Agreement:" said the "aid" funds supplied to Yugoslavia must be used for "furthering fundamental individual human rights, freedoms and democratic institutions." The political translation could be obtained by adding the phrase "as in the United States."¹³³

c) 1954, the "Treaty of Alliance, Political Co-operation and

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Mutual Assistance" with Greece and Turkey, both NATO members: provided for "military and diplomatic coordination" among the three countries, thus making Yugoslavia virtually a member of the U.S.-controlled military bloc.¹³⁴

d) From 1954, a whole series of other agreements, of which more than fifty were concluded between 1957 and 1962: ceded to the U.S. the following rights in Yugoslavia:

- "(1) to control its military affairs;
- "(2) to control its foreign affairs;
- "(3) to interfere in its internal affairs;
- "(4) to manipulate and supervise its finances;
- "(5) to control its foreign trade;
- "(6) to plunder its strategic resources; and
- "(7) to collect military and economic intelligence."¹³⁵

e) Aside from all these treaties, Yugoslavia complied in one field after another with "Western monopoly capital's demand to penetrate" its economy:

- "(1) From 1950, abolished the state monopoly over foreign trade;
- "(2) 1961, reformed the systems of foreign exchange and foreign trade in such a way as to further relax restrictions on import and export trade."¹³⁶

Naturally, there were "economic consequences" for receiving large amounts of U.S. "aid:"

1. "Yugoslavia has become a market for...huge quantities of industrial goods and farm produce from the imperialist countries."¹³⁷

2. "Yugoslavia has become an outlet for imperialist investment: "According to Augustin Papic, the general manager of the Yugoslav Investment Bank...between 1952 and 1956, 'the participation of foreign funds reached 32.5% of the total value of economic investments'."¹³⁸

3. "Yugoslavia has become a base from which imperialism extracts raw materials." Since 1957,

"about half of Yugoslavia's exports of important metals,─

such as magnesium, lead, zinc and antimony, have gone to the United States."¹³⁹

4. "The industrial enterprises of Yugoslavia have become assembly shops for Western monopoly capitalist companies." Many major Yugoslav industries

"produce under licence from Western countries and are dependent on imports of semi-processed materials, parts, spare parts and semi-manufactured products."¹⁴⁰

5. "In these circumstances,

Yugoslavia has become an integral part of the world market of Western monopoly capital. In the financial and economic spheres, it...has degenerated into a dependence...particularly of U.S. imperialism."¹⁴¹

All these facts explain the Yugoslavia of today, a Yugoslavia amply summarized in the following words:

"Belgrade has become the cradle of U.S. espionage where new fiendish plans are hatched against the socialist camp and peace."¹⁴²

If Yugoslavia was the earliest example of revisionist evolution, the most graphic remains *the Soviet Union*. From its "peaceful co-existence" there emerged at the international level, in practice, the degeneration of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most interesting illustration of this process would be the astounding success of the famous Seven Points laid down in March 1950 by the late Dean Acheson as U.S. Secretary of State through two policy speeches.¹⁴³

One by one, we will now examine their outcome in detail.

"First point: The German, Austrian and Japanese peace treaties must make these countries 'free' – in other words, capitalist countries allied with the U.S. against the Soviet Union."

Outcome? The world witnessed the re-emergence of top Nazis as high officials of the West German government under direct

U.S. guidance while the Soviet Union partially pulled its troops out of Eastern Germany. It was also a matter of record that Japanese monopoly capitalism had since 1945 experienced a "miraculous" resurgence, under conditions wherein more than 90% of foreign capital invested in its economy was American. As to Austria, which might seem of less importance, it was Vienna which furnished the site for the famous Kennedy-Kruschov "summit" where even more

concessions were demanded of the Soviet Union. And is it without significance that Austria became the scene of Social Democratic triumph, when that party won over 50% of the popular vote for the first time in its history?*

"Second point": 'Orderly representative processes' must be introduced into 'the whole group of countries we are accustomed to think of as the satellite area' – in other words, the Soviet Union must stand aside while the United States organizes counter-revolution in Eastern Europe."

In this field, apparently the response from "the East" was not fast enough, for at the famous Vienna "Summit" between President John Kennedy and Premier Nikita Krushov in 1961, John Kennedy again demanded that

"the Soviet Union should extend 'a free choice' to the people of Eastern Europe, that is to say, the capitalist system be restored in Eastern Europe."¹⁴⁴

Under Soviet influence, top Eastern European socialist circles did, in fact, develop a "do-it-yourself sell-out of their own economies, already studied in part in this text, above.

"Third Point": 'The Soviet leaders could drop their policy of obstruction in the United Nations' – in other words, the Soviet Union must acquiesce in the UN's becoming an instrument of American policy."

Did the UN become such an instrument or not? Did the

* See LONDON TIMES, February 27, P 4; March 2, P 5; and April 21, P 5, 1970.

Soviet role inside its "hallowed halls" in any way obstruct that development?

Moreover, was not the Soviet leadership's over-emphasis on the "effectiveness" of the UN for "international cooperation" a direct extension to the world level of the "parliamentary road" it espoused at the national level everywhere? Were not the results exactly the same: absorption of the "revolutionaries" who harbored such illusions by the international bourgeoisie led by the United States – precisely through its "world parliament"?

Lenin could have been talking of just such a development when he wrote into the "Conditions for Affiliation to the Comintern" No. 6:

"Every party wishing to join the Third International must expose...the falsehood and hypocrisy of social-pacifism. It must systematically demonstrate to the workers that without the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, no international arbitration courts, no talk of

reducing armaments, no 'democratic' reorganization of the League of Nations will save mankind from imperialist wars."¹⁴⁵

Has the need for this admonition abated one whit since July 1920 when it was uttered?

"*Fourth Point*: The Soviet Union must accept 'realistic and effective arrangements for the control of atomic energy and the limitations of armaments in general' – in other words, the Soviet Union must place her work in the field of atomic energy under the control of an American-appointed agency and submit her military apparatus to outside inspection."*

This point exhibited a certain harmony with Revisionist attitudes toward war and peace in general and, hence, toward treaties and agreements in particular. Activity apparently directed toward control of the use and militarization of nuclear energy arose in the UN and flourished, including activities concerning the "space race," wherein nuclear energy plays a key role.

* The development of satellites orbiting in space eventually rendered this condition obsolete.

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"At the fourteenth session of the General Assembly in 1959...at the request of the Soviet Union...the Assembly unanimously affirmed that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important in the world...this...marked the beginning of a new and more productive era in international disarmament negotiations, which continued through the decade of the 1960s..."¹⁴⁶

This "new and productive era" issued, among others, in: UN Resolution 1721 (XVI) (20 Dec 1961), which made the UN the "focal point for international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space;" the Partial Test Ban Treaty on Nuclear Testing (10 Oct 1963); UN Resolution 1884 (XVIII) (17 Oct 1963), restricting orbiting objects from carrying nuclear weapons; later incorporated into UN Resolution 1962 (XVIII) (13 Dec 1963), a "Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space;" which became a Treaty (in force, 10 Oct 1967); UN Resolution 2130 (XX) (21 Dec 1965), "International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space;" a Treaty from this Resolution; the Draft Treaty on the Rescue of Astronauts (Dec 1967); (mid-1968) Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; currently "in progress," the so-called Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the U.S. and USSR. At the end of the 1960s, the UN also piously declared the 1970s "a Disarmament Decade."¹⁴⁷ In May 1971, the Soviet Union tabled a Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon.¹⁴⁸

As to the "effectiveness" of this great flurry of activity, consider this:

"Since the launching of the Space Age with Russia's Sputnik I,* the U.S. has spent well over \$40 billion on Space, while Russia has spent about \$ 35 billion...The U.S. has orbited approximately 630 spacecraft – 590 or so in earth orbit (about 40 percent of earth-orbiting

satellites are 'spy' satellites)...The Soviet Union has orbited approximately 425 spacecraft, all but 40 or so in earth orbit (over 40 percent are 'spy' satellites)...

"Orbiting space stations have vital military applications,¬

* October 4, 1957 – HE.

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not only as observation platforms, but for rocket launchings (rockets launched in space would require less fuel and thrust).¹⁴⁹

Or how about this?

"The space race...is...a desire on the part of one nation to keep its military advantage over another...Today...whoever controls outer space could conceivably control the world...Today, as before World War II, treaties are being drafted to ensure that no one power can gain control of outer space...Unfortunately, these treaties, like all treaties, are usually kept only as long as they remain convenient to all parties."¹⁵⁰

The channeling of all such treaties, which represented Soviet policy directed toward achieving "peace" through treaties, alliances and agreements, ensured the realization of Dean Acheson's Point 4.

"**Fifth Point**: The Soviet Union must 'desist from, and cooperate in efforts to prevent, indirect aggression across national frontiers' – in other words, since 'indirect aggression' is the usual pseudonym for social revolution, the Soviet Union must not only agree to United States counter-revolutionary actions but actually aid and abet them."

Here, too, results apparently were not fast enough for the U.S. rulers, because another demand from Kennedy at Vienna in 1961 was

"that the Soviet Union must give up 'communizing the entire world,' that is to say, the Soviet Union should not be permitted to support the world revolution."¹⁵¹

Was this point involved in the bizarre "incident" involving Cuba, whereby the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, having unilaterally introduced missiles into that island, removed them – again unilaterally – immediately upon the huffing and puffing of the imperialist wolf?

"**Sixth Point**: The Soviet Union and its allies (as long¬

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as it has any) must give American official representatives the run of their countries."

This point, in contention for a long time, was rendered obsolete by the successful launching of space satellites.

"Seventh Point: The Soviet leaders must stop criticizing the United States and its allies."

This one really put the revisionists in a bind: how, carrying it out, could they continue to "lead" the "anti-imperialist" struggle in the desired direction? Therefore, especially in the United Nations, the sound was occasionally heard of Eastern European "socialist leadership" denouncing the United States. But, *in practice*, the drive for "peaceful co-existence" continued; the assurances that socialism would trip in along a path of "peaceful economic competition," and the extolling of "the parliamentary road" also continued.

This ever-closer compliance with Acheson's Seven Points highlighted the deterioration of socialism's world position.

Other signs pointed in the same direction:

For instance, there was an "unusual speech" on U.S. European policy" by President L B Johnson, wherein the U.S. War chief of that time announced

"the policy of stepping up 'peaceful evolution' for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries...a confession of world-wide U.S.-Soviet collusion on a big scale."¹⁵²

Urging the continued advance of the "winds of change" in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries generally, the U.S. President had added that the U.S. would

"'with the consent of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union' 'heal peacefully the division' between the East and the West, 'achieve a real reconciliation in Europe,' and 'make Europe whole'."¹⁵³

Within six months, the "suggestion" had already been taken up in their own way by the Modern Revisionists:

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"The leaders of 25 European communist parties have called on West Europeans to join East Europe in a new security system without the United States, reports *Reuter*...'to settle themselves the issues of peace and security of their continent,'...said...a joint declaration at the end of a conference in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia...

"The party leaders, led by the communist chief Leonid Brezhnev, publicly called on West European socialists, trade unions, intellectuals, Christians, and 'bourgeois groupings' to join them in calling for an all-European security conference.

"They reaffirmed the Warsaw Pact countries' offer of a joint abolition of their alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."¹⁵⁴

The last paragraph clearly implied that, while the conference was desired *without* the United States, it was not directed *against* it. What was suggested was the old imperialist "division of spheres of influence" game between "friendly rivals." The "game" had begun with imperialism and was still in progress with a few new players, it would seem. British and German Social Democrats were soon "leading figures" in a crescendo drive for a "European Security Conference."¹⁵⁵

But perhaps the last word on the development of U.S.-Soviet "peaceful co-existence" was said three days after Johnson's above talk, following a two-hour private confab between the U.S. President and Andre Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, who – immediately after that – had conferred secretly with Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

"The day after the Gromyko-Johnson talks...the U.S. Commerce Department announced that the U.S. Government had decided to lift export restrictions on about 400 'non-strategic' commodities (including foodstuffs, textile products, chemical products and metallurgical equipment) to the Soviet Union and the East European countries...Early in October, U.S. Democratic Senator Magnuson who was in Moscow told reporters that the Soviet Union was 'eager' to explore possibilities for increased trade with the United States."¹⁵⁶

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All over Eastern Europe, similar developments were occurring in the field of international relations.

For example, a report from Bonn disclosed that in trade talks, both Bulgaria and Rumania were involved "against a backdrop of warming relations between Bonn and Russia's satellites in southeastern Europe." The comment was:

"...increased trade assumes a new meaning as a preliminary step toward what is officially called 'normalization' of relations with Bonn's eastern neighbors...Eastern markets are an inviting lure for West German industry."¹⁵⁷

So "inviting," in fact, that West German State Secretary, Rolf Lahr, himself visited Sofia in the latter half of September 1965, and new negotiations started in October 1966. The new agreement was said to provide for an annual trade volume between West Germany and Bulgaria of about 125 million dollars "divided equally between imports and exports."¹⁵⁸

Rumania had, only the previous month (September 1966), concluded an agreement for increased trade with Bonn

"amid signs that Bucharest may sooner or later become the first capital in the East bloc, outside of Moscow, to exchange ambassadors with West Germany."¹⁵⁹

The meaning of such developments from the viewpoint of Modern Revisionist practice was admirably summed up by the South African socialist HM Basner, discussing the meaning of General Charles De Gaulle's refusal to ease Britain's entry into the Common Market:

"De Gaulle is proving that *coexistence has opened new opportunities of neo-colonialist expansion for West Europe*."¹⁶⁰

Furthermore, this was a *general* trend in the industrialized West:

"...the relative tardiness of direct industrial investment by one E.E.C. country in another is shown by developments in Italy's Mezzogiorno development region. According to ("merger specialist Nicholas") Stacey ("of Chesham-

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Amalgamations") direct American investment between 1950 and last year (1966) numbered 105 manufacturing and trading companies compared with 11 British. Among the other E.E.C. countries, the Germans invested in 18, the French in 13 companies, and the Belgians and Dutch in none."¹⁶¹

Perhaps one of the reasons why there was no Belgian investment in the cited Italian region had been pinpointed in an earlier report of how American manipulation of manufacturing licenses and patents (a classical method of neo-colonialist penetration) had affected that Western European country:

"The big American companies draw considerable super-profits from the 'ceding' of manufacturing licenses, which end up by making the firms which depend on them subsidiaries of American firms, without the latter having to invest one cent...on a grand scale, as in Belgium, it...aggravates the economic dependence and exploitation of the workers of such countries by American imperialism."¹⁶²

Another, perhaps even sharper, characterization of such American activity was this one:

"Instead of firmly opposing the hegemonistic activities of the USA in Europe and Bonn's revenge-seeking designs...to isolate and oust American imperialism from Europe, the Soviet revisionist leaders...have erased the German problem from their books and...are pursuing in Europe a policy of 'appeasement,'...leaving free play to American imperialists."¹⁶³

Still another telling illustration of where the theoretical renunciation of class struggle led in practice lay in the many *Summit Meetings between "East and West,"* which in reality were private conferences between U.S. Presidents and Soviet Premiers, albeit sometimes including "others."

These began at Teheran in December 1943, when World War II had made a major turning point unfavorable to the Nazis and it had become necessary for the temporary "Allies" to come to some sort of understanding about likely next steps.

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At Teheran, F D Roosevelt of the U.S., Josef Stalin of the USSR, and Winston Churchill of England came together just after the opening in Europe of the second front against Hitler. Allegedly, they there set up the United Nations and reached an agreement that "America, Russia, Britain and China (then under Chiang Kai Shek) should look after world security," while "Germany must be partitioned."¹⁶⁴

The next Summit between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill occurred at Yalta in February 1945, with military victory in Europe now assured. At this meeting, Polish borders were drawn and the decision taken not to recognize the Government-in-exile in London; the West admitted "an interest" in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, then occupied by the Red Army; voting procedure in the UN was set up, while

"Roosevelt made concessions in the Far East to Russia at the expense of China."¹⁶⁵

(Obviously the "palace coup" of Kruschov was prepared in the soil of "orthodox Marxism" by Josef Stalin.)

The last wartime Summit took place at Potsdam in July 1945: the principals now were U.S. President Harry S Truman; Clement Attlee for England, with Stalin still representing the USSR. This meeting followed Nazi Germany's, but preceded Japan's, defeat. Here, an agreement was "vaguely" reached about the "economic and political pattern for Germany" after the abolition of Nazi power. The decision on Poland's government and borders were made "favorable to Russia." Soon after this meeting, the Cold War set in again, living testimony to the real value of negotiations.¹⁶⁶

Postwar Summits began at Geneva in July 1955. There, Kruschov and Bulganin met with U.S. President Dwight D Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden "after a decade of cold war and the nuclear arms race." Public opinion had been exerting pressure to "ease tensions":

"Kruschov wanted some easing in foreign relations to permit de-Stalinization at home and a drive for influence in the non-aligned world."¹⁶⁷

Under discussion were: Germany and European security; disarmament; peaceful contacts and trade. Although no real agreement was reached, tensions allegedly were "eased" by the meeting.¹⁶⁸

In September 1959, Krushov met Eisenhower at the latter's playground, Camp David:

"Some say that the 'spirit of Camp David' was so misleadingly harmonious that Krushov carried away a false impression of the extent to which Eisenhower could practice compromise over Berlin."¹⁶⁹

In May 1960, Krushov, Eisenhower, French Premier De Gaulle and British Minister Harold Macmillan were to have met at Paris, intending to discuss "Berlin and the German question." But the famous "U-2 incident" – intrusion of a U.S. plane over Soviet territory during the time scheduled for the Summit – left Krushov no alternative but to break the Summit up.

However, in June 1961, U.S. President John F Kennedy and Krushov met at Vienna. At this meeting, allegedly, the two world leaders were "sizing each other up:"

"In some views, the Berlin and Cuba crises of succeeding years followed from the (incorrect) assessment (of Kennedy) made by Krushov at Vienna."¹⁷⁰

With the death of Kennedy and the fall of Krushov, with growing disunity in both the U.S. and USSR camps, some six years passed before any further top level get-together. In June 1967, "two rounds of talks" occurred a few days apart between the U.S. President, "Chief War Hawk" Lyndon Baines Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexander Kosygin, at a small American town, Glassboro, New Jersey.

One detailed account of as much of this summit as was known to newsmen quoted President Johnson in "a graceful toast to Kosygin" as saying at lunch during the first day:

"There is a special place...in this world and a special responsibility placed upon our two countries because of our strength and our resources. This demands that the—

relations between our two countries be as reasonable and as constructive as we know how to make them."¹⁷¹

The "special place" and "special responsibility" which both the Soviet Union and the United States claimed as a result of their "strength...and resources" supremely illustrated a warning of Lenin's:

"Let us not deceive ourselves with hopes of agreements and international congresses...international connections are restricted by the vise of the military dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie."¹⁷²

But the Soviet Union's modern "leaders," being "out of this world," did not hesitate to. declare Lenin "outmoded." According to reports, the New Jersey Summit concluded on the following note:

"Soviet diplomats at the U.N. were passing the word that the Glassboro Summit could herald a major long-term improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow."¹⁷³

And bourgeois pundits hastened to spell out the meaning of these hopes:

"The likelihood of solutions to specific central differences seems small; but even so...If the momentum of the space treaty, the consular agreement and other bilateral arrangements should now be accelerated, these plus-factors together could have immense consequence in the long run...

"Both governments are thinking more urgently of the need for less elaborate systems to counter the growing, if less sophisticated, Chinese potential."¹⁷⁴

What was involved here was the Marxist-Leninist approach to *foreign policy*, dealings with other countries, both capitalist and socialist. Certainly, Lenin had been the architect of the attitude in this matter acceptable to any genuine Left:

"Take foreign policy: In no bourgeois state, not even in the most democratic, is it conducted openly. The masses—

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are deceived everywhere...The Soviet government has torn the veil of mystery from foreign policy in a revolutionary manner."¹⁷⁵

Talking of the Social Democratic position, "supporting" the imperialist war, Lenin had also noted that

"a particular striking expression of the imperialist character of the war was the secret treaties for the partitioning of the world and the plunder of other countries."¹⁷⁶

For Lenin, it was unthinkable that a proletarian government could indulge in secret talks or secret treaties. He stressed many times that *socialist* diplomacy *had nothing to hide* and, in unmasking bourgeois secret sell-outs, performed a service for the world working class. Yet, the "new" Soviet government operated as if Lenin's words were "obsolete," as if the U.S. had become a socialist country. Or did the USSR, by conforming to capitalist practice in diplomacy, thus expose its own drift backwards to capitalism?

In sum, Revisionist practice which relied on achieving harmony between irreconcilably hostile classes led socialist economies to a point where some of them already bore the major features of a colony: export of outside capital into them; prevention of industrialization; supply to metropolitan powers of strategic raw materials; local manufacture consisting of processing semi-processed goods, etc. Where a socialist country had already industrialized to a large extent, the type of colony produced resembled countries like Belgium, where U.S. capital had taken over another imperialist power.

2. *Abandonment of Proletarian Internationalism*

Another aspect of the revisionist attitude toward class struggle comes out when glancing at the record of foreign relations of socialist Yugoslavia. For the question of class solidarity is as important to the Marxist concept of class antagonisms as that of non-compromise with the class enemy.

From this point, it is no leap at all to note the indispensability.¬

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of proletarian internationalism as the essence of class solidarity in the working class in today's world. In that light, what was Yugoslavia's record?

Between 1953 and 1963, the Tito rulers played a counter-revolutionary role in international relations in the following ways:

"By setting the example of restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia," thus "helping U.S. imperialism to push its policy of 'peaceful evolution' inside the world revolution."¹⁷⁷

"By serving as an active agent in the anti-China campaign" which is "frantically...disrupting the socialist camp."¹⁷⁸

"By trying to wreck the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America" in the name of "non-alignment and active coexistence"¹⁷⁹

between powers with differing social systems.

"By sparing no effort to prettify U.S. imperialism and benumb the people of the world in their struggle against imperialist policies."¹⁸⁰

"By peddling revisionist poison everywhere" under the "pretext of opposing 'Stalinism',"¹⁸¹

the Tito clique in reality, especially in the latter case, was opposing revolution by people everywhere.

These features of Yugoslav Revisionism's disrespect for proletarian internationalism manifested themselves *in practice* in the following *actual events*:

a) *Greece*:

"On July 10, 1949, Tito closed the border between Yugoslavia and Greece against the Greek people's guerillas. At the same time, he allowed the Greek Fascist royalist troops to pass through Yugoslav territory...to attack the guerillas from the rear."¹⁸²

b) *Korean War*:

"...on September 6, 1950, Edvard Kardelj...then foreign minister, brazenly slandered the Korean people's just war...and defended U.S. imperialism. On December 1...at the U.N. Security Council, the...Tito clique attacked—

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China for its 'active interference in the Korean War. (They) also voted in the United Nations for the embargo on China and Korea."¹⁸³

c) *First Phase, Vietnam War*:

"On the eve of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, in April 1954, the Tito clique violently slandered the just struggle of the Vietnamese people, asserting that they were being used by Moscow and Peking 'as a card in their postwar policy of cold war."¹⁸⁴

d) *Albania*:

"The Tito clique has...engineered four major cases of treason (against Albania) in 1944, 1948, 1956 and 1960. Its armed provocations on the Yugoslav-Albanian border numbered more than 470 from 1948 to 1958. In 1960, the Tito clique and the Greek reactionaries planned an armed attack on Albania in coordination with the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean."¹⁸⁵

e) *Hungary*:

"...After the outbreak of the (counter-revolutionary) rebellion, Tito published a letter supporting the counter-revolutionary measures of the traitor Nagy. On November 3, the Tito clique bade Nagy seek asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Hungary...on November 11, Tito characterised the...rebellion as resistance by 'progressives'." ¹⁸⁶

f) *Lebanon and Jordan*: Following the 1958 direct intervention in these countries by U.S. and British troops, respectively, at the emergency UN session occasioned by world-wide protests, Koca Popovic, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, advocated intervention by the UN, then fully under U.S. control. ¹⁸⁷

g) *Quemoy Island*: When, in 1958, following direct U.S. provocation in the Taiwan Straits, China shelled the Chiang-Kai-Shek-held Quemoy Island,

"The Tito clique maligned China's just struggle as 'a danger to the whole world' and 'harmful to peace'." ¹⁸⁸

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h) *Paris Summit, 1960*: Directly after the four-power Summit was sabotaged by the U-2 spy-plane, on

"May 17 Tito issued a statement attacking the correct stand...by the Soviet Government." ¹⁸⁹

i) *Japan*: In the wake of massive anti-U.S. public reaction in Japan in June 1960, the

"Tito clique defended...U.S. occupation of Japan (as having promoted the democratization of political life of Japan.' Later, after Ineijiro Asanuma, late President of the Japanese Socialist Party, declared U.S. imperialism 'the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese peoples,' the Tito clique attacked Asanuma's statement, accusing him of 'standing for an extremist line'." ¹⁹⁰

k) *Indonesia*: The Tito clique attempted to prevent

"the establishment of...a government of national unity comprising the nationalists, religious circles and the Communists'." ¹⁹¹

l) *Congo (Kinshasa)*: In the summer of 1960, during

"U.S. armed aggression against the Congo under the flag of the United Nations, the Tito clique not only voted for U.S. imperialism...but...sent air force personnel to the Congo to take a direct part in the bloody suppression of the Congolese people." ¹⁹²

m) *Laos*: As U.S. aggression escalated in January 1961, the Tito clique

"spread the view that the United Nations 'is really concerned for the peace and neutralization of Laos'." ¹⁹³

In accompaniment to U.S. assassination and armed conflict, in May 1963,

"the Tito clique attacked the Laotian patriotic forces for 'putting all the blame on the United States'." ¹⁹⁴

n) *Latin America*: The enforced signing by a number of Latin American countries of the Alliance for Progress program in August 1961 was greeted by Tito and his henchmen as

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"meeting in large measure the requirements of the Latin American countries." ¹⁹⁵

o) *Sino-Indian Border Conflict*: In this case, in 1959, Tito

"openly spread the lie that 'the demarcation of the boundary was already completed at the beginning of the present century and put into the shape of the well-known McMahon Line,'...making the slander that China 'permits itself to revise its border with India wilfully and by force' and 'committed aggression' against India." ¹⁹⁶

p) *Cuba*: During the Caribbean crisis in the Autumn of 1962,

"the Tito clique defended the U.S. imperialist aggression, saying that 'the difficulties started when the Cuban revolution trod on the pet corn of the U.S. companies,' and that 'if it is said that the United States was irritated by the establishment of rocket bases in Cuba in its close neighborhood, that would be understandable'." ¹⁹⁷

Thus, from the "mere" revision of Marxist theory on proletarian internationalism, the Yugoslav communists inevitably moved on in practice into a degeneration amounting to become imperialist – that is, U.S. – lackeys.

Under Revisionist leadership, the same thing began happening to *the Soviet government*, too.

A. As will be elaborated later, the Soviet government found no difficulty in continuing into the fascist military era of the Suharto-Nasution military group its agreements with the Sukarno government of Indonesia, despite the military's murder of more than half a million Indonesian patriots. ¹⁹⁸

B. Besides arming these fascist tools of U.S. imperialism, the Soviet leaders also

"in fact transported large quantities of military supplies to the *Indian* reactionaries over sea routes." ¹⁹⁹

To make this charge more specific,

"Five Soviet ships loaded with arms and ammunition,—"

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including heavy tanks, Mig-21 fighters, military trucks, machine-guns and missiles, arrived in Calcutta, India, in the middle of May...

"...Pakistan...reaction...pointed out that this military assistance would make the Indian reactionaries more aggressive toward India's neighbors, China and Pakistan ...and would 'embolden India to blackmail and browbeat its smaller neighbors'." ²⁰⁰

This amounted to support for a neo-colonialist government against a socialist brother country, China. "New principles" in foreign relations turned out to be not so new at all.

In a word, far from "marching at the head of the international working class movement," as it had earlier, the CPSU leadership now began to pervert proletarian internationalism:

"Soviet Kruschovite revisionists have trampled upon the sovereignty of peoples and of other socialist countries, interfere brutally into their internal affairs, organize undermining activities against them, try to exploit them for their own interests, to hamper the development of their independent economy, exert allround political, economic and military pressures going as far as to establish blockades, to organize military provocations, to rupture diplomatic relations, to call openly for counter-revolutionary measures in order to force their own dominion on them." ²⁰¹

As to *Western Communist Parties*, following in Moscow's footsteps, they made no attempt to expose their own reactionary governments and ruling classes. Rather, they talked constantly, in Italy as elsewhere, of the "peaceful parliamentary road" to socialism, by making the "sensible" bourgeoisie give way to "the electoral will of the majority." This, in the "age of nuclear weapons when even the ruling classes will not be spared."

So far, for better or for worse, there has been no successful example of this "theory" in actual operation in any major Western country. The case of Finland, a minor Western power, cited above, was not a case of "power" but of absorption, and this—"

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has been the only lesson the implementation of such policy has offered for future reference.

Section E: Revisionist Practice and Fascism

In a previous study of the relationship between Social Democracy and Fascism,* it was shown why "harmonious" relations between opposing classes, as advocated and practised by old-time Social Democracy, could be stretched to include shooting down "one's own" workers or participating in out-and-out fascist governments.

It was further demonstrated that the ties between Social Democracy and international Fascism were indissoluble because of Social Democracy's indispensable role in supporting the bourgeoisie through maintaining a labor aristocracy; while the bourgeoisie itself increasingly requires Fascism to continue its own existence.

It was also revealed that, in our epoch, Fascism has become an international phenomenon, with its body in Wall Street, USA, but its tentacles in various "overseas" areas, so that what appears to be Vietnamese, Brazilian, Congolese or Mississippian Fascism is, in reality, the American brand *in operation*.

In this context, examining Modern Revisionist practice discloses its connection with international Fascism in certain unmistakeable forms:

1. inside a number of "socialist" countries, as developed or incipient Fascism itself;
2. in particular cases of support to specific sections of international Fascism; and
3. in Modern Revisionism's growing, and less-and-less disguised, anti-Communism in its peculiar modern form. (Treated in Section F, Pp. 102 ff, below.)

1. *Inside Certain "Socialist" Countries*

A prime example of Fascism which had supplanted socialism was *Yugoslavia*. There, capitalist restoration began so soon after the victory of socialism that outright fascist methods had to be used by the Tito group.

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XIV.

Albanian and other sources have already been quoted* showing that the bourgeoisie was building up in Yugoslavia a distinctly chauvinist edifice, and it exerted its dictatorship in "open, terrorist" form, as in the definition of Fascism studied earlier.**

Critics of Yugoslavia have said:

"Tito now feels obliged to affirm that there is but one government in Yugoslavia, that of UDB, of that terrorist and criminal organization set up by the ruling clique for its own protection from the people's anger...for everybody is subjected to persecution, investigation and murder by it."²⁰²

Fascist measures attributed to Yugoslavia's rulers by such critics included: a) Fascist prison and concentration camps,²⁰³ b) pardon for at least 161,000 "counter-revolutionaries living in exile."²⁰⁴

Furthermore, as was shown in detail previously,^{***} the Fascist character of the present Yugoslav state was inseparable – like all modern Fascism – from control and direction by Wall Street.

The truth was, "peaceful evolution" had its very bloody side, if Yugoslavia was either a criterion or a preview of the future in store for other revisionist-led-countries.

2. In studying *Revisionist support for particular sections of international Fascism, the case against Yugoslavia* rested on that country's record of abandoning proletarian internationalism. In this, it furnished an example for similar degeneration among other Eastern European socialist governments, led by that of the USSR.

At this writing, instances of outright fascist methods against their own citizens have not yet been reported from Eastern Europe; but methods quite related have been reportedly used against "certain foreigners" inside them, notably African and Asian students.

In any case, it was part of Kruschov's record that he reinstated Titoite Yugoslavia to the category of "ally" and "model." The

* Pp 39 ff, above.

** See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XIV.

*** See Section C, Pp 62 ff, above.

effect of this reversal of stated policy, combined with Yugoslav brutality, could not be favorable to real socialism.

The Soviet Union had been the world's first socialist power which, in the 1920s, had fought to a standstill the armies of fourteen intervening capitalist nations; and, in 1945, had defeated the hordes of international Fascism. The development of a new elite within higher Soviet echelons came later than in Yugoslavia; and the demagoguery that tried to cover that elite's presence was for

a long while able to parade as "Marxism" because of the USSR's authoritative position in the socialist world: with words of Lenin's as smoke-screen, the CPSU's leaders had been able to "follow in Tito's footsteps" so softly at first that they had advanced a long way down the Yugoslav path before the truth became clear. For a long time, only the Chinese and the Albanian communists, and a few dissidents crying in the wilderness of the Western (pro-Soviet) parties, insisted that what was going on was deterioration.

But, as time went by, widely varying sources began to offer supporting evidence. And that evidence, like the forerunning Chinese-Albanian accusations, clearly showed that original "slips" from Marxism-Leninism have always led to closer collaboration with imperialism *under the latter's leadership*:

For instance, in August 1966, an Indonesian reported that the head of the Southeast Asia section of the Foreign Department of the CPSU Central Committee, one Yakovlev, talking to him, had

"even stated that the Soviet Union would consider any request for arms aid from the Soviet Union, if the present Indonesian fascist military regime made it."²⁰⁵

He had been summoned to explain a greeting by another Indonesian on behalf of progressive Indonesian journalists to the Emergency Meeting of Afro-Asian Writers in Peking on June 29, 1966. In this statement

"the Soviet modern revisionists were taken to task for...their continued shipments of arms to Indonesia after the September 30 affair, a fact that has been announced by the Indonesian fascist military regime, and has never been refuted by the Soviet authorities."²⁰⁶

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Furthermore,

"...when speaking about the racist atrocities committed by the Indonesian fascist military regime against Chinese nationals in Indonesia...(the Soviet ruling clique) even go so far as to claim that it is the Chinese nationals themselves who are to blame, for solely making profit in Indonesia. Such a claim is mere repetition of the version of the Indonesian fascist military regime justifying their racist barbarities."²⁰⁷

Another indictment of the Modern Revisionists listed the following facts showing collaboration with Indonesian fascism:

a) On November 23, 1966, a Soviet

"agreement conceding the postponement of the repayment of Indonesia's debts to the Soviet Union, totaling around one billion U.S. dollars...in combination and complete mutual

understanding with the U.S. and other imperialist powers, which likewise consented for the Indonesian reactionary regime to put off repayment of its debts."²⁰⁸

b) At the same time, Soviet-Indonesian agreement "to increase the trade volume between the two countries,"²⁰⁹ including (according to Western News agency reports) the delivery of "spare parts of Soviet tanks which were recently sent to Indonesia."²¹⁰ These can be used only internally, against the people.

c) If these were merely slanders by Western news agencies, Soviet leaders themselves acknowledged "warm" relations between Indonesia and the USSR, in Soviet continuation of aid to the Indonesian military regime. Such acknowledgement took the form of

"a ceremony to mark the termination of the construction of an Indonesian military project, sponsored by the Soviet Navy."²¹¹

Another source, discussing the same subject, declared that the "military project" in question was known by the code name "055" and described it as

"a complete project for (Indonesian) naval forces...The

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project includes a power charging station for the submarines of the Indonesian navy."²¹²

d) Not content with postponing repayment of the former regime's debts to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government

"is also going to grant them fresh credits in addition to continuing endless military aid."²¹³

e) Indicative of the entire Eastern European revisionists' orientation was "Bulgaria's hurry to build a power-generation plant in Indonesia."²¹⁴

All this amounted to aiding the criminal Indonesian fascist military as

"the outcome of contacts and collaboration which in the beginning were done covertly, but now overtly."²¹⁵

Nor did this end specific charges against Soviet revisionism for collusion with Indonesian fascism. An Indonesian student expelled from the USSR on February 8, 1967, said, upon reaching Peking, that the following additional facts testified to Soviet official

"collaboration with the counter-revolutionary regime of Nasution-Suharto...

"by the intimate relations and good cooperation between the *Soviet trade unions* and the yellow trade unions in Indonesia, the faithful lackeys of the Nasution-Suharto regime of right-wing generals;

"by the close cooperation and the good relations between the *Soviet journalists* and the reactionary Indonesian Journalists' Association;

"by the attitude of *the Kosygin administration*...which has...encouraged the fascist military regime by *giving* 'patriotic', 'clean', and 'anti-imperialist' labels to a fascist general like *Nasution*;

"by the *warm reception* to Adam Malik, the *fascist regime's Foreign Minister*, during his visit to the Soviet Union;

"...by the *pressures* they bring to bear on the revolutionary *Indonesian students' movement in the Soviet Union* aimed at having it abolish—

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from its program the part on the struggle against the Nasution-Suharto regime of right-wing generals; "by the broad opportunities and freedom of action given to the reactionary Indonesian students' movement in the Soviet Union, etc., etc."²¹⁶

Moreover, the militarist regime allegedly had Soviet revisionist leadership support "right from the beginning:"

"When the tragedy of October 1965 occurred, Kruschov's successors ferociously assailed the PKI, accusing it of being 'adventurist,' 'Putschist,' 'sectarian' and so on. They closed their eyes and turned a deaf ear to the heinous and sanguinary outrages committed against the Communists and other patriotic forces. This has been a great support given to the Indonesian reactionaries in the international arena."²¹⁷

This report called attention to the great likelihood that the Indonesian military coup had U.S. imperialist backing, while it also had been

"encouraged by the revisionists. In this, the economic and military aid given by the Kruschov revisionists to the Indonesian reactionaries played its part. The present Indonesian regime...as a result of the economic chaos and anarchy which it has created, (can) no longer stand erect without the political and material support which the U.S. imperialists and the Kruschov revisionists award them."²¹⁸

Finally, the treatment accorded Albania was contrasted with that meted out to the Indonesian fascists by the Soviet Union's leading officials:

"Suffice it to recall how the Kruschov revisionists...oppose the People's Republic of Albania by means of attacks and base slanders, by breaking all relations, by organizing a blockade in all fields, by plotting with imperialism to overthrow the people's government...By contrast, with the Indonesian fascist...right-wing generals, they create close friendship and grant them every material and moral support..."²¹⁹

Just exactly where the policies leading to this contrast wound→

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up was thrown into question by an item in CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS in the USA in February 1967:

"INDUSTRY CONCENTRATES...The Soviet Union has sold 2200 tons of magnesium to Dow Chemical. In this unusual move, Dow, the world's largest producer of magnesium, imported the Soviet metal *to meet short-term requirements brought on by both the Vietnam war and increasing consumer demands*. Dow points out that the purchase is in keeping with official U.S. government policy of 'building bridges' with the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries whenever possible."²²⁰

Stunned by the crudeness of the move and the justice of ensuing criticisms, a professional Soviet apologist printed the following in its Readers' Column:

"How can I protest against the USSR selling magnesium to Dow Chemical to make napalm for roasting children in Viet Nam?" (Rev.) H.J.B.

"Reply: Send your protest to Chairman Mao in Peking. His propagandists sent you this silly lie. *There is no magnesium in napalm*. Soviet missiles are now preventing YOUR COUNTRY from roasting children with bombs from B-52's...they can no longer be risked. Shame on you as a clergyman for parroting this wretched and stupid Mao-ist slander."²²¹

Note that the items concerning Dow did not claim that magnesium was a component of *napalm*. Note that Dow Chemicals' anti-Vietnam activities, involving substantial super-profits, were not dealt with at all by the Soviet apologists.

Another source described how Sukarno, far from having been a real anti-imperialist, had started undermining other Asian liberation movements *long before the coup in Indonesia*; and, immediately thereafter, had helped the fascist Indonesian dictatorship. As a result, this paper noted,

"Already, the imperialist puppet Lee Kuan Yew regime (of Singapore – HE) *backed by the Soviet revisionists*, has begun negotiations with the new Indonesian regime."²²²

And, by October 1971, this same Lee Kuan Yew was quoted on BBC Radio – one heard the actual excerpt of the Prime Minister's remarks – that now Indonesia was joining those parts of Asia, like Yew's Singapore, where "rapid development" was occurring under the "benevolent guidance" of "foreign aid." The nature of this type of "development" has been dealt with elsewhere.*

In addition to its repercussions in colonial areas, the Soviet attitude to the Indonesian fascists bore fruit in Eastern Europe, which appeared to have accepted the Soviet position of support for the murderous regime. Thus, one item described *talks* between "Indonesian fascist authorities" and the *German Democratic Republic*.²²³

In these talks, Peter Florin, Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the GDR, was quoted from a press conference in Djakarta on November 25, 1966, as saying

"...that there were no contradictions at all between the two countries...

"...that the two governments were now continuing to strive for stronger friendly ties and cooperation between them.

"...that the massacre and persecution of Indonesian communists and democrats were an internal affair of Indonesia...

"...(that) the decision...banning the diffusion of Marxism-Leninism-Communism...was an internal matter of Indonesia."²²⁴

A consecutive news item read as follows:

"BERITA ANGKATAN BERSENDJATA on November 26 quoted a public statement by the German Democratic Consulate General in Djakarta saying that the GDR had provided 80 million dollars to the Indonesian Government ."²²⁵

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XLI, "Anti-Communism, Racism and Social Democracy."

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Section F: Revisionism and Anti-Communism

If American imperialism has become the international spearhead of modern "fascist imperialism," and if anti-communism is and always has been a tool of fascism*, then it becomes necessary to inquire *whether anti-communism can be found among the Modern Revisionists*. Consider the following:

"...clearly, the continued growth of the American military machine is inseparable from world anti-Communism spearheaded by the U.S., and the combination is intended to implement the grand strategic aim of the U.S. ruling class: 'to contain, compress, and eventually to destroy the rival world socialist system.'

"Anti-Communism, then, is the major strategic ideological weapon of imperialism today; its material tool is unprecedented military strength and force; and its aim is the end of the socialist system."²²⁶

Therefore, if anti-Communism did exist among modern revisionists, they would be automatically, willy-nilly, aiding the U.S. imperialist "grand strategic aim" of "destroying the socialist system."

Considering that imperialist propaganda media still now and then referred to the Modern Revisionists as "communists," one could hardly have expected the Revisionists themselves to utter the usual Hitler-brand shriek against Communism as such. On the contrary, didn't the CPSU Program of 1961 declare beatifically that the actual building of Communism was now proceeding in the USSR?

So then, did anti-Communism take some other form among Modern Revisionists?

It has been shown how, despite the cries of "Communism" against them, the Revisionists gradually attained international respectability. While the "hate chorus" against them diminished, however, the hue and cry itself continued *fortissimo*, but against People's China: the once-hated Soviet Union had become—

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XLI, "Anti-Communism, Racism and Social Democracy."

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respectable enough to hob-nob with Uncle Sam. China replaced her as "the world's despised," and as "the Communist menace" of today.

In this light, the position – starting with Kruschov's advent – of the new Soviet leadership toward China (and her supporters) WAS anti-Communism in the "new circumstances." The Soviet campaign of vilification and lies against China, some of which have already been noted in context in these pages, blended smoothly with the international fascist chorus and constituted the most damning proof of Revisionism's collaboration with international Fascism.

Let us look at some of the evidence:

Anwar Dharma, Indonesian communist journalist expelled from the USSR, dealt with specific Soviet support for Indonesian Fascism as such. But his own case, in and of itself, comprised another instance of anti-Communism among Modern Revisionists. Dharma himself declared:

"This incident can only expose still further the intimate cooperation between the Soviet modern revisionists and the fascist military regime of Indonesia."²²⁷

Such cooperation was further proven in the timing of his own expulsion:

"when Djakarta was busy arranging the visits (to the Soviet Union) of Adam, the Foreign Minister of the fascist military regime."²²⁸

The reason advanced by Pyaditev, Deputy Head of the Soviet Press Department, and Fedorenko, adviser, for the Soviet Foreign Ministry expulsion decision was that Dharma had been

"engaging in anti-Soviet activities and maintaining an active contact with a certain foreign mission which is hostile to the Soviet Union."²²⁹

Dharma commented that

"after many talks with responsible members of the Soviet Government and Party, I presume that what they have—

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labeled as 'anti-Soviet' is my firm attitude in opposing imperialism and modern revisionism."²³⁰

And this incident would seem to be supportive evidence for an Albanian charge

"that the Soviet revisionist leadership has long been engaged in attempts to crush the PKI, to obstruct and undermine the PKI's policies in defending the people's interest, to deflect Indonesia from the road of anti-imperialist struggle, from supporting the liberation forces in Asia."²³¹

While neither Chinese nor Albanian sources have hesitated to expose such facts and interpret their meaning, it is not necessary to rely solely on their word. For example, in the official international organ of the very respectable Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), an "esteemed member of the Australian WILPF" examined conditions in "that vast Asian territory."²³²

She described "mass killings of communists and alleged communists," and attributed them to "a wild frenzy of fear" accompanied by a "mystical sharing of guilt," and noted that they were reported in the U.S. newspapers WASHINGTON POST, LOS ANGELES TIMES and NEW YORK TIMES only six or seven months after the events themselves, which allegedly "shocked" the Western world.²³³

However, the author claimed that "a leading Australian writer on Indonesia, Bruce Grant," heard from "an influential man in Djakarta" that

"it was not such a shock to us, although even now we do not know for sure the magnitude of it."²³⁴

It is common knowledge who qualified as "influential" in Djakarta after September 30, 1965, whether foreigner or "native." The same "Australian writer on Indonesia" was quoted as confessing that

"the charge that gave the thing its dimension of horror was fear – fear that the government had lost control."²³⁵

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Meaning that the "wrong" people might start getting killed? The WILPF writer's comment was that

"even in the West it would be regarded as dangerous to release communists. In Singapore and Malaya it was accepted that communists must be detained without trial for security reasons. The Soviet Union seemed to understand that the pro-Peking communists should be kept under observation."²³⁶

All 500,000 of them, no doubt...trust a Western do-gooder to smooth over any little inconveniences like murder in the millions.

Estimating the end results insofar as the Indonesian Communist Party was concerned, the Australian woman noted:

"The once third largest Communist Party in the world is in eclipse at present – its leading activists, dead. The Socialist Party may go into opposition for fear of another authoritarian regime."²³⁷

Meaning, one like Sukarno's? Among Indonesian "socialists," with their close ties to the Second International, no fault was found with the militarist Nasution regime, nor was the word "authoritarian" applied to *it*.

And EVEN the Soviet Union "understands" which communists "must be kept under observation," a euphemism dripping with the blood of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Indonesian revolutionaries.

The case of Indonesia brought Revisionism's modern form of anti-Communism irrefutably into the open and established Revisionist connection with Fascism. But once again, this development was *first* manifested in Yugoslavia, where even today, anti-Communism has been a bit more "classical:"

"Tito's clique...became the forerunner of the Kruschovite revisionist group and a bridge for the imperialist-revisionist alliance, a model for the restoration of capitalism in the European socialist countries where modern revisionists are in power."²³⁸

Furthermore,

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"UDB has stained...Yugoslavia and socialism with the blood of thousands of internationalist communists...massacred 'en masse' and poisoned with other lethal methods of extermination, with mass tortures...a reign of terror unparalleled in the annals of history...

"But the files of the UDB do not end here. A very large chapter is occupied by its provocations, the espionage and plots hatched against socialist countries, its foul dealings in the service of the intelligence organs of imperialism and its collaboration with them to...fight socialism and the national liberation movement on a world scale.

"...documents discovered in Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and elsewhere showed with all clarity that Tito's band...pursued a reactionary policy of hegemony in the Balkans and in Central Europe."²³⁹

The *international* anti-Communist activities of Yugoslav revisionism have already been documented in a previous chapter, where their anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary nature was exposed and was shown to be sufficient to qualify them for inclusion now in this section on anti-Communism.

The development of anti-China activities by top Soviet circles has also been traced in detail.²⁴⁰

What concerns us here is the co-terminous evolution of Krushchov's revisionism and the official Soviet anti-China campaign as a peculiar brand of anti-Communism in what were, indeed, "new circumstances."

The "palace revolution" which elevated Nikita Krushchov to power in the USSR occurred shortly after the death of Josef Stalin. Immediately thereupon, "new principles of socialism" began emanating from the Kremlin:

"The 20th Congress of the CPSU was the first step along the road of revisionism taken by the leadership of the CPSU."²⁴¹

And who opposed this revisionist line from the outset? The Chinese Communist Party claimed this distinction, declaring that it had differed with the Soviet leadership sharply on two points: the "complete negation of Stalin on the pretext of 'combating"

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the personality cult," and the "peaceful parliamentary road to socialism."²⁴²

As a matter of fact, this text has noted elsewhere that the anti-Stalin campaign itself was an additional form of anti-Communism in that it negated the dictatorship of the proletariat in a socialist country.

Those who took over Soviet reins in 1956 had counted heavily on the well-earned international prestige and authority of the CPSU to put their alterations of Marxism over without too much fuss. But the Chinese, refusing to be over-awed, claimed to have stuck by their guns, for

"the question of Stalin and of 'peaceful transition' are by no means simply internal affairs of the CPSU; they are vital issues of common interest for all fraternal Parties."²⁴³

This statement was said to be proven by the fact that, in the wake of the 20th Congress, a world-wide wave of imperialist-type anti-Communism had been directed *against the Soviet Union*, apparently in an attempt to push "peaceful development" along faster than was then possible. At the same time, Tito and his followers became more aggressive, using "anti-Stalinism" as the excuse for attacks on socialism and on the dictatorship of the proletariat. And

"The errors of the 20th Congress brought great ideological confusion into the international communist movement and caused it to be deluged with revisionist ideas."²⁴⁴

The Chinese considered it "no accident" that, at precisely this time, there occurred "the incident in Soviet-Polish relations" and the "counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary."²⁴⁵

Starting with April 5, 1962, not long after the 20th Congress, the CPC began issuing pamphlets containing statements of principle in opposition to the CPSU leadership. For a long time, this "debate" remained hidden. So cogent and well-documented were the Chinese charges, meantime, that the "time schedule" and complete victory of incipient Revisionism were allegedly greatly hampered.²⁴⁶

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At the same time, imperialism used the Polish and Hungarian incidents to become exceedingly aggressive; and only the insistence of the Chinese Communists "and other fraternal Parties persevering in Marxism-Leninism" still managed quietly to force the Soviet leadership to safeguard the socialist camp. In this way, the onslaught of imperialism was allegedly at least temporarily repulsed.

In this setting, the 1957 Meeting of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties took place in Moscow. Here,

"the erroneous views of the 20th Congress on many important questions of principle were rejected and corrected."²⁴⁸

A Declaration from this meeting took "specifically Marxist-Leninist" stands on all questions of principle. Again, the Chinese Party delegation, this time headed by Chairman Mao himself, saw itself as having played a "worker bee" role at the Congress, keeping the CPSU leadership in line whenever it tried to get out, and buzzing here and there between delegations, ensuring consensus.²⁴⁹

Despite the formulation and issuance of this Declaration of 1957, the CPSU's revisionism grew, aggravating the differences in the international communist movement. Ignoring the 1957 gathering's designation of U.S. imperialism as World Working Class Enemy No. 1, Soviet

leaders sought greater and greater collaboration with it, culminating in September 1959 at the Camp David Talks between Khrushchev and President Dwight D. Eisenhower of the U.S. Khrushchev saw these Talks as marking "a new era in international relations" and "a turning point in history." He was right – but not in the way he intended his remarks to be interpreted.

Anti-China activities by the USSR leadership now included:

"In 1958...CPSU...demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control...were rightly and firmly rejected...in June 1959, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on...national defence...between China and the Soviet Union in October 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture.

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"Then, on the eve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States,...the CPSU rushed out the TASS statement of September 9 on the Sino-Indian border incident, siding with the Indian reactionaries...

"(Both these actions)...were presentation gifts to Eisenhower...to...create the so-called 'spirit of Camp David'."²⁵⁰

From such beginnings, the "incidents" became increasingly serious. For example, the Soviet leadership carried its anti-China vendetta into the subjugated areas of the earth:

"...Back in 1927, the Chang Tso-lingists murdered Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the CPC. Now, in 1967, the Mao Tse-tungists are snuffing out his son Li Pao-hua, First Secretary of the Annui Provincial CPC Committee...

"Mao Tse-tung and his henchmen seek to rid themselves of veteran Chinese internationalist-minded Communists...

"But...these...'Red Guards' (will) be inevitably spurned by the Chinese people...and be remembered...with horror."²⁵¹

Here was official Soviet literature in Africa airing "internal" quarrels in a completely incomprehensible way before a country where China had an embassy! With "comrades" like these, who needs imperialism?

By this time, obviously, the Soviet leadership had become revisionism's fountainhead, its literature – dripping with anti-China venom – spouting "new principles of socialism," assiduously spread into whatever international democratic organizations it influenced or controlled. For example, at the General Council meeting of the World Federation of Trade

Unions (WFTU) in June 1960, anti-China action burst into the open. By December 1966, the WFTU's General Council in Sofia would refuse even to admit a Chinese union delegation.²⁵²

Clearly, the anti-China campaign of the CPSU leadership had become part of a world pattern of which American anti-Communism, especially anti-China propaganda and action, formed the main aspect.

A climax was reached in November 1960 at a meeting of representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow. ▯

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The general outcome was epitomized by a new rejection of the revisionist line and "a great victory for Marxism-Leninism" in the world revolutionary movement.²⁵³

In October 1961, the CPSU held its 22nd Congress, which achieved the systematization of official revisionism, along with the unprecedented use of a Party Congress for public attacks on fraternal Parties, in this case on the leadership of the Albanian Party of Labor, actually calling for the overthrow of its leaders, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. (The Program adopted by this Congress has been quoted frequently in this text.)

Since the 22nd Congress, sabotage activities against Sino-Soviet unity have been categorized as follows.²⁵⁴ They have

- a) tried to impose their erroneous line on all Parties, reserving the sharpest attacks for dissenters;
- b) for the first time in the history of relations between fraternal parties and countries, diplomatic relations were ruptured between the CPSU and socialist Albania in retaliation for the latter's refusal to knuckle under;
- c) pressure on China was stepped up through a series of open letters, etc.;
- d) the CPSU leadership rejected all proposals for meetings by fraternal Parties suggested as a means of healing the widening International breach, except on condition that the "recalcitrants" abandon their "neutral" stance;
- e) in April and May of 1962 at Sinkiang, China, the revisionists

"enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union...to this day this incident remains unsettled. This is indeed an astounding event, unheard of in the relations between socialist countries."²⁵⁵

- f) August 1962: the Soviet Government formally notified China that the USSR was to conclude an agreement with the USA on "nuclear non-proliferation." The Chinese at once protested,

interpreting any such agreement as an attempt to prevent China from defending itself, nuclearly if need be.²⁵⁶

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g) Rapprochement with the U.S. Government was increasingly sought by the CPSU leadership

"even at the expense of the interests of the socialist camp and the international communist movement."²⁵⁷

The Carribean crisis was cited as an example, when the revisionists submitted to U.S. blackmail, accepting their demand for "international inspection" of CUBAN areas.

h) Rapprochement with the Indian reactionaries also proceeded. The CPSU leadership openly sided against socialist China with India's reactionaries:

"Two-thirds of Soviet economic aid to India have been given since the Indian reactionaries provoked the Sino-Indian border conflict. Even after large-scale armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border began in the autumn of 1962, the leadership of the CPSU has continued to extend military aid to the Indian reactionaries."²⁵⁸

i) Collusion with Tito's Yugoslavia greatly increased, the CPSU taking a number of steps to reverse the verdict of the 1960 Statement against the Tito Government for "betrayals."²⁵⁹

j) After November 1962, increasingly heavy verbal attacks on China began escalating onto the international level. Hundreds of articles attacking China appeared in the Soviet press. Congresses of

"the fraternal Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Democratic Republic of Germany became stages for anti-China performances, and more than forty fraternal Parties published resolutions, statements or articles attacking the Chinese Communist Party and other Marxist-Leninist Parties."²⁶⁰

k) The CPC, forced finally to make public reply to these attacks, published some seven replies, between December 15, 1962, and March 8, 1963. In these, it did not as yet criticise the CPSU leadership by name. Although the CPC still continued to seek some sort of understanding with the CPSU leadership, the end result was the signing, by the latter in Moscow, with Britain and the U.S. of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which China

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again interpreted as more anti-China than pro-peace.²⁶¹

l) How these verbal attacks escalated into practice could be seen from a typical anti-China "incident" in 1966:

"In taking the initiative to oust the Chinese without waiting for their possible withdrawal, the Russians seized upon an opportunity to depict the Chinese Government as hostile to the North Vietnamese and other foreigners.

"The Soviet move also fitted into the Kremlin pattern of using all available weapons to demonstrate that Peking is to blame for the enmity between the two countries."²⁶²

Moreover,

"Chinese students had not been seen much here since they staged a mass demonstration outside the U.S. embassy on March 4, 1965. This was called to protest U.S. policy on Vietnam but resulted in street fights between Chinese students and Russian police, with many injuries on both sides."²⁶³

m) A few months later, elsewhere in Europe, a story on Soviet poet Andre Voznessenski described and quoted *Walkie Talkie*, a poem from this author's latest published collection which had recently appeared.

Interestingly, in this anti-China poem (at least in the excerpts liberally quoted), China itself was not once mentioned. The poem, rather,

"is in the form of an apocalyptic evocation of the Mongol invasion at the end of Russia's Middle Ages, and of the role as shield of Western civilization which Russia at that time played."²⁶⁴

Apparently, Uncle Sam was to have a bit of stiff competition for his claim to the title, "shield of Western civilization."

The following excerpts are from the poet's "cry of alarm." They formed the main body of the story (the reader is asked to pardon the author's literal translation, since content, not form, is here the crucial item):

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"I have a foreboding of Koutchoum;

"I foresee his armor across the gibberish of 'military communes,'

"I have a foreboding of Koutchoum;

"I foresee urine on the joyous Egyptians in the Louvre.

"I have a foreboding of Koutchoum;
"Dust rises above the horde,
"Simulating a mushroom form.
"Men, come back from your amorous youth to reality,
"For I have a foreboding of Koutchoum.
"Is it possible that tomorrow cosmonauts will fly toward Mars
"And that the day after they return to a time of pastoral feudalism?
"Is it possible that someone would force Shakespeare
"To confess ignorance of 'isms'?
"Is it possible that they would drag Stravinsky through the streets,
"Howling with a bucket of ordure over his white hair?
"I think...is the majority always right?
"Was it right, flooding Florence when it roasted a palace like a nut?
"But it is genius which will conquer
"Not numbers...
"I think...the mob or unity?
"Which is the more lasting:
"The century, or that moment which Michaelangelo seized?
"The century has blown up, but the instant still lives...
"Paris is not afraid to flame like a torch on a pile of wood...
"What good are centuries of history
"If their end is to fall back onto our feet?"²⁶⁶

Here, the reporter commented that the poet had made clear that "the people are not Koutchoum," and that, besides, "skin color has nothing to do with it there," for have not there been "blonds" who

"have burned adolescents alive in order to make lampshades of their skins?"

Then, the poet was again quoted:

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"The Super-West peoples the dreams of the Super-East.

"Koutchoum, that's the wave of owlsh chauvinism.

"Koutchoum, that's war."²⁶⁸

Now began praise of the Russian "saviour role":

"Are we then required once again to carry the planet on our shoulders?

"O time...direct your prayer to Russia for her extraordinary destiny...

"For our self-denial, eternal as the skies,

"Who receives on her body all the bullets aimed at Rome and at Vienna...

"Saviour Russia, whoever the Batyis²⁶⁹ may be,

"Always Russia, eternally Russia..."²⁷⁰

The author of the article made the following comment:

"The passage on 'Saviour Russia' relies directly on the intellectual tradition of the 'slavophiles' of the past century, who saw in their country the redemption of the universe. 'Proletarian internationalism' looks pretty far off."²⁷¹

Far off was right! If this was any sample of the "intellectual" atmosphere in the Soviet Union created by the CPSU leadership revisionism, well – bad as it smelled – it wasn't terribly original: shades of the old U.S.-spawned notion of "yellow peril"! This "work of art" published by Soviet revisionism revealed far more clearly than open political incidents its leading spokesmen as advocates and practitioners of a "new form" of imperialism's own anti-Communism; and thus, as collaborators with international Fascism.

The *result* has been *confusion* in revolutionary ranks, especially (as will be shown) in the "hinterland" areas; *splitting* of the world revolutionary movement; and the *strengthening* of *U.S. imperialism* (if only by permitting it a better hold on its existence) at a time when it could not have withstood a united liberation-socialist combination.

Thus, from "A to Z," modern Revisionism's theoretical position—

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on class struggle has led to *practical consequences*, some old, some new:

Stemming from a "slight theoretical aberration" (the "abolition of classes" in the Soviet Union before the advent of communism), what arose, starting with Yugoslavia under its slogan of "worker's management" of individual state-owned enterprises, was *an actual new elite* connected with the proletarian state and its means of production, and bearing all the hallmarks of capitalist exploiters.

The main features of this new elite's rise was *economic polarization* in both urban and rural areas: *deterioration* in the conditions and wages of working people, while Party and Government leaders, managers of industry, professionals and technocrats (again, starting in Yugoslavia but continued by Kruschov and his successors in the USSR and extending to all Eastern Europe) began to enjoy luxury.

The new elite itself advocated and/or practised the "peaceful transition to socialism" via the old, discredited "parliamentary road." Because the bourgeoisie today is international, class collaboration by Modern Revisionism, while complex, also became unmistakeably international; and, just as in Western Europe in the mid-30s, included support for international Fascism, which (as this author has noted elsewhere*) currently operates in "overseas" — i.e., colonial — areas. Proletarian internationalism was abandoned in all but lip-service.

Finally, Indonesian experience proved that international class collaboration by Modern Revisionism was a new form of the old Social Democratic sell-out of the international working class. And exactly as with Social Democracy in the preceding epoch, so one form of modern class collaboration by Modern Revisionism turned out to be support for international Fascism.

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XIV, "Class Collaboration and Fascism."

V | MODERN REVISIONISM AND OWNERSHIP OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION

Section A: In Theory

Marxian theory holds that the *indispensable material keystone* for building a socialist economy is *ownership of the social means of production*. Such ownership is attained by wresting those means of production from the former, minority, ruling class, and investing it in the new ruling class, the proletariat. The new ownership is then protected and extended through the new ruling class state, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This step is the very pivot around which the struggle for political power between the former owners of industry and the workers is waged, and the success or failure of the transition from capitalism to socialism is determined. Before any new ruling class can change any existing economic set up, it has to own and control the social means of production, distribution and consumption.

A primary characteristic of *capitalist economy* – based on *private* ownership of the social means of production – is *anarchy of production*. Flowing out of the system's profit motive, which "regulates" the economy, individuals – or, as the system advances, collective "individuals" called monopolies – alone decide what is produced, and how it is to be done; who is hired and for how long; who is fired; methods of securing markets for goods. The criterion for any decision under capitalist economics is the amount of profit the operation is likely to bring to the private owner. If an enterprise proves "inefficient," i.e., unprofitable, the owner can close it down, regardless of how many workers are thereby rendered jobless: the "right to work" does not exist.

The main change, therefore – the main economic purpose in carrying out a socialist revolution – is to *remove the*

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profit move and thereby become able to substitute for former productive anarchy *centralized planning*. Such a change can come about only after a) the attainment of *political power*; and b) the *use* of such power *immediately* to seize ownership of all the main social means of production and distribution. Moreover, c) both these preconditions must be sustained in order for a revolution not to be reversed.

With the success of both preconditions, the needs of society can, at last, guide what or how much is produced; production can, at last, be for use rather than for exchange. Owning the means of production along with control over distribution ensures that the anarchic mechanism, the "free market," will be gradually eliminated.

Obviously, the speed at which such a basic change can be effected will depend on a number of factors. Primary (history is showing) is *understanding by the masses* of the main changes

needed; and mass *participation* therein. Other factors include the availability of internal investment fund sources for building industry where historical conditions leave little or none; existence of Marxist leadership, etc.

Did new socialist economies, built in the face of international sabotage and amidst the rubble of war and revolution, have difficulty reaching ruling-class capitalist standards? The vested interests thereof have always gloated in advance about "socialism's failures." This, in itself, never has and never will make them actual failures.

Yet, such taunts were useable by other vested interests:

"...the current search for incentives to get the Russian economy moving again is nonetheless an eloquent testimony to the failure of one of Communism's cardinal creeds: that the profit motive is wrong and evil, and unnecessary in running a society."¹

And off went the Eastern European countries, "pioneered" by Yugoslavia, but soon led by the Soviet Union. What do their "experiments" prove about profit under socialism?

Profit is not a generalized thing-in-itself which fits into any economic system with a bit of trimming here or there. It *is, by definition, a specific portion of surplus*—

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value created by workers but appropriated privately by OTHERS who own the means of production on which the values were created. This definition of the very essence of profit is neither academic nor semantic. Defining terminology is a scientific exercise which alone ensures the precision of any science. Blur one term and you blur the science itself. Therefore, this scientifically determined definition applies to *capitalism*; it can NOT simply be lifted over to the *socialist* set up and, perhaps shifting lightly from the right foot to the left, go marching gaily onward and upward. What the people get under the socialist economy in fringe benefits, or in the expansion or establishment of their industries, derives from a *socially-created public* fund that has no resemblance whatsoever to profit because its very basis – SOCIAL ownership of society's means of production – constitutes the major *qualitative* difference between the two systems. Any other approach at such a crucial point plays not only with words but with people's lives.

That the Modern Revisionists descended into this depth was, as we shall see, merely an extension of other aberrations: having disposed of the class struggle, they moved logically on to discuss who should OWN the social means of production.

Now, if Modern Revisionist theory holds that ownership of the social means of production can, "in the new circumstances," be transferred to the people by negotiation with its current owners, the monopolist ruling class, then implementing such "theory" should bring about erosion not only in social ownership of the means of production itself, but also in every economic effect flowing from such ownership: one should expect not only an upsurge in the private sector of the

economy per se; but with that, the destruction of centralized planning; the return of the market mechanism, including cut-throat competition between individual enterprises; anarchy of prices, of production and of employment patterns with resulting trends toward monopolization; closing of "inefficient" enterprises; and unemployment. There should also occur the loss of control over foreign trade and over investment funds, and even usury would not be surprising.

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Having postulated transference of ownership of the means of production, key to power, "by agreement and political cooperation between different parties and democratic organizations," the CPSU leadership went on to extend the "principle:"

"It may well be that as the forces of socialism grow, the working class movement gains strength and the positions of capitalism are weakened, there will arise in certain countries a situation in which it will be preferable for the bourgeoisie, as Marx and Lenin foresaw, to agree to the basic means of production being purchased from it and for the proletariat to 'pay off the bourgeoisie.'"²

Even if such a contingency were to arise, Lenin specifically emphasized that *expropriation by itself was not a guarantee of victory for the working class struggle*. Specifically, he noted:

"expropriation alone, as a legal or political act, *does not settle the matter* (of a successful uprising) *by a long way* because...For a long time after the revolution the exploiters inevitably continue to enjoy a number of great practical advantages: they still have *money* (since it is impossible to abolish money all at once); some movable property – often fairly considerable; they still have various *connections*, habits of *organization and management*, *knowledge* of all the 'secrets (customs, methods, means and possibilities) of *management*, superior *education*, close *connections with the higher technical personnel* (who live and think like the bourgeoisie), incomparably *greater experience in the art of war* (this is very important) and so on and so forth."³

Aside from such considerations, it was sheer intellectual dishonesty when the Program referred – without quoting – to Marx and Lenin as though they had agreed that exceptions they might have mentioned in a political aside could become the rule. And this diagnosis confirmed in Lenin's actual words. For example, discussing the right of nations to self-determination, he declared:

"...it cannot be denied that in individual cases, *by way of exception*, in some small country, for instance, after the social revolution has been accomplished—

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in a neighboring big country, peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie is POSSIBLE, if it is convinced that resistance is hopeless and if it prefers to save its skin. *It is much more likely, of course, that even in small states socialism will NOT be achieved without civil war*, and for that reason the ONLY program of international Social Democracy (now "Communism" – HE) must be recognition of civil war, although violence is, of course, alien to our *ideals*."4

The *only* program Communists can recognize vis-a-vis the achievement of socialism is *civil war*, Lenin said. He put it this way despite a few, small, individual post-revolution, possible-but-unlikely *exceptions*.

The Program of the CPSU 22nd Congress simply wished away the world's sharpening class struggle. But it was erroneous for them to try to claim for this act the sanction of either Marx or Lenin.

Erosion of theory and practice *began* there; but nothing, thereafter, could *confine* it to that sphere. Since class struggle occurs around ownership of the social means of production, it was only "natural" that the subject of the private sector of the old economy – and of the new – occupy a major place in revising the theories of Marx and Lenin.

Nobody is contending that the private sector of an economy directly after a successful revolution can, presto-change-o, be eliminated. The Marxist attitude on this matter runs like this:

"Judging by the record of all socialist countries, it is not strange to find different sectors, including a private capitalist sector, existing in the national economy of a country for a considerable period after the proletariat has taken political power. *What matters is the kind of policy adopted by the government towards private capitalism* – the policy of utilizing, restricting, transforming and eliminating it, or the policy of laissez-faire and fostering and encouraging it. This is an important criterion for determining whether a country is developing towards socialism or towards capitalism."5

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What sort of policy, then, was adopted toward the private sector in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe?

Section B: Practical Erosion of Public Ownership

1. In Yugoslavia

Little question remains that the policy of Tito and his ruling junta has been one of rapidly wearing away genuine socialist ownership of the means of production. He has favored and instituted the return of private ownership *in a new form* – but even in the old, naked form.

For example, in

"Yugoslav reality...the means of production and the fruits of the labor of the workers...belong to the new type of the comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie which has...sped up and completed the substitution of social property with the property of individual bourgeois groups, first and foremost, those of Croatia and Slovenia which are the stronger."⁶

This retrogression and its results have been fully documented from Yugoslav sources which revealed, among other things, that

"Subservient to U.S. imperialism externally and serving the bourgeoisie internally, the Tito clique has caused the state power built in their revolutionary way by the Yugoslav people to degenerate into...the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie...used...to carry out...'workers' self-government' in enterprises, thus completely undermining the socialist economy owned by the whole people in production, circulation and distribution...to make the Yugoslav socialist economy...degenerate step by step into a capitalist economy."⁷

In Yugoslavia, the mechanism by which this was accomplished went by the name of "workers' self-government." The first step in that direction was allegedly taken in June 1950,⁸ when the Yugoslav Federal National Assembly adopted the "Basic Law Concerning Management by Working Collectives of State Economic Enterprises and Leading Joint Economic Concerns."

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The exact itinerary of Yugoslavia's return to the capitalist fold has also been traced.⁹

Contrary to claims by Tito and his followers that "workers' self-government" has "transformed" state ownership into "public ownership," "direct social possession," or a "higher form of socialist ownership," the facts of Yugoslav economic life proved that, first,

"the social functions of production, management and distribution of social products are wholly in the hands of the managers of the enterprises. These managers, in the words of the Tito clique, 'appear in the capacity of a "state" factor'."¹⁰

Secondly, these managers were in actual fact independent of any control by workers; they were accountable only to the local government.

Thirdly, the laws promulgated by the Yugoslav government itself

"lay it down in barefaced terms that the state is entitled to grab through taxation and collection of interest the lion's share of the surplus value created by the workers."^{11*}

And the state was assured of continuing to grab such wealth by laws which decreed that

"an enterprise will be closed down by the state in the event of failure to pay taxes and interest to the Tito clique's state at the specified time and in specified amounts."¹²

Another bond between the Yugoslav state and such enterprises lay in that state's role in financing the enterprises:

"all the more important enterprises in Yugoslavia were built with the capital of the state power at various levels. Should such establishments incur deficits, they are subsidized by the state, provided they are of vital importance to the Tito clique. There are all sorts of subsidies. In—

* See Page 44, above, last quotation.

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reductions of interest on fixed assets and liquid capital, cancellation of payments of income to the state, and direct and indirect subsidies sidetracked from the local funds and budget, etc."¹³

In a word, Yugoslavia's "workers' self-government" enterprises

"are enterprises of that (Tito) clique's state ownership, in which 'the representative of the means of production is still the state'."¹⁴

Furthermore, the June 1950 Yugoslav law

"places factories, mines, transport and communications, trade, agriculture, forestry, public utilities and other state enterprises under 'workers' self-government'...for independent management...(who) have the power to decide on management policy, distribute a portion of their accumulation independently and to employ and dismiss workers and staff members."¹⁵

Such a state of affairs clearly suggested that

"this is not socialist but capitalist state ownership, whether it is judged in the light of relations between enterprises or between managers and workers."¹⁶

Did Tito's "state intervention into the affairs of individual enterprises" constitute "proof of Yugoslav "socialism" – as certain self-styled socialist opinion holds? By no means! As far back in Marxist history as Engels, the Marxist position has been that

"the modern state...is only the organization that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no

matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine. The more it proceeds to taking over of productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage workers – proletarians."¹⁷

As a result, in Yugoslavia,

"The means of production of the enterprises under 'workers'—

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self-government' do not belong to one or more private capitalists but to the new type of bureaucrat-comprador bourgeoisie of Yugoslavia, which includes the bureaucrats and managers which the Tito clique represents."¹⁸

That is, restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia did not require the simple spread of private enterprise *as such* in city and countryside, but was manifested in "*state capitalism of a peculiar kind*."¹⁹

Yet, under this new development, private ownership of enterprises themselves was even actually increased under Tito:

"there are over 115,000 privately-owned establishments in Yugoslavia...the owners of many of these private enterprises are not 'craftsmen,' but typical private capitalists."²⁰

The law in Yugoslavia allowed private owners to employ a maximum of five workers each. Nevertheless,

"there are some who employ ten or twenty times as many and even some who employ 'five to six hundred workers'. And the annual turnover of some private enterprises is over 100 million dinars (\$133,000) (from VESNIK U SREDU, December 8, 1961)."²¹

In many cases, such private capitalists were actually "big entrepreneurs," who "in turn have their own 'sub-contractors'," and "no longer engage in labor but only give orders, make plans and conclude contracts, travelling by car from one enterprise to another."²²

And these "entrepreneurs" did not "earn" mere chicken-feed:

"the net income of some private handicraftsmen reaches one million dinars (\$1,330) per month."²³

There have even been cases in Belgrade where "last year 116 owners of private enterprises each received an income of more than 10 million (\$13,300) dinars."²⁴ Some even "received an income of about 70 million dinars (\$93,100)" in one year.²⁵

Nor were such developments confined to the cities:

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"The fact that Yugoslavia has been swamped by capitalism is even more striking in the countryside."²⁶

Lenin's opinion always was that small peasant economy constantly breeds capitalism. Stalin, referring to this, warned that

"so long as this danger (predominance of peasant economy in the countryside) exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction."²⁷

The first act of the post-war, at-first-revolutionary, Tito government was "a land reform" which resulted in the formation "a few peasants' working cooperatives." But, in the main, "the rich peasant economy was left untouched."²⁸

Yugoslav authorities allegedly claimed that collectivization was "not of value in Yugoslavia."²⁹ In 1951, therefore,

"the Tito clique openly declared its abandonment of the road of agricultural collectivization and began to disband the peasants' working cooperatives."³⁰

In fact, from more than 6,900 in 1950, these cooperatives decreased to a little more than 1,200 in 1953 and to 147 by 1960.³¹

Beginning in 1953, Yugoslavia's rulers promulgated a number of decrees for the rural areas,

"granting freedom to buy, sell and rent land and to hire farm hands, abolishing the planned purchase of agricultural produce and replacing it with free trading in this sphere...the forces of capitalism spread rapidly in the rural areas and the process of polarization quickened."³²

Such polarization showed itself in various ways:

First, in *changes in land ownership*. In 1959, poor peasant households (less than five hectares of land each) constituted 70% of all peasant households but owned only 43% of all privately-owned land. At the same time, rich peasant households (more than eight hectares each) making up only 13% of all peasant households nonetheless owned 33% of all land privately owned. About 10% of peasant households – mainly poverty-stricken families – bought or sold land each year.³³

Second, in *concentration of land*. For example, in one district there were

"thousands of peasant households with far more than legal maximum of 10 hectares of land,"³⁴

and a commune in which 500 peasant households were found owning estates of ten to thirty hectares.³⁵

Third, in "*great inequalities in the ownership of draught animals and farm implements*."³⁶ For instance, the province of Vojvodina, a leading grain-producing area, contained 308,000 peasant households. Of these, 55% had no draught animals; 40.7% had less than two hectares of land each and owned only 4.4% of all ploughs in the region (an average of one plough to 20 households). The rich peasants of this area owned more than 1,300 tractors, much other farm machinery, and "large numbers of ploughs and animal-drawn carts."³⁷

The CPSU has claimed that the "socialist sector" of rural Yugoslavia increased from 6% to 15%.³⁸ But investigation proved that even this 15% was not really "socialist."³⁹ Rather, the Yugoslav countryside was dominated by the exploiting class. The 15% referred to "agricultural farms" and "general agricultural cooperatives" promoted by Tito and his followers.⁴⁰ These

"in fact...are capitalist farms and...capitalist economic organizations engaging mainly in commerce. They do not affect the private ownership of land; what is more, their main function is to foster the development of the rich peasant economy."⁴¹

This contention found support in a Yugoslav work which emphatically denied that the cooperatives

"in the least signify socialist reconstruction of agriculture and of the countryside. They are working not so much for the creation of socialist strongholds as for the development and promotion of capitalist elements. There are cases in which these cooperatives are kulak associations."⁴²

Reinforcing this alleged trend was the fact that Yugoslav law gave the general agricultural cooperatives a *monopoly* on the right to buy agricultural products from the peasants. Naturally, they used this monopoly to manipulate farm prices, to speculate, ▯

and generally "to exploit the peasants in a big way."⁴³

Still further reinforcement for this general drift of the Yugoslav countryside back toward capitalism came from the "Law on the Utilization of Cultivated Land," issued in 1959. It stipulated that the land of self-employed peasants who could not farm "according to

requirements" was to be subject to "compulsory management" by the general agricultural cooperatives and agricultural farms:

"In effect, this means the expropriation of poor peasants and the forcible annexation of their land to develop capitalist farms."⁴⁴

The Yugoslav pattern of restoring capitalism was, then, fairly clear cut.

2. *In the USSR*

Kruschov has been quoted in these pages as he praised Tito, calling him "a great socialist" whom the USSR would "humbly imitate." This attitude was never repudiated by Kruschov's successors. Rather, as Mikhail Suslov himself testified*, they have continued to support it.

Did such support affect ownership of the social means of production *in the USSR*?

As will now be shown, once the USSR departed from the Marxist-Leninist path and this departure had been reflected in the deteriorated role of the vanguard party, economic conditions – deprived of their "proletarian watch dog" – also began to slide.

Interesting in this context, and in the light of Yugoslavia's example, were references by Soviet leaders to the NEP period in the early revolutionary days. Talking of "a plan for the radical transformation of the country, for the construction of socialism," one such reference intoned:

"On the basis of a thorough scientific analysis, Lenin→

* See Note 51, Page 47, Chapter IV, "Revisionism and the Attitude to Class Struggle," Section B, "The Soviet Union," above.

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elaborated the policy of the proletarian state for the entire period of transition from capitalism to socialism. *He evolved the New Economic Policy* (NEP), designed to bring about the victory of socialism."⁴⁵

The sophistry – if not downright dishonesty – of dragging in the NEP to justify what has been going on in the USSR can only be exposed by a short digression to discuss the timing, duration and meaning of the NEP itself in its historical context.⁴⁶

The NEP was a *tactical maneuver of short duration* instituted in March 1921 by the Tenth Congress of the CPSU in order to

"fall back a little, to draw closer to and establish better contact with its base"⁴⁷

by the Party immediately after the victory of the Soviet Army over its international and internal enemies. Fourteen armies of intervention had been beaten and ejected from the country. And, just a week before the Tenth Congress, the "Kronstadt rebellion" had been decisively put down.

Furthermore, the NEP was adopted at a time when the internal socialist economy was in dire straits:

"The victory in the Civil War has not been an easy one. *The country had been reduced to a state of ruin...*The gross output of agriculture in 1920 was only about ONE-HALF of the pre-war output...Even worse was the plight of industry...The output of large-scale industry in 1920 was a little over ONE SEVENTH of pre-war...There was a shortage of fuel. Transport was disrupted. Stocks of metal and textiles in the country were nearly exhausted. There was an acute shortage of such prime necessities as bread, fats, meat, footwear, clothing, matches, salt, kerosene and soap.

"While the war was on, people put up with the shortage and scarcity...But...when the war ended and there was no longer any danger of the landlords returning, the peasants began to express dissatisfaction with having to surrender all their surplus...and to demand a sufficient supply of commodities."⁴⁸

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Basically, and foremost, the change from "War Communism" – where the peasants were required to deliver to the socialist state ALL their surplus in order to finance the war against intervention – to "New Economic Policy" – where

"it would be necessary to permit private trade and to allow private manufacturers to open small businesses" –

was merely a *temporary* state of affairs, and envisioned as such. The new measure was implemented by substituting a tax in kind for the surplus-appropriation system, with the aim of giving the peasants an incentive to revive and expand agriculture.⁴⁹

In his speech to the Party Congress that March (1921), Lenin had warned that

"freedom of trade would at first lead to a certain revival of capitalism in the country."⁵⁰

But, he had added, the moment it had accomplished its purpose, this "retreat" would be withdrawn and

"then a determined offensive would be undertaken to destroy the remnants of capitalism in the country."⁵¹

And this actually did take place:

"The fact is that *only a year after NEP was introduced* Lenin declared at the Eleventh Party Congress that the RETREAT HAD TO COME TO AN END, and he put forward the slogan, 'PREPARE FOR AN OFFENSIVE ON PRIVATE CAPITAL'."⁵²

There is, therefore, a sharp contrast between the short duration and limited scope of the NEP "retreat" and what is envisioned by today's "reformers" in the modern USSR. In the face of virtual abandonment of socialist economic principles, modern Soviet references constituted nothing but an attempt to make the NEP appear as the *core* of Lenin's "plan for the radical transformation of the USSR, when in fact it was a *retreat* that alone would prepare for such an actual radical transformation.

Moreover, the new Soviet economy was one which had *recovered* from war-time devastation in a remarkably short period,─

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without shortages such as those described in the Russian histories.

The contrast was revealing, for it pointed up the essence of the "new conditions," and exposed the modern heirs of the 1921 peasants, whose then-legitimate dissatisfactions today have found grotesque reflection in the consumer-orientation of a new elite.

In addition, this digression clearly shows why the NEP has become an obsession among the "reformers" in the USSR.

Thus, one of them, Professor Evsei Liberman.

"of the University of Kharkov, who is regarded as the principal theoretician of this new reform – and who is Kosygin's protege"⁵³

was described in England at the time as worrying about Soviet resistance to his "new ideas:"

"He recalled that the transition from war communism to the liberal period of the New Economic Plan during the Twenties also gave rise to a lot of difficulties. 'When the NEP was inaugurated,' he said, 'many worthy comrades complained that it was shameful to liberalise trade and they even refused to renew their Party cards.'"⁵⁴

The English comment was:

"At the moment there is obviously no question of reviving private enterprise (in the USSR), but any reform which increases the power of the industrial bosses and supplants the old management methods needs plenty of time for digestion."⁵⁵

That is to say, there was *at that moment* no thought of introducing the familiar individually-owned capitalist factory, especially since Russian industry was already for some time on a large scale (thanks to centralized socialist planning).

All the same, Yugoslav-type "workers' collectives" did begin to be instituted in more and more Soviet factories*, with even PRAVDA; official CPSU organ, loudly calling for the system to be extended to heavy industry:

"It is of paramount importance that leading iron and steel-

* See Chapter IV, Section 2, Pages 47 ff, above.

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enterprises should switch over to the new system at the earliest possible date."⁵⁶

Although it was fashionable to denounce Stalin in the new USSR, wasn't it Stalin who had insisted that, without possession of the "commanding heights" of an economy – its heavy industry – socialism's power would soon be forfeit?

All the same, just as happened in Yugoslavia, following the establishment of "workers' collectives," in the "new" Soviet Union stress began more and more to be placed on the individual plant, with managers given growing power to decide questions which, under socialism, should never be the prerogatives of individuals. Even a capitalist analysis of the direction of Soviet reforms could say that

"Except for the cardinal Red principle of state ownership of property, no part of the Soviet economic edifice was eventually spared the reformers' wrecking balls."⁵⁷

In actual fact, the private sector had never been entirely absent from the Soviet Union's agriculture. That it was now spreading, various sources agreed, one of them noting that "the new team" of Brezhnev and Kosygin

"In agriculture...has given encouragement to the private sector...and one of the refreshing results has been a relative abundance of privately grown fresh fruits and vegetables in markets throughout the Soviet Union. 'We've never had so much produce on sale as in the last year,' one market manager told me. 'I'm glad he (Kruschov) is gone.'"⁵⁸

As to Soviet cooperative farms, noting advantages and disadvantages, a Canadian source admonished,

"Keep in mind...that Soviet farming *has always been* ONLY IN PART SOCIALIST (publicly owned). The co-ops (are) owned by farmers who are members of them, not by the public. Also, agriculture has always been a lot more 'free' than papers over here have told us

in the past. For example: Soviet co-op farms HAVE to sell to the Socialist system ONLY A PART of what they produce. Anything over their 'quota' they can sell ON THEIR OWN.

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"...lately the Soviet people have taken a REALISTIC VIEW...the attitude to farmers which Lenin always insisted was most practical.

"In brief: if farmers produce WHAT THE PUBLIC NEEDS, foods which are NOT YET BEING PRODUCED IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITY by Socialism's big State Farms – then LET them, DON'T HINDER THEM.

"What happens? Capitalism's coming back? Private farming?"⁵⁹

The Canadian source, an openly-Soviet mouthpiece, attempted to reply to its own questions in the negative by noting, with figures, that these private sales (though admittedly extending) were still such a small percentage of total farm sales, etc. Yet it admitted that, even after 50 years of Socialism, certain products in the USSR were as much as 30% privately marketed:

"Milk, meat, wool, fruits, etc., are now about 70 per cent sold through state, not private markets."⁶⁰

Corroboration came from an authoritative London source, which said that the Soviet government

"is now ready to admit that production on the private plots must be permitted, and even encouraged, *into the indefinite future. The plots cover 2 or 3 per cent of the cultivated land but account for a third of all agricultural produce by value.*"⁶¹

What! "Building communist society" with private plots "into the indefinite future" ! ??

But "private plots" didn't constitute the whole of this degeneration. The co-ops were turning more and more to state markets to dispose of goods, precisely as in Yugoslavia.⁶² ("Less trouble, quick sales, fast money."⁶³) Finally, "public help," such as "collective farm equipment," alone enabled Soviet co-op farmers to indulge in private farming on the side.⁶⁴

3. *In the "Satellite Countries" of Eastern Europe*

Anti-socialist slanders of long standing had no doubt originally been based on the difficulties of any transition economy. But they had been slanderous in the hypocrisy and pretense of—

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discovering something new, or inherent in socialism, with which they were offered as "news". Typical of these were attitudes about workers and work methods in such countries.

And perhaps these countries did furnish certain grist needed by the mills of the anti-communist press. Articles in the media of Rumania, Poland and Hungary began a barrage of criticism of the Yugoslav methods. Now, these in turn were used by the Western press for a "We told you so" smoke screen of international proportions. Once again, socialist workers were "lazy," lacked incentive, "goofed off on the job, got paid whether they worked or not, etc.:

"Eastern Europe's nirvana of nonwork, of course, is the price Communism pays for full employment. Because of the nonwork mentality, Westerners do not look for any quick adoption of modified free enterprise or state capitalism in Eastern Europe: the area simply lacks enough efficient workers to make it work. *Their hope is that a gradual shift to economic liberalism would provide workers and managers with enough incentive so that the desire for material gains would grow stronger than the tendency to goof off.*

"Managers would also have to fire at least 30% to 40% of their workers, and spend years re-educating the others to the disciplines of modern, efficient production."⁶⁵

The possibility of unemployment peered out of the last paragraph, while later paragraphs suggested a prospect of the return of speedup and rationalization.

Certainly, the general direction was clear to all:

"In any event, Communism as an economic philosophy has already been altered beyond Marxian recognition. *All that will be left of the Communist system is state ownership of property. The problems and the motives of the entire economy will be enterprising and free.*"⁶⁶

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4. *The Western Left*

Here too, "nationalization" under "extended bourgeois democracy" appeared to have been accepted as a suitable substitute for socialism.

For example, the Communist Party of Norway based its program on this view:

"...the Party calls for the RENOVATION AND EXTENSION OF DEMOCRACY, for *curbs* on the power of monopoly capital. The essential steps in this direction are: nationalization of the big private...monopoly enterprises...which hold the key position in the economy; democratic control in the basic branches of the economy, the right of factory and office workers and other groups of the working population *to have a say in the management* of big public and private enterprises, banks and insurance companies; better working

conditions and a higher standard of living; democracy in all political, administrative and cultural bodies; a government policy directed against monopoly capital."⁶⁷

In short, "workers' self-government" and a more thorough copy of the great British "socialism." What the Norwegian Party leaders imagined the monopolists would be doing with their army while all this peaceful transition was going on, their statement of program neglected to mention.

Appropriately, the Indonesian Communists, who saw their own "peaceful revolution" inundated in blood, wrote a worthy comment on the Norwegians:

"...The take-over of imperialist-owned enterprises did not mean the birth of the socialist sector in economy, because these state-owned enterprises did not belong to the people and were not managed by the people's state, but had fallen into the hands of the bureaucratic capitalists. Similarly, the Basic Agrarian Law could by no means liberate the peasantry from the oppression and exploitation by the vestiges of feudalism.

"Disregarding the difference between the economic concept of the national bourgeoisie and the economic concept of the proletariat, and lumping them together in the formulation of 'national and democratic economy' without—

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discussing the necessity to establish first the people's democratic power, were tantamount to abandoning the proletarian class stand and capitulating to the bourgeoisie."⁶⁸

Section C: The Destruction of Centralized Planning

The extension of the private sector after less than 50 years of socialism's existence, mentioned briefly in the foregoing pages, was only one aspect of a general economic erosion of socialism caused by revising the theory governing state ownership of the social means of production.

As noted previously, this erosion revolved around failure to destroy, or the resurgence of, the market as governing mechanism in the economy's operation. Failure fully to destroy that mechanism, or its resurrection as an "economic device," had to start by discarding centralized planning. For, such planning ensured that a socialist economy would be built, while planning could continue to function only if the economy became socialist.

Lenin had had his word to say on this point:

"Socialism...is inconceivable without planned state organization which subjects tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a single standard in production and distribution."⁶⁹

The classic excuse among revisionist leaders for abandoning centralized planning was that socialist industry had grown so big it had become "unwieldy." And it is noteworthy that capitalist sources were among those spreading this story around:

"...by the time Stalin died, the economy had grown so complex that no army of planners, however, large, could possibly keep up with Russia's exploding technology."⁷⁰

The Yugoslav economy could not be so described; yet, it was the *first* to move away from centralized planning. Lenin, for example, had never considered size a factor in deciding for or against centralized planning. Rather, he had talked of

"the transformation of the whole of the state economic

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mechanism into a single *huge* machine, into an economic organism that will work in such a way as to enable hundreds of millions of people to be guided by *a single plan*."⁷¹

Another main rationalization for revisionist abandonment of centralized planning has been that centralized planning led to

"bureaucracy," "a great danger to socialism" during the period of transition...leading to 'state capitalism' when pressed to extremes."⁷²

This rationalization has been discussed elsewhere in the following way:

"After the Cominform's excommunication of Yugoslavia in 1948 and Stalin's economic blockade against that country, the Yugoslav theorists...arrived at the conclusion that centralized administrative planning inevitably strengthens bureaucracy (which)...becomes increasingly a fetter on progressive evolution towards a socialist society...

"In order to avoid these pitfalls, one must strike at the root of the evil, centralized planning, by administrative means: such was and is Yugoslav contention."⁷³

The writer of these words then contended that the basic weakness of the "theory" was its failure to define the word "bureaucracy," a failure he undertook to remedy:

"...from a Marxist point of view, the bureaucracy in a society emerging from the overthrow of capitalism can only be defined as THE SUM TOTAL OF ALL MATERIALLY PRIVILEGED ELEMENTS AND LAYERS WHICH ARE NOT PRIVATE OWNERS OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION."⁷⁴

With this definition as pivot, he suggested that what the Yugoslavs had

"not proved, and cannot prove, is that centralized planning by administrative means is the only or the main avenue for strengthening the bureaucracy in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism."⁷⁵

All they "prove," he claimed, was that "centralized planning—

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through administrative means" was "the main source of a *central* bureaucracy." He continued:

"But it does not follow at all that growing decentralization and substitution of market mechanisms for planning can somehow prevent the growth of TYPES AND LAYERS OF BUREAUCRACY other than the functionaries of central planning boards or 'industrial' ministries."⁷⁶

Instead, he maintained, "there is every reason to expect the opposite":

"Increased use of market mechanisms must lead to INCREASED INEQUALITY – inequality between plants in the same industry; between different industrial branches, between workers of different regions, and between workers and managerial personnel in general...Yugoslav society during the last ten years...has shown a growing inequality...

"Therefore, we arrive at the conclusion, supported by facts, that the growing use of market mechanisms STRENGTHENS BUREAUCRACY AT PLANT AND COMMUNE LEVEL."⁷⁷

The actual operation of the Yugoslav economy had, in fact, produced – as results of abandoning centralized planning –

"a balance-sheet of a huge amount of resources wasted or under-employed or employed in a socially inefficient way."⁷⁸

Moreover, there were certain *side-effects of planlessness*:

"The pursuit of individual enrichment becomes the universal ideal of all members of the community. This then implies *fierce individual competition in all fields of social behavior, at the expense of solidarity and cooperation*. Phenomena, like widespread corruption, prostitution, venality of the pen and of the spirit, growing loss of social ideals and social idealism in youth, must then inevitably grow in such an atmosphere."⁷⁹

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1. *Yugoslavia*

The restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia, while manifested in the spread of "free enterprise" as such in city and countryside, also showed up in other ways. Economic crumbling was said to have begun at the end of 1951, when the "Law on the Planned Management of the National Economy" went into effect, virtually announcing the abolition of unified planning for Yugoslav industry and commerce. Workshops and even producers' teams within enterprises were to be treated as "economic units" with independent accountability.⁸⁰ What such an eventuality meant in practice was described in the following words:

"Since 1950...the essence of 'workers' self-government' consists of...each enterprise operating independently, purchasing its own raw materials, deciding on the variety, output and prices of its products and marketing them, determining its own wage scale and the division of part of its profits...economic enterprises have the right to buy, sell or lease fixed assets."⁸¹

The developments which accompanied "independent" operation by enterprises had already been reported:

"It is quite common for enterprises under 'workers' self-government' to engage in embezzlement, speculation and hoarding, to inflate prices, bribe, hide technical secrets, grab technical personnel and even to attack one another in the press or over the radio in rivalry for markets and profits.

"The fierce competition among Yugoslav enterprises goes on not only in the home market but also in foreign trade."⁸²

The most noticeable and radical change evolving from the introduction of "workers' self-government" into Yugoslavia in 1951 was *anarchic production*. The direct expression of such anarchy was that

"the variety and amount of goods produced are determined by the enterprises themselves in accordance with market conditions; they are no longer determined on the basis of the unified state plan of production.

"...the means of production needed by enterprises and the

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goods produced by them are freely bought and sold on the market; they are no longer allocated in accordance with a unified plan of distribution of materials drawn up by the state."⁸³

2. *The Soviet Union*

Similar erosion was not over-long in showing up *in the Soviet Union*, either:

"At stake (in setting up the then-proposed reforms) is nothing less than Russia's vast 'command economy'... regulating every pulse and throb of the nation's economic engine. ...at stake, too, are a generation of ideological maxims boastfully vaunting the superiority of Socialist planning over capitalism, the pervasive power – and perhaps the jobs – of some ten million planners large and small, and perhaps the amenities of life of millions of ordinary Russians."⁸⁴

Two economists in the Soviet Union credited with "opening a breach" for the Yugoslav type of economic thinking were Evsei Liberman, "in 1956 still an obscure scholar in a provincial school (Kharkov University! – HE);" and Vasily Nemchinov, "regarded as the dean of Soviet economists."⁸⁵ The latter had recognized in Liberman's article, originally published in the magazine *KOMMUNIST* and suggesting that local plant efficiency and quality could be improved by shifting administrative emphasis to profitability, the "panacea" needed by an allegedly slowing Soviet economy.⁸⁶

As evidence of such "slowing," Moscow, early in February of 1965, had announced that industrial output for 1964 had risen at a rate of 7.1%. This represented a rate of growth

"sizeable...for a mature economy but the lowest in Russia since 1946."⁸⁷

For, after 1961, the Soviet Union could no longer point to its former "long-time double-figure performances."⁸⁸

So Nemchinov had invited Liberman to Moscow and, in 1962, when economic troubles were said to be stalking the Soviet economy, had

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"persuaded Krushchov to give Liberman's theories a showcase in *PRAVDA*."⁸⁹

Accordingly, on September 9, 1962, that Party organ reprinted Liberman's already-published article, "The Plan, Profits and Bonuses." From then on, Liberman's ideas began to dominate the "Kafkaesque" bureaucracy of the Soviet planning apparatus.⁹⁰

The result, which went ahead on its own momentum after Nemchinov's death in October of 1964, was that

"One by one, other economists leaped into the fray...insisting that plant managers be given more autonomy...Planning decrees would be replaced by contracts between enterprises and

the government, with the lowest bidder getting a particular job – and setting its prices as a result."⁹¹

Explanation for the ease with which these reforms were accepted in the Soviet Union was allegedly that "over one-fifth of Russia's factories operate at a subsidized loss."⁹²

Economists favoring "autonomy" for individual plants also favored funneling government funds into "firms running in the black,"⁹³ which, of course, was precisely what was being done in Yugoslavia.

Marxist arguments against such a course were brought out in an illuminating talk between the world-renowned American journalist, Anna Louise Strong, and "rebel workers" who had seized power in the Kwanghua Wood Products Factory owned by the municipality on the outskirts of Peking.⁹⁴

These youthful rebels commented on "the former Party leadership" at their plant who, they declared, "had taken the capitalist road," putting

"'profits not politics, in command'. Some products are necessary for the people's livelihood but the profit on them may be small. Other products may have high profit but be non-essential. The previous leadership stressed high profits rather than service to the people.

"They also copied the Soviet form of management by which one man was boss in the factory with a boss under him in every shop...They stressed material incentives, promoting the 'ideology of capitalism'."⁹⁵

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Once the initial blow against planning had succeeded in the Soviet Union,

"It was by no means only economists who poured through the breach that Liberman had opened. The manager of a giant construction complex even went so far as to use the phrase 'supply and demand' in pleading for a freewheeling open market for consumer goods, admitting that it would necessitate major reliance on that old capitalist technique of market research by firms."⁹⁶

Other examples were brought up. "A director of Odessa's Red October Plant" was reported as complaining that a "host of directives" from planners were causing his plant to run at less than 75% of the capacity called for in the Plan. Managers in Leningrad said that they had lost half a million man-days of work during 1964 "running back and forth to Moscow to get decisions from central planners."⁹⁷

And was it, then, really the "failure of centralized planning" to which this growing list of complaints attested? Or did it point, rather, to the mechanical application of good principles, to

inflexibility, to lack of imagination, and to bureaucratic thinking and methods through separation from ordinary workmen?

The portions of Soviet planning obviously in need of improvement were said to be

"chiefly two: too many cooks from the Supreme Economic Council on down, and the more often than not wrong recipe in 15 copies...the Izhora factory...received no fewer than 70 different official instructions from nine state committees, four economic councils and two state planning committees all authorized to issue Izhora production orders."⁹⁸

That planning itself was at fault was not unanimously agreed in the USSR, for very soon

"outraged rebuttals began to fill the columns of the (Soviet) press."⁹⁹

These noted that centralized planning was the soul of socialism. Many of them castigated profit as a "motive" for a socialist—

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society. One remark, attributed to "Academician Federenko," summed up objections to dropping centralized planning:

"We must never forget that unique economic 'planification' which is centralized is one of the great victories of the socialist regime. We must not weaken but improve centralized planning."¹⁰⁰

Such pleas were in vain. The erosion continued. Centralized planning was swiftly and surely removed in all but name in the Soviet Union. The mechanism that took its place was, as in Yugoslavia, the "free market."

By September 28, 1967, a report, based on "differences among the 'collective leadership'", of manpower shortages and uncertainty over the course of the current "economic reforms" said that a decision to scrap the then-impending five-year industrial plan was, as yet,

"not firmly spelled out. But it was clearly implied in a report of the Central Committee published...today...(which) spoke only of separate draft plans for next year and until 1970...

"...in August 1966 Mr Kosygin, the Russian Prime Minister, admitted that the plan was not ready. There had been no mention of it since...

"Observers believe that the differences in the Kremlin on the plan's priorities have helped delay its appearance. But the main reason was apparently that the Russian economy had met troubles over reforms designed to stimulate production."¹⁰¹

A number of Western experts have had a word or two to say about this then-latest of Soviet reforms. Among them, "the Rand Corporation's Sovietologist" Abraham Becker commented:

"Within carefully defined limits...the consumer will be allowed to determine the major part of his buying habits. But the central planners will still set the limits as they see fit. Still...it would not be beyond the realm of possibility that Soviet society should resemble Yugoslavia's within ten years."¹⁰²

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3. *Eastern Europe*

In all Eastern Europe, the same process could be observed: as has been noted,

"Russia itself has lagged behind the satellites in the economic shift toward Western ways."¹⁰³

Typical of Eastern European "satellite" destruction of centralized planning were the reforms of Czechoslovakia's Liberman, Professor Ota Sik, whose activities were described in gleeful detail in a Western news story¹⁰⁴, and resulted in most of the deteriorations already seen in Yugoslavia: decentralization of planning; restoration of the market mechanism; unemployment and redundancy;

"Basic to Sik's scheme is the decentralization of planning. The party economists in Prague will become Communist equivalents of Western investment analysts, leaving all short-term decisions to the individual factory managers...on how much he wishes to reinvest for future development and how much he wishes to pay out to his employees in bonuses."¹⁰⁵

Again, as in Yugoslavia and the USSR, the party was losing its vanguard role; economism was becoming enthroned.

4. *In the West*

While their confreres in socialist countries rapidly abandoned centralized planning, the Communist Parties under capitalism began demanding it from "their own" monopolist bourgeoisies!

In fact, it was *the Italian Communist Party* which extended this concept to its logical conclusion. During the Party Congress early in February, 1966, Party Secretary-General Luigi Longo was demanding for Italy's working class

"nothing more doctrinaire than better economic planning and fewer monopolies."¹⁰⁶

So, modern revisionists in countries where socialism had had power were now abandoning centralized planning – under proletarian governments where (and only where) it was feasible. At the same time, such Parties in the West were now paradoxically→

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demanding it – from monopoly-controlled "bourgeois democracies."

Yet the paradox was more apparent than real: while socialist revisionists moved "downward" to a kind of super-British-type all-national state capitalism, their Western counterparts were trying to move "upward" to the very same goal. The illusion was of a super-consumer society, all sweetness and light, with reformed Communists sharing "power" with an "enlightened" bourgeoisie. The whole scheme reeked of blood and death – the blood and death of subjugated peoples.

Attitudes in the citadels of Modern Revisionism toward centralized planning resulted in *a return to the market mechanism in socialist economies*. This was just one more consequence of revising Marxist theory about the indispensability of proletarian ownership of the social means of production.

It is almost incredible into how many nooks and crannies of a once-socialist economy this particular form of theoretical erosion reached during its implementation, or how deeply it affected the everyday life of ordinary socialist citizens.

Section D: The Return to the Market Mechanism

The Marxist approach to the market mechanism has been expressed as follows:

"Traditional Marxist theory starts from the assumption that the building of a socialist society is identical with the withering away of commodity production and of market mechanism...some form of market mechanism will survive during the period of transition...But...nevertheless always...basic to their thinking is the assumption that, historically, there is a definite incompatibility between...a classless society and a high degree of social equality and economic efficiency – and commodity production.

"This conviction is founded on two fundamental bases. Commodity production inevitably generates social inequality...Commodity production also inevitably produces waste of economic resources, which is inconsistent with the goal of maximizing social output and income."¹⁰⁷

The author conceded that, within the socialist world, there were innumerable opinions as to the proportions or speeds that should be allocated to different phases enroute to the full achievement of production for use. This, he declared, was attested by the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the early 1920s. But, he added,

"whatever differences have arisen among these schools of thought and action, they were bound together by a consensus about the socially objectionable character of a market economy – even if it is a necessary evil for a long period."¹⁰⁸

As to where and when the disintegration of this basic position began, the writer was quite specific:

"Western European social democracy broke with this conception some time after the Second World War, and started to conceive of market economy as basically sound and desirable...In fact, social democracy now openly admits its integration into bourgeois society. Its ideal nowadays is a smoothly run capitalism, purged only of its glaring social ills: the welfare state. It follows that the classical antithesis between market economy and classless society is fully confirmed by the social democrats' option in favor of market economy, the other side of which is a frank rejection of the concept of a classless society."¹⁰⁹

The market mechanism, which is *set in motion by commodity production*, was reflected in a number of practical results, already enumerated. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, two particulars among those cited above are useful:

- a) Commodity production "inevitably generates social inequality;"
- b) It "also inevitably produces waste of economic resources." The economic side-effects of reintroducing the market economy i.e., the operational form of commodity production – into a formerly socialist economy generally fall under either or both of the above main effects.

These side-effects are summarized in the following phenomena:

Production becomes tied to profit, and that type of production then gradually supplants production for use. This entrains the following inevitable consequences:

- a) Fierce capitalist-type *competition between individual enterprises*, leading to all the cut-throat methods such competition always entails.
- b) *Monopolization*, including the *closing of "redundant" enterprises*, with *growing unemployment*.

c) *Anarchic production*, with resultant *chaos in price structure*.

The pattern suggested by such side-effects is a matter of record which can be studied in detail.

1. *Yugoslavia*

Among the middle European countries which, at the end of World War II, swung into socialist ranks, the antithesis between a market economy and a classless society was soon forgotten. *Yugoslav* Communists were

"the first to try to reverse this antithesis. For them, market economy...is here to stay even after the end of the construction of socialism."¹¹⁰

As a result, according to another source,

"Radical changes have taken place in the direction of the economic activities of Yugoslav enterprises since 'workers' self-government' was introduced into them."¹¹¹

And *first* among such changes,

"production in enterprises is aimed at making profits instead of satisfying the needs of all members of society."¹¹²

This amounted to a change in motivation in individual enterprises – from fulfilling or over-fulfilling its portion of a centralized plan, to vying on a market for customers in order to make maximum individual plant profit – and that change in motivation therefore brought to Yugoslavia in its train all the evils attendant on the same mechanism under capitalism:

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"In Yugoslavia, the sharpest competition is developing among different enterprises in their quest for profits."¹¹³

An entirely different report confirmed this diagnosis of the direction of the "new measures":

"Yugoslavia long ago created a 'Socialist market economy' – relatively competitive enterprise under state ownership."¹¹⁴

Since individuals or private groups could now buy and sell fixed assets in Yugoslavia, there was nothing to stop the mushrooming of enterprises in the classical capitalist pattern whereby investment follows greatest demand, as a number of examples from Yugoslav sources soon showed:

"In 1959 when a need for farm machines was keenly felt, an exceptionally large number of new farm machine-making factories suddenly appeared. Between the end of 1960 and the beginning of 1961, 'the brick-making industry overnight became a gold mine. In some areas, prices trebled,' as a result, many brick-making enterprises vied with each other in expanding or modernizing existing factories. This led to 'large stockpiles which could not find customers and circulation funds were frozen'."¹¹⁵

And so on, down a long list, including foundries and Yugoslav railways.

Such competition has other consequences: monopolization, closing of "redundant" enterprises, unemployment and price chaos, as already mentioned.

As to the growth of monopoly,

"Where there is competition there are mergers, and the vanquished are inexorably liquidated. The Yugoslav press reported that two of the five bicycle factories in Yugoslavia had closed down in the struggle on the market. The struggle in sales in 1963 was as hard as ever for the remaining three."¹¹⁶ According to incomplete data in the OFFICIAL BULLETIN OF THE F.P.R.Y., law courts in recent years have ordered 500-600 enterprises to close down every year.

"Competition inevitably leads to monopoly, but this cannot stem the tide of competition. In such a branch of industry—

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as modern transport and communications, which requires centralization, the extraordinary phenomenon of the splitting up of enterprises has taken place. Railways are administered by 29 independent enterprises."¹¹⁷ In order to maintain its monopoly in the area under its control, one company often lets the wagons from another go empty on their return from its area."¹¹⁸

Included in this trend toward monopolization was the ensuing scramble for technical personnel, as well as an addiction to secrecy in technical knowledge¹¹⁹ – absolutely unheard-of under socialism.

The Yugoslav example completely verified Lenin's emphatic warnings about elevating "trade" or "market mechanisms" to prominence in a socialist economy, as, for example, when he said,

"...the more rapidly trade and capitalism develop, the greater is the concentration of production and capital which GIVES RISE to monopoly. And monopolies have ALREADY arisen – precisely OUT of free competition! Even if monopolies have now begun to retard progress, it is not an argument in favor of free competition, which has become impossible after it has given rise to monopoly."¹²⁰

2. *The Soviet Union*

Within a short time, the *Soviet* leadership had instituted – and have since also approved in their "satellite" Eastern European neighbors – the Yugoslav pattern. In their turn, they have been moving step by step through all the deterioration of socialist economic principles passed through before them by Yugoslavia.

As in Yugoslavia, Soviet reforms began establishing "workers' collectives." London sources of varying political coloration began saying that, up to the time of writing, the Soviet system of decentralization had already been applied to 647¹²¹, 673¹²², or 704¹²³ enterprises.

Kruschov had instituted this change – in two Soviet factories. His successors – Brezhnev and Kosygin – among their first acts extended the "experiment" to 400 clothing and shoe factories –

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across Russia, "together with 7 8 of their raw material suppliers,"¹²⁴ while

"Kosygin went even farther, asserting that eventually the reforms would be extended to all of Soviet industry."¹²⁵

All this had been implied by Liberman's discoverer Vasily Nemchinev when he – going blind and nearing the end of his life –

"called for something very close to a state-owned market economy."¹²⁶

In January 1965, Liberman had gone to Lvov to explain his theories to the Town Economic Council

"which has been authorised to make the first area (as opposed to industry) test of the 'profit incentive.' Lvov is of particular interest because the five industries in the test include a coal mine and a mobile-hoist manufacturing plant – the reformers' first venture outside the confines of light industry."¹²⁷

In that same month – January 1965 –

"a Moscow economist proposed that the profit motive even be extended to agriculture, Russia's perennially insoluble problem."¹²⁸

A rabidly pro-Soviet Canadian source denied that today's junkets into the profit motive under socialism were "a far cry from original socialist ideas":

"On the contrary, Lenin repeatedly stressed the need to make profits in a publicly-owned system."¹²⁹

Strange that this magazine, so intent on "justifying" any course taken by the current Soviet leadership, should not quote a single such "repeated" stress of the great Lenin! Rather, it insisted that socialist countries "have always made profits:"

"Socialism is more profitable than Capitalism! But they were held back because SOME important industries and selling organizations ran at heavy losses for years."¹³⁰

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Later, this article admitted that "Socialist enterprises" like the *health* system, *education*, the *arts*, *defense* industries and the like "run at heavy losses for years." But, because the people have needed them, they had thus far been financed out of the "profits" of other industries.

In order to maintain its outlandish proposition, a number of "misconceptions" had, of course, to be "refuted," and shown to be due to "misinterpretation" of what has been happening in the Soviet Union:

1. Professor Evsei Liberman didn't call for a return to the profit system in 1962:

"Liberman's ideas were aimed at IMPROVING, not eliminating Soviet economic planning."¹³¹

2. Liberman did not argue

"in favor of profits as a motive for speeding up production in their system...Profit won't act as a motive in Socialism *because individuals cannot take profits*...Liberman argued that profit is *the best way to measure economic efficiency*, and Soviet planners should use that measure."¹³²

3. Despite the absence of private ownership of means of production, this source claimed profits were necessary, both to ensure larger wages and fringe benefits and for expanding and establishing industries.¹³³

4. Making profit under Socialism could not result in raised prices, land speculation and the like because

"Such profits are not practical in Socialism, since methods of that kind would be simply making profit by taking it away...no actual profit would result."¹³⁴

5. Planning was not done with profit in mind; but for use – to satisfy needs.¹³⁵

6. Planning to satisfy needs did lead to many "inefficiencies," but the "new economic measure" would now presumably eliminate them.¹³⁶

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7. "Efficiency methods" would not make Socialism turn back to Capitalism nor give "top planners" too much power because in

"their system...the drive comes from...THE WORKING PEOPLE. The new campaign in the USSR is a mass campaign."¹³⁷

But Yugoslavia had already preceded the Soviet Union down precisely the same path, and Soviet Leaders acknowledged, even eagerly asserted (as quoted earlier), that Yugoslavia was their model. That model had in its own development thoroughly and materially refuted allegations like above many times over:

- *Individuals* do not have to "take profits" for a socialist economy to revert to capitalism. In countries where workers have achieved power, this reversion has been shown to occur *in a new form*, whereby *groups connected with the new state have become a collective exploiter, operating through that state*.
 - Expanding old industries and/or establishing new ones does not depend on profit under socialism. It depends on following through the socialist principle of a centralized economy, not on doing away with it.
 - To say that measuring plant efficiency by "looking at" its profits would not wear away socialism was to ignore the openly-stated *purpose* for doing this – and to pretend that an unsocialist change would not have unsocialist results.
 - Once a formerly socialist economy began estimating profits *by individual enterprise*, nothing could stop the growth of chaotic prices, land speculation and the development of anarchic production, as Yugoslavia's example has shown.
 - While in theory production under "reformed" socialism remained "for use," in practice, as Yugoslavia demonstrated, "use" became that of the "best customers," the new elite. Profit did IN FACT replace use as the guide to production and as yardstick of "economic achievement."
 - Although old inefficiencies would be "corrected" by the "new" principles, Yugoslav practice also proved that new (familiar because characteristic of capitalism) and very real *other*—
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inefficiencies, like waste of resources, began to arise and soon dominated the economy, reversing its direction.

- Yugoslavia also proved that the "*masses*" might furnish the "drive" of these "new" economies in words, but *in practice* they *lost all power* which, in fact, passed into the hands of the "top planners" and their minions, as this text has studied.

There were those, however, who claimed that the alleged "failure of socialism to advance without the profit motive" lay not with any of "Communism's cardinal creeds," but with the Soviet leadership for revising precisely those "cardinal creeds," high among which still ranked the need to obliterate the profit motive in order to complete the victory of the socialist revolution.¹³⁸

3. *Eastern Europe*

Following the Soviet – and Yugoslav – footsteps, these reforms spread "from the Baltic to the Black Sea...through all east European countries."¹³⁹

"Eastern European satellites are...boldly opening up their own internal economies to Western technique. Fortnight ago, *Czechoslovakia* inaugurated a massive decentralization program...Except for general growth goals set by the state and controlled prices in some key sectors, each Czech factory will have wide freedom for its own development. *East Germany*, too, has relegated planning to groups of enterprises...is toying with profit incentives. *Hungary* has introduced a form of profit sharing...*Poland* has permitted three firms to set up their own foreign-trade pipelines..."¹⁴⁰

and, moving logically onward,

"...even the accumulation of wealth – once a heretical thought under 'egalitarian' Communism"¹⁴¹

was being chewed over as a "possibility" in Czechoslovakia and in other Eastern European countries. In Czechoslovakia, the far-reaching reform program

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"shatters the rigidity of central planning, establishes realistic prices and eliminates subsidies, forces each Czech factory to pay its own way or close down."¹⁴²

This argument around the relationship between "subsidies" and "plant efficiency" flew in the very face of socialist practice, for

"In reality...the greatest advance which socialist planning allows compared with 'free enterprise' resides precisely in its capacity to provide for outcome and income maximization AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, which may very well entail deliberate losses (subsidies) to various individual firms."¹⁴³

Travelers from capitalist countries to the Soviet Union in the early 60s, including the writer's son, noted with surprise that brand new, excellent children's clothing could be bought in Moscow stores for the equivalent of 5¢ US, whereas other goods, like TV sets, were priced considerably higher than on the American "free market." What would happen to this "quaint custom" after some time of using the "new principles"? Were factories producing such children's clothing "inefficient" or "unprofitable"?

According to these "socialist reformers," they were, indeed. For,

"Key to the whole Sik reform is prices. 'If the system is to work as a market,' says Sik, 'it needs real market prices.' Only a few staples – mainly foodstuffs and fuel – will have centrally fixed prices. All others will be allowed to move freely in response to supply and demand."¹⁴⁴

In *Rumania*, too, the same disease took hold. With "the first national Communist Party conference in more than 20 years," then on the verge of taking place there, such reforms went into high gear:

"Rumanian leaders are now...recognizing the profit motive and material incentives and encouraging economic units to plan their own production, marketing and investment. In future factories will be running their own affairs...and this in turn means that they will have to bear the consequences in case of failure.

"The new wage structure provides for a sharp differentiation→

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in pay to stimulate skill and quality while penalizing slackness and poor workmanship.

"...economic decentralization will inevitably lead to a relaxation of central controls...more power and responsibility...transferred to local councils, suggest that the state administration is also to be simplified and decentralized as part of the general drive for efficiency."¹⁴⁵

And the reformers blithely accepted, even welcomed, the consequences:

"Sik feels there is competition enough among domestic producers to keep prices healthy."¹⁴⁶

Just what he meant by "healthy" was a bit hard to deduce from the story:

"Already some 1,300 'redundant' Czech factories have been closed, and another 1, 400 of them may shut down before the reform wave crests."¹⁴⁷

The "theory" behind reformist economic practice, as seen for example in Yugoslavia, held that the "equalization of demand and supply" through the use of the market would come about when "consumers exercise their 'free choices within the restraints of their income'."¹⁴⁸ While Yugoslav theorists drew no conclusions from this allegation, such conclusions were "rather important":¹⁴⁹

a) Differing incomes resulted in differing consumption expenditures on different goods and services.

b) If, then, investment was guided by "effective demand,"

"the whole structure of industry will adapt itself to that unequal distribution of income."¹⁵⁰

c) Luxury goods would be in greater demand than certain goods *needed* by the "poorer parts of society:"

"There will be an overproduction of washing machines before every household has a pair of good winter shoes. Investment will tend to concentrate in the richer regions at the expense of the poorer ones...it will tend to satisfy the needs of the higher incomes before the needs of the

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lower ones...Liquor can, after all, meet more 'effective demand' than books on sociology or philosophy, not to speak of Marxist textbooks...Financial autonomy of housing units will lead to 'economic rents,' i.e., a monopoly of comfortable modern homes for the bureaucracy, with workers returning to slums..."¹⁵¹

Section E: Modern Revisionism Loses Control over Foreign Trade

All the foregoing would be fantastic if it had been suggested as the future for the great Soviet Union, were not Yugoslavia in existence, continuing its downward "progress" – and had not the current Soviet leadership starting, but not ending, with Kruschov, insisted that Yugoslavia was becoming "ever more socialist" and that they intended to follow that "socialist" example. And so they have done, in one field after another.

In capitalist history thus far, trade has been the first connection between two economies. As it has grown, it has soon been accompanied, and then surpassed, by the *export of capital* in various forms. This classical progression was originally analysed by Lenin in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, and is in no way negated by the fact that today capital itself finds other overseas outlets aside from actual physical export.

The conduct of trade, domestic or foreign, can be controlled only if a society owns its own social means of production. At the same time, when a socialist society does own those means, it is possible for any deterioration of control over trade to loosen such ownership.

Marxist theorists were well aware of this inter-relationship:

"Everybody knows that state monopoly of foreign trade is a basic principle of socialism. Lenin said¹⁵² that '...the protection of industry...in no way refers to its protection by customs policy, but solely and exclusively...to its protection by *monopoly of foreign trade*.' Stalin said that 'the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the—

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unshakeable foundations of the...Soviet Government' and that the abolition of the monopoly...would mean 'abandoning the industrialization of the country,' 'flooding the U.S.S.R. with goods from capitalist countries,' and 'transforming our country from an independent country into a semi-colonial one'."¹⁵³

In various ways, this context was understood and acknowledged by both bourgeois and revisionist sources. For instance,

"Even in the United States which has been slow to exploit openings in the east, there is a growing awareness both of the potential for expanded trade ties and their political consequences."¹⁵⁴

Earlier, "one of Europe's most prominent statesmen, who was neither a Frenchman nor counted as a supporter of French President Charles de Gaulle,"¹⁵⁵ reportedly said he feared

"that what we originally embarked on (the Common Market) was not big enough. We must broaden the scope. We must think in terms of...— above all — the end of the artificial division of Europe between East and West. The time is now ripe."¹⁵⁶

A year later, even President Johnson of the U.S. was pictured as having "caught on" to the possibilities of trade with the East.¹⁵⁷

In a discussion on the U.S. war chief's speech earlier in the same month, on the occasion of the millenium of Christianity's establishment in Poland, Johnson was quoted as having

"declared that his government would 'continue to build bridges across the gulf which has separated us from Eastern Europe.' One of his 'bridges' is the 'intimate engagement of peaceful trade'."¹⁵⁸

During that same year, an American source, after noting the relatively still-small size of East-West trade, nonetheless commented:

"Mr. Johnson believes that trade can be a dynamic political weapon. He is convinced that the United States can use the good things of life to help undercut Communism.

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"...Trade is one of the most powerful currents that can be used to carry freedom to Eastern Europe."¹⁵⁹

Concurrently with these developments in the West, the revisionists were busy hypnotizing themselves into their own version of precisely the same position. For example, an editorial touting the superiority of the Soviet System in every field in a pro-Soviet Canadian source, went into the question of trade:

"The appeal of Socialism for Europeans is on THE BROADEST BASE ever seen anywhere in the world. It reaches all through the *business* community; as in France and Italy and Britain, where TRADE FOR PEACE is now more attractive than contracts for arms. It shows the vast majority that all Europe could be organized to serve THE GOOD OF MAN."¹⁶⁰

Well, shades of 1776, when "all through the business community" was the equation for "THE BROADEST BASE EVER," and "TRADE" (does it really matter for WHAT?) was the equation for "THE GOOD OF MAN!" "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." Isn't this what "THE GOOD OF MAN" has *always* meant to a new bourgeoisie on the make?

So, carrying this approach to its logical conclusion, this Soviet mouthpiece reported:

"For the first time ever, in April this year (1967), the Communist Party of both East and West Europe MET TOGETHER IN FORMAL CONVENTION. They sounded no empty 'left' cries for 'revolution.' YET THEIR DECISIONS WERE REVOLUTIONARY FOR EUROPE."¹⁶¹

Bourgeois sources suggested just how "revolutionary" for Europe or elsewhere this "new" concept of trade as a form of class struggle *really* was:

"...the grim reality of the Berlin Wall has blinded many to the rusting away of the Iron Curtain in other places. For this, West European tourists...and businessmen can claim a major share of the credit. Western businessmen, in fact, have become regular commuters to Eastern capitals."¹⁶²

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Or, from another top capitalist source, this:

"Russia's flirtation with market mechanisms comes at a time of swift and startling economic change across the whole Communist-bloc spectrum. Hotel lobbies from Warsaw to Bucharest are jammed with Western businessmen scrambling to get into Communist markets."¹⁶³

And even more succinctly,

"Communism...is...undergoing a gradual mutation that may ultimately change its form."^{163a}

1. *Yugoslavia*

What happened when this idyll went into high gear had already been demonstrated in Yugoslavia:

"Beginning in 1950, the Tito clique abolished the state monopoly of foreign trade. In 1953, it promulgated the 'Decree on Management of Foreign Trade,' which permits enterprises to go in for foreign trade independently and allows them to carry on foreign trade directly with foreign monopoly capitalist enterprises. This has kept the door wide open for Yugoslav enterprises to fall into direct subservience to international monopoly capitalist and for the infiltration of imperialist capital and commodities..."¹⁶⁴

Moreover, the sharp competition among enterprises resulting from "workers' management" extended to foreign trade. A number of such instances from Yugoslav sources have been cited:

"'for selfish reasons,' foreign trade enterprises 'are out to to earn money' 'indiscriminately' and 'at all costs.' They are competing for business, for customers; each trying to squeeze the other out and win over its trading partners. They behave just as if they came 'from two different countries.' It is no rare occurrence for '20 to 30 representatives of Yugoslav foreign trade companies to flock to the same foreign market'."¹⁶⁵

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2. *The Soviet Union*

It was not long before Soviet leadership began traversing the same path, as attested by their own Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev, who boasted that the Soviet Union was entering its 50th year since the October Revolution as one of the leading countries in world trade:

"...he said that her trade turnover with a hundred countries in 1966 exceeded 15,000 million roubles.

"Among the capitalist countries, the Soviet Union's biggest trade partners were Finland, Britain and France."¹⁶⁶

He was "optimistic" about future trade with Western Europe, mentioning specifically France and Italy:

"Nikolai Patolichev also expressed the Soviet Union's further readiness to expand co-operation with Italy in various economic branches. The long-term credits given by Italian banks, he emphasized, were contributing to an increase in trade...

"...favorable prospects also existed for trade with a number of other Western European countries. The Minister was very optimistic about trade prospects with Japan."¹⁶⁷

During 1966, according to earlier Western estimates of USSR foreign trade,

"East-west trade...rose by some 15 percent and this year could see a record increase if some major engineering contracts are finally approved by Moscow."¹⁶⁸

So anxious was the Soviet Union, with "its massive potential for absorbing western exports," for Western trade that it had

"offered to both (France and Britain) long-term commercial agreements of the type Russia has with her east European partners."¹⁶⁹

President Johnson's and President De Gaulle's "separate but equal" hopes of wiping out the "artificial" distinction between East and West were apparently being put into operation on a do-it-yourself basis by the Soviet leadership!

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The hopes thus encouraged were crudely if accurately assessed in the West:

"The east-west trade potential is truly enormous...Leaving aside Yugoslavia which is already seeking private western capital to help finance its development programs, Russia and the east European countries now present a combined population just about equal to that of western Europe. With those sort (*sic*) of numbers, the trade potential is certainly immense: in the agricultural sphere, where Britain should be very well placed to supply machinery, the Soviet Union alone has announced an urgent modernization program which according to Premier Kosygin will cost £30,000 million."¹⁷⁰

That potential, however, was then still in the future:

"Set against this vast potential, existing east-west trade is really little more than a trickle – whether or not one includes Communist China."¹⁷¹

In fact, West European exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc (except Norway and Denmark) had increased up to the time of estimate by 25%, yet still accounted for only about 5% of such

exports to all destinations. At the same time, imports constituted "an identical five per cent." On the other hand, western Europe was supplying more than 50% of the Soviet bloc's total trade with the rest of the world.

Up to the time of writing, exports of the U.S. to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and imports from those regions, were both less than one percent of the U.S. totals in each category.¹⁷³ To the accompaniment of the first noises about the glories of the "eastern markets," this situation was not unnaturally assessed as purely temporary:

"Last year (1964), commerce between East and West soared to \$9 billion – a 100% jump in seven years. In his State of the Union address, President Johnson asked the nation to explore new ways 'to increase peaceful trade' with Communist countries – a goal that may well multiply twelvefold American exports to Russia in the next five years."¹⁷⁴

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Two years later, the situation was expanding according to plan:

"Following President Johnson's call for the 'building of trade bridges to the east,' the Soviet Union uniquely took a two-page advertisement in the NEW YORK TIMES last January calling the attention of U.S. businessmen to 'opportunities for trade with the USSR,' and stressing that ideological differences were no barrier to increased trade."¹⁷⁵

Groundwork for implementing the last sentiment had already been laid, as a comment in the source suggested:

"Countries such as Japan, India, the United Arab Republic, Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Cuba and Australia would agree."¹⁷⁶

For, among the latter countries,

"Eastern Europe is...a big buyer from India (primarily jute and jute products, tea, oilseed cake and meal and cashews) and provides roughly 10% of all India's imports.

"On the other hand, Russia is the big customer for the UAR (taking about 40% of its exports – mainly cotton) and, with eastern Europe, provides just over a fifth of total UAR imports."¹⁷⁷

While Canada and Australia were then importing very little from "the east," they were big sellers of wheat to the Soviet bloc. Hong Kong reportedly was importing almost £150 million in goods annually from "communist countries (almost exclusively from China)" while exporting almost nothing to such regions.¹⁷⁸

However,

"the really spectacular deals remain those between east and west on the European continent, including Russia."¹⁷⁹

Some possibilities occurred to the western ideologues:

"Deliveries get under way this year for Britain's big (£30 million) Terylene deal with Russia and Anglo-French aviation men still hope to sell some of the supersonic Concord airliners to Moscow – perhaps in exchange for the Russians' giant helicopters."¹⁸⁰

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In due course, an industrial agreement was reached between the Russians and the British for "technical cooperation:"

"The agreement...provides a basis for the expansion of scientific, technological, economic, and industrial links between the two countries...particular areas of special interest...include transport and education technology, materials research, information storage and retrieval, and non-conventional methods of food production.

"A number of industrial sectors – including patents, standards, electricity supply and transmission, industrial pollution, scientific instruments, machine tools, and both mining and constructional equipment, have also been agreed – and technical exchanges are to be developed through industrial groups and the relevant Ministries. The Confederation of British Industry is already establishing working parties in most of the designated areas."¹⁸¹

The *leading* role in trade with the Eastern bloc, however, was apparently played by the Western Germans:

"Last year, West Germany exported \$1 billion worth of goods and capital equipment to Eastern Europe. Nearly a third of France's exports will go to Russia within five years. And total East-West trade now tops \$13 billion a year." (Compare this figure with the \$9 billion estimate above¹⁸²)¹⁸³

A year and a half later, following "a fresh round of talks with a high-powered Russian trade delegation," speculation about contenders for this lucrative market arose again:

"The French hope that the discussions will lay the base for a big increase in sales of everything from wine to automobile plants.

"Can France dislodge Germany from its leading trade role? Last year, the Germans exchanged \$1.2 billion worth with all the nations of Eastern Europe, more than twice the \$670 million of France. But in the first six months of this year, French trade with the East had risen to a yearly rate of nearly \$750 million. At the same time, the German trade eastward has been unchanged."¹⁸⁴

The last two quotations give certain political overtones to

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East-West trade. Ever since its "showcase" status had finally suffered an ordinary capitalist-type threat of economic collapse, West Germany had been one of three economies within the "free World" badly in need of propping. The other two were the Japanese (today become Uncle's Frankenstein "monster") and England, where the threatened crash of the pound sterling was for a time fended off only by stringent emergency measures inside that "tight little island," accompanied by a strong injection of traditional "American support." (The pound was, of course, devalued in November 1967 in any case.)

An enormous increase of trade with the "Socialist Bloc" played *obligato* to the above development, an increase found in all three areas:

"*Japan's* exports to the bloc countries in the first nine months of the last year (1966) amounted to some £70 million (up just over 40% on the comparable period of 1965), while Japanese imports from the region rose by almost one-fifth to £86 million.

"The Japanese, whose trade turnover with Russia alone this year is expected to be worth roughly £170 million, have increased considerably their export sales to eastern Europe – up to £16,4 million in the same period of 1965. "While *West Germany* is by far the largest non-communist trader with the east, *Britain* retains her position as the Soviet Union's main trading partner in the West – with a balance (£75 million in 1966) very much in Moscow's favor.

"During his visit to London earlier this year, Premier Kosygin promised to do something concrete about this continuing deficit and an early go-ahead is expected on a number of big projects – including the Leyland Motor Corporation's scheme to build a bus-assembly factory in Russia and a similar plan from British Motor Holdings for a car plant."¹⁸⁵

A little over a year later, the British were sending "a team of industrial captains" to Russia:

"The objective is to 'develop sales', said Sir Stephen Brown, president of the Confederation of British industry...

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"The feeling at the moment is that Britain could probably break into the Soviet nuclear power, computer and transport markets as well as other electronics fields. But, as Sir Stephen hastened to point out, trade should be two ways. The adverse balance of payments

from Britain's point of view reached £76 million last year but with a healthy bag of machine tool orders in the pipeline future prospects are brighter."¹⁸⁶

Success from this "intensive two-day round of talks with their nearest Russian equivalents,"¹⁸⁷ was soon reflected in the British motor industry:

"Sir George Harriman, chairman of the new British Leyland Motor Corporation, and the heads of several of Britain's biggest component companies are standing by for a call from the Russians to fly to Moscow to explain in more detail their plans for setting up major car and bus factories in the Soviet Union...

"The invitation is expected to come from Nikolai Strokin, deputy Minister of the U.S.S.R. automotive industry and a key figure in the negotiations.

"...It is widely believed that the Russian leaders will suggest some compromise deal.

"It is no secret that the huge Fiat contract for a complete car plant for Russia was considerably aided by the Italian Government's decision to enter into long-term agreements to buy Russian exports. The most likely product on offer to Mr Wilson will be oil.

"Although B.M.C. and Leyland have in the past submitted plans for complete package deals for car and truck plants, the Russians...are much more interested in technological cooperation...

"Car and commercial vehicle manufacturing is becoming more and more a question of assembling other people's products."¹⁸⁸

The tendency of the USSR to trade with a balance favorable to herself, alluded to above, and which Kosygin was reported "willing to do something about," brought the following English comment:

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"In the long term, east Europe may be a better bet for Western industrialists than the U.S.S.R. itself.

"These countries are usually more open to a straight deal than a barter arrangement; even now, they collectively buy from the west considerably more than do the Russians.

"...they're better at converting promises...into actual orders – unlike the Russians, who last year succeeded in running a favorable trade balance with almost every single West European country.

"...the east Europeans ran deficits with all their west European trading partners which will produce problems of its own in due course."¹⁸⁹

An illustration of how trends in East-West trade developed in the 18 months after the last report dealt with *Poland*:

"Despite the doubling of British exports to Poland since 1965, Britain has lost £32 millions worth of potential sales there in the past two years...(due to) high prices and over-long delivery dates in some cases..."

"Under the current Anglo-Polish agreement, bilateral trade should be roughly equal, with up to £15 million in Poland's favour to cover British invisible exports."

"In 1965 British exports were only £24 million, against imports of £48 ½ million. In 1966, Britain sold £35 million against £57 million. Last year British exports rose to £48 million against £56 million."

"...The preponderance of Polish exports to Britain are foods and include agricultural products...After joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Poland hopes Britain will give a lead in liberalising trade barriers for her. She would like to sell Britain more manufactures."

"British exports to Poland consist of 67 per cent. of various materials, and 29 per cent. of capital investment goods..."

"But Poland is increasingly interested in technical agreements for British know-how and cooperation. Striking examples are a licence agreement with Leyland's for engine production and co-operation on building Jones cranes."¹⁹⁰

A number of Eastern European socialist countries have been suffering 30 years of "ultra-protectionist" Smoot-Hawley tariffs—

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against their exports to the U.S. Led by Rumania, they now began seeking "most favored nation treatment" as the "price" for doing their part in Lyndon Johnson's "bridge-building to the east."¹⁹¹ "Most favored nation treatment" means keeping U.S. duties on the given country's goods higher than the lowest granted to any other country. That status had been sought for some time by certain U.S. politicians for "communist countries which behaved."¹⁹²

However, in 1951, the American Congress had voted

"to deny (it) to all Communist countries *except Yugoslavia*. President Dwight D. Eisenhower added Poland to the cleared list in 1960. But Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, as well as the Soviet Union, are still beyond the pale."¹⁹³

During the first week of October, 1966, however,

"shortly before Mr Johnson launched his new campaign (for friendlier relations with the east), Cornelio Manescu, the foreign minister of increasingly independent Rumania, told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that any closer accord between the two countries must await Rumania's receiving most favored nation treatment...'We have to have it to negotiate'."¹⁹⁴

Rumania seemed the "communist" country most likely to succeed, for

"the United States wants to encourage the Rumanians to move farther and faster along the same road – just as it encouraged the Yugoslavs and then the Poles."¹⁹⁵

The foregoing information creates a picture of "both sides" scrambling for advantages, advantages with distinct strings attached. *Consequences* began showing up during *the next economic step which invariably follows trade: foreign investment in socialist industry*, at the invitation of leading circles of those very countries.

Section F: Foreign Investment in Socialist Industry

Drawing on Lenin's detailed analysis of imperialism as "The

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Highest Stage of Capitalism," it has been shown elsewhere* that "foreign investment in overseas industries and resources" is a vital form of capital export; and that capital export (or its modern evolutions like reinvestment of super-profits, maintenance of under-valued prices on primary products, etc.) is the core of colonialism.

Undoubtedly, for colonial and ex-colonial areas, the problem of sources of investment funds for industrializing is a knotty one. Colonialism has so drained these "hinterlands" of their real wealth that, upon political independence, they find themselves unable to advance by purely economic means. This makes investment funds a pivotal issue for economic progress in "emergent" countries.**

The Soviet Union, under Lenin and then Stalin, had, by drastic means, developed the first successful example of socialist accumulation. And it paid off much later in the blazing "Allied" victory of World War II, when the Red Army virtually alone decisively drove back Hitler's imperialist-backed hordes. After that victory, Soviet economy, with prewar experience under its belt, made a remarkable come-back in a very short historical period. But, as it did so, a class

arose within its borders anxious, perhaps because of being its major beneficiary, to avoid "spoiling" the good new life being created.

Excuses began to be found about "using sources already available," "learning from capitalism," or "dealing with the sensible sections" of the international ruling class – and so on.

One of the first practical results was the *restitution of the profit motive* "to accelerate economic advance." From this evolved other measures, among the first of which was invariably *the supremacy of monetary incentives* as the "promoters of productivity."

* See Chapters IV, V and VI, *Labor Aristocracy*.

** This, of course, assumes that industrialization in the Western sense is a "solution" for colonies. Their peoples have not yet had the opportunity to decide so. Moreover, China's example of using labor power as a principal "investment fund" suggests that colonial peoples have alternatives from which to make the choice.

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Insights into this process have been developed in a number of places. For instance, during 1966, there had been circulating within the Soviet Union a most interesting pamphlet, authored by

"Soviet Bolsheviks...exposing and repudiating...the Kruschov revisionist clique...The pamphlet was published by the ZERI I POPULLIT, organ of the Party of Labor of Albania, on December 20 and 21, 1966." ¹⁹⁶

This document was said to have declared that the current "ideas" of the USSR leadership were not new. What the Modern Revisionists had been putting forth were

"ordinary definitions made by the opportunists to the activities of Lenin during the whole period of the Russian Revolution." ¹⁹⁷

For instance, the opportunists who plagued the CPSU its earlier history – the Trotskyites and Zinovievites – claimed that they

"were all in favor of the (Party's) policy of industrialization...but in reality they...demanded the surrender of a number of mills and factories to foreigners in the form of concessions, and pinned their main hopes on foreign capitalist concessions in the U.S.S.R." ¹⁹⁸

Words like these, out of the horse's own mouth, so to speak, form a context for other insights into the process of reversion to capitalism in socialist lands. For example, a famous journalist and writer was recorded as remarking:

"A country that is trying to build itself along socialist lines cannot rely for its source of capital accumulation on colonial conquest. Neither can it rely, as China cannot rely, on foreign aid or foreign exchange from, say, loans because this would hamper its own

development. Therefore, the only way it can provide capital accumulation for construction...is from its own people. This means that the people must be dedicated, thrifty and saving, and doing work not for material incentive but for higher revolutionary ideas, for ideas basic to a socialist economy. If you begin the other way around, if you make it a material incentive, you are going to run into dilemmas. Where are you going to get your sources except by selling—

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your independence for loans or aid, as other nations have done, or else engaging, as Japan did, in wars of conquest?"¹⁹⁹

That this was precisely what befell Eastern Europe will, it is hoped, become evident in the following pages. It must constantly be borne in mind that, no matter how "sensible" any section of the international imperialist ruling class may be, when it has invested funds anywhere, its sole criterion has been whether or not such investment returned profit. And when, as so often, such investment was outside its own borders, its criterion was the return of SUPER-profit.

Allowing, then, no side issue to divert us from this elementary truth, what kinds of deals have been made in Eastern Europe between socialist governments and/or enterprises and various huge Western monopolies? Where were these leading?

1. *In Yugoslavia*

"The new plan to invite foreign capital to participate in economic ventures in communist Yugoslavia is perhaps the most far-reaching of all the changes and reforms introduced in the country over the last 18 years or so."²⁰⁰

That period had been spent by the Yugoslav leadership in "liberalizing" the country's economy, notably through reintroducing the "market force," with its attendant "free competition" and lifting of centralized planning. And

"all this has been 'capitalism without any capitalists,' for Yugoslav enterprises are all state-owned."²⁰¹

What was meant, of course, was "capitalism without any *visible* capitalists." Our previous chapters have described a new form of capitalism in Yugoslavia, operating through the state. Nonetheless, the point being made was of great importance to understanding Yugoslavia's descent into capitalism:

"Now a law is shortly to be passed which will not only enable foreign private and public companies to invest their capital in Yugoslavia but also share in the management of joint enterprises."²⁰²

In the West, such a law was viewed as "little short of revolutionary."²⁰³ And one Mr. Opresnik, reputedly Secretary of Finances for the Republic of Slovenia, (previously cited as one of the top national oppressor regions of Yugoslavia) was summoned to bear witness for the West:

"Our Republic has been starved of capital. It is vital that we should get fresh funds for our development no matter where they might come from."²⁰⁴

The door having thus conveniently been cracked from inside, the first to jam a foot into the tiny opening was West Germany's quondam supplier of Nazi munitions, Alfred Krupp, who signed a contract to build a cement plant in Yugoslavia.²⁰⁵

In this way, West German companies soon made the additional discovery in Yugoslavia of

"cheap and abundant local labor being the main attraction for prospective investors."²⁰⁶

Yugoslav leaders of the reforms had other schemes in mind, as well:

"Yugoslavia has been...the first communist country to enter into technological co-operation with western companies. Hundreds of licensing and other agreements have transformed the Yugoslav consumer market, making it much more attractive than any in the rest of the communist world. "²⁰⁷

Up till then, however,

"foreign companies had no incentive to supply the best and latest technology."²⁰⁸

Of course not! "Technological 'co-operation'" has been a major American imperialist method for taking over already-developed (i.e., Western European) industry.^{209*}

So a new law was to change the situation in Yugoslavia:

"Now...a western businessman will have a direct interest in the financial success of the Yugoslav company in which—

* See Chapter XI, *Labor Aristocracy*.

he is participating. This may also make it easier of (*sic*) the Yugoslavs to export goods to hard currency world markets."²¹⁰

Quite simply, that is, in return for letting foreign capital directly into its industry, the new "comprador-state" elite of Yugoslavia would be allowed new sources of "hard currency." Industries in Yugoslavia "especially anxious to attract foreign partners because of their need for modern technology and wider markets," were named in particular: chemical, electronic, and motor.²¹¹

Specifically, foreign investors were now to be allowed to hold "up to 50 per cent" of total risk capital in any individual enterprise.²¹²

Equally significant, they were to "share the responsibilities of management." In addition, agriculture, communications and transport were to be thrown wide open to foreign participants,

"while tourism is expected to bring untold foreign wealth into the country...

"Last year an unprecedented number of about twelve million visitors were...bringing in a total of \$150 million. This year 20 million foreign visitors are expected, with some 10 million cars."²¹³

(The use of "tourism" as a political and spying wedge in democratic Spain by the Nazis in the 1930s is well known.)

A major development in Yugoslav tourism was this: the Yugoslavs

"wish to invite their own citizens to participate, as shareholders, in tourist projects. If this proposal is accepted, such shareholders will be the first new breed of (individual – HE) Yugoslav capitalists."²¹⁴

The reason given for this move was the fact that "the 400,000 or so migrant Yugoslav workers now employed in Western Europe" had managed to save up some \$200 million from their weekly wages, and "the idea is to tap this sizeable new source of capital."²¹⁵

On the other side of the coin, however,

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"for those (workers) remaining in Yugoslavia times continue to be fairly hard. According to a recent public enquiry, fewer than 5,000 families had a higher income in 1966 than in the previous year. Consumption of meat and other more expensive food as well as expenditure on recreation and holidays were particularly affected. A rigorous squeeze and incomes policy have been in force since the new economic reform was inaugurated in July 1965. But there is no immediate prospect of economic relaxation."²¹⁶

Nor was there likely to be, for

"A major necessity in Yugoslav industries is to close down uneconomic factories and dismiss or re-direct inefficient surplus labor."²¹⁷

"Inefficient surplus labor!" Where have we heard that before? Yet, if the quoted source was accurate, such "ideology" was being swallowed relatively without ideological convulsions:

"...in Yugoslavia, one sees relatively little opposition to the new trend save from the deposed and frustrated former beneficiaries of the old system."²¹⁸

2. *The Soviet Union*

The irony of the last statement should have been appreciated, if it wasn't, by the Soviet leadership, which was moving along the same path.

Among their deals with western monopolies mentioned by both bourgeois and Soviet sources were: a scheme for Leyland Motor Corporation of Britain to build a bus-assembly factory in Russia;²¹⁹ a similar plan from British Motor Holdings for a car plant;²²⁰ "big orders" from the Soviet Union for the Italian Fiat group and the French Renault company;²²¹ and Soviet-suggested "tapping" of Siberia's immense resources by Japanese business, "sharing the wealth" with the Soviet state.²²²

Some of these agreements seem strange on reflecting that not too long before, Nikita Krushchov had stated publicly that the Soviet Union would "never" go for American-type car production for individual consumption. This, he had intoned, was "not the Socialist way," which would rent cars and buses to people as—

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needed. The pride of Moscow had long been its public transport system. This, Nikita had been fond of saying on numerous occasions, was good enough for socialist workers – and far superior to the wasteful American method.

In fact, the CPSU Program had noted specifically that "car hire centers will be organized on a large scale."²²³

Well, Krushchov fell in November, 1964. Within a very few months, a "car urge" became part of a general tendency of "the Soviet consumer" to want more:

"As IZVESTIA unabashedly admitted a fortnight ago: 'The urge to have one's own car is as compelling as technical progress itself.' This was a kind of consumer pressure that the Kremlin planners had never before encountered."²²⁴

Looking back, the mention of increased production of private cars had come up exactly twice in the CPSU Program:

"A ramified network of modern roads will be built throughout the country. The automobile fleet will increase sufficiently to fully meet freight and passenger requirements."²²⁵ "The wages of such numerically large sections *of the Soviet intelligentsia* as engineers and technicians, agronomists and stock-breeding experts, teachers, medical and cultural workers will rise considerably. As the incomes...grow, THE GENERAL LEVEL OF POPULAR CONSUMPTION WILL RISE RAPIDLY...Production of motor-cars will be considerably extended to service the population."²²⁶

More specifically, the Fiat deal had been reported on a number of occasions in a Soviet source which made the following points about the agreement and its results:²²⁷

a) Fiat itself had, in this agreement, made "the biggest commercial deal in its history." The Italian monopoly would help construct a motor works in the town of Togliatti on the Volga near Kuibyshev. Plant design was to be Italian. Production envisaged would be 600,000 cars a year – about 2,000 off the assembly lines each day. Cost of the project would be \$800 million.

"Fiat will supply equipment to an approximate total of –

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300 million dollars and has granted the Soviet Union a 10-year credit to this amount."²²⁸

b) Under this agreement,

"The Kuibyshev area will become the Soviet Union's third biggest motor industry center, after Moscow and Gorky."²²⁹

Construction of this plant began early in 1967. The word "construction" was to include the expansion of existing buildings and the erection of new ones, providing five new enterprises to supply the car plant itself with the necessary units and spare parts. The expansion was to get under way in the second half of the same year, 1967.

c) Among workers for the new plant would be 8,000 young specialists and skilled workers from various parts of the Soviet Union. By 1969, a new city – with an estimated population of half a million – would have been built by young people on the shore of the great Kuibyshev reservoir.

Presumably production methods would be geared to meet recent "scathing criticism of the way cars and parts are sold" in the Soviet Union. One of Moscow's three car dealers, Mr. V Osiko had reportedly been "upset" at what he called "backward marketing."²³⁰ for he complained publicly that his showroom was too small, too crowded, time procedure for obtaining a car after money

was available was too long, and spare parts were simply not obtainable in anything like the quantity needed.²³¹

"Mr Osiko did not mention the prices, but they are very high. A Moskvich, for example, costs more than \$4,000 and it is smaller than an American compact...Despite this, the Russians show every intention of bringing a full-fledged car civilization to this country. Soviet passenger car production is scheduled to rise from 200,000 last year to 800,000 in 1970."²³²

Most interesting was the comment of Fiat's Soviet deal by the late Professor Vittorio Valletta, president of the concern, who signed the agreement for Fiat. He declared that

"the credit has been granted on the best of terms, but—

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declined to be more specific. He said that the firm of Olivetti would probably take part in supplying equipment, especially machine tools. 'We shall invite many Italian companies to take part in this operation,' he added."²³³

The Professor's remarks should be read within the context of the well-known penchant of big monopolies to invest where profits are highest for a given unit of investment.

And, sure enough, the Chinese soon commented on the Fiat deal:

"This has enormously pleased U.S. imperialism. The U.S. Departments of Commerce and Defence promptly supported the Export-Import Bank in financing a \$50 million loan to Fiat for purchasing the required machinery from the United States. John T. McNaughton, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence, appearing before a House Committee, said approvingly that this 'will be an important element in President Johnson's program of building bridges to Eastern Europe. It is our opinion that such bridge-building serves our national security'."²³⁴

Supporting McNaughton's contention,

"Former Under-Secretary of State George Ball...said meaningfully that the car was ideology on four wheels..."²³⁵

Light was thrown on the Chinese comment by a Soviet publication "put out especially for West Africa:"

"QUESTION: Could you kindly give some details on the prospects of development of trade with Western Europe? "ANSWER: Our country is trading with most of the West European nations on the basis of inter-governmental agreements...

"As regards the state of trade between the USSR and Italy, it is important to note that the two countries express readiness for co-operation in various spheres of economy. This is testified by the agreements and contracts in the field of automobile manufacture. The development of Soviet-Italian trade is also being facilitated by the long-term credit given by the Italian banks. This credit—

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enables us to expand our purchases of commodities in that country and expand our export to Italy." ^{236*}

On Russian deals with Japan, Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev, already reported "very optimistic", was quoted to the effect that

"The possibilities for further growth 'are far from exhausted,' he declared. The continuing development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, he said, opened up new opportunities for *Japanese* firms: they could supply equipment on a credit basis for the building of enterprises, receiving finished products in payment." ²³⁷

These remarks undoubtedly followed a number of exploratory trips to Japan by Russians over the preceding year or so. In mid-March 1966, 28 Russian "economists and technicians" had made the jaunt to Tokyo "as if they actually meant business." ²³⁸ Mikhail Nesterov, president of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and head of the delegation stated:

"Siberia has reserves of 40 billion tons of oil, 42 billion cubic meters of lumber, vast amounts of iron ore, coal and nonferrous metals, all waiting to be tapped.' He invited the Japanese to suggest methods of tapping them all and sharing the wealth." ²³⁹

For the Japanese, this Siberian offer from Moscow was merely "the most exciting in a series of recent economic dealings," which were listed as:

1. 1963, a fisheries agreement;
2. January 1966, a commercial air agreement;
3. February 1966, a new five-year \$2.1 billion trade agreement. ²⁴⁰

In their visit to Tokyo, the Russian delegation was further alleged to have made the following additional offers to the Japanese:

- "Participation by the Japanese in development of the Western Siberian oil fields, which are expected to become Russia's biggest producers." The Russians, on their side, were said to need—

* See Appendix I.

4,338 miles of 48" pipe from the oil fields to the port of Makhodka, plus 500 miles of 28" pipe for sidelines. The suggestion was that, after 1975, when production would have risen above local needs, the Soviets could pay the Japanese in oil for supplying this pipe.²⁴¹

- "Purchase of huge Japanese bulk carriers of oil and ore, if the Japanese buy the oil and ore that the ships would carry."²⁴²
- "Interest in buying Japanese cargo-loading equipment, warehouses, tug-boats and icebreakers for a \$111 million program to improve the harbors of Makhodka, Vladivostock, Vanino and Mago."²⁴³
- "Purchase of Japanese lumbering machinery and equipment, if the Japanese buy some of the lumber."²⁴⁴

Thus, what the Second World War could not accomplish – penetration of Siberia by Japanese monopolies – the Soviet revisionist leadership began voluntarily under Kruschov, and continued under his successors.

Moreover, subsequent details of these deals which were soon revealed threw a certain light on China-USSR "border incidents" involving islands in the middle of rivers:

"The Japanese Government is being pressed by the United States and by the Soviet Union, each in its own way, to help contain China...

"The Russians would like to see (the Japanese) shift their economic and financial interests from China to the development of Siberia.

"They are dangling such tempting bait as a co-operative *profit-sharing arrangement* for the production of natural gas on Sakhalin, and for the exploitation of copper mines and lumber in Siberia.

"*Some of these projects are on territory claimed by the Chinese.* Not since the 1920s have the Russians made such offers to attract foreign capital. Japanese financial interests are still hesitant, and so is the Japanese Government.

"The sums involved are huge, some \$4,000 million or \$5,000 million over a period of 10 to 15 years; and there is also the question to what extent this would increase Japanese dependence on Russia, but one or two of the—

offers are likely to be accepted if an agreement on prices can be reached."²⁴⁵

3. *Eastern Europe*

If such was the condition of the Soviet Union, how about Eastern Europe? The number of deals with capitalist concerns in that quarter seems past counting now. Western stories from 1965 and 1966 offered details:

"500 Western firms...are engaged in cooperative ventures worth \$800 million in Eastern Europe...which will do many times that amount of business in the years ahead."^{245a}

A few reported early ones included:

POLAND: West Germany's Krupp was reported²⁴⁶ negotiating to build factories (synthetic fiber plants) "that will be *German-owned but will employ Polish labor*."²⁴⁷ By April 1967, Fiat was to start equipping a factory capable of producing 30,000 cars per year.²⁴⁸

HUNGARY: Early in 1965, Krupp also found a welcome here²⁴⁹ for a plant like Poland's; that is, a synthetic fiber plant.²⁵⁰ By 1967, France's Renault had made an assembly agreement with Hungary for some 10,000 vehicles annually.²⁵¹

BULGARIA: Krupp, by early 1966, was to equip and manage a \$25 million synthetic fiber plant here, and to sell diesel-powered fishing boats.²⁵² Renault reportedly would implement an agreement like the one with Hungary for 10,000 cars to be assembled annually. 253

RUMANIA: "The West German firm(s) of Gutehoffnungs-hutte...Damag and Siemens, Krupp and M.A.N. all add to a German investment in Rumania that exceeds \$50 million."^{253a} Krupp would build a machine tool plant here.²⁵⁴ Firestone Tire and Rubber and Universal Oil Products would each erect "major plants."²⁵⁵ Renault's order was for a "50,000-units-a-year plant."²⁵⁶ Rumania itself made a \$100 million petroleum agreement with Iran, which would import Rumanian oil refining and drilling equipment, carbon black and a rolling mill for unwelded pipe.²⁵⁷ a similar agreement, in the neighborhood of \$95 million, was being negotiated with-

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Gabon in "French Africa" for Rumania to export oil-drilling and refining equipment in exchange for crude oil.²⁵⁸

As with Yugoslavia, Eastern European countries were by then also seeking the use of licenses and patents from the West. The pattern was:

"Czechoslovakia is steadily expanding its purchases of patents and licenses from Western nations in an effort to speed industrial modernization. It is also selling more of its own licenses to the West.

"According to official figures, income from Czechoslovak license sales (to foreign firms) in 1965 was six times what it was three years ago."²⁵⁹

Perhaps the most revealing of the varied welter of details, above, is the recurrence of the Nazi-tied name of KRUPP in all these "deals." Quite interestingly, too, it was an East German publication according to which

"By mid-November of this year (1966) Krupps of Essen whose turnover exceeds £460 million, had got itself into a serious financial mess...In 1963, two British papers reported serious problems with Krupp short-term loans...this year the spectre of bankruptcy has arisen again."²⁶⁰

This East German source noted that Krupp had been rescued from this "mess" by "Herr Blessing, Governor of the Government Bundesbank" after more or less blackmailing "the better informed financial journals and correspondents" into not revealing his action because Herr Alfried Krupp was known as the "former slave driver and armorer for Hitler."²⁶¹ But such an "explanation" actually begs the question: big banks lend only to customers with "good" (i.e., verifiable) prospects.

A somewhat clearer version of what rescued Krupp from his hard times appeared in New York. Under the guidance of Berthold Beitz, general manager of Krupp's huge German combine, the failing oligopoly was able to make all kinds of deals with Eastern European socialist countries:

"Why go all the way to Indonesia or Bolivia when East Europe is on our doorstep?"²⁶²

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Reference to Indonesia and Bolivia is by no means fortuitous. As is usual after military defeat, Germany after World War II, as after World War I, had had all its colonies surgically removed. Even U.S. "aid" could take a "resurrected" capitalist economy only so far if it had no colonial-type outlet for its own surplus capital. That would seem to have been the situation into which Krupp's revived empire had fallen before Beitz had the bright idea of making big deals with Eastern Europe – and before revisionism had softened Eastern Europe sufficiently to make them possible.

One explanation for the above-noted softening held that the European Common Market, by keeping out Eastern European agricultural products, had "forced" these countries to "seek new ways of earning hard currency:"

"They hope to do so by exporting industrial products from the new enterprises built in partnership with Krupp. Ignoring politics, Krupp has pioneered West-East deals in which it provides the technological know-how and much of the machinery to labor-rich Eastern Europe, *shares both risks and profits with Communist Governments*. Manager Beitz predicts that in ten years Krupp's trade with Eastern Europe (only \$12.5 million in 1963) will equal its sales to Germany's Common Market partners.

"The former armaments giant certainly could use the business. After making a spectacular postwar recovery that lasted into the end of the 1950s, the firm has had three lean years in a row. Between 1960 and 1963, its earnings were estimated to be below 4% of its sales – barely enough to meet the interest charges on Krupp's large indebtedness. Last year's sales (1965) were up about 10%, to an estimated \$1.43 billion."²⁶³

The way Krupp had rebuilt his postwar-dismantled "corporate structure" after World War II was by reacquiring a number of major properties while the "Allies" looked the other way.²⁶⁴ With the completion of such internal reorganization, the Krupp empire's slack was ready to be taken up as "The company is now looking...Eastward."²⁶⁵

There were other reports of Krupp's eastward moves, starting with that synthetic fiber plant in Poland:

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"The trail-blazing Beitz is taking advantage of the fact that Eastern European countries are now making the first cautious moves from a centrally directed economy to a socialist version of the market economy. Apolitical technocrats are being allowed into key jobs and they are more interested in results than in proving Marx right."²⁶⁶

Ironically, however, they *were* "proving Marx right"! An analysis of the following thought confirms precisely Marx's analysis:

"Perhaps the most interesting experiment in East-West economic relations is the 'co-partnership' idea of West Germany's Krupp industrial combine. The brain-child of wheeler-dealer Krupp boss Berthold Beitz, 51, it calls for Krupp to supply machinery and technical know-how for a new plant in Eastern Europe while the Communist government provides the site, factory buildings and manpower. Risks and profits are shared 50-50 with the government concerned."²⁶⁷

The "sharing of risks" meant that if the "venture" should lose money, the "socialist" government would stand half the loss. The "sharing of profits" meant that *a specific fraction of the values produced* above and beyond the wages and overheads involved (of a "socialist" enterprise) *were to be siphoned out of an allegedly socialist economy*. Values created by socialist workers were now to find their way into the pockets of WESTERN capitalists (among whom Krupp was soon only one).

But Marx spent a long lifetime proving that the private expropriation of surplus values is exploitation! Since there could be no exploitation under real socialism, whether in large or small enterprises; since socialist law forbids hiring labor power by private persons – therefore, *the introduction of exploitation into any socialist industry IS the re-introduction of capitalism into the entire economy*. It could only be a matter of time before the disease spread – and the patient died.

This is the hard core fact which all the revisionist sophistry,¬

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"justifications out of Lenin," and smoke screens were designed to disguise, hide or bury.

4. *Ex-Colonial Countries*

The most tragic aspect of the above fact has been its effects upon Communist theory and practice among Parties where colonialism had been politically overthrown:

"the revolutionary...movement was diverted from its correct orientation and became a reformist movement...there were apparently big actions by workers that had great political significance, such as the take-over of the enterprises belonging to the Dutch, British and Belgian imperialists. But the actual results of these actions were beneficial only for a handful of bureaucrat-capitalists...

"Besides, since the Party leadership considered the former imperialist-owned enterprises...as a national property, further actions by the workers were restrained. On the contrary, far too many activities aimed at increasing productivity...did not improve the living conditions nor heighten the revolutionary spirit of the workers."²⁶⁸

This same misconception by an emerging government regarding the significance of ownership of means of production by a transition government was, during the same epoch, playing havoc with the professed socialist orientation of the Convention People's Party in Ghana, West Africa.

Government control of *credit* is a usual means of controlling and channeling investment, as was soon clear in Yugoslavia, where, by 1961,

"Through the banks, the Tito clique control the credit of the entire country and the investment funds and liquid capital of all enterprises and supervises their financial affairs."²⁶⁹

Within a few years, it became clear where this was leading:

"...credit funds needed by (Yugoslav) enterprises are no longer issued in accordance with a unified plan; instead the banks invite tenders, and whoever offers the highest

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rate of interest and repays the loan in the shortest possible time gets the funds."²⁷⁰

In Eastern Europe, one country had already caught the bug:

"Hungary...in a deviation from Marxist ideology unique in the bloc, has imposed an interest rate of 5% on capital."²⁷¹

A Czech story, written later, showed that Hungarian practice was soon by no means "unique in the bloc:"

"Now central planners will only advise the banks about the climate of investment to guide them in their credit policies. Instead of handing out fat subsidies as in the past, the Czech central bank will charge 6% interest on capital loans – a price that should make plant managers more concerned to develop in the right direction."²⁷²

The pioneering in economic degeneration had, as always, occurred in Yugoslavia:

"In Yugoslav cities...there are also usurers, who are known as 'private bankers.' These usurers operate openly and even advertise their business in the newspapers; one such advertisement runs as follows: 'A loan of 300,000 dinars for three months offered, 400,000 dinars to be returned. Security necessary'."²⁷³

The foregoing pages have shown how a theoretical aberration on the question of public ownership of the means of production caused the following erosions in formerly socialist practice:

1. The growth of the private sector itself, notably in agriculture, as expressed in the buying and selling of land.
 2. Decentralization of planning, resulting in putting individual enterprises ahead of the national economy, leading to the rise of a new elite.
 3. As centralized planning was abandoned, the following economic consequences appeared:
 - a) Fierce competition between enterprises;
 - b) Closing of redundant enterprises, leading to unemployment;
-

- c) Anarchy of production and distribution;
 - d) Monopolization and mergers;
 - e) Chaos in prices.
4. Reintroduction of the profit motive and monetary incentives for workers, corroding the entire superstructure, hastening restoration of capitalism.
 5. Loss of control over foreign trade, which became part of world capitalist trade.
 6. Penetration into the once-socialist economy of bourgeois capital and, with it, exploitation (at first by outside imperialism).

All that has remained of "socialism" – as the world bourgeoisie so clearly understood – was state ownership of property. This text has shown that the latter is not, in and of itself and without certain specific accompanying conditions, either socialist or socialism.

VI | MODERN REVISIONISM AND THE STATE

Section A: In Theory

Lenin's writings are crowded with rejections of "peaceful socialist revolution," "peaceful democracy" and other distortions of the Marxist view on the role of the State.

About that, Lenin had been quite specific:

"...the state is a 'special repressive force.' Engels gives this splendid and extremely profound definition...And from it follows that the 'special repressive force' for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie...must be replaced by a 'special repressive force' for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat."¹

"The state is a special organization of force: it is an organization of *violence* for the suppression of some class. What class must the proletariat suppress? Naturally, only the exploiting class, i.e., the bourgeoisie."²

Such being the case, how must Marxists work the State into their program for revolution?

"Revolution consists not in the new class commanding, governing with the aid of the OLD state machine, but in this class SMASHING this machine and commanding, governing with the aid of a NEW machine."³

Why was this? His reason was based on the Marxist position on the state:

"The bourgeois parliament, even the most democratic in the most democratic republic in which the property and rule of the bourgeoisie is preserved, is a machine for the suppression of the toiling millions by small groups of exploiters."⁴

He castigated the opportunists who thought they could make a revolution through the vote:

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"The (opportunists) are ready to 'recognize' the proletarian revolution but only with the proviso that first, WHILE MAINTAINING INTACT the force, power, oppression and privileges of capital and wealth, the majority votes (with the election carried out under the bourgeois apparatus of state power) 'FOR REVOLUTION'!! Just try to imagine the entire depth of the philistine blockheadedness of these views, the entire depth of the philistine trust in the capitalists, in the bourgeoisie, in the generals, in the bourgeois apparatus of state power."⁵

As will be demonstrated subsequently, it is no longer necessary to "imagine" these depths; history has, since Lenin's day, provided an almost tragically large number of concrete examples of precisely such "philistine blockheadedness."

Furthermore, the architect of the Russian revolution on innumerable occasions reminded workers that winning control of a *government* was by no means the same thing as capturing *state* power:

"Marx does not speak of the 'form of government' but of the form or type of STATE. That is something altogether different; altogether different."⁶

So, then, if revolution required the smashing of the old state machinery and its replacement by something "NEW," what should the latter be? Here again, Lenin was sharply specific:

"Only he is a Marxist who EXTENDS the recognition of the class struggle to the recognition of the DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT...This is the touchstone on which the REAL understanding and recognition of Marxism is to be tested."⁷

He did not say "if," "but" or "maybe." In fact, he further restricted the perimeter of misunderstanding his meaning:

"Proletarian dictatorship is the SOLE means of defending the working people against the oppression of capital, the violence of bourgeois military dictatorship *and imperialist war*."⁸

Taking the idea one step further, he added that

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"...the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is VIOLENCE against the bourgeoisie."⁹

In sum, Lenin insisted on violence as the only practical path to successful revolution as long as capitalism existed anywhere; he had maintained that successful revolution by violence could be sustained only by embodying that same revolutionary violence in a dictatorship of the proletariat and had proclaimed that the only guarantee of a proletarian dictatorship was to smash the old standing army, replacing it by the armed people, and to smash the old bureaucracy, substituting representatives not only elected by universal suffrage, but recallable at any time by that electorate, permitted no parliamentary privileges and paid at rates no higher than those of an ordinary workingman.

On all these points, the modern revisionists opposed the "old" Marxist position, claiming instead that

a) The "decisive" position of socialism in the modern world made it possible to achieve socialism by "the parliamentary road," with a corollary that the content of proletarian dictatorship "in the new circumstances" was "not violence but creation;"

b) having "abolished the class struggle" inside socialist countries, the socialist state, "the dictatorship of the proletariat" had now "ceased to be indispensable."

c) They brought back, rather than smashed, the old bureaucracy – or a new one, while bogging their army down with professionalism and weaponry worship.

From these positions, basically reminiscent of Social Democracy and opportunism of the World War I vintage, certain consequences were inevitable.

At the beginning of its Program of 1961, the CPSU leadership had said:

"The bourgeois state, whatever its form, is an instrument of the domination of labor by capital."¹⁰

However, a few pages on, it added:

"Soviet experience has shown that THE SOCIALIST STATE is the main instrument for the socialist transformation of of society. The state organizes and unites the masses,–

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exercises planned leadership, and safeguards the revolutionary gains of the people."¹¹

Still later, it arrived at the following more general position:

"In the conditions prevailing at present...The working class, supported by the majority of the people...can...win a solid majority in parliament, transform it from a tool serving the interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch a broad mass struggle outside parliament, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and provide the necessary conditions for a peaceful socialist revolution."¹²

In this quotation, no phrase designating the socialist state as "an instrument of suppression" against anything or anyone occurred. Not a word was mentioned about the continuing need to keep down the defeated bourgeoisie. Rather, a symptomatic vagueness clouded what the socialist state must "safeguard against" in protecting "the revolutionary gains of the people."¹³

Further on in its Program, the CPSU leadership discussed the role of the socialist state in the "second" or "last" phase of socialism:

"After the exploiting classes had been abolished, the (state) function of suppressing their resistance ceased to exist...Having brought about the complete and final victory of socialism – the first phase of communism – and the transition of society to the full-scale construction of communism...The (Soviet) state...has...become a state of the entire people, an organ expressing the interests and will of the people as whole."¹⁴

Lenin had, at one point, expressed an opinion which could well have been tailored for this passage of the CPSU Program:

"This extra-class or supra-class presentation, which supposedly embraces the entire people, is an outright travesty of the very foundation of socialism, namely its theory of the class struggle."¹⁵

Behind Lenin's theory of the State, of course, lurked the fundamental Marxist thesis on class struggle: the irreconcilability of antagonistic classes. And Lenin made short shrift of "betrayers of—

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socialism" who pretended before the working class that the bourgeoisie would ever "yield to the majority of the working population."¹⁶

On the contrary, Lenin was most specific about the class struggle "ceasing:"

"The dictatorship of the proletariat does not signify the cessation of class struggle, but its continuation in a new form and with new weapons. As long as classes exist, as long as the bourgeoisie, overthrown in one country, intensifies tenfold its *attacks on socialism on an international scale*, this dictatorship is essential."¹⁷

So, even had classes actually been "abolished" inside the Soviet Union, there certainly could be no doubt about the "tenfold" intensification "on an international scale" of imperialism's attacks on socialism.

Aside from such considerations, the concept of a "people's state" was *nothing new* in revolutionary history. Lenin quoted a letter from Engels to August Bebel written on March 28, 1875, on this specific subject. In it, Engels had said:

"As...the state is only a transitional institution which is used...in the revolution to hold down one's adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free people's state; so long as the proletariat still USES the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the state as such ceases to exist."¹⁸

And the CPSU Program did pay lip service to this concept:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of the Marxist party are indispensable conditions for the triumph of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism."¹⁹

But how did the Soviet leaders envision "dictatorship of the proletariat"? They enlightened us in their very next breath:

"The firm *alliance* of the working class and the working peasant masses under the leadership of the

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working class *is the supreme principle* of the dictatorship of the proletariat."²⁰

Later, they added to this "supreme principle" that

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is a dictatorship of the overwhelming majority over the minority; it...expresses not only the interests of the working class but also those of all working people; *its chief content is not violence but creation*..."²¹

Finally, the CPSU Program announced that

"...the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and *has ceased to be indispensable* in the U.S.S.R. from the point of view of the tasks of international development..."²²

Lenin's view of the proletarian dictatorship – as we have seen – contained not a single word about "alliances" as any "supreme principle;" he directly and specifically contradicted the beatific current Soviet view of that dictatorship's "chief content," and he had many specific words to the contrary to say about the possibility of its becoming dispensable before the advent of communism was feasible:

"The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is rule won and maintained *by the use of violence* by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie."²³

Lenin had insisted that bourgeois violence governed the need for continuing the counter-violence of the proletarian dictatorship right into the era of communism:

"This object (transition from capitalism to socialism) cannot be achieved at one stroke. It requires a *fairly long period of transition* from capitalism to socialism, because the reorganization of production is a difficult matter, because radical changes in all spheres of life need time, and because the enormous force of habit of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois property relations can be overcome only by a long and stubborn struggle. That is why Marx spoke of an entire period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the period of transition from capitalism to socialism."²⁴

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As far as Lenin was concerned, the proletarian dictatorship *implemented* Marxist theory about force and violence; in fact, in his eyes, that dictatorship could be viewed as the major practical expression of that theory:

"...whenever there is any serious aggravation of the class struggle intrinsic to (capitalist) society, *there can be no middle path between dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and dictatorship of the proletariat*. Dreams of some third way are no more than reactionary petty-bourgeois lamentations."²⁵

Again, he had noted that

"the necessity of such violence is PARTICULARLY created...by the existence of a MILITARY CLIQUE AND A BUREAUCRACY."²⁶

Lenin also made the specific connection between such militarism and the methods needed for successful revolution:

"Imperialism...is, by virtue of its fundamental ECONOMIC traits, distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom, and by a maximum and universal development...of militarism. To fail to notice this in discussing the extent to which a peaceful or violent revolution is typical or probable is to stoop to the position of a most ordinary lackey of the bourgeoisie."²⁷

On every possible theoretical level, then, the CPSU leadership has broken with Marx, Engels and Lenin on the question of the nature and role of the state in any society, as well as upon the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat to continue through into the establishment of communist society.

The existence of the U.S. international military behemoth, forever intensifying its pressures in and around the USSR, deprives the Soviet ideologues of the "out" in their phrase "In the conditions prevailing at present," by which they have attempted to smooth over their departure from basic Marxist positions and to take the entire revolutionary movement into their Never-Never Land.

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Section B: Revisionist Practice and the State

1. In Yugoslavia

For an outfit that spoke at such length about, and with such emphasis on, "peaceful transition," "peaceful co-existence," "peaceful competition," and the "parliamentary road to socialism without civil war," the Modern Revisionists were really a bloody lot.

For instance, *in Yugoslavia* it has already been shown in detail how the revisionist leadership there collaborated with international fascism and internally practiced a fascist dictatorship.

In a very short historical period, based upon a wrong theory of the state, Yugoslavia's dictatorship of the proletariat had been revised into a dictatorship of ruling Slovenian and Croatian "nouveau-comprador-capitalists," who – to retain and enhance their own usurped power – revised proletarian internationalism to aid the brutal imperialists in suppressing revolution throughout the world.

Innumerable instances of Yugoslav fascist dictatorship replacing that of the proletariat have been cited:

"adopting Gestapo fascist methods...of the bourgeois police...of provocations, extermination, in Franco's and monarcho-fascist jails...a veritable jail for...genuine communists, for patriots and revolutionaries, for all honest people who cherished freedom, socialism and progress."²⁰

Then, in 1966, inner ruling clique contradictions burst into the open:

"Now the Yugoslav revisionists feel obliged to *admit* that their state is a police state, that UDB rules there with a high hand over...everything from the highest Titoite Party and state apparatuses to the simplest enterprises...to the salesmen of the most remote villages."²⁹

Moreover, this type of activity soon evolved links with the Soviet revisionists:

"Tito's clique still keeps its oppressive police apparatus intact, it continues to enjoy the all-round support of the U.S. imperialists, of the Soviet revisionist leaders and of the reactionaries in various countries."³⁰

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What did all this blood-thirsty power-jockeying mean? Where was it leading?

"The degeneration of the state power in Yugoslavia occurred not through the overthrow of the original state power by violence and the establishment of a new state power, but through 'peaceful evolution'. In appearance, the same people remain in power, but in essence these people no longer represent the interests of the workers, peasants and the working people but those of imperialism and the old and new bourgeoisie of Yugoslavia."³¹

That is, the real – i.e., practical – outcome of "peaceful transition" turned out to be not forward to socialism, but back to capitalism!

2. *In the Soviet Union*

Perhaps the most interesting – if one may be allowed the expression – perversion of the Marxist attitude toward the state came *in the Soviet Union*: its much-publicized "struggle against the personality cult." This began, it will be recalled, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 under the direction of Nikita Krushov. Within a mere ten years, evidence of a Soviet "underground" which opposed this perversion had appeared. From its hiding places, it proclaimed that the whole anti-personality-cult was merely a masquerade for the destruction of proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union:

"...the whole...personality cult...involves the first experimentation with the dictatorship of the proletariat."³²

If this source was credible, many Russians were seeing the drift and trying to stop it:

"Soon after the 20th Congress, in the public meetings of the Communist Party organizations of the Soviet Union, mass petitions were put forth by rank and file party members, demanding that the Central Committee make a truer Marxist assessment of Stalin's activities. These demands were so insistent that the party leadership was compelled to carry out persecutions against various party members and to dissolve a number of party organizations."³³

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But in so doing, the "opportunists" were merely, in practice, providing proof for Stalin's own position:

"...the opportunists tried to reject one of Stalin's most important theses (that) the class struggle, while approaching Communism, becomes ever more fierce and assumes ever more complicated form."³⁴

Furthermore, although the revisionists combed his writings, they were unable to refute a single one of his theories. They were forced to concentrate on his "executions." But a man whose theory could not be refuted could not at the same time be "to blame for so many sins...it would be the most strange phenomenon in the world."³⁵

So, the Soviet opportunists were seen as criticizing the personality cult:

"in order to cater to their own egoistic interests; they need it as a smoke screen, behind which to conceal their ugly faces and deeds."³⁶

At the same time, in a kind of "reverse personality cult," although Krushov adopted

"all the political and especially the economic programs proposed by his group...it was *only he who was blamed* for all the failures of the great 10 year plan. ...the opportunist chieftains of...the Soviet Union sacrificed Krushov for the sake of Soviet public opinion."³⁷

As a matter of fact,

"all the accusations leveled against Stalin by the opportunists can be summarized in a single phrase: violation of proletarian democracy. Criticising Stalin...the opportunists compared him to Lenin, thinking that this was...the most convincing argument for them."³⁸

Instead, official editorials castigating the personality cult ironically used the same vocabulary that Lenin had once directed against the opportunists and socialist renegades of his own day!³⁹

What was worse, the modern revisionists were trying to turn Lenin into

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"a supporter of the thesis, 'do not resist evil with violence'...(they) are ready to forget Lenin (who said) 'We are Jacobins on the side of the proletariat' – these words of Lenin's must be taken into consideration by those who are seeking to give Lenin the appearance of Jesus Christ."⁴⁰

In any case, what the revisionists were trying to cover up was the fact that, if Stalin really had such a "big power," that was only because, after the death of Lenin, at the Party's 15th Congress,

"Those belonging to the opposition demanded that an elementary democratic attitude be taken toward them, they demanded more exchange of views, while the whole congress shouted: 'Down with the opportunists! Long live Stalin!' And this was no suppression of democracy but its affirmation."⁴¹

At that time, the opportunists had wanted to put agriculture above industry and "thus sacrifice the Russian peasantry to fascist slavery."⁴² The issue was

"should the construction of industry in the Soviet Union be carried out at the cost of a great deal of effort and unbelievable privations? Was Stalin right when he said: 'Either do this or be suppressed?' We think that the best answer to this question can be given by the soldiers of the Patriotic War who held in their hands the arms produced by Stalinist industry. And it was just the Mensheviks and the errants who opposed industrialization."⁴³

Earlier Soviet sources bolstered this diagnosis: Stalin had presented the Central Committee's proposals; Trotsky and Zinoviev and their organized anti-Stalin henchmen had plugged their own:

"In October 1927...two months before the Fifteenth Congress, the Central Committee...announced a general Party discussion and the fight began. Its result was...724,000 Party members voted for the policy of the Central Committee; 4,000, or less than one percent, for the bloc of Trotskyites and Zinovievites. The anti-Party bloc was completely routed."⁴⁴

Stalin was the particular man chosen to wield this power voted by the Fifteenth Party Congress because

"he was the determined conveyor of Leninism even under the attacks of the rightists, 'leftists' and various opportunists."⁴⁵

The crux of the matter lay in answering the question, about Stalin, "Against whom, the persecutions?"

"The opportunist gentlemen, seeking to conceal the social basis of these persecutions, want to present Stalin as a man who, fearing rivalry, captured and shot everyone whom he considered reasonable. Of course, this is groundless even in relations to the circle closest to Stalin. Otherwise, for example, the members of the opportunist clique must admit that they survived at the time of Stalin because, from the mental viewpoint, they deserved no attention...

"Stalin persecuted the main petty-bourgeois ideologues...who...disguised themselves before the Bolsheviks. Herein lies the essence of the 'notorious trials in Moscow.' Stalin freed Russia from the 'fifth column'."⁴⁶

The theoretical background for granting "such a big power" to Party Secretary-General Josef Stalin was along the following lines:

"In its first stage...in the face of mortal danger under conditions of very fierce class struggle...should one place confidence in the commander on whom the destiny of a revolutionary army depends?...He who wants to fight cannot fight without commander. And if today Stalin is not alive, we will fight in the battalion of Mao Tse-tung and Enver Hoxha."⁴⁷

Finally, examining who the anti-cultists resurrected offered adequate commentary on the personality cult itself:

"The opportunists rehabilitated all those who once suffered under Stalin's hand: counter-revolutionary bands which took part in the 1905 punitive expeditions, degenerates who stole the people's property, German policemen and so on...historians were allowed access to archives of the Ministry of Home Affairs only with the personal authorization of Kruschov...His successors continue this sinister course."⁴⁸

Thus, averred the anti-revisionist opposition within the Soviet Union,

"Stalinism, if one wants to give it a general definition, represents in itself the operation of the dictatorship of the proletariat."⁴⁹

And the fact that those who loudly proclaimed the anti-personality cult had created

"a bureaucratic stratum between the revolutionary center and people which hinders and obstructs full unity"⁵⁰

merely proved the purpose of their prolonged insistence on anti-Stalinism. For,

"the usurpation of power on the part of the bureaucracy as well as the struggle against it are a manifestation of class struggle...the Soviet bureaucracy('s)...first step was official abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat...And so before us appears the enraged selfish, greedy and...frightened petty bourgeoisie...a class enemy...still more dangerous because he wears our uniform, because amidst the flames of class struggle, we may think he is on our side...and later be stabbed in the back."⁵¹

3. *In Eastern Europe*

Stentorian proclamations against the personality cult soon spread to all Eastern Europe – for the same reasons, and with the same results, as in the Soviet Union.

It was at Eastern European Communist Party Congresses – East German, Rumanian, Czechoslovakian – that the most virulent anti-Chinese outcries (in the name of "anti-Stalinism") occurred.

And, since the revisionists themselves had brought it up, what about the "cult of personality" they claimed was being practised in China?

Author Han Suyin replied to a question whether or not she saw in China

"any manifestations of the cult of the individual as it expressed itself in the Soviet Union under Stalin...is there—

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not a danger of so much being placed in one individual – that is, for the future of the revolution?"⁵²

by saying that

"if you go into it deeply, you do realize that what you call the cult of the individual is the cult of the thought of Mao...I believe it is the writings of Mao and what is called the thought of Mao that are the chief guidelines of the (Chinese) revolution, and not Mao himself as a personality...

"Another thing is that Mao is not using this cult of personality to do any kind of purging of personal enemies. Many people who oppose him are still in the central committee. Nor does he use it to make any pronouncements of edicts now. He acts as if he had done his work. There is the compendium of thinking, and he doesn't say a word."⁵³

A similar reply was implied in the remarks quoted above from the anti-revisionist opposition inside the Soviet Union. Their implication was that "war communism" still existed internationally; that therefore a "supreme commander" (like Stalin) was needed; and that Mao was such a commander.

The outcry in revisionist circles against Mao coupled with revelations like those in the Soviet anti-revisionist pamphlet quoted above, suggested that Mao's thought, like Stalin's, aimed at maintaining and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat in China. Contrariwise, those who foamed at the mouth about the "cult of Mao" could simply have been giving themselves away as opponents in China or elsewhere of the same dictatorship of the proletariat which has been done away with in so many areas of the socialist world.*

* In this respect, a diatribe-in-point written since the outbreak, spread and success of China's cultural revolution under Mao's guidance listed⁵⁴ the number of times Mao's pictures and/or adulatory references to Mao appeared in PEKING REVIEW and compared this with the alleged contents of pre-cultural-revolution issues. The distinct impression created was that then-current PEKING REVIEWS contained nothing but personal (rather than political) references to Chairman Mao. It never seems to have occurred

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Han Suyin, asked if the U.S. were not aware that success for Mao's thought in China "would have world-wide implications and repercussions," replied that such was, indeed, the case. She added that, where Mao's thought was not being followed in countries of the same of similar background,

"We have seen 66 coups d'etat in the world since 1950, most of them to promote military right-wing governments into power, which are reproducing on a large scale all over the world the war-lord situation which was present in China in the 1920s..."⁵⁵

Section C: The Old Standing Army

Lenin, basing himself on Marx and Engels, had pointed out that the *essence* of the state was its *armed forces*. He taught that if, after the victory of socialism, the workers developed and united their own armed forces, this

"will be based on the 'complete destruction' of the centralized (bourgeois) state apparatus – the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy."⁵⁶

Elsewhere, Lenin had dealt with the army itself more specifically:

"...not a single great revolution has ever taken place or ever can take place, without the 'disorganization' of the army. For the army is the most ossified instrument for supporting the old regime, the most hardened bulwark of bourgeois discipline, buttressing up the rule of capital, and preserving and fostering among the working people the servile spirit of submission and subjection to capital. Counter-revolution has never tolerated, and never could tolerate, armed workers side by side with the army.

to such self-styled revolutionaries that perhaps the successful implementation of Mao's thought among tens if not millions of "ordinary Chinese" may perhaps have *earned* the Chairman unbounded gratitude from those whom he has helped become advanced enough to understand what Mao Tse-tung thought is about. Armchair liberals in "God's country" quite obviously do not have the material background to enable them to grasp this simple concept of gratitude for deliverance.

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"...The armed workers were the embryo of a NEW army, the organized nucleus of a NEW social order. The first commandment of the bourgeoisie was to crush this nucleus and prevent it from growing. The first commandment of every victorious revolution, as Marx and Engels repeatedly emphasized, was to smash the old army, dissolve it and replace it by a new one. A new social class, when rising to power, never could, and cannot now, attain power and consolidate it except by completely disintegrating the old army...and by gradually building up, in the midst of hard civil war, a new army, a new discipline, a new military organization of a new class."⁵⁷

Almost as if discussing "interpretations" of these precepts by revisionists, Lenin, in still another work, had spoken of the Social Democrats of his day who had managed to attain posts in bourgeois governments. This, he had pointed out, was something the entire working class had to see with their own eyes in order to believe, in order to absorb the lesson of the necessity to crush the old state power:

"Not only the uncultured, often illiterate, masses of Russia, but the highly cultured, entirely literate masses of Germany had to realize through their own painful experience the absolute impotence and spinelessness, the absolute helplessness and servility of the bourgeoisie, the utter vileness of the government of the knights of the Second International, the absolute

inevitability of a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries...as the only alternative to a dictatorship of the proletariat."⁵⁸

So, then, what has been the *practice vis-a-vis the old army under Revisionism in power?*

In Yugoslavia, it has already been shown how their armies and police were perverted from serving the people into an instrument of fascism. But what is interesting here is to know whether this army was the popular working-class-peasant army of anti-Nazi and socialist days. If so, it would comprise a phenomenon Lenin did not have to deal with and would go back to "*The State and Revolution*," which showed the army as a major constituent of the State, and the State as the instrument—

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of force of the ruling class. If, then, the ruling class "turned," would it not be inevitable that its army would also "turn"?

In the Soviet Union, the deterioration of the original working-class army had taken a form different from the same process in Yugoslavia. The Soviet form of "new" standing army embodied both polarization and/or the elevation of technique above political considerations. A London publication has described the process,⁵⁹ noting the army as "a key organ of the state," suppressing workers under bourgeois rule and defending working people against their class enemies under socialism. It described the going controversy around "smashing the old standing army" and replacing it by "the armed people." With the political deterioration of Eastern Europe, one form this process took, according to this study, was a "debate" around whether to have a "professional" or a "people's" army.⁶⁰

As usual, the Chinese learned from actual experience in trying to apply Soviet practice, using the Soviet Army as a model, which "emphasized technical and organizational modernization" as the way to build a socialist army. That model included

"the creation of 'a system of military ranks and a system of awarding orders and medals to those who have rendered meritorious services'."⁶¹

The Soviet military insisted that "modernization itself bears no class character – a people's army can be modernized just as much as an army of the bourgeoisie." But this always resulted, claimed the Chinese, in the creation of a *professionalized* army; that is, to their way of looking at it, a standing army of the old type.

Yet, in 1959, the Soviet line had still found adherents in China. These

"insisted on the primacy of technique as against Mao's general principle of 'politics in command'...sought to do away with the Party's absolute leadership over the army...with

political work, rejected...participating in socialist construction, and attempted to abolish the militia. This 'professional' line...would mean separating

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the army from the people, thus reversing the revolutionary tradition of the army as 'one with the people'."⁶²

Certain of the practices taken over from the Soviet Union by China for its own army

"had already begun to affect adversely the relations between officers and men and the whole democratic character of the People's Liberation Army. An outward and visible sign of the trend was the introduction of uniform and insignia copied from the Soviet army, symbols of the changed relations since the days when all shared hardships alike."⁶³

The Soviet line on the "new" army required

"acceptance of the idea that weapons were decisive, not men...it implied that a revolutionary army should base itself on orthodox science instead of replacing it with new military concepts...reliance on modern military equipment would inevitably mean dependence on the Soviet Union."⁶⁴

By way of contrast, there was Lin Piao's position. In 1959 at the Lushan Conference of an Enlarged Session of the Chinese Party Military Commission, Lin had replaced Peng Teh-huai (the commander favoring the Soviet position). He had outlined the military policies which arose from fighting Soviet ideas through to their conclusions. Lin had said:

"As part of our national defence forces we have in addition to a politically firm and technically modern standing army, built up a militia force of several hundred million people...

"Within our army the two opposing classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class, do not exist, but the struggle between bourgeois and working class ideology does exist..."⁶⁵

The international revolutionary movement furnished examples that tested this controversy and offered unanswerable judgement. For instance, a Vietnamese general had dealt with modernity of weapons:

"Reality has shown that we must have and need to..."

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equip ourselves to a certain extent with modern weapons and means such as jet planes and missiles...Nevertheless, reality has also shown that jet planes and missiles are not universal air defence weapons, as there never is a universal weapon adapted to all complicated fighting conditions...Like other weapons, airplanes and missiles have...their weak points and strong points and are suitable to certain fighting conditions...The militia and self-defence units have downed up-to-date jet planes of the U.S....a...frequent occurrence (which)...has struck with awe the military strategists who glorify too much modern weapons and technique...the close co-ordination between various arms and weapons is the linch-pin to create a fire network of many levels which is effective everywhere in order to down as many U.S. planes as possible...

"Our air defence forces have also devised EFFICIENT, CLEVER AND VERSATILE COMBAT METHODS. With these our men equipped with infantry weapons have succeeded in bringing down scores of U.S. modern jet fighters and our medium- and long-range A.A. guns, high-speed planes."⁶⁶

This could have been a reply to the official Soviet position contained in the following remarks:

"...with today's level of scientific weapons, the people of an under-developed nation cannot defeat a great advanced nation, no matter how wonderfully courageous they are. Here, again, the military superiority of socialism stands out...missile-rockets are the foundation of the (Soviet) Red Army. These weapons are REVOLUTIONARY. They radically change the technique of war, on all levels...For the first time in history it is now possible to deliver, in a single blow, a weapon more powerful than all the shells and bombs used in all past wars.

"And this blow can be delivered by the USSR's Strategic Rocket Forces against any aggressor, at any point on Earth. This can be done against the aggressor in Viet Nam, the USA...this...is...the one and only fear which restrains the brigands of the Pentagon from all-out 'escalation' in Asia."⁶⁷

This was not a new argument from this same source. Earlier it had already claimed that it was Soviet weapons which were winning in Vietnam, not the Vietnamese people:

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"...as 1965 ended, heavy attacks (by the Vietnamese Army) began on USA air bases, with multi-million-dollar plane losses...

"Why?...

"First fact: the Liberation Army in Viet Nam is a powerful force...

Second: the nation with the most powerful military capability in the world, the USSR, has GUARANTEED the Liberation forces all the support they require to achieve complete defeat of their enemy...*

"The USA IS GOING TO GET OUT of Viet Nam because...If (it) doesn't...then the Socialist allies of Viet Nam, led by the Soviet Union, will (give)...the Liberation Army enough support to destroy any number of draftees...400,000 or 4,000,000."⁶⁸

The spectre of Dien Bien Phu haunts these patronizing revisionist claims.

Another enlightening discussion on the role of an army was held by survivors of the massacre in Indonesia after the September 1965 military coup. They noted that

"proceeding from the erroneous view that 'the armed forces of the Republic are not reactionary armed forces' (D. N. Aidit, 'Raise High the Banner of Revolution'), the problem of 'Working within the enemy's armed forces' was interpreted as 'integrating the important organs of the state with the people,' or 'strengthening the relations between the people and the armed forces.' This plainly means integrating the instrument of violence of the oppressing classes with the oppressed classes."⁶⁹

How could such a grave error have occurred? The Indonesian answer was that it had happened

"because the Party leadership had deviated from the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the state. They considered the Indonesian Republic not a bourgeois state and the armed forces of the Republic not an instrument of the bourgeois state. The Party leadership forgot...that the

* The recent expulsion from Egypt of several thousand Soviet advisers by Egypt's President Sadat was at least partially based on Egyptians claims that the Soviet Union refused to sell offensive weapons to Egypt. This casts an interesting light on the above "guarantee." (See Note 8, P 350, below.)

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armed forces of the Republic, as a whole, despite the fact that they were brought into being by the August Revolution, had become the organ of rule in the hands of...the reactionary bourgeoisie."⁷⁰

The above considerations condemn Revisionist practice embodied in attitudes toward both Vietnam and Indonesia, based on Revisionism's failure thoroughly to smash – or on its restoring through the back door – the old Standing Army. The latter approach, furthermore, has led to the adoration of technique and weaponry, and failed correctly to adjudge the role of any army. The result has been to disarm revolutionary cadres, both literally and theoretically.

Section D: The Need to Smash the Bureaucracy

If smashing the old standing army stood first on the list of practical tasks facing a victorious socialist revolution, destruction of the old bureaucracy lagged not far behind.

From one end of Eastern Europe to the other as well as in other quarters of the globe, contrary practice certainly corroborated the correctness of these priorities with a vengeance.

Lenin had specifically enumerated the measures needed to realize the goal of "smashing the bureaucracy":

"The workers, having conquered political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus...and...replace it by a new one consisting of the very same workers and office employees, AGAINST whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: 1) not only election, but also recall at any time; 2) pay not exceeding that of a workman; 3) immediate introduction of control and supervisions by ALL so that ALL shall become bureaucrats' for a time and that, therefore, NOBODY may be able to become a 'bureaucrat'."⁷¹

A latter-day evaluation of the Paris Commune, which approvingly quoted a similar statement from Engels, declared that the real masters of the Paris Commune had been "the masses," taking an active and organized part in its deliberations and decisions. At the same time, the Commune was deemed to have—

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highly valued the views of the masses, "attending their various meetings and studying their letters."⁷²

The provision for recall was, in fact, used against various elected offenders, including a Commune deputy named Blanchet:

"because he had been a member of the clergy, a merchant and a secret agent."⁷³

The Commune had other methods to prevent resurgence of the old bureaucracy; it

"also resolutely did away with all the privileges of state functionaries and in the matter of salaries it made an important reform of historic significance...

"This Paris Commune forbade its functionaries from getting paid for multiple posts...

"At the same time,...the Commune...also raised the lower salaries so as to narrow the gap in the salary scale...In order to ensure the livelihood of low-salaried personnel, the Commune also forbade by express provision all monetary deductions and fines."⁷⁴

How have modern socialist countries lived up to these precepts? The case of *Yugoslavia* has already been covered.*

1. *In the Soviet Union,*

"the leading clique of Kruschov revisionists...chase after privileges, make use of their privileged status, turn public activities into opportunities for personal gain, appropriate the fruits of the people's labor and receive incomes that are tens of times, or even over a hundred times, greater than the wages of ordinary workers and peasants...these people have...imitated what the bourgeoisie and the bureaucrat capitalists do...use...diverse methods of making money to raise up a highly-paid and privileged stratum."⁷⁵

Corroborating details for these charges have already been presented.**

* See Chapter IV, Pp 38 ff., above.

** See *ibid.*, Pp 47 ff., above.

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If Yugoslavia's example was prophetic, however, the Soviet's proved politically debilitating on an international scale due to enormous Soviet prestige from 1917 on.

For example, revisionist influence has been shown to have caused a rupture in relations between Indonesian Communists and the masses because the Party leadership failed to set an example to the rank and file:

"Many Party cadres, especially higher ranking cadres of the Party, and still more particularly those with certain skills...in the various fields of governmental institutions, had reached a standard of living which was by far different from...the rest of the working people. They enjoyed the same facilities as the regular high-ranking officials of the government...

"...in conformity with...the way of life pursued by the bourgeoisie. All of this was carried out under nonsensical slogans like 'acting in accordance with the greatness of the Party,'...etc. Some leaders of the Party even got bogged down in...decadent bourgeois morals, and besmeared Communist morality...

"The appeals to 'combat complacency,' to 'be a good and still better Communist,' to 'create a Communist family,' etc...were...directed...as if only cadres outside the leadership were capable of committing misdeeds...

"When cadres from the regions looked up to the center, instead of finding...Communist simplicity, both in Party life and in personal life, they found...'extravagance,' 'modernity' and 'grandeur'⁷⁶...The Party leadership turned a deaf ear to...honest criticism."⁷⁷

The wealth of corroborating detail supplied by the Indonesian Communists clearly illuminated revisionist departure from the Marxist ideal of "smashing the bureaucracy;" it pointed up Lenin's warnings that participation in bourgeois governments is a corrupting activity unless the role of the State has been fully clarified and acted upon accordingly. Moreover, in the case of the Indonesians, the lesson was heavily paid for in blood.

To sum up, practical revisionist failures in regard to the State can be illuminated by comparing the revisionists' activities with those of the Paris Commune, first historical example of the

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dictatorship of the proletariat. The 19th Century prototype was used as comparison for the following reasons:

First,

"it was born in the armed uprising of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and founded on the basis of the destruction of the bourgeois state machinery."⁷⁸

Second,

"the proletariat was the master of the house. Its mainstay was the workers' armed forces."⁷⁹

Third, it was "a revolutionary regime totally different from a bourgeois parliament," the separation between the legislative and executive functions having been eliminated.⁸⁰

Fourth, it was "a revolutionary regime which upheld proletarian internationalism. It fought to emancipate not just some local or national group, but "all toiling humanity."⁸¹

Finally, it

"had as its aim the liquidation of exploitation."⁸²

The foregoing discussion on revisionist attitudes toward the State, as revealed by actual practice, has proven that:

First, the modern revisionists have advocated – and still do – "parliamentary" or "peaceful" solutions as the ONLY way to socialism "without civil war" or "violence," disregarding Marxist theory that the state expresses the absolute irreconcilability of antagonistic classes under capitalism and imperialism.

Second, although the proletariat set out in 1917 as "master of the house," erosion or abandonment of the very important precepts demanding that privileges and high salaries be done away with soon created a new elite, both the civil service and from among the "managers" of individual enterprises; disregarding the Marxist position on public ownership of the social means of production which inseparably entails centralized planning.

Third, elections and electoral procedures have become a "sacred cow" of Revisionism; "superstitious reverence for the state" has become manifest, especially where the proletariat was still not in power. And where it had attained power, revisionist→

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tendency was to turn "representatives of the people" into "oppressors of the people," as in Yugoslavia; and soon afterwards, in the USSR and all Eastern Europe.

Fourth, as glaringly shown in Yugoslavia, revisionism in power wiped out proletarian internationalism, replacing it by policies and resulting actions which, by the most sanguine interpretation, have played directly into imperialism's hands.

Finally, instead of liquidating exploitation once and for all, "civil servants" and "managers of state enterprises" began working out of individual enterprises which predictably resulted in the return to once-socialist economies of exploitation in a different form, including taxation by the revisionist-run state and foreign investment by international monopolies with "agreements" that lead to the outflow of socialist-created values, whether through licenses and patents, imports and exports on the colonial price arrangements, or "profit-and-risk sharing." Values created by socialist workers, for the first time since 1917, began flowing into imperialist pockets – perhaps at first as a trickle – and so, into those of the new bureaucracy.*

* See Chapter V, Section F, Pp 166 ff., above.

VII | REVISIONISM: ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR AND PEACE

Section A: In Theory

Claims by Modern Revisionism for the sanction of Lenin on any of their own "new principles of socialism" stand up in general only by not referring to what Lenin actually said. His position on war was unequivocal. Perhaps the most resounding indictment of the opportunists on this score, and an overall context in which to view the question, was the following:

"...the possibility of 'answering' a war depends on the nature of the crisis produced by that war...the struggle must consist...not simply in replacing war by peace, but in replacing capitalism by socialism. The task is not merely to prevent war, but to utilize the crisis it produces in order to accelerate the overthrow of the bourgeoisie."¹

That was because

"War is...an inevitable stage of capitalism, just as legitimate a form of the CAPITALIST way of life as peace...this war will soon be followed by others unless there is a series of *successful* revolutions...to overthrow the domination of the bourgeoisie of all nations."²

Short of world socialism, Lenin said, and *as long as* capitalism exists *anywhere*, war is *inevitable*. Having taken this position, he mocked notions like those held by the Kautsky's of his day, saying that only

"bourgeois pacifists dream of an everlasting peace WITHOUT the overthrow of the yoke and domination of capital."³

The Soviet reply, of course, was that such advice may have been all very well for Lenin's day, but "now things are different." Lenin may have anticipated such a position when he said:

"war is a necessary product of capitalism."⁴

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It is our contention that the only thing really "different" about the capitalist system today as compared to Lenin's day is its scale: the system has escalated; its contradictions have merely intensified and spread. The only way to get around this approach is glaringly illustrated in the CPSU Program: you "wipe out" capitalism and/or imperialism by *decreeing* that it has "changed;" you ignore existing contradictions by *declaring* them defunct.

From that "revolution in words," all else follows, including the convenient "duty" safely to "set an example" while the earth's oppressed go on dying from colonialism (also "wiped out").

And so it was, too, with the revisionist position on war and peace.

In its 1961 Program, the CPSU leadership stated:

"World capitalism has now entered a new, third stage of (the general crisis), the principal feature of which is that its development *was not connected with a world war*."⁵

A few pages later, another idea was added:

"Communists have never held that the road to revolution lies necessarily through wars between countries. Socialist revolution is not necessarily connected with. war...the great objectives of the working class can be realized without war."⁶

The Program explained:

"THE JOINING OF THE EFFORTS OF THE NEWLY-FREE PEOPLES AND OF THE PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WAR DANGER IS A CARDINAL FACTOR OF WORLD PEACE. This mighty front, which expresses the will and strength of two-thirds of mankind, can force the imperialist aggressors to retreat."⁷

Upon the basis of the previous three postulates (an absence of war as the principal feature of world capitalism; the possibility of achieving revolution without a war; and the ability of a united world to force imperialism to retreat), the CPSU Program→

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claimed that the question of war and peace was *central* to all of today's problems:

"The C.P.S.U. considers that *the chief aim* of its foreign activity is to provide peaceful conditions for the building of a communist society in the U.S.S.R. and developing the world socialist system, and together with the other peace-loving peoples *to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination*."⁸

The Program then took the last step, with the unequivocal declaration that

"THE ISSUE OF WAR AND PEACE IS THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE OF TODAY."⁹

Not only did the Program postulate "war or peace" as the "principal" issue of today, but – according to it – peace was *currently* achievable:

"...forces capable of preserving and promoting universal peace have arisen and are growing in the world. Possibilities are arising for *essentially new* relations between states...At a time when *imperialism no longer plays a dominant role in international relations*...it is

becoming possible for the *new principles advanced by socialism* to gain the upper hand over the principles of aggressive imperialist policy."¹⁰

Not only could this take place, but it had to do so:

"The peoples *must* concentrate their efforts on curbing the imperialists in good time and preventing them from making use of lethal weapons. THE MAIN THING IS TO WARD OFF A THERMONUCLEAR WAR, TO PREVENT IT FROM BREAKING OUT. *This can be done by the present generation...* War cannot and must not serve as a means of settling international disputes."¹¹

Step by step, the Program advanced this premise:

"PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE implies renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes, and their solution by negotiation..."¹²

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The Program claimed that

"The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems always has been and remains *the general principle* of the foreign policy of the Soviet state."¹³

How this would "work" was suggested later:

"It is not through war with other countries, but *by an example* of a more perfect organization of society, by rapid progress in developing the productive forces, the creation of all conditions for the happiness and well-being of man, that the ideas of communism will win the minds and hearts of the masses."¹⁴

Section B: Revisionist Practice and War

What were the inevitable consequences of this theoretical position? One view was that, serious as Opportunism's aftermath had been to the Soviet Union internally,

"its consequences are still heavier and more dangerous in the international arena. To justify their departure from revolutionary ideals in the international arena, the opportunists have found a pretext, that is, the struggle for peace."¹⁵

It was obvious, this view claimed, that in any abstract choice between war and peace, anybody would choose peace. The Modern Revisionists were trying to extend the fact that they, too,

"choose peace" to include the idea that their opponents inside Marxist ranks were therefore and *ipso facto* choosing war,

"which implies general extermination, and aims to build communism on the atomic ruins...

"The impression is being created that the cause of safeguarding peace and averting war from relations among peoples is independent of the class struggle and can be solved separately from social problems...

"To speak about the establishment of peace through a general agreement with the capitalists is tantamount to speaking about the liquidation of the capitalist system through an agreement with its representatives."¹⁶

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This, however, could be only a losing game:

"...to present peace as the first and main task...is a capitulation through which the imperialists are able to use military threats to attain their aim in every concrete political and international question...Logically, at the end of this so-called humanist road, we ourselves and all mankind should kneel down and put imperialist chains around our own necks...

"...communists cannot put the question of war and peace in first place and separately examine it; this question is only part of their general struggle for socialism...class aims cannot be achieved within the framework of war and peace. Moreover, from the very moment when the struggle for peace is put forward as the fundamental line of the world communist movement, it is openly opposed to the class struggle."¹⁷

In fact, these critics added, this would amount to (a) communists merging with the broad democratic "current of peace partisans...who are not interested in a revolutionary change."¹⁸ (b) Since the danger of war is so obvious, placing peace first also could only result in hysterical screams about "the dangers of annihilation."¹⁹ In turn, revolutionary movements in colonies (the only possible guarantee of removing war from the world by destroying its material base) would find themselves – and were so finding themselves – thwarted and paralysed.

In short, in practice as well as theory, the Modern Revisionist position on peace

- a) denied that war was inevitable as long as imperialism lasted;
- b) lumped all wars together, conjuring away both practical support for anti-colonial liberation and the old Marxist-Leninist distinction between just and unjust wars; and
- c) made war and its prevention "an end in itself," with technology the determining factor in the outcome of the struggle.

1. "Peace by Negotiation"

To what practical results did the above positions lead?

If war is not inevitable, due to allegedly "new circumstances,"—

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then peace should be achievable by negotiation. And to negotiation, indeed, the Revisionists turned. But the outcomes did not support their view, and the end of that road was a split in the peace movement into two irreconcilable approaches:

"One is a line of maximum curbing and isolation of U.S. imperialism, the main enemy of world peace, a line of dealing continued blows at and weakening the imperialist forces of aggression...

"The other is a line of blurring the distinction between friend and enemy, of compromise with and capitulation to U.S. imperialism, a line of encouraging the imperialist forces of aggression."²⁰

So, in practice, support for the schemes of U.S. imperialism in Asia blossomed like a moth-eaten flower out of the stem of "negotiations" which had sprung from a theoretical seed. The particular "schemes of U.S. imperialism" thus encouraged, were set forth by the members of the aforementioned "first line" in the peace movement:

"One, at present, the United States intends to stamp out the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation by escalating its war adventure and by playing the game of 'forcing peace talks through war'...

"Two...the United States...not reconciled to its failures in Asia...wants to go on struggling to the last ditch...to deal with socialist China with counter-revolutionary violence.

"Three, Johnson energetically peddled...another major object of his Asian tour...to rig up a new anti-China alliance to replace the ramshackle SEATO. And the Manila Conference was the first step toward realizing this plot."²¹

What kind of negotiations with imperialism did such conditions evolve from?

One of the most outstanding was the long-drawn "drama" of the "disarmament" negotiations carried on by Soviet maneuvers in the U.S.-controlled United Nations. Progress along these lines would have to be claimed by the USSR in such negotiations if—

it were to vindicate its "theoretical line," said the anti-Revisionists. These negotiations also showed the bond between "peaceful co-existence" and "disarmament" – all, under the "new conditions."

Thus the 1961 Vienna "summit" between American President Jack Kennedy and the USSR's Khrushchev: Since each side had a "satisfactorily lethal supply" of A-bombs, allegedly

"their real business (at Vienna – HE) was to decide whether two widely differing social and economic systems could exist side by side, and which areas of conflict had to be eliminated to make coexistence a practical goal."²²

However, on examining the background of this conference itself, it became obvious that

"There has been no real peace in the world since the Soviet Union emerged from the October Revolution, 1917. First came the wars of intervention by the Allies, and then the CORDONS SANITAIRES – all designed to stifle or contain the spread of communism in Europe."²³

The rise of fascism had followed, supported and financed by Western imperialism. After Hitler's World War II defeat, the West had acquired the atom bomb; China had refused to be cheated of its revolution; and, between "the Soviet Union's Stalin and American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles," the Cold war was on:

"NATO, SEATO, CENTO, the Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Wall and the European Common Market,"²⁴

were really only

"larger varieties of the CORDONS SANITAIRES of Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Hoover."²⁵

In such a setting, ex-colonial countries had begun achieving political independence, facing a NATO increasingly dominated by West Germany. Dogged by the spectre of Nazi terrorism, the typical Revisionist alternative followed inevitably:

"The Nuclear Bomb is the new frankenstein monster, deadlier and even more implacable than fascism, which will destroy the whole world unless the two contending systems can move into a period of coexistence to abolish nuclear armaments."^{26*}

Antagonisms inside the NATO alliance and the Warsaw pact suggested the folly of hoping for anything substantial from that direction. The only thing left to fall back on were

"efforts like the Aldermaston Marches and the Accra Assembly (for the "World without the Bomb") – an indication that the Bomb may be destroyed and mankind, saved."²⁷

The Soviet-guided World Council of Peace acted as a prime mover in a drive for disarmament as "the road to peace," during the course of which it mounted innumerable Conferences, Congresses and other gatherings all over the world. In December 1961, there was a Conference of this nature in Stockholm, which the writer attended. There, the Sino-Soviet split was in full view, the Russians – apparently deliberately – provoking the Chinese to a point where they had no choice but to walk out: of the main meeting hall, of seminar sessions. To one who had spent an entire youth "defending the USSR," and who, having seen no hint of the split in the U.S. Left press, had refused to believe in its existence, the meeting was the start of a far-reaching political awakening. Moreover, at the time, it had seemed most curious that all the screaming matches and walkouts appeared to take place over the order in which certain words should be placed in a proposed definitive resolution: Should one say "For Peace, Freedom and Socialism" or "For Socialism, Freedom and Peace"? (It took a couple of years of life in Ghana to clarify the *issues* involved.)

In November 1963, the British section of the World Council for Peace ran a conference in London, called "Breakthrough to

* Note the comparison between a material thing ("the Nuclear Bomb") and an entire political system and historical epoch ("fascism").

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Disarmament," at which the writer was also present. At this gathering leading English professors and trade unionists made categorical pronouncements along these lines:

"Only through disarmament can mankind hope to escape the perils of nuclear war...Either we disarm or we perish."²⁸

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, evidently the basis for the optimistic title of the meeting, was scrutinized. After much wringing and twisting, the first mouse produced by the peace mountain out of "U.S.-U.S.S.R. co-operation" was adjudged

a) "not an actual disarmament measure – not a single nuclear weapon at present in existence will be abandoned as a result of the Treaty."²⁹

b) "a greater concession on the part of the U.S.S.R. than on the part of the U.S.A.... we should all...appreciate the action of the U.S.S.R. in agreeing to this relatively...unfavorable agreement in the hope that it would start things moving toward wider disarmament measures."³⁰

c) "of the negotiations being carried on in the eighteen-nation disarmament meeting in Geneva...These...have been proceeding for nearly two years and stand all but deadlocked...(despite the fact that) in contrast to the position of the Western powers, the Soviet negotiators have made quite substantial concessions."³¹

A former president of the Scottish Trades Union Congress devoted his talk to proving, with United Nations information as basis, that "Disarmament would not cause economic dislocation to Western economies" if it could be attained (a line immediately taken up or already rampant in the learned discourses of revisionist "economists" the world over, notable among whom was Victor Perlo of the U.S.). The Scottish speaker followed the usual World Council of Peace line about how much money "would be available" for presumably "better uses" if only disarmament could "be forced on" the war-makers. After all, he fairly-storied, if there were no war industries for war-makers to invest in, "they would need to seek new pastures for their investment."³²

In the conference keynote address, an eminent British scientist—

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claimed that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty "triumph" actually "marked the beginning and for the time being the end of any movement toward disarmament."³³

As to the two-year-old negotiations by the 18-country "disarmament conference" at Geneva, what concrete results had been achieved?

"Every week a new inter-continental ballistic missile comes off the assembly line. Every week there is a new Polaris submarine in the docks. Re-armament is going forward at a rate...never reached before."³⁴

As Chairman of the WCP Presidential Committee, this Professor brought out the fact that

"The principles of disarmament are agreed between the United States and the U.S.S.R....over two years ago, the Americans and the Russians signed an agreement accepting the principle of general and total disarmament, the McCloy Zorin Agreement...Nothing has come of this yet, except the partial test ban treaty...But the important thing is that we have a really practical scheme for disarmament."³⁵

Not a single delegate rose to query, "Practical, in what way?" Instead, the Professor merely reiterated the enormous concessions already made by the Russians.

Nor was this gathering the only one at which world Peace Do-gooders were forced by logic to reveal the utter bankruptcy of hopes in disarmament:

"How often my thoughts turn back to the Disarmament Conference held (in Geneva) just thirty years ago...While we commented on the mounting tension in international

relations...the discussion (in the committees) centered around the size of the bore of cannons...The World War came, and with it the bombs and their devastation."³⁶

Compare such examples with Lenin's profound warning that

"Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars and in their turn grow out of wars."³⁷

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His comment on the consequences of relying on "persuading" an enemy were also acidly applicable:

"No matter what the good intentions of the...parsons or of sentimental Kautsky...the only objective, i.e., real, social significance Kautsky's 'theory' can have is: a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present time, and directing (it) towards illusory prospects."³⁸

So today, the Social Democrats of our own time were still echoing this same scare, with special appeals to "their own" bourgeoisie to "change strategy." But realities would seem to have been moving in a different direction:

"At worst, if the present search for a new 'strong' man (for South Vietnam) continues and reform is forgotten, the situation in Vietnam must disintegrate further until the Viet Cong wins its final victory.

"These are the only visible alternatives in Vietnam today. It is a race between revolution and war, in which present odds favor the Viet Cong warriors."³⁹

For the Modern Revisionists, the "spectre of revolution" was so frightening that it was never directly mentioned. Their forte, rather, was "scaring people" with the "horrors of nuclear war." And every time any peoples started making a revolution, or defending one against imperialist intervention, the spectre of "a horrible nuclear death" (which begins more and more to resemble Marx's "spectre of Communism") has been dredged up and held over the heads of the hapless revolutionaries of the moment.

Clearly, of course, nobody is pretending that nuclear war is not horrible. Such a point was never at issue; something else was: in Vietnam, NO nuclear war has been unleashed (though "rumors" of it filled the air whenever the Vietnamese seemed like really making a complete military victory). Were napalm, phosphorus and "anti-personnel" bombs any less "horrible" than nuclear death? Ask the victims!

"Do the opportunists, by threatening doom's day, seek to terrify the partisans of South Vietnam and the Congolese insurgents?...Why should they get rid of tortures through a world clash between capitalism and socialism? Is it not the same to them whether they die of napalm or the atomic bomb?"⁴⁰

Yet the cries of Professors in the peace movement have been supplemented by those of the "official" revisionists, who constantly justified their own hysteria:

"Lenin died long before nuclear weapons appeared. But even before World War I, he warned that a universal conflict (even with weapons of those days) might be so fierce as to destroy 'the very conditions of the existence of human society'."⁴¹

No source was, of course, offered for this "quotation," or its context. But even if it exists, Lenin's full position on war was such that he himself would never have used such warning to admonish the subjugated not to fight for their freedom.

Nonetheless, "the horror of it all" pervaded revisionist peace efforts:

"World War I led the Russian people into their victorious Socialist Revolution – but the frightful destruction during that war left Russia paralyzed, and without question, **THAT RUINATION HELD BACK SOCIALISM FOR MANY YEARS.** If the Russian workers, farmers and soldiers had been able to **STOP THE WAR IN 1914** (as Lenin tried desperately to do!) the Soviet Union would have been far ahead on its socialist goal."⁴²

Well, if "THAT RUINATION" left Russia "paralyzed," it *also* left her *socialist*. Thus, the "ruination" following any successful revolution was impliedly deplored, and the need for endless concessions (i.e., "peaceful coexistence") could then only bob to the surface.

But today, the cases of Indonesia and other revolutions prove that concessions have not led to "peace" or to successful revolution, but to frightful, if delayed, slaughter of the imperialist system's victims. Furthermore, revolution has always, inevitably, ▯

entailed counter-revolution, without the defeat of which final victory for socialism has never yet been realized.

Nonetheless, the disarmament "drama" continued. What had now for some time been in the wind was another Treaty between the U.S. and the USSR, the so-called "Non-Proliferation" Treaty, whereby possession of nuclear arms was to be confined to nations which already had them; all others would voluntarily sign a world-wide promise not to acquire any.

As previously, the Chinese led all criticism of this Treaty.⁴³ In the past, they recalled, Soviet negotiators "used to feign opposition" to the U.S. Multilateral Nuclear Force"(MLF) which the entire peace movement had then been agreed was just a fancy name for handing nuclear arms to West Germany's army, re-nazified under U.S. control. "Non-proliferation," according to the Chinese, was merely a new name for the old MLF. As evidence, they cited how

"Not long ago, the U.S. State Department openly declared that the signing of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty will in no way affect West Germany's 'nuclear sharing role' in NATO."⁴⁴

Yet, the Chinese noted, Soviet leaders were "ready to sign" such a Treaty. The Chinese warned against this "monstrous fraud":

"U.S. imperialism...is the worst nuclear proliferator in the world...The treaty is in fact aimed at covering up U.S. imperialism's nuclear proliferation and hoodwinking the people of the world."⁴⁵

Proof, said Peking, lay in this:

"that the U.S. did not agree to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons when it had the monopoly of such weapons. Nor will it agree when only a few countries possess such weapons."⁴⁶

Moreover, the Chinese charged that, behind this non-proliferation arrangement,

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"The U.S. and Soviet governments are also striking dirty deals in other areas. The 'peaceful transition' of the Soviet revisionist clique has greatly whetted the aggressive ambitions of U.S. imperialism."⁴⁷

At the practical level, the kernel of the Marxists' position on war lies in their distinction between just and unjust wars. It is that distinction (and thus the essence of the position on peace) which the revisionist attitude of peace-at-all-costs obliterated.

A specific revisionist discussion attempting to turn aside this blurring of a vital differentiation claimed to have been setting forth the Leninist position on war:

"MAIN THING: War is the policy of a class, extended beyond usual actions into armed action – violence.

"WAR HAS TWO ASPECTS: Social-political (what class follows what policy) and military (weapons, strategy)...

"Lenin used THREE QUESTIONS (to judge)...any war. In brief form:

"• What are the actual forces involved in the war?

"• What political aims are there on each side?

"• What classes are trying to achieve these aims?

"Regarded in this way, in the Soviet view ALL WARS FALL INTO TWO BROAD TYPES: JUST and UNJUST wars."⁴⁸

Had this ideologue stopped there, one would wonder what the Chinese thunder was all about. However, his practical positions ensured that he could not stop:

"...this is not simply a 'moral' question. You won't get anywhere, studying a war, *no matter what side you take*, if you ignore – 'is it JUST or UNJUST?'...

"Recently, some 'left' leaders discarded Lenin's scientific approach and proclaimed three kinds of war: Local War, World War, and Liberation War.

"That's just muddy thinking. It confuses the SIZE of war, with its SOCIAL-POLITICAL (class) nature. Thus, a 'local' war between two Capitalist powers would fast grow into a world war today. No 'liberation' war can long be held to a small scale – either one side or the other.

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other will triumph, or the fighting will spread. And today, a world war raises entirely NEW problems."⁴⁹

Having "refuted" unnamed "left leaders" for their alleged "proclamation" of "three types of wars," the statement itself went on to furnish a prize example of the precise link between the "peace-firsters" and anti-liberation. The "entirely NEW problems" raised by world wars today turned out to be technological. And in fact, the position given amounted, NOT to "confusing the SIZE of war with its class nature," but to lumping revolutionary (just) wars of liberation with "war between two Capitalist powers" (unjust) – even to the quotation marks around the crucial word "liberation." To struggle for liberation – in the revisionist view – makes one equatable to imperialists fighting each other over *colonial* loot. Thus, it was the revisionists, not the "left leaders" who abandoned the class position on war and peace.

Nor was this an isolated stand in a single organ of revisionism. It became the standard – often blatant – revisionist "line." During the aforementioned "Breakthrough to Disarmament" Conference in London in November 1963, the writer personally heard Reverend J Endicott, Canadian member of the World Council of Peace Presidential Committee, say at a public meeting not directly connected with the Conference that it was

"just too bad we have to ask peoples struggling for their freedom from colonialism to wait for perhaps another eighty years"⁵⁰

to realize their goal. Such struggles, the Reverend claimed, would inevitably escalate. If not for that, he declared, "I would say 'go ahead' and fight for your liberation."⁵¹

This bit of Western arrogance was typical of Modern Revisionism, both in its unconscious assumption that the world was hanging breathlessly on its pearls of wisdom and in its patronage toward what it referred to as "ex-colonial" peoples.

2. *The Warsaw Pact*

In their frantic international endeavors to implement their "treaties and agreements" with the U.S., the Modern Revisionists—

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have not hesitated to throw even their own Warsaw Pact into the balance.

During a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in July 1966 at Bucharest, the Soviet Government was accused of

"placing the Warsaw Treaty deeper and deeper into the service of the policy of Soviet-American collaboration...brutally ignoring the sovereign rights of the Member-States...to unscrupulously violate the principles and basic dispositions of this Treat."⁵²

What was the Warsaw Treaty?

Set up originally in 1955, it was a defensive and mutual assistance answer by the socialist camp to America's aggressive NATO alliance.

But these purposes were "never carried out by the Khrushchev revisionists:"⁵³

"Renegade Khrushchev made the first experiment...at the expense of the People's Republic of Albania (in) using the Treaty as a means of blackmail, pressure and intrusion."⁵⁴

Specifically, the Soviet Government

a) tore up the bi-lateral agreement with Albania to arm the Albanian Republic and protect it from its enemies:

"It stopped the delivery of all arms and other equipment to the Albanian army, it seized 8 submarines, property of the Albanian State, as well as the Albanian warships which were undergoing repairs at the Sevastopol shipyard."⁵⁵

b) "It hatched up plots with the Titoite traitors and Greek-monarcho-fascists, the 6th U.S. fleet and their agents."⁵⁶

c) "...the other signatory governments of the Warsaw Treaty...under pressure from the Kruschovite revisionists...allowed (an allied socialist country) to be 'de facto' expelled from the Warsaw Treaty for the only reason that it stood faithful to the Marxist-Leninist principles on which the Treaty was set up."⁵⁷

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That is, Albania disagreed with the Revisionists and was victimized by means of a "socialist" treaty. The alleged result was that

"the Kruschovite revisionists use (the Warsaw Treaty) now just as the U.S. imperialists use the North Atlantic Pact towards their allies...(as) an instrument of predominance of the Soviet revisionists, of disintegration...of the camp itself into an instrument of...pressure against the socialist camp."⁵⁸

Serious charges, indeed! And where did this meddling with the Warsaw Treaty lead?

"...the (revisionists)...speaking of the aggressive intentions of Western Germany and its demand to be equipped with nuclear weapons...arrive at the conclusion that the present conditions...in Europe make possible the dissolution of NATO and Warsaw military pacts and the achievement of a European treaty of collective security."⁵⁹

Under such an umbrella, were not the revisionists in fact joining the imperialist chorus for "rising above (class) differences" to "make peace?"⁶⁰

Although Albania was "personally" involved in the crisis of the Warsaw Treaty, its views cannot be dismissed as "prejudiced." A Ghanaian paper absolutely untainted by the slightest suspicion of "socialism" because it was part of the newspaper kingdom of the reactionary English press czar Cecil King, saw fit to reprint an article on the subject by another Englishman with a reputation for "liberalism."

This man, an "authority on Africa," noted that many "non-aligned" Asian and African countries had refused to join either pact. Thereby, he claimed, they had already saved the world "from who knows what untold disasters." But now, within each Pact, this man saw "trouble:" Kruschov was beset by "his allies in China;" Kennedy was having "precisely the same difficulties with America's allies in Europe." While China kept insisting on opposing the Kruschov line on "war and peace," France and Germany were straining against Uncle Sam's leash, each intent-

on furthering its own aims through nuclear rearmament and reshuffling current European alignments.⁶¹

U.S. attempts to counter these measures all wound up with "Uncle's" hand still at the end of a political, economic and military leash because of insoluble contradictions among the various powers:

"Would Italy put her fate into the hands of France? Would Norway hand over her destiny to West Germany? Not likely!"⁶²

Furthermore, objective examination of the situation would reveal that

"this spread of nuclear weapons around the world can offer President Kennedy and Mr Kruschov only two prospects:*

"One prospect is that the arms race will continue as at present. In that case, both alliances will gradually break down...this would make a general settlement between East and West immeasurably more difficult to reach, and perhaps impossible...

"The other prospect* is negotiations which can bring about a general settlement between East and West before the alliances break down on either side...both President Kennedy and Mr Kruschov...are eager for negotiations."⁶³

Of course, in this eagerness, Mr Kruschov was hampered by "the difficulty of the Chinese communists and other bellicose people in his camp," while President Kennedy had three opponents to contend with: Britain, France and West Germany.

The solution offered by the English liberal was that the advent of a "labor government" (i.e., Social Democratic – HE) to Britain would throw Britain's weight into the balance "on the side of peace." Other than that, he believed, the contradictions could only continue pulling these alliances apart.⁶⁵

* A third – "ghost" – prospect (revolution and the violent overthrow of imperialism) could, of course, not find a place in liberals' arguments. For them, the Status Quo, however deplorable, represents a comfortable existence.

Nearly ten years have passed since those words were printed. Has History passed judgment on this prognostication?

The fact is that the Warsaw Pact under revisionist implementation *has* descended into an alliance of the old type, full of contradictions revealed (for example) by the increasing trend of members making their own deals with imperialist powers; and by the growth of trade between the West and individual Eastern European countries (already examined). So, when revisionist theory on war and peace was carried into action, socialist relations degenerated in practice.

The Albanians, examining the crumbling of the Warsaw Pact, emphasized, as their conclusion, the restoration of capitalist-type international relations as the consequence of revising the Marxist position on war and peace:

"Now the main objective...of the imperialist powers towards the revisionist countries of Eastern Europe is...finding all ways and means to build 'bridges' between capitalist and revisionist Europe, in order to speed up the economic, political and cultural integration of the latter into the former...the Kruschovite revisionists through their new proposals within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty...try to secure the division of zones of influence in Europe with the U.S. imperialists, to secure a period of relative quiet for the latter on this continent in order to allow them to throw all their military weight on Asia."⁶⁶

3. *The Vietnam conflict*

According to the leader of the Albanian Communist Party,

"The barbarous aggression against Vietnam is the clearest expression of the current target of U.S. imperialism...not simply to stifle the liberation movement of the heroic south Vietnamese people and to perpetuate U.S. rule over there; but...to show its strength to the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America...in the struggle against imperialism...to intimidate them...to test the strength of the socialist countries and force them to give up their support for the revolutionary liberation struggle...a component part and a link in the whole project of U.S.¬

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imperialism against the People's Republic of China...its main enemy."⁶⁷

The Albanian diagnosis was corroborated from a different angle in the following item from the organ of a huge U.S. monopoly in a specialized field:

"U.S. government and industry are mobilizing an all-out war on hunger overseas, a problem which now affects two-thirds of the world. The assault will entail Federal expenditures as high as \$35 billion annually and strategy centers on three assumptions: (1) Many underdeveloped areas offer sufficient business opportunities to support profitable enterprises, provided local government will cooperate; (2) where such opportunities are lacking, international cooperation between business and government will be necessary to

capitalize and run food-producing enterprises; (3) new methods for transferring income to underdeveloped nations must be created to replace the shipment of food supplies from developed nations, which offer no hope of eventual self-sufficiency to the recipients...International agencies, European nations and Japan will also be called upon to participate in the multi-national effort."⁶⁸

In a word, setting out from a class position opposite to that of the Albanians, U.S. Big Business revealed imperialism's intention of mobilizing all its "allies" to maintain its hegemony in colonial areas, exactly as the Albanians also declared.

This is the overall situation in which the massive self-sacrifice of the incredible Vietnamese people, refusing to be beaten down by the world's "mightiest" power, has been – with their own delicate flesh – proving the truth of the position which proclaimed people, not weapons, the decisive factor in war:

"The struggle waged by the Vietnamese people against overwhelming odds has...shown the whole world the decadent nature of imperialism...(and) with growing clarity that the Vietnamese people will certainly win, that the advance of the liberation struggle of the peoples against imperialism cannot be stopped and that victory belongs to them."⁶⁹

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Toward this war, the revisionist position emerged clearly out of examining the facts.

How did the Vietnamese conflict mirror actual revisionist practice toward what is here defined as a just war, a war of liberation and anti-colonialism?

What has been the role of military aid to the Vietnamese in testing attitudes toward war and peace? How much aid has been given to these protectors of world revolution by the Modern Revisionists? What kind of aid has it been?

The relationship between Modern Revisionism and "the belligerents of both sides" can be seen in a number of accusations by the Modern Revisionists themselves against China around the question of aid to Vietnam.

For instance, in a speech in Hungary in the Spring of 1966, the USSR Minister of National Defence Malinovsky reportedly claimed that the Chinese were hampering aid to Vietnam, adding that the only reason the Soviet Union did not give more aid to Vietnam was due to "the lack of a common border with Vietnam," for which reason Soviet aid could reach Vietnam only through Chinese territory.⁷⁰

In reply, the Chinese pointed out that there were sea routes to Vietnam, adding that the USSR had not shown reluctance to use even the longest sea route whether "to deliver nuclear missiles

and then remove them" to and from distant Cuba, or to supply "the reactionary Indian government" with military aid in very generous quantities.⁷¹

Specifically, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically stated:

"Malinovsky is a liar. All military aid materials which Vietnam asked for and which the Soviet Union asked China to forward have been transported to Vietnam by China with priority, at high speed and free of charge. From February 1965 when the Soviet Union asked for the sending of its aid materials to Vietnam through China up to the end of 1965, China transported a total of 43,000 odd tons of Soviet military aid supplies to Vietnam."⁷²

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Nonetheless, less than a year later, the Soviets again charged that the Chinese were impeding aid to Vietnam.⁷³ Their claim was that military supplies for Vietnam from the Soviet Union "have often just disappeared" in transit through China; that "Red guards disassembled" some Soviet equipment and "forgot" to return certain important parts; that the Chinese superimposed "Chinese characters" over the Soviet trade marks on Russian equipment; that they "replaced" the Soviets' "latest types" of equipment with less valuable older (and presumably Chinese) types. Allegedly, the "Soviet representative in Washington on February 22" had offered these accusations to American correspondents for wide distribution.⁷⁴

What is more, on that same day, the Soviet First Vice-Minister of Defence Grechko, reportedly made an anti-China speech at a Moscow meeting celebrating Soviet Army Day. In it, he was quoted as accusing China of

"making use of its geographical position unscrupulously...in an attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from supplying goods to Vietnam."⁷⁵

The Chinese saw these new accusations as retaliation for having exposed what they said was the Soviet stepping up of

"their collusion with U.S. imperialism, trying to put over its criminal plot of 'forcing peace talks through bombing' against the Vietnamese people."⁷⁶

A statement from a Vietnamese source shed some light on these charges and counter-charges:

"The Vietnam News Agency is authorized to declare that these reports spread by American and other Western news agencies are sheer fabrications invented for the most vile purposes."⁷⁷

The Vietnamese added that China had given wholehearted help in transporting aid to Vietnam, "adequately and according to schedule."⁷⁸ The Agency did not, of course, mention that "Western news agencies" had received their reports from Soviet sources.

Furthermore, an ultra-conservative London source involuntarily proffered corroboration of Chinese assistance to Vietnam in an item dealing with an entirely different subject. Date-lined from Washington, this source declared:

"American officials denied a London report that America wants to keep the Suez Canal closed to deny its use to Russian ships carrying arms to North Vietnam. They said most supplies to North Vietnam move overland through China."⁷⁹

Undoubtedly, the Soviet charges had their roots in previous Chinese charges about Soviet aid to Vietnam:

a) That, in quantity and quality, the Soviet Union had offered to Vietnam aid which had been "far from commensurate with its strength."

Instead of "several hundred thousand tons of military supplies," which allegedly should have been "very easy for a big power like the Soviet Union," it had given "only a few tens of thousands of tons."⁸¹

Furthermore, most of the Soviet supplies allegedly

"consisted of old weapons of its own armed forces, which had been replaced and which even included some that were worn out and of no use at all. True, the Soviet Union has also given Vietnam some weapons of comparatively new types, but even these are already outmoded. As for those of truly good quality, the Soviet Union either does not supply them or is unwilling to supply them in large quantities...

"Take for instance the first quarter of this year. For this period, the Soviet Union asked us to earmark a transport capacity of 1,730 wagons. We agreed and readied the wagons. However, the actual Soviet delivery was only 556 wagons loads."^{82*}

b) In Kruschov's day, the Soviet leadership was said actually to have refused to aid Vietnam. But even when Kruschov's successors claimed that they had altered this policy,

"the new Soviet leaders' aid for Vietnam is aimed at—

controlling the Vietnam situation and bringing the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation into the orbit of 'U.S.-Soviet collaboration'. "⁸³

c) The Soviet leading group was accused also of "serving U.S. interests," a goal which the Chinese saw as requiring the entrance of as large a wedge as possible between the Vietnamese people and the people and government of China.⁸⁴

d) Soon, a more general charge was added:

"the fact that the Soviet leading group are so anxious to conclude a treaty for the prevention of nuclear proliferation with the United States when the latter is unceasingly expanding its war of aggression in Vietnam further exposes the ignominy of their sham support and real betrayal of the Vietnamese people."⁸⁵

e) Examining the rapprochement which had already been developing between Kosygin and General Charles de Gaulle, the Chinese turned their attention to the visit by Kosygin to France which occurred during the end of 1966. What they particularly noted was that De Gaulle had refused the Soviet suggestion of an immediate "European security conference," insisting that such a conference could be held only after "a rapprochement between East and West Europe."⁸⁶

f) Finally, early in the following year, the Chinese took a look at the completed Kosygin visit to Britain. Harold Wilson, the Chinese charged, had been constantly beckoning and calling Kosygin "after telephone communication with Washington, D.C.," and the "central theme" of the official and private talks between Kosygin and Wilson had, the Chinese charged, consisted of

"How to help the United States peddle its scheme of forcing 'peace talks' by war and inducing 'peace talks' by halting the bombing so as to bring the Vietnamese people to submit to the U.S. aggressors."⁸⁸

As evidence, the Chinese suggested the timing of the trip to coincide with the Lunar New Year in Vietnam and the ceasefire during that period, which the Chinese claimed was used—

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by the U.S. to "push ahead with its 'peace talks' scheme with the help of the Pope, Wilson, and their like."⁸⁹

Furthermore, the joint communique from the Kosygin-Wilson talks

"mentioned not a single word about U.S. aggression against Vietnam...it went so far as to allege that this war is 'a danger to neighboring states and to peace and stability of the region'. "⁹⁰

In relationship to U.S. aims in Vietnam, an anti-China attack in public* could only be considered part of Revisionism's anti-Vietnam activities. This particular initial "blast" from a top Soviet leader had indeed soon become part of a pattern familiar throughout Eastern Europe: (bear in mind here that Vietnamese News sources had, up to early 1968 at least, not rushed to deny the

Chinese charges against Soviet aid failures as their Agency did to refute Soviet (i.e., "Western") allegations regarding China's role in this regard).

In Yugoslavia an anti-U.S. demonstration of some 15,000 middle school and college teachers and students, connected with American policy toward Vietnam, was reportedly suppressed (December 20, 1967).²² Three days later, according to the Chinese, students of Belgrade University held a meeting to support the Vietnamese people. After the meeting, they had marched to a nearby U.S. library. Here, too, they had been stopped by tear gas and water hoses, a number of students being injured.

Western sources offered similar news, though from a different angle. For instance, a story from a U.S. source, discussing developments during the first full year after Krushov's fall, reported from Moscow its estimate of the "new team" of Brezhnev and Kosygin:

"In this perilous nuclear age, the stable and unflamboyant style of Brezhnev and Kosygin has been a welcome change after the years of off-again, on-again confrontation under the unpredictable Krushov. But so far, it is felt here, ▯

* By Kosygin in London over BBC.²¹

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the change in leadership has been more of a boon to the West than to the Russians...

*"...for the U.S. this has principally meant a virtually free hand in Vietnam."*²³

According to this report, for President Johnson in escalating his Vietnamese "commitment," Krushov would have raised an outcry at each step in such escalation, and would have

"kept hammering at the U.S. without letup. Brezhnev and Kosygin, of course, have done none of these things. ...the Kremlin's most substantial contribution to the North Vietnamese to date has been the SAM surface-to-air missiles that ring Hanoi and which have notably failed to deter the daily U.S. bombings."²⁴

There has been other evidence, some of it of the backhanded variety. For example, there was one anything-but-delicate attempt to show that the Russians were giving "substantial aid" to Vietnam. A well-known reactionary U.S. columnist cited a Soviet statement, issued a short while before, acknowledging "for the first time" that its military personnel were actually in Vietnam (as instructors). And, added this pundit, American forces were being killed by airplanes and other weapons furnished to the Vietnamese by the Soviets. The Soviet Union had thus, he claimed, not only "violated neutrality"(!), but had also violated the SEATO agreement (which - to be sure - it had not signed). Bitterly, the writer suggested specific ways to "punish" the upstarts:

"The United States, for instance, could sever diplomatic relations and cut off all trade with the Soviet Union."⁹⁵

Nevertheless, far from breaking diplomatic relations or cutting off all trade with the Soviet Union over its "aid to Vietnam," the U.S. tended rather (as we have seen earlier) to seek closer relations; to urge and prepare for a huge *increase* in trade with this "belligerent against the U.S." First of all, obviously, the U.S. had its hands full in Vietnam. Secondly, there was the possibility that such a column was a "plant," needed from time to time to prop the sagging Soviet revisionist "image." Or perhaps—

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the Soviet leaders had whispered in Uncle's ear of their intention, soon to be carried into action, to expiate this "crime" by their sale to Dow Chemical Company of the U.S. of 2,200 tons of strategic magnesium to help Dow out during "a short-term emergency shortage."

One further reflection of Soviet practice in the Vietnam situation appears to have stemmed from Hanoi itself, embodied in frequent rumors of a Sino-Soviet-type division inside top circles of the Vietnamese Workers Party led by the late Ho Chi Minh.⁹⁶

One of many illustrations of this phenomenon and how the imperialists used it took as its "springboard" the "imminent death" of Ho Chi Minh, claiming that

"the political picture of Vietnam may soon change."⁹⁷

Amidst a welter of ill-disguised ideological pushings and shovings based on pure speculation, the writer pinned his opinion obliquely and impliedly on Premier Pham Van Dong. The crux of his "hopes" was that

"By talking about 'friendship' with the American people' the North Vietnamese – as I see it, and this of course they will deny – prepare for an acceptance of the fact that the balance in Asia depends to a certain extent on some form of American presence...

"On the question of US military bases in South Vietnam, they are, for the record, just as stubborn, but for a period of time they might accept one or two American bases...The matter will have to be handled delicately."⁹⁸

In sum, then, modern revisionist practice that arose from viewing War and Peace as "the principal issue of our day" consisted in a great to-do about disarmament agreements which, analysed, brought about not the slightest iota of real disarmament; the playing of a very questionable and possibly dual role in regard to a going, just war in Vietnam; and actual destruction of the Warsaw Pact, a socialist alliance, by converting it into a quasi-imperialist organization for transmitting imperialist pressures into a socialist system.

VIII | REVISIONISM AND IMPERIALISM IN REVISIONIST THEORY

It was Lenin, in his masterly "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," who most fully delineated the Marxist position on imperialism. Today, books are being written to "prove" that the many phenomena Lenin scrutinized in that analysis are "no longer applicable." But what none of these pundits mentions or can explain away is the very core of Lenin's approach to the vast and complicated subject: Lenin said that the "chief characteristic" of imperialism was its *parasitism*. What he described as some of its features, such as the export of capital, were merely the forms by which that parasitism expressed itself in his epoch. Few, indeed, are those who today care to analyse how or whether such forms have changed or been supplanted by others.

Having failed to recognize or to analyse imperialist parasitism, there came about a constant reiteration of certain World-War-I-based formulae (which had not originally been formulae at all, but became so through mechanical repetition not bolstered by the application to them of changing material conditions).

So, while Western and Eastern European revisionists kept issuing figures to show the growth of monopoly in the capitalist economy, they never properly took into account in determining tactics and strategy for the world revolutionary movement the increasing importance of the "overseas" component in such monopoly profits. For example, failure to expose the full import of the growth (unaffected by all the many and continuing changes in *form*) of "capital export" was illustrated by one typical Revisionist stance:

"It should be pointed out...that private foreign capitalists are investing less and less in (developing) countries."¹

This belief has already been demolished in detail.* It was shown that, while the words above may embrace a limited,¬

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter IV, "Methods of Social Democracy."

literal truth, Lenin's point about the growth of parasitism was concerned primarily with means by which monopolies engender super-profits for themselves out of "overseas" activities.

A concomitant and debilitating consequence of the failures to study parasitism as the spine of imperialism was the prevalent and consistent contention that the working class of the main capitalist countries was becoming revolutionized, based on allegedly growing poverty among the masses in metropolitan areas.

U.S. Government statistics up through 1968, at least, disproved both these notions, which demonstrably issued from failure to recognize the depth and growth, always characterizing

imperialism, of parasitism, and that – while *colonialism* is the *main* expression of such parasitism – another major one is the rise and growth of a metropolitan labor aristocracy.

It was from mechanical mouthing of Lenin's original estimate of such a labor aristocracy as "a tiny minority" of total working class, without ever once applying statistics to it as times changed, that the CPSU could reach its euphoric conclusions about the militancy, strength and outlook of the Western working class.

The entire modern revisionist attitude toward imperialism embodied in its concept of "peaceful co-existence" with it arose from imagining that imperialism itself had changed. The alleged change consisted in the appearance of "sensible sections" among the international ruling class, including that of the U.S., a development in turn based on the "lethal quality" of modern weapons, which such "intelligent" members of the world bourgeoisie "realized" would "not spare the ruling class...either" in the event of a world war.

Without discounting the various inner contradictions racking any bourgeoisie, it is a fact that, in the struggle to prevent their own overthrow, they always have been and always will be united as one, "sensible" or not, in the *common* cause against revolution. And this is so long as imperialism lasts.

Lenin had argued as follows:

"The questions as to whether it is possible to modify this basis of imperialism, whether to go forward to the further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms it—

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engenders, or backwards, towards allaying these antagonisms, are fundamental questions in the critique of imperialism. Since the specific political features of imperialism are reaction all along the line and increased national oppression...advocating in the epoch of finance capital a...'peaceful democracy'...OBJECTIVELY...drags us back from monopoly capitalism to non-monopoly capitalism, and is a reformist swindle."²

Revisionism's underlying, rosy-glasses view of imperialism, based on its underestimation of the extent and importance of the system's inseparable and ever-growing parasitism, in turn had involved collapse of former Marxist accuracy in predicting the behavior of the imperialist economy. Since that economy notably failed to fulfill continuing prophecies, left over from the 'Thirties, of "imminent collapse," a failure the revisionists could not explain, illusions about imperialism could take root – and they did.

A further factor reinforcing revisionism's memory loss about imperialist parasitism was its growing habit of "analyzing" metropolitan – or other, for that matter – economies as though they were isolated.

And utterances of the CPSU leadership demonstrated admirably where illusions have led, especially illusions about the nature of imperialism.

For one thing, since socialism's economic superiority had allegedly extracted imperialism's teeth, Revisionism postulated that imperialism could – and, paradoxically, due to atomic weapons, had to – be lived with "peacefully."

In practice this soon resulted in socialist Europe's knuckling under to all the anti-socialist demands of imperialism's ruling class.³

It wasn't that the CPSU dared to paint imperialism in glowing colors. Its Program described the horrors of that system at some length.⁴

But even as it described them, it watered them down. For instance, among "manifestations of the GENERAL CRISIS OF CAPITALISM," it listed these:

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"the break-away from capitalism of more and more countries; the weakening of imperialist positions in the economic competition with socialism; the break-up of the imperialist colonial system..."⁵

Since, today, no discussion of imperialism means much unless it takes a stand on the U.S. variety, it is interesting to see what the "new" Soviet position on this was:

"THE U.S. MONOPOLY BOURGEOISIE IS THE MAINSTAY OF INTERNATIONAL REACTION. It has assumed the role of 'savior' of capitalism...founding aggressive military blocs. American troops and war bases are stationed at the most important points of the capitalist world. "But...the United States has not been able to retain its share in the economy of the capitalist world, although it is still capitalism's chief economic, financial and military force."⁶

Once again, the world's self-proclaimed "savior" – strong though it admittedly still was – impliedly was about to crack up. Moreover, it had its "saving grace":

"Support for the principle of peaceful coexistence is also in keeping with the interests of that section of the bourgeoisie *which realizes* that a thermonuclear war would not spare the ruling classes of capitalist society either."⁷

This was the quotation which could be interpreted as postulating a "sensible" section of the world bourgeoisie. The concept was indispensable to the basic Soviet leadership position on the nature of imperialism's allegedly changed condition:

"By uniting the working people, the masses, the working class can beat back the offensive of fascist reaction and bring about the implementation of a national program for peace, national independence, democratic rights, and a certain improvement of the living conditions of the people...This can be done only by extending and continuously developing the class struggle...for far-reaching social reforms, for peace and socialism."⁸

Significantly, the class struggle is here reduced to a struggle→

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first for "far-reaching reforms," and last, for socialism. History has yet to furnish a single example where far-reaching reforms have led to anything but an extended labor aristocracy. Still, numerous parties of the Left fell for this line; and they have paid – and the masses of their countries have also paid – in blood for believing it.

Yet, the ideological deterioration had a material base: all the doom-prophets of the thirties who had expected Hitler to devour the Soviet Union were proven dead wrong at Stalingrad: Hitler's Allies-produced military machine could not beat the first Soviet Republic!

If this induced illusions in the Soviet Union, its effect among the Left in the capitalist world was euphoric indeed: for example, one spokesman of the American Left, talking of the Teheran Summit, declared:

"The primary effect of this promised harmony of the great capitalist powers and the world's only socialist state both ensures the future of socialism and gives a new lease on life to Capitalism...So long as capitalism can expand productivity and help to raise the living standards of all the peoples of the earth it will be progressive politically and socially...the issue before us today is not capitalism versus socialism but the effective operation of the world's economy for the well-being of all nations and peoples."⁹

After so many years of defending the USSR from its enemies, Western Marxists were apparently unable to sustain the shock when the most powerful of those enemies was forced by the inner contradictions of its own system to come to the assistance of the erstwhile antagonist against whom it had itself helped to instigate attack. Kautsky's "progressive" imperialism rose again like a Phoenix from the ashes of Stalingrad – and socialism's economy was gratuitously opened to imperialist penetration, long before Khrushchev's day.

Lenin's comments on espousers of "progressive" imperialism in his own day might equally well be applied to their successors of today:

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"...this...philistine attempt to persuade the financiers to renounce imperialism...has degraded Marxism to unheard-of prostitution...The parson tries to PERSUADE the capitalists to adopt peaceful democracy – and he calls this dialectics!"¹⁰

In a word, the modern revisionists were out on Kautsky's old limb!

What particular antagonism, generated by imperialism, is today the *central internal* one of that system?

We have already emphasized Lenin's description of the main characteristic of imperialism as its parasitism, which he proved resided inseparably in the system's need to "export capital" to (i.e., to super-exploit) several overseas countries and colonies."¹¹

This, he pointed out, was the essence of colonialism. And colonialism, he proved, permitted the moribund economy to stagger along on a steady stream of super-profits, from super-exploiting colonial labor power.

Hence, the central contradiction inside the imperialist system in our epoch pits the imperialist bourgeoisie (together with its allies – mainly the labor aristocracy and petty bourgeoisie) in the "metropolis" against the super-exploited in the world's "hinterlands."

Has this main feature of imperialism altered since Lenin described it? If anything, it has intensified. Events on the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America since 1964 revealed that realistic imperialism fully understood the source of the main internal threat to its continued existence – and acted accordingly: the long series of military coups in the "underdeveloped" world continued unabated, top of an iceberg of intrigue, assassinations, bribes, "small" going wars and other evidences of its determination to spare neither effort nor expense – efforts up to now disconcertingly successful – to prevent liberation.*

And one of the ideological and investigative failures of the modern revisionists which reinforced this imperialist determination—

* See Appendix III.

to prevent liberation was the failure of the revisionists to understand, discuss or analyze the effect of colonialism on the Western worker: exactly two sentences appeared on this subject in the 1961 CPSU Program, for example. And they came along in the middle of a paragraph on "militant actions of the (metropolitan) working class."¹²

Lenin, however, had devoted to this particular aspect of imperialism a considerable section both of the Preface to the German and French editions, and of Chapter VIII in *Imperialism, the*

Highest Stage of Capitalism, as well as in other writings. Specifically, in comments written before the First World War, when opportunism was just emerging as a major split in the Western working class, he had noted that

"with the growth of colonialism, the European proletarian is PARTLY placed in a position when it is NOT *his* labor, but the labor of the near-slaves in the colonies, that maintains the *whole* society...That being so, in certain countries there is created a material and economic base for infecting the proletariat with colonial chauvinism."¹³

In the text of his *Imperialism*, Lenin had made clear that those "certain countries" were the "usurer nations," the imperialist countries of the West.

But the modern revisionists ignored these sections of Lenin's writings. Relying entirely and uncritically on sectarian and undocumented Western Left "analyses" of the size and role of the metropolitan labor aristocracies, the modern revisionists made seriously wrong estimates throughout the world of the forces actually and currently available as allies of revolution. These errors also included complete blindness to the real role of the metropolitan labor aristocracy in enabling imperialism to continue benefiting from colonialism-in-new-forms. The extent to which such blindness went included the fact that, for the revisionists, the term "world war" was interpreted as describing only war which involved the "urban" section of the earth; i.e., major capitalist centers.

Consequent upon such theses, analyses of imperialist economics have, for the world's colonial peoples, resulted, through-

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implementation, in further subjugation and exploitation. These revisionist "analyses" implied or even actually predicted imperialism's "peaceful collapse" through a "united electorate" which could allegedly enforce and maintain a bourgeois electoral victory solely through re-peopling the old state machine with a "personnel oriented toward the working class."

Again, such illusions were fostered because revisionist underestimation of imperialist parasitism caused a complete failure on their part to expose – perhaps because they themselves did not fully grasp – the role in the imperialist economy of super-profits derived from various forms of capital export and/or its modern equivalents. They insisted that the source of Western proletarian prosperity was the "productivity" of the Western worker; or they concentrated on the "poverty" of the Western working class. As a consequence, they could not come to grips with the real nature of colonialism, how it operated, or how it could be destroyed.

In sum, all the theoretical errors of modern revisionism regarding imperialism boiled down to its blindness – voluntary or involuntary – about the parasitic nature of that system. Lip-service condemnation was given to imperialism; but the fact that larger and larger sections of the

Western populations were literally benefiting from it was carefully hidden, covered with silence, or denied outright.¹⁴

But because Lenin's analysis showing parasitism as the main characteristic of imperialism has never yet been disproven – and is, in the author's view incapable of such disproof; and because the main expression of such parasitism is (as it has been since Lenin's analysis) the phenomenon called colonialism, the remainder of the book will be devoted to examining a number of precise consequences flowing to colonial-type areas from modern revisionism's theoretical failures vis-a-vis the nature of imperialism.

It is the disturbing practices of modern revisionism in the misnamed Third World which most glaringly reveal the depths of its deterioration from the Marxist revolutionary position, core of which was always proletarian internationalism.

IX | REVISIONIST PRACTICE ON IMPERIALISM: REVISIONIST ATTITUDES TOWARD COLONIALISM

Section A: The Theory

The gist of Revisionist conclusions which resulted in erroneous practice toward colonies was contained in their false notion that "colonialism has collapsed;" in a number of places, their Program announced that the colonial empire of imperialism had "broken up."¹ It referred to the "*disintegration* of the colonial system and the collapse of the old empire."²

It was not that the revisionists had failed to report the evils of imperialist penetration into colonial areas in the form of foreign capital investments and other manifestations. On contrary, they printed a plethora of lip-service to this aspect of imperialism's functioning.³

As a sample, a British Communist, in his first address to a colloquium in Prague on how "new nations" could "develop," stated that in

"the newly independent African countries...little industry exists and...the commanding heights of the economy are in the hands of foreign monopolies."⁴

As is customary among revisionists, speaker after speaker at this same colloquium from super-exploited areas followed the lead thus established for them by their "more experienced" (i.e., pro-Russian, Western) "leaders." The essence of their agreement was perhaps best contained in the facts and figures, as opposed to rhetoric, offered by a speaker from Chile:

"According to official data, between 1946 and 1955 the imperialists shipped \$7,685 million out of Latin America in the form of profits and interest on capital. If we add to this the repatriated capital and sums debited to depreciation, totaling \$3,492 million in the same period, the actual outflow was \$11,177 million, compared with \$8,000 million originally invested by foreign capital.↵

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But this is not all. As a result of non-equivalent exchange (high prices for imports of manufactured goods and low prices for raw material exports – HE) the Latin American countries incurred an additional loss in the period from 1945 to 1955 of \$6,458 million."⁵

In the face of such facts, though stated by their own followers, the revisionists drew amazing conclusions, apparently because in some places national anthems and flags had been substituted by imperialists for open rule by white administrators which the World War II aftermath was in any case threatening to destroy for something better.

The extent to which the "theory" of "collapsed colonialism" penetrated the world Left is nowhere more devastatingly illustrated than in its elaboration by revisionist followers in the colonial areas themselves.

For, it is a fact that, no sooner had "Big Brother" Kruschov expressed this postulate⁶ than the same idea began to be parroted elsewhere – and by people whose experience should have taught them better.

For instance, at the Conference of "emerging countries" already discussed⁷, a South African opened his address in the following way:

"On the African continent, the crumbling of the colonial system is now in full swing...the imperialists are everywhere on the retreat. They are being forced to concede political independence and to search out less obvious and more disguised ways to continue the system of colonial exploitation...NEOCOLONIALISM IS COLONIALISM IN RETREAT."⁸

The quaint notion that neo-colonialism marked a "retreat" by imperialism rather than a change of battlefronts has been exposed by this writer earlier.* Conditions for colonial peoples worsened under a neo-colonialist regime; the rise of the well-paid elite (well – or even fabulously – paid by local standards in its upper echelons) simply raised statistical averages quoted in the

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XXVI, "Early Marxist Illusions about Working-Class Relations."

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notebooks of imperialism's apologists who thereupon prated of "improvements." And such sentiments continued to be expressed, and were perhaps believed.

For instance, an Iranian at the same Conference – having noted that "the entire economy" of his country was being "run by foreigners," and having pointed to the "grievous" position of working people there, could nonetheless declare:

"Things are moving fast. The colonial system is disintegrating. The oppressed peoples are freeing themselves from the colonial yoke."⁹

Another prominent Communist spokesman of Indian origin declared (and the emphasis was his own) that

"NEO-COLONIALISM AS A WHOLE REPRESENTS A NEW PHASE IN THE GENERAL STRATEGY OF IMPERIALISM, AND CORRESPONDS TO THE PRESENT PERIOD OF INCREASING DISINTEGRATION OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM WHEN THE MAJORITY OF FORMER COLONIAL PEOPLES HAVE ESTABLISHED POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT STATES."¹⁰

Such statements were typical. If there was confirmation in fact, of course, a number of old strategies and tactics would have become obsolete, just as the CPSU leadership had been claiming. Moreover, the "new principles" expounded in the latter's 1961 Program, would have become valid for colonial areas as for elsewhere.

How can it be judged whether or not colonialism has collapsed?

All that is necessary is to apply to colonial areas the major features of colonialism enumerated previously in this text during discussion of imperialist parasitism and here recapitulated:

1. *The key sectors of a colonial economy are in foreign industrialized hands.* Has this changed? Even the people who declared that colonialism was "falling apart" testified that it had not. A Moroccan speaker noted that, long after the political independence of his country, foreign capital controlled all key branches and dominated the principal sources of accumulation.¹¹ A Lebanese offered similar testimony—

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about the French in his own land.¹² a representative of Iran confirmed similar experiences.¹³ Indonesians noted the dominance of Dutch finance capital and industrialists in their homeland.¹⁴

2. Agriculture on a primitive subsistence level is a predominant feature of colonial economies in general, while *monoculture* characterizes any of its non-subsistence crops or other exports, absorbing the major portion of its economy.

Has something different occurred in this sphere in the politically independent countries? Here again, sophisticated Left ideologues in the West as well as people from Morocco, Algeria, Argentina and other similar locales – the latter talking glibly of colonialism's collapse – nonetheless testified to the failure of subsistence agriculture and monoculture to change.¹⁵

3. Colonial economies are marked by the flight of both profit and of material wealth itself (i.e., the actual gold, diamonds, metal ores, etc., are physically removed from the scene and used to benefit metropolitan economies).

Changed? Here, specific and detailed evidence has been offered, such as the great disparity between metropolitan funds invested in these areas compared to those removed as profit, interest, repatriated capital and sums debited to depreciation and non-equivalent exchange.¹⁶ That is, with or without political independence – with the notable exceptions of North Korea, North Vietnam, China and Albania – the trends associated in the sphere of wealth-removal from colonial areas continued and accelerated.¹⁷

4. *Trade* between colonial areas and industrialized centers on the world market is characterized by the export from such hinterlands of primary or semi-processed products (raw materials) and their import of manufactured goods and certain types of capital equipment. This trade is always

characterized by a growing "price scissors," whereby the prices of primary exports fall while those of manufactured imports rise.¹⁸

Not only has this aspect of metropolitan-colonial relations remained the same after, as before, political independence. Worse yet, Soviet trade with such areas soon began to exhibit precisely the same features, as testified by its own authorities:

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"Question: What are the characteristic features of our trade ties with the developing countries?"

"Answer: The trade ties and economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are expanding from year to year. The increased trade this year with what is known as the 'third world' will make it possible for us to boost imports of wool, cotton, jute, rubber, non-ferrous metals, coffee, fruit, hides and other raw commodities and foodstuffs. Purchases of certain commodities of the national industry of these countries – footwear, textiles, garments, and knitted goods – will also be increased.

"The young states frequently experience serious difficulties in finding money to pay for imports. The Soviet Union meets them halfway, and supplies a sizeable part of the machines and equipment, needed for the national economy of these countries, on credit. The effectiveness of our credit is especially great for them, because it can be repaid (*sic*) with traditional export commodities, and not foreign currency. Besides, this form of transactions (*sic*) stimulates the development in the young states of their national industry, occupied in the manufacture of export commodities, which ultimately helps to expand trade between them and the Soviet Union."¹⁹

5 Finally, through all the foregoing processes, colonialism evokes a continuous fall in the conditions of the masses (despite statistical "evidence" to the contrary). This, too, was and has been admitted by spokesmen from the areas under scrutiny, especially those claiming the "disintegration" of colonialism.

By their own evidence, in a word, those spokesmen mouthing words put into their mouths by Revisionism have nonetheless proven that colonialism was very much alive and still growing, whatever new forms have been discovered and implemented to achieve this result for the metropolitan monopolies.

What is important to the world today is what resulted from the positions shown above. And the consequences included:

1. Revisionist underestimation of the role of colonial liberation in bringing about any possible world revolution.

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2. They failed to stress and teach the need to carry any national democratic revolution in colonial areas all the way to socialism.

3. They extended into colonial areas their concept of a "peaceful electoral path" to anti-imperialist revolution, thus ideologically (leading to literally) disarming colonial revolutionaries.

4. They contributed to the growth of ideological confusion in Liberation's ranks, expressed via the adoption by colonial revolutionaries of

a) Revisionist ideas and practices on all key questions of Marxism;

b) Penetration of bourgeois ideas into colonial areas;

c) The rise in such areas of anti-communism;

d) Erroneous analyses of the real material conditions in colonial areas:

1) Misconceptions about the real class forces there;

2) "Analysis" of colonial economies as if they were self-contained entities which, furthermore, were viewed as weak carbon copies of earlier European economies at a "previous stage of development;" for example, they talked about colonial "industry developing" and "swelling the ranks of the (colonial) proletariat".²⁰ This, despite the fact that up to now any such industry in the modern sense has been virtually non-existent in colonial areas due to brutal and deliberate interference from imperialism. Even the alleged "exception" in South Africa shows massive warping by the colonial factor;

3) The preoccupation of the CPSU Program with the "national bourgeoisie" in such areas has evoked further unacceptable conclusions:

"The national bourgeoisie (in colonies) is dual in character. In modern conditions, the national bourgeoisie in those colonial, one-time colonial and dependent countries *where it is not connected with the imperialist circles* is objectively interested in accomplishing the basic tasks of an anti-imperialist anti-feudal—

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revolution. *Its progressive role* and its ability to participate in the solution of pressing national problems are, therefore, *not yet spent*."²¹

Regrettably, the Program failed to mention in which particular "colonial or one-time colonial or dependent country" it had discovered *such* a "national bourgeoisie." Certainly, it should have let the world's masses in on so valuable a secret.

5. They must be held responsible for deteriorating relations between once-socialist Europe and newly-independent ex-colonies, which became visible in the capsule of socialist aid, what it does or doesn't do; what it does or doesn't mean.

6. Their errors toward colonial peoples have had the objective effect of bolstering U.S. imperialism in the era of its potential demise.

7. Their errors were revealed and exposed by the increase of racism and chauvinism within the once-united socialist community, expressed in general in relations with subject peoples, and in particular in blindness to the power of unity among the world's "emerging" peoples, including indifference to divisions in Liberation's own ranks caused by Revisionist theory (especially on War and Peace, and on Peaceful Co-existence). The most acute such expression has been in Eastern Europe's relations with Chinese communists; but others arose in socialist literature and art, as well as in marked and varied forms of interference in the internal affairs of newly-freed peoples.

8. Their theories on colonialism also led to subordinating the right of self-determination (up to and including the right of separation from the "mother" country) to "peaceful development," with unfortunate consequences for unity in the socialist camp even among revisionists themselves in Eastern Europe.

9. Refusal to accept the essence of colonialism also caused socialist countries themselves, under the guidance of their revisionist leaders, to begin a do-it-yourself metamorphosis into semi-colonial areas of a new type. The repercussions on world revolution of this particular change has yet to be fully assessed, since it encompasses an era still under way.

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To the study of practices resulting from the above aberrations from Marxism the following sections of this text will now turn.

Section B: Revisionist Underestimations of Colonial Liberation's Importance

Marxist spokesmen in various parts of the world have made this point:

"The revisionists speak glibly of the key role of the working class in imperialist strongholds...but they ignore and call dogmatists those who say that, for the advance to revolution in the imperialist strongholds to become a practical possibility, further...victories must be achieved in...the storm centers of world revolution, Asia, Africa, and, to a degree, Latin America...In practice, they attempt...to hold back the struggle in the revolutionary storm centers today."²²

Non-communists (e.g., an American newspaperman) also noted that

"To some extent, the de-radicalization of countries like 'Marxist' Mali matches Moscow's own more sophisticated and individualist attitude to the arts, to creature comforts and to global trade."²³

1. *Examples illustrating the practical outcome of such accusations.*

An early one was embodied in the composition of delegates to a conference on "Paths of Development for Newly-Emerging Nations," referred to earlier.²⁴ A total of 14 colonial countries were represented by 16 delegates; five Eastern European countries (but none from such colonial areas as Asia) and two capitalist countries (Italy and Britain) were represented by 15 delegates. At "international" conferences called ostensibly to discuss colonial problems, such a typical composition revealed the attitude of Eastern Europe toward colonial revolutionaries (as distinguished from those of "mother" countries).

Furthermore, during this conference, overall strategy for colonial areas was defined by Europeans;* those from the "hinterlands"→

* Instead of offering an analysis of their own areas and suggesting how it could assist colonial revolutionaries in their activities, struggles, etc.

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merely buttressed European arguments, especially referring at length and in flattering terms to the role of the USSR as a "worthy example" for colonial peoples to follow.²⁵

A similar conference was held in March 1963 ("The Socialist World System and the National Liberation Movement").²⁶ There, only a single delegate whose remarks were considered worth summarising came from "Black" Africa²⁷; two, from North Africa.²⁸ None of these three spoke for the African continent.²⁹ That was done by spokesmen from Eastern Europe and from the French and British Communist Parties.³⁰

As late as the end of 1966, no change had occurred:

"Supposedly an African one, (the Cairo Seminar's) list of invitees was determined in Prague. While many resolute anti-imperialist African nationalist parties were excluded,

more than 20 'observers' from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe took part...One of the main reports, 'Some Problems about Social Progress in Africa,' was delivered not by an African but by a Soviet citizen named (Alexander) Sobolev, who happens to be the Secretary-General of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM."³¹

Talking of the same seminar, a bourgeois writer declared:

"On studying the records, one gets the impression that at the seminar, the handling of critical problems arising from the...military coups in Africa were largely left to the Egyptian speaker Lofti El-Kholi (editor-in-chief of the UAR magazine AL TALIA). The Soviet speaker Alexander Sobolev (Secretary of editorial board of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM) concerned himself principally with the strategy of the 'non-capitalist road of development to socialism'."³²

Another favorite attitude among Eastern European "Africanists" or "Orientalists" toward "Third World"-Eastern Europe relations was to create the impression that all benefit between the two sectors moved only from the "socialist" world to the national liberation movement.³³

This attitude was peddled consistently to the world's subjugated areas, then in ferment:

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"By its steadily increasing might, the Soviet Union is fettering the main forces of the imperialist powers...The leaders of the national liberation movement have repeatedly stressed: if the imperialist camp headed by the United States,...world gendarme, is unable to resist the national liberation movement and to strangle the countries that have freed themselves from colonialism, this is *due to the* fact that the selfless struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples is meeting the *all-round support of the USSR and other socialist states*."³⁴

Naturally, support from socialist countries for anti-colonial revolution is indispensable. But the above quotation does not so much as hint that the national liberation movement might conceivably have been in turn protecting the socialist world – as, indeed, has been documented.

Anna Louise Strong, late veteran among the world's top journalists, had two interviews with Le Mai, Press Attache of the South Vietnamese Liberation Front's Mission in Peking. Le Mai told her

"At present, the U.S. is using 70% of its army and 50-60% of its naval and air forces on Vietnam, directly or indirectly."³⁵

A veteran Australian journalist writing in a New York paper stated

"The full might of American air power has been hurled against the northern part of (Vietnam); well over a third of all American ground forces – including all the elite divisions – have been committed in the South.

"...Never in history has any nation the size of Vietnam had such an enormous weight of men and arms thrown against it."³⁶

Underestimation from the late 20s and early 30s in revisionist attitudes toward the importance to world revolution of anti-colonial liberation has already been discussed.* By 1928, European Marxists had already taken a position essentially indistinguishable from that of Social Democracy.³⁷ By 1966, that weed had—

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XXV and XXVI.

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over-run the Marxist garden insofar as the "Colonial Question" was concerned.

The 1928 European Marxist position: that the "working class in the main capitalist countries" (equated to "the proletariat") must lead world revolution³⁸ – can be seen in more developed but less open form in the following:

"Using the UN and other international organizations in the interests of the national liberation movement, the USSR perseveringly seeks to mobilize progressive forces and isolate the imperialist colonialists. This has been facilitated by UN adoption – on the Soviet Government's initiative and with the vigorous support of the newly independent states – of the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

"It goes without saying that the Soviet people do not put their hopes in the UN Declaration as a...panacea against colonial exploitation. They maintain that this document must be continually shored up by concrete popular actions against the imperialists and their confederates."³⁹

The main content of this quotation was its paternal approach: "Big Brother is doing all for you" – first made famous by Krushchev – combined with illusions of parliamentarism vis-a-vis the United Nations.

Accompanying this "Big Brother" attitude went a constant bragging by the USSR leadership about its assistance to the national liberation movements, with attendant recitals of the "gratitude" of the latter. In one article alone, at least 17 such boasts occurred within seven pages of text.⁴⁰ (To give the writer his due, there were also two paragraphs within the same seven pages mentioning, in general, support by oppressed peoples to the Soviet Union.⁴¹

2. *Failure to stress the need to carry national democratic revolution all the way to socialism.*

This arose in part from the implication that liberation struggles were not "all that important" to world revolution, so that there could be no urgency for such countries to push ahead at all possible speed from political independence toward socialism:—

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they could, with no serious results, halt indefinitely at the national democratic stage of their revolutions.

One version of this viewpoint appeared in a Soviet publication put out for West Africa:

"Bourgeois-democratic revolutions were accomplished in the interests of the bourgeoisie in the first place. National liberation revolutions...in the interests of the whole nation, at least at the first stage...solve the tasks of bourgeois-democratic revolution, but this does not exhaust their aims.

"In the conditions of the existence of the world socialist system and the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism.

"...Nowadays, the tasks of the national-liberation and socialist revolutions not only draw closer together but sometimes interweave."⁴²

"Aims" and "accomplishments" are here smoothly interchanged so as to suggest that not only would socialism come to the West "peacefully by the parliamentary road," but national liberation movements could spontaneously become "interwoven" into the socialist world without muss or fuss.

This or a similar attitude had also been reflected in the types of goals set for themselves by Communist or Workers Parties in many colonial areas, some of which were clearly set forth in a previously cited source.⁴³

Numerous pronunciamientos delivered by Communists at Conferences discussing national or anti-colonial liberation were remarkable for the infrequency with which, even when mentioned, socialism was posited as the goal of national liberation – especially where political independence had already been attained. Only the Cubans appeared unequivocal about socialism as the goal of their revolution.⁴⁴

Most speakers from Eastern Europe or Western Communist Parties at such gatherings were content with a single abstract passing reference thereto.

Thus led, no colonial revolutionists apparently wanted socialism. Typically a Moroccan delegate to a conference discussing¬

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anti-colonial goals, speaking of his country's economic development, put it this way:

"Only the state can be the basic factor of economic development. And not any state can take over the economic levers and organize economic development. The state can play this role only if it fulfills certain conditions:

" – it should represent the interests of the masses, not those of the feudal or bourgeois minority;

" – it should combat economic pressure by the imperialists and the survivals of feudalism;

" – it should rely on the people under a genuine, political, economic and social democracy;

" – it should resolve to overcome the social obstacles in the way of economic development...

"Only a national-democratic state can steer the country towards independent economic development, in other words, along a non-capitalist path."⁴⁵

An Algerian Communist noted that "the first blow at the colonial structure" in his country would be "a radical agrarian reform."⁴⁶ Even referring to Cuba, the same Algerian talked of that island's political activities as "non-capitalist," acknowledging only in the last sentence of his talk that the Algerian people were "keenly interested in socialism,"⁴⁷ spoken as context for noting their acquaintance with "a state of national democracy".

An Argentine delegate also mentioned socialism, telling people in subjugated areas that

"the need to clear the way for socialism calls for an alliance with definite sections of the national bourgeoisie, a task which can be implemented by THE STATE OF NATIONAL DEMOCRACY."⁴⁸

Indonesians in a joint paper declared that

"The Indonesian revolution is essentially a national-democratic revolution which holds out the prospect of building socialism, not capitalism."⁴⁹

Yet they also noted that "nationalization of the Dutch enterprises" and adoption of the Indonesian government's "plan for¬

progress" had "not yet produced the desired results."⁵⁰ (Actually, the results of their position toward "definite sections of the national bourgeoisie" and toward "the state of national democracy" flowered on September 30, 1965.)

From South Africa, a speaker discussing the "non-capitalist path" emphasized a "state-controlled sector of the economy." Since South Africa's *official* policy favored exactly this goal and *practised* it in key sectors of the *apartheid* economy, the Black South African's position was at least ironical. In his peroration he declared that "the non-capitalist path" leads to socialism.⁵¹ So, too, proclaimed Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and those around Indonesia's Big Daddy, Sukarno.

Even the English Communist Party's representative talked about

"the need to oust foreign capital from the economy of the countries emerging from colonialism."⁵²

But all that his version of this "key task" envisioned was "nationalising their properties," creating a state sector for that purpose, and "a degree of economic planning by the state."⁵³ He assured people in subjugated countries that, as emerging nations struggled against foreign domination of their economies,

"democracy can be extended and living standards raised. For many African countries, in fact, there is a real possibility that they will...because of their internal class structure and relation of class forces and the favourable world alignment of forces...be able to bypass the full capitalist stage of development and take the non-capitalist path."⁵⁴

Thus an English Revisionist, at a conference led and sponsored by Eastern European "Marxists," clearly stated – and was duly parroted by the faithful retainers from the servants' quarters – that, for subjugated countries, there was some "path" neither capitalist nor socialist, just "non-capitalist." Such illusions were soon to cost uncountable lives, whether in outright blood-baths – as in Indonesia – or in a return to colonial conditions with their "unfavorable statistics" for the Black African masses, as in Ghana and elsewhere.

3. Extension of the "peaceful road" of "development" from revisionist bastions into colonial areas.

The following tid-bit is from a Russian source:

"In the period preceding monopoly capitalism, democratic changes were clearing ground from medievalism for the subsequent capitalist development. In the period of general crisis of capitalism, especially at its third stage, general democratic reforms, if they are carried out with a revolutionary determination...are capable of ending capitalist development once and for all."⁵⁵

So! The bourgeois revolution evolved from "democratic changes" which the socialist revolution may now successfully copy! Events of 1650, 1776, 1789, 1820, 1830, 1848 and 1870 suggest differently.

From 1961, another official Soviet stance was this:

"Peaceful coexistence affords more favourable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and facilitates the struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation."⁵⁶

A year later, an Iranian typified the widespread ingestion of this ideological "nourishment:"

"The national-democratic state, in my opinion, can assume different forms...parliamentary or non-parliamentary...an extremely complicated and debatable question...peaceful transition to socialism through Parliament even in highly developed capitalist countries is not excluded. It is possible that in countries where national-democratic states will be established the question of the parliamentary road to socialism may also arise."⁵⁷

As with other Revisionist illusions, History began hammering home its reply. Between 1950 and 1966 alone, some 66 military coups hit the world's hinterlands.^{58*} These comprised merely the beginning of a continuing operation (not all coups were made by those commonly accepted as "reactionaries.") which – taken together – constitute one visible, material evidence mocking

* See Appendix III for partial list.

Revisionist claims of what "national democracy" by itself could do for an ex-colony.

In any case, the revisionists never suggested that the "national-democratic" revolution should develop into socialism (they said it would "evolve" there). So, Western and Eastern European Communists got bogged down in the details of their "alliances with the national bourgeoisie" which were to smooth "the parliamentary road" (not to socialism but) to "full democracy," their undefined albeit high-sounding aim.

The symptoms quickly spread into Liberation's ranks, allowing every demagogue financed or otherwise encouraged by class-conscious imperialism to have his day.

Section C: Aspects of Revisionist Confusion in Liberation's Ranks

This writer does not intend, in talking of "ideological confusion" introduced by Modern Revisionism into colonial areas, to usurp thereby the task of revolutionists in such areas by arbitrating overall strategy and tactics there. Concern here is rather with the influence in such locales of revisionist ideas on the practical conduct of revolution as defined there, either before or after political independence. The assumption is that "correct" tactics and strategies are those achieving stated objectives with the least casualties. This is even the stated rationalization for revisionist theory and practice which, in reality, led to the very opposite results.

Three aspects, outlined above, of revisionist ideas and practices related to ideological confusion will be examined.

1. Penetration of revisionist ideas and practices into colonial areas, either before or after political independence.
2. The rise in such areas of anti-Communism.
3. Resulting erroneous analyses of colonial areas by Revisionists themselves, or by their followers, in such places.

1. Penetration of Revisionism into Colonial Areas

Indonesian Communists who escaped the massacres following the late-1965 Sukarno government overthrow were in an

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unparalleled position to judge of such penetration. After assessing their own responsibility for what had happened, based on the PKI's failure, especially its leadership, to exercise criticism and self-criticism, they added:

"...the...line of right opportunism which became the main feature of the mistakes committed by the PKI in this period...(was) caused by...

"the penetration of bourgeois ideology along two channels: through contacts with the national bourgeoisie when the Party established a united front with them; and through the bourgeoisification of Party cadres, especially the leadership, after the Party obtained certain positions in governmental and semi-governmental institutions...

"...modern revisionism began to penetrate into our Party when...the Central Committee...uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the 20th Congress

of the CPSU and adopted the line of achieving Socialism peacefully through parliamentary means' as the line of the PKI...This revisionist line...was never corrected, not even when our Party was already aware that since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the leadership of the CPSU had been following the road of modern revisionism."⁵⁹

What kind of "bourgeois ideology" penetrated not only the PKI but most of the struggling colonial revolutions?

Briefly, penetration in the above sense may be defined as the acceptance as valid of all the revisionist – and a number of capitalist – economic and political shibboleths, most of which qualify as illusions.

The Cairo Seminar of 1966 brought together participants from Eastern Europe and the "Third World." No force was present to counteract revisionism: decisions, remarks and positions taken represented pure revisionism, applied in colonial areas. One Western observer made this point:

"...eight African national organizations that had sent representatives to...Cairo were excluded from the deliberations...one sees that this involves a remnant of Chinese influence on 'parties' in Africa.

"Since the Chinese also were not present in Cairo, PRAVDA was able to report with satisfaction:

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'It is noteworthy that in the course of the discussion at the seminar, not a single speaker defended Peking's splittist concept. Not a single Chinese representative came to Cairo!'"⁶⁰

The "eight African national organizations" excluded from the Seminar were the Basutoland Congress Party, the Bechuanaland People's Party, the Mozambique Revolutionary Council, the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, the Swaziland Progressive Party, the South West Africa National Union, the Zimbabwe African National Union and "an Angolan group."⁶¹

The statement made by these organizations in reply to their exclusion came – as the Western writer acknowledged – from PEKING REVIEW. He could as easily have quoted – though he did not – just a bit more from that publication of what these same organizations said about the significance of the Cairo door-slamming:

"The interest of the Soviet ruling clique in the affairs of the African revolution is dictated by its need to secure international backing for its foreign policy...at present...oriented to...maintaining friendly relations with U.S. imperialism...to prevent jointly...the spread of revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial world."⁶²

This statement castigated Soviet speaker Alexander Sobolev's admonition to Africans to proceed along a "non-capitalist" path through peaceful means, declaring that this view

"runs counter to the (view of) revolutionary struggle by violence in Africa. In this manner the Soviet revisionists cover their tacit support for the status quo in the dependent countries" and "their counter-revolutionary role in the African continent is exposed to the light of day."⁶³

These unrepresented Africans averred that Sobolev's Cairo talk was

"intimately connected with his country's tacit agreement with the U.S.A. to act jointly as an international fire brigade to put out the revolutionary conflagration."⁶⁴

In Ghana, however, readers were not treated to this analysis,¬

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but rather were told of "Communism's ideological softening," and its effect on "the politico-ideological relations of the Soviet Bloc to several of the developing countries,"⁶⁵ which

"blurred the previous rigid, fixed boundaries between Communist ideology and the social revolutionary ideas of various ideologies in these (developing) countries.

"On the one hand, certain leadership groups in the developing countries had more elbow room to adopt 'some version of Marxism' into their own program.

"On the other hand, pluralistic Communism could build bridges and expand by borrowing from the politico-ideologic arsenal of the 'Third World'...

"With adaptation to the new pluralistic phenomena – which are capable of further expansion – the Soviets no longer subject 'national' or 'African socialism' to negative and scathing politico-ideologic criticism. Even though several Soviet theoreticians do not care to admit it, the Soviet bloc since 1963 has gradually had to accept a 'third road' for a certain group of developing countries."⁶⁵

What the writer meant by his frequent references to "pluralistic Communism" he defined as follows:

"...under today's pluralistic conditions...The 'socialist world community' has long since ceased to be a firm organization with a fixed program, strict discipline and unified center. It exists today only as a vague overall concept, which includes the Soviets as well as Yugoslavia, Albania, Cuba and China.

"There would be no more insurmountable obstacles to including Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Syria, Tanzania and the UAR in such a heterogeneous 'socialist world community'; furthermore, these states are countries with which Moscow has better relations and has far fewer difficulties than with China."⁶⁶

Not surprisingly, Revisionist erosion of the principle of maintaining the vanguard role of the revolutionary party in power had also systematically been extended to colonial areas. "Licensed infiltration," as the Western journalist dubbed this aspect of colonial policy developed by Revisionism (but which they themselves called "good relations with new governments in colonial areas")—

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was not only acceptable to the progressive governments; they actively assisted it. Nkrumah's Ghana, for example, was under definite and strict Russian guidance in such key areas as the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, the Bureau of African Affairs, the EVENING NEWS, THE SPARK, and certain other publications. From this position, the next followed logically:

"The Yugoslav Communists had recognized for years that in the above mentioned countries under the leadership of single parties, the non-capitalist road to development could be trod and socialism attained, without a well-organized working class and without the leadership of a Communist Party. The Soviets have taken this viewpoint since 1963.

"Native Communists in Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Ghana, Congo(Brazzaville), Mali, Tanzania and the U.A.R. were assigned to join the existing single parties and to transform them into parties of the socialist revolution; through them (the Communists) were to stabilize Marxism-Leninism in their countries."⁶⁷

An interesting by-play around the Cairo Seminar showed how this operation functioned. The Seminar had been organized by four prominent UAR intellectuals who, just before the gathering was due to open, had been arrested by the Egyptian Security Police (NZZ), which justified itself by declaring:

"The above-mentioned are former Communists who, following the orders of the Soviet Union, have declared their party as dissolved and joined the state party."⁶⁸

The upshot, according to this report, had been that President Gamal Nasser himself, at the time away in India, had intervened directly to have the four released – and the Seminar went ahead. (Egypt had several agreements with the USSR.)*

Coups in Algeria, Ghana and other countries cut off the possibilities for colonial advance allegedly involved in the "good relations" of these new governments with "Communist" countries.—

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Syria, however, disagreed with this approach, insisting that socialism in its country could be developed

"only under the leadership of the working class with the Communist Party at the helm."⁶⁹

But elsewhere, since 1965, "licensed infiltration" had been assisted by

"an entire network of manifold-relations between Soviet – oriented Communist Parties of Europe and individual single parties...This...consisted of...a rather large number of official accords on the exchange of party experiences between European CP's as well as the Cuban CP and the individual single parties in Africa."⁷⁰

According to this report, such agreements with the USSR had been achieved by Guinea's ruling Party; of UAR, of Mali, Congo (Brazzaville), and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi Party, while the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) must also have had some understanding with the USSR since their representatives participated in the Soviet Party's 23rd Congress in 1963.⁷¹

2. *Class Struggle, Ownership of the Means of Production and the Form of the New State*

In these ideological areas, revisionism also exerted strong influence on revolutionaries in colonial areas.

The "new Soviet theory" on these items soon forced the USSR to deny that the "national bourgeoisie" was in power in the "progressive" ex-colonial countries. Rather, Soviet literature began according that honor to "revolutionary intermediate classes," which it started referring to as "national democrats." Although orthodox theory had long denied the ability of middle classes to hold or exercise power, since they were always vacillating between bourgeoisie and proletariat, Moscow began conceding that

"these 'revolutionary democrats' in their countries began 'to carry out essentially the same historically necessary measures in their own way that the proletarian avant-garde (i.e., Communist Party) would have had to carry—

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out if it were strong enough...to get to power'...From this conclusion...the question arises whether a takeover by the communists in the revolutionary democratic countries is still necessary, if the 'revolutionary democrats' are not already solving communist tasks."⁷²→

Such a "new theory" for colonial areas also did away with any need for the dictatorship of the proletariat:

"Now...Soviet theoreticians admit to the 'revolutionary democrats' that they can carry out a leadership role in the transition of their country to a socialist society without a dictatorship of the proletariat. They are thus guaranteed that they will not be liquidated in the 'second phase of the revolution' by the Communists. Rather, the Soviet expect that objective development conditions will re-educate them."⁷³

In place of confiscating all social property of the ruling classes, the "new principles" to be applied to colonial areas would bring about a "revolution in three peaceful stages:"

a) The stage after political independence had been achieved:

"In all necessary nationalization and expropriations and in the development of new industries as well as in the formation of agricultural co-operatives in the first stage, besides a state and co-operative sector, the private sector under state supervision and control is not to be immediately abolished.

"Economic relationships with the capitalist world are also not to be diminished since 'one can hardly imagine that the African countries can isolate themselves from the capitalist world'⁷⁴."⁷⁵

Nothing new here: More than four years earlier, a top revisionist leader assigned to Africa had said:

"Of course it would be ridiculous for the new African states to sever all economic connections with the West."⁷⁶

During Stage No 1,

"The traditional economic and cultural connections to the capitalist countries should be maintained more or less...under state control. 'This would assure a certain influx→

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of capital and specialists and also export markets, but at the same time protect national sovereignty and the economic independence of the developing countries'⁷⁷."⁷⁸

b) Stage No 2, the "pre-socialist reorganization stage,"⁷⁹ during which

"the state sector should be expanded and the private sector should only be admitted insofar as this is necessary for the economy and is socially useful. In this stage, the process of a systematic elimination of the private capitalist sector begins, albeit by economic means and methods."⁸⁰

Retaliation by the owners of private capital? The "theoreticians" had their answers to that, too:

"The logic of development leads honest political officials away from their petty bourgeois thinking to an understanding of the decisive role of the working class and to the adoption of their ideology" and "to the degree that deep socio-economic and political reforms are effected, a definite evolution of their views toward Marxism can be observed."⁸¹

The class struggle having been thus disposed of, it was duck soup to arrive at

c) Stage No 3, transition to which would be accomplished when

"the national-democratic revolution grows into the socialist (revolution)...the state of the transition period grows into the socialist state."⁸²

While all this painless liquidation was going on, the "new relations" with the imperialist world would, of course, result in that benign entity now assisting the "developing" countries into full independence from itself.

3. *War and Peace*

Did the question of support for Vietnam arise during the Cairo Seminar? Surely, international pressures alone would have made that mandatory. If so, its relevance to the rest of the

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discussion held in the land of the Pharaohs was accurately estimated by the Western reporter: he did not find the subject important enough to mention.⁸³

Other revisionists had, however, discussed War and Peace as related to colonial areas. They made a serious attempt to tie the main anti-colonial strategy to the Soviet leadership's line: that War and Peace is the primary issue facing humanity; and the "preservation of peace," mankind's principal duty.⁸⁴

For instance, an Algerian documented uncountable imperialist military bases, ports and troop deployments in Africa, to press home specifically and in great detail the point that imperialism had arms and armaments superior to those of peoples struggling for emancipation:

"The Algerian people know from bitter experience what it means when the enemy has the advantage of superiority in arms, especially aircraft. They lost a million men, mostly civilians, in the war forced on them...hardly any of the people fighting for liberation have a navy."⁸⁵

Yet, the fact was that, without air superiority, without a navy, the Algerian people had defeated imperialism with all its superior armaments. It was this colossal historical reversal that the million men had died to bring about. The author even acknowledged:

"It is indicative that already now, when disarmament has yet to be achieved, the imperialists are finding it beyond their power to deal with even relatively weak countries, largely because the balance of world, forces has changed in favor of progress and peace. Were the British able to silence the patriots of Cyprus and Iraq? Could the French intimidate the people of Algeria, Tunisia and Guinea? Or the Americans impose their will on the valiant people of Cuba? No! Despite their weapons, they could not."⁸⁶

Precisely! These were facts which even revisionists, if they wished to establish credibility, could not omit. Yet, the same man returned soon to his previous thesis, pointing out how much easier it would have been for colonial countries if they hadn't—

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had to spend for armaments; or if only the "disarmament plan of the Soviet Union" could have been adopted by the UN.

The Algerian concluded that colonial peoples should negotiate with imperialism for their freedom:

"Were it up to them...peoples fighting for freedom would prefer to discuss general...disarmament with the imperialist representatives rather than carry on negotiations for a cease-fire, in the course of which they are compelled to make concessions...People who, like the South Rhodesian representative at the Conference of Asian and African Writers recently held in Cairo, reiterate 'We want guns, not disarmament...fail to appreciate that by combating imperialism in every way, it is possible to deprive it of the means used by it to stave off its inevitable end...Politically conscious patriots understand that by depriving Welensky's British masters of the means of prosecuting war, favorable conditions would be created for the victory of the peoples of Rhodesia and Nyasaland."⁸⁷

In the meantime?

"it is a fact that for every gun in the possession of the peoples of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Roy Welensky has ten...The oppressed peoples always have to fight imperialism with UNEQUAL WEAPONS...What would be left to the imperialists if they were deprived of their arms?"⁸⁸

And for every gun the people of Vietnam have, how many has imperialism? The only logical sequel to this position we have seen in a Canadian publication devoted to eulogizing the revisionists of the USSR: that it was, indeed, ONLY the Soviet arms aid to Vietnam which was defeating U.S. military might in Asia.⁸⁹

It was also symptomatic that, although the war in Vietnam was at least nine years old when an Algerian Communist was wringing his ideological hands in North Africa and elsewhere over imperialism's weapons superiority, Vietnam was not considered worthy of mention. Quite understandable, because in practice, the Vietnamese people – and, for that matter, the Algerians, too – had knocked every revisionist argument in the Algerian's arsenal into the well-known cocked hat.⁹⁰

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Section D: Bourgeois Ideas and Illusions in Colonial Areas

Young and energetic hopefuls of the then-ruling Convention People's Party in Ghana (plus more than a few young people – mainly men – from other African countries) were sent for ideological training to the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) at Winneba. But the new elite which had usurped the main Party and Government apparatus in Ghana refused to employ graduates of this Institute: most of them either had to return to former obscure jobs, or were left idle.

Perhaps that was just as well. At least one Englishman who had a contract to teach at KNII described in detail how that Institute was rigidly controlled by Czechs, Poles, East Germans (in the form of an American wife of one of the latter) and Russians to whose smallest advice the titular Ghanaian and other African leaders there bowed without any apparent struggle. And when the said Englishman dared to question this control, he found himself effectively ostracized; only the February 1966 coup cut short his ordeal.⁹¹ In a word, Eastern European control of KNII was real and effective.

The Ghanaian ideological weekly, THE SPARK, run by a Nigerian Marxist who was also head of KNII, furnished examples of the pap fed to Africans at that Institute.

a. One was a series by a Polish lecturer there who had the bad taste to start by referring frequently to "over-population" among "developing" nations:

"Strong population pressures and excess of population in many Asian and African countries constitute an additional...necessity to increase the share of accumulation in national income...there is a necessity to maintain correct proportions between the rate of accumulation and population increase."⁹²

"...the problem of overpopulation in the country and in towns creates a chronic crisis...in food supplies."⁹³

"...productivity...increase...was not occurring on such a scale in the developing countries, which are usually overpopulated despite intervention by the state. Chronic

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overpopulation of the countryside and the lack of means for creating new jobs outside agriculture means that productivity in this branch of the economy continues to be low."⁹⁴

"Attention should be drawn to one more negative factor. Most of these countries (especially those which are over-populated) suffer from hunger."⁹⁵

Not colonialism, but "over-population" rendered subjugated peoples hungry! One further gets the impression from this obsession with "over-population" (four references in only twelve columns of print!) that there was something "not quite nice" about subjugated peoples' bearing children: "so crude of them, don't you know!"* Moreover, and worse, these sentiments simply echoed Western fashion on this same subject:

"Sherwood Fine, director of the OECD department of development, says the main reason for the growing (wage) gap (between the West and the 'Third World' – HE) is the greater population increase in poor countries."^{95a}

b. Further advice explained how to "develop" a colonial economy:

"Production growth can be achieved only through extensive economy because the land suitable for cultivation has already been used...areas...not cultivated are mostly desert...or covered by bush and savannah. They are not suitable for cultivation without the necessary treatment."⁹⁶

But which country led the way after 1917 in reclaiming deserts, remaking river beds, and blasting huge irrigation canals out of land "mostly desert"? Besides, "necessary treatment", so often also recommended by bourgeois advisers, invariably includes purchase by the advised of large amounts of expensive and usually ill-suited chemical fertilizers and agricultural machinery from "metropolises."

"...the problem of finding financial means for the

* One is reminded of purple-printed white strips of paper pasted up in London's Underground stations; always half torn off: "Interbreed, multiply, over-populate. Too late!"

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development of modern industries...did not arise in the developed countries and even if it did it was not in such sharp focus."⁹⁷

No. "Developed" countries, as Lenin had noted, had had recourse to a number of outlets for their surplus capital, including even the sale of the very inhabitants themselves of the "underdeveloped" countries. Modern industries in "developed" countries arose by then putting such "financial means" to work in "under-veloped" countries. The results were so lucrative for the "developed" that, naturally, there was "no problem" about establishing industry. But it was "established" in the classical capitalist portion of a world of which *subjugated territories formed – and still form – the major and strategic portion.*

"According to W. W. Rostow...commercialization of agriculture...has always been a starting point for economic growth, for effecting the 'start'."⁹⁸

W W Rostow, whose term for the economic "start" was "takeoff," was then the most recent oracle of the bourgeois economic world. Although many of his ideas were offered by the Polish lecturer, none of the remainder were credited. Out of mercy for the reader, we skip most of them, except:

"The colonial powers introduced certain elements of technical progress into the colonies."⁹⁹

So claim those very "colonial powers" at every possible opportunity! So, also, as this text has shown¹⁰⁰, did the Social Democrats. President Sekou Toure has replied to the "argument" for Africa, putting "improvements" by colonial powers into context:

"Three hundred years of colonisation in Senegal have given that country the modern city of Dakar, the largest port on the West Coast of Africa, two major highways, and a railroad connecting the coast with Bamako, capital of Mali. But there was no profound improvement in the living conditions of the people which, in many cases, on the contrary experienced a serious deterioration.

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"Our brothers...of (French) Community states, should not...forget (that)...It was in order to milk Africa's resources more effectively that the colonizers built these facilities that they now exhibit as civilizing work...the first wharfs at Goree, the Islands of Loos, Conakry or Bassam were constructed to make the slave trade easier."¹⁰¹

Revisionist "explanations" of how colonial countries happened to wind up "under-developed" ran like this one:

"The...raw material character of the exports of developing countries and exploiting by foreign capital are not the only factors hindering...industrialization.

"The constant decline in the prices of goods exported by them has had perhaps even more grave consequences. There are many reasons for this.

"The very rapid development of the chemical industry is one.

"...the process of decolonization creates uncertainty for many industries in the capitalist countries...

"...the tendency toward integration which is becoming more and more evident in capitalist countries and which strengthens the...monopolies in the raw material market, etc.etc."¹⁰²

As if the "raw material character of the exports of developing countries" could be separated from "the constant decline in the prices of the goods exported by them!" In fact, such an "explanation" was a neat screen for the "price scissors," imperialism's modus operandi (not an impersonal act of God from outer space). Saying "uncertainty for many industries in the capitalist countries" served to sweeten the meaning: complete and rapacious dependence of the entire imperialist economy on colonial "raw material exports."

1. *Revisionist "Analyses" of the Colonial Economy and the Concept of "Development"*

Eastern European and Western Left traders in ideology offered not the slightest understanding of colonialism as the real motor of imperialism. Successful experience in formerly-colonial lands like North Korea, North Vietnam, China or Cuba was ignored as—

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if it had never existed. Indeed, as we shall soon see in detail Cuba's inability to carry out its own economic development free of ties with the revisionists was to cast a brilliant light over revisionist ideas of "industrial development" in ex-colonies.

In fact, whenever revisionists discussed the "under-developed" world, their verbiage became loaded with bourgeois sociological jargon — slinging together with no explanation incomprehensible terms. Were the recipients supposed to be "impressed" with the authors' "professionalism" and "expertise"?

2. *Colonialism as a "Policy" of Imperialism*

This concept, scotched with some heat by Lenin,¹⁰³ had been espoused by opportunism over a long period of time (for instance, by the author of the last quotation, above):

"Any self-sustained economic tendencies aimed at changing the structure of employment (in developing countries) during (the second half of the 19th century) were curbed by the

imperial policy of the colonial power. This policy originated from the principle of maintaining a traditional economic structure and the agricultural and raw material character of the colonies."¹⁰⁴

"From the beginning of the 18th century Britain...owing to her colonial policy, developed industries based on cheap raw materials imported from her colonies...

"This policy...was soon followed by France...

"...developing countries today...find themselves in a situation in which consequences of the colonialist policy still exist and are at work."¹⁰⁵

Revisionism's root belief that "colonialism has collapsed" left no alternative but to regard phenomena which "still exist and are at work" in such territories as merely "consequences of a colonialist *policy*." It then followed that, if only the support and aid of "sensible sections of the international bourgeoisie" (i.e., the imperialists) were enlisted, they could alter the *policy* for a more "intelligent" one. Everything dovetailed neatly – except in real life.

But this position was not new among revisers of Marx and Lenin. The "short policy statement on colonialism" by the British–

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Communist Party during the General Elections of 1964, where the "outdated system of imperialism" was referred to as a "policy," has been examined elsewhere.*¹⁰⁶

3. *Extolling "Parliamentarism," or "Bourgeois Democracy," in and for Colonial Areas*

As noted in the foregoing text, this particular illusion stemmed from gross warping of the Marxist position on the role and function of a state, on the irreconcilability of opposing classes' antagonisms in a society, and on renouncing class struggle as the main activating force of history. In colonial areas, that illusion was pushed by revisionism:

"The legality of the Party was...regarded as a principle while other forms of struggle should serve this principle. Even when counter-revolution not only had trampled underfoot the legality of the Party but had violated the basic human rights of the communists as well, the Party leadership still tried to defend this 'legality' with all their might."¹⁰⁷

And to what did this position lead?

"...the illusion was spread that under the rule of bourgeois dictatorship, where the armed forces under the leadership of the Party did not exist...it would be possible to set up a united front government of all democratic elements including the Communists."¹⁰⁸

Indonesian refinements to this position (i.e., their "two aspects" theory about the Indonesian State under Sukarno) had helped the PKI rationalize revisionist illusions on this score, especially

"its erroneous assumption that the forces of the national bourgeoisie in the state power...represented...the people's interests."¹⁰⁹

Examples illustrated this point, too.

a) A typical excerpt from an Eastern European adviser of—

* See *Labor Arist.*, Chapter XXV, "Relations between Western and Colonial Workers."

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Africans showed (or presumed to show) the "fountainhead" of "progress" in colonial areas:

"...the most effective way to do the job (of capital accumulation) which was in the past done (in developed countries – HE) by the capitalist class is through the economic and social initiative of the state. Today the state must replace the capitalist class."¹¹⁰

Remembering Indonesia, Guatemala, Ghana and other "Third World" lands now suffering under foreign military or economic domination ferocious in renewal, one is reminded that *the state in colonial areas* was originally set up, has always served, and still serves the imperialist world economy, to which it is irrevocably bound.

b) A German, reprinted in an African newspaper, described the role played by a Czech magazine, a chief pusher of revisionist ideology and practice for colonial areas:

"Since 1963, both the Communists and the revolutionary-democrats have been trying to raise reciprocal party relationships to a higher plane and to develop them multilaterally. For this purpose, the organ PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, the official paper of the Moscow-oriented Communists, was enlisted. Since the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943 and of the Cominform in April 1956...PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM is today, except for the Communist meetings on the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, the only functioning international communication organ of Soviet-oriented Communism.

"Lenin considered a newspaper as a 'collective organizer.'...in this age of pluralistic Communism...this paper...confines itself essentially to conducting international Communist conferences and congresses for the exchange of opinion and for discussion of political ideological problems...it is significant that PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM...is now expanding its activities into Africa, too."¹¹¹

The sorts of "opinions" which this "paper" caused to be exchanged regarding colonial areas was typified by remarks of the previously-cited Argentinian Communist, discussing nationalization of imperialist banks, etc:

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"By ensuring democratic liberties...the national liberation front government will open up the way for building a socialist economy in Argentina...the new government will be interested in co-operating with those capitalists who show readiness to fit in with the new state of affairs and. place their production capacities in the service of the state."¹¹²

Experience in a number of countries which got further than Argentina in trying to implement such advice soon revealed that what developed in practice out of this theory were "capitalists who show readiness to...place" the state "in the service of *their own* "production capacities."

Nonetheless, similar sentiments were echoed by other Communists from colonial areas:

"It goes without saying that, with the existing low level of national production, the formation of a state sector does not mean nationalizing the privately-owned Lebanese enterprises. The state should support these enterprises, guarantee them markets, supply them with raw materials and help them to compete with foreign firms."¹¹³

Never has exhortation been more earnestly implemented than this one – with the fervent assistance of the private owners themselves; and with consequences fraught with unceasing military coups and often, as in Indonesia, dripping with the blood of colonial revolutionaries who had taken part in the implementation:

"...further to develop the national economy, it is imperative to strengthen the state sector, stimulate the activity of the people, and draw workers into managing the enterprises and controlling their operations."¹¹⁴

Let Indonesian comment on these words from other Indonesians:

"...in practice not a single effort was made in this direction."¹¹⁵

Furthermore, especially among those Communists from colonial areas who followed the Soviet lead, revolution in their plans receded further and further:

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"In Iran the working class and its party aim at establishing a state of national democracy. This...will be a long and complex process...In order to establish a state which will

eventually choose the NON-CAPITALIST WAY it is essential first to build a national, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal front which would embrace all the democratic and patriotic forces in the country. With the development of the national-liberation movement the role of the working class will grow...The small bourgeoisie will cooperate with the working class. Some of the more radical members of the national bourgeoisie will continue to side with the masses...who will eventually decide the course of events."¹¹⁶

What the word "eventually" meant in practice is on view to the world in today's strife-torn, tourist-ridden, racially-divided, poverty-stricken, U.S.-controlled Yugoslavia. It was also illustrated in the continued practical colonialism still operating in places like Iran.*

To all such illustrations of how revisionism created ideological confusion among the peoples and cadres of colonial areas, the PKI Self-Criticism replied:

"...we must not in any way underestimate the danger of modern revisionism and must wage a resolute and ruthless struggle against it."¹¹⁷

Section E: Anti-Communism and Erroneous Analysis in Colonial Areas

The peculiar form of anti-Communism practised by Modern Revisionism, anti-China activity (a form which "happened" to tie in neatly with U.S. foreign policy), left its mark on colonial areas.

For example, whenever progressive governments were ousted, notably in Africa, there soon followed diplomatic rupture with Communist China:

In the Central African Republic: On November 28, 1965,

* Time will judge whether or not "Islam" in power has changed this.

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1965, President David Dacko publicly attended a Chinese Exhibition, thus deliberately defying heavy pressure to stay away. On January 1, 1966 (33 days later), a military government took power. On January 5, it broke with China.¹¹⁸

In Dahomey, in 1965, then-President Sourou Migan Apithy, returned from "Nkrumah's Ghana" where he had made a few indiscreet remarks favoring "socialism" and "Ghana's example," was ousted by a coup d'etat on December 22. On January 3, 1966, the new military regime severed relations with Peking.¹¹⁹

In Ghana, the Army got rid of Kwame Nkrumah on February 24, 1966. (A previous attempt at a coup on January 8 that year had failed.) The first of the "bad" Oriental examples to go were the North Vietnamese, who told the writer that they "could not afford to keep an Embassy open for

nothing." The North Koreans were asked to leave "quietly," according to their interpreter Kim Choong Il; that is, without publicity. They did. By October 1966, the Chinese were finally expelled.¹²⁰

In Congo(Kinshasa) (now Zaire), the Chinese were even offered as an excuse for accepting Tshombe and his successors, a maneuver that aroused international interest. One article on the subject, from a very "respectable" source in London, worked up a "limited dossier of well substantiated evidence" of Chinese deeds warranting what the author called "the politically risky course" pursued by U.S. President Johnson in supporting Tshombe.¹²¹

Americans were also rumored to be financing the then-newly-recruited "mercenary forces" fighting for Tshombe and made up of Rhodesians and white South Africans against the Congolese "rebels." The London writer also considered use of these white mercenaries "politically risky."¹²²

The list of China's "crimes" in Congo(K) included:

1. the presence of Chinese embassies in countries bordering the Congo:

"...the Chinese have undoubtedly maintained well-staffed embassies since the beginning of the year in the capitals of two neighboring countries, Congo-Brazzaville and Burundi. Both of these are strategically sited...Several

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reporters have suggested links between these embassies and the (Congo-Kinshasa) rebels...It is alleged that these embassies are a source of funds for the rebels. They certainly distribute literature...and stocks of pictures of Mao Tse-tung..."¹²³

2. Literature assertedly was found on "captured rebels:"

"Peter Younghusband of the DAILY MAIL...states that copies of a handbook on guerrilla warfare by the North Vietnamese guerrilla leader (*sic!*) General Giap have been found in the possession of captured rebels."¹²⁴

3. Personnel allegedly were interchanged:

"Several reporters agree that Pierre Mulele, the leader of the rising in Kwilu Province, received 'training' for a time in Peking. A 'Chinese commander' was allegedly killed in Kasai recently...Mr Tshombe firmly believes that the Chinese are behind all his troubles."¹²⁵

"Mr Tshombe" accused Congo-Brazzaville of maintaining "a camp" for training guerrillas fighting against him, which then-President Massemba-Debat's government categorically denied.

London's comment:

"None of these reports have been confirmed."¹²⁶

Nor was doubt of their authenticity confined only to the writer:

"Gavin Young of the OBSERVER states: 'I have found Western diplomats doubtful that the Chinese were physically involved in training rebels,' and quotes a Brazzaville-based rebel leader, Mr. Bocheley-Davidson, as saying: 'We do not need foreigners to teach us guerrilla warfare. Many Congolese officers and men have escaped from Leopoldville to join us here'."¹²⁷

About this, the reporter commented:

"There is no doubt at all that the bulk of the arms and equipment the rebels have been using have been obtained from defecting Congolese soldiers, and have therefore been mainly American or old UN arms."¹²⁸

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One strong implication behind this and similar reports was that black people – especially Africans – were too stupid to dream up their own rebellions.

These imperialist anti-China shenanigans formed the setting wherein Soviet participation in the anti-China chorus helped spread confusion and defeatism in colonial areas.

For instance, in Ghana, a featured article¹²⁹ in a major paper on the subject of the draft treaty jointly tabled at the UN by the U.S. and the USSR offered Ghanaians the following ideological pot-pourri:

a) "Super-powers" claimed that, as long as they had their fingers on the "nuclear trigger," there was "no danger to peace." Neither the U.S. nor the USSR had as yet dropped an H-bomb (well, an "A-bomb" – especially one dropped on "inferior yellow men" in Japan – or was that two? – didn't qualify here).

b) But if "the weapon is to spread to a host of smaller and more irresponsible powers, Heaven knows what might happen."¹³⁰ Like, Egypt might drop one on Tel Aviv; India might lob one into Karachi:

"there is a lot to be said for this argument...for those who fear a nuclear war of the future 'the fewer the better' seems a very valid principle."¹³¹

c) Of course, France and China had already said they wouldn't sign. So?

"Though France is a danger to no one, this cannot be said for China...The latent conflict between China and the free countries of Asia is perhaps in present circumstances the only instance where we see the danger of confrontation between nuclear and non-nuclear countries."¹³²

Continuing, the writer confessed that, while "some" might have had "moral" objections to the treaty, the real considerations against it were "based on fear of the future."¹³³ He admitted that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty had "little if anything to do with disarmament,"¹³⁴ even though it should have been expected to be accompanied by some.

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"What," finally agonized this writer by way of peroration,

"can be done to dispose of this fear? The only answer is of course to provide guarantees by the great powers. "But this would make the inequality between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers even greater, and in the eyes of many peoples the danger of world domination by them would be even greater."¹³⁵

Here, a colonial people were being asked to "trust" two "super-powers" to "guarantee" them against "greater world domination" in a context wherein those very same super-powers were concocting a treaty which the writer himself saw as a device precisely for "greater world domination"!

The point of the entire piece here is that in this bit of "peace propaganda" dished up in a neo-colonial country, revisionist anti-China blasts blended painlessly with those of the Pentagon.

Hence, such an article helps evaluate the anti-Chinese virus of the "developing" world. If America was instigating breaks with People's China and ousting of Chinese personnel followed each military coup in a subjugated area, was it not at least wondrous coincidental that so many of revisionism's representatives remained in such countries? And was it also not at least most peculiar that what poured forth from the remaining revisionist embassy presses were anti-China "press releases," bulletins, articles – and activities – which thereby lent a "revolutionary" aura to these damaging diplomatic ruptures, at the same time virtually "exonerating" the United States?¹³⁶

d) Specifics of modern revisionism's *erroneous analyses of colonial conditions*.

Mention has already been made of the "peaceful" or "electoral" road to "genuine democracy" advocated for colonial countries by Revisionists; also, of the equation by Revisionists between classical capitalist economy and some "relevant stage of development" in "emerging" economies.

Both these phenomena found expression through references to—

(a) a type of economy allegedly neither capitalist nor socialist but simply "non-capitalist"; (b) a so-called "national bourgeoisie;" and (c) the colonial proletariat. In addition, these notions also contributed to (d) a quite-mistaken view of the alternatives actually open to colonial peoples;

(a) *The alleged "non-capitalist" economy:* Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Syria, Tanzania and the UAR were so named in a series of articles in an Accra paper (alluded to earlier¹³⁷) by a German, who commented on the change in Moscow's attitude toward these "non-capitalist," "revolutionary democratic" or "national democratic" governments:

"Until 1966 Soviet experts thought of all developing countries as capitalist states. It became illogical, however, to consider the above-mentioned eight revolutionary-democratic countries as 'non-capitalist states' and yet include them in the capitalist world...a revision had to be made. Now (Soviet writers) emphasize: 'It would be fundamentally wrong to continue to include these countries...in the capitalist world system. It would be more correct to say, the countries mentioned are on the same side of the barricades as the socialist countries in the fight against imperialism'." ¹³⁸

In addition, according to the writer, even the thesis (from the 1961 CPSU program) that developing countries had not yet left the capitalist economic system and would play the role of "world village" was being "developed" by Soviet experts, one of whose "new principles" the Western writer quoted while dubbing it "quite paradoxical":

"While we are talking about the transition of several liberated countries by way of a non-capitalist development, it is insufficient to point to their special place in the capitalist world economy. These countries no longer belong entirely to the capitalist world economic system, although they have not yet become part of the socialist world economic system'." ¹³⁹

Such a position, however, left rather an embarrassing question:

"Into which system these countries are to be included, according to his definition, is still an open question. The Soviet experts do not dare to construct a 'third world' market." ¹⁴⁰

A warning uttered only shortly before by Indonesian survivors of the September 1965 coup and its subsequent massacres might have been directed against the above type of speculation:

"Prior to the establishment of a people's democratic power, the struggle of the people in the economic field will never possibly give birth to a people's democratic economic structure. The take-over of imperialist-owned enterprises and the existence of old-type state-owned

enterprises did not mean the birth of the socialist sector in economy, because these state-owned enterprises did not belong to the people and were not managed by the people's state, but had fallen into the hands of the bureaucrat-capitalists...People's democratic elements will never grow in a state power which represents the interests of imperialism and the vestiges of feudalism."¹⁴¹

(b) *Diagnosing the "national bourgeoisie" as "progressive," confusing its class features, and yielding leadership of the "revolution" to it.*

The CPSU Program had set the tone for this with its "dual character bourgeoisie" in colonies or ex-colonies, where – when it is not "connected with the imperialist circles" – its "progressive role" may be considered "not yet spent."¹⁴²

The idea that any sector of a colonial elite could have "no connection with imperialist circles" was lethally erroneous because it led to placing alliance with the bourgeoisie first, leaving other issues, especially socialism, in a subordinate place. Placating "progressive" sections of the local elite then became the "proletarian" pass-time. Revisionism's glibly-inserted phrase, "where not connected with the imperialist circles," was of a piece with its other opportunist delusions and pipe-dreams:

"...the position of the national bourgeoisie could not in any way represent the interests of the people and that is why it could not be called the 'people's aspect' in the state...Because the joint forces of the national—

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bourgeoisie, and the proletariat were led not by the proletariat but by the national bourgeoisie, the positions of the Party leaders in the government that gave them no real power was...a political concession from the national bourgeoisie who needed the support of the people in their contradictions with the comprador-bourgeoisie and, to a certain extent, also with the imperialists."¹⁴³

That is, yielding leadership of the revolution to the "national bourgeoisie" invariably led to changing the "proletarian vanguard" into the "tail of elite," and thus in reality maintained the colonial workers in their familiar role as the milch cow of imperialism.

As far as this writer is concerned, there is really not much excuse for the persistent, recurrent use of the term itself, "national bourgeoisie," in colonial countries. The bourgeoisie in capitalist countries are not simply "the owners of the means of production" or "the rich." They employ wage-labor in industry to make profit. Only the tiniest fraction of most colonial elites (certainly, in West Africa) have qualified in this category. Most of them were "cocoa capitalists" who depended *completely* on the world (i.e., imperialist-controlled) *market* for *outlets* and thus, for existence.

And in the early days of Revisionism, Revisionist spokesmen knew this and spoke of it even among colonial followers:

"In most of East Africa...in Central and Southern Africa...the national bourgeoisie is only just emerging. But even in West Africa, where political independence has been won, the national bourgeoisie – apart from some small light-industry enterprises, for example cotton ginning in Uganda – scarcely exists.

"The African bourgeoisie lacks industrial experiences...factory development...the training of African skilled workers, with the provision of all the social and cultural services and conditions which are a necessary corollary...The consequence...is a tendency to leave industrial development to foreign monopolies. On the other hand, the lack of willingness of private African capital to develop industry compels the new African states to intervene and take steps to develop STATE industry...in most of Africa communally-owned land is still the rule..."¹⁴⁴

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"...leave industrial development to foreign monopolies"??? Since when did foreign monopolies ever develop industry in a colony (in the sense that their own industry was "developed") or permit any ex-colony in which they had the slightest influence to do so? It has become fashionable to point to Latin America – which has had nearly two centuries of neo-colonialism – as a break from "under-development." But even there, it can be shown that the industry foreign monopolies "develop" is necessary under advancing parasitic conditions to serve imperialist super-profits by absorbing spare parts and equipment from metropolises or partially processing primary materials (thus enhancing their utility) needed by Western industry (which, by paying the "processed" price, also saves the processing costs).

With any balanced industry in such places still to be built; with any land not communally owned in foreign hands, how can the term "bourgeoisie" apply to this local elite? To this writer, it seems that the facts rather suggest a term denoting a layer or group at top income levels in such a society. The term "elite" seems far closer to the mark: *in every colony-in-fact, the role of "bourgeoisie" belongs to outside imperialism.*

These thoughts have been (often in the name of supporting the Revisionist position) attested by people from "developing" countries:

"During the period of French domination most of the Lebanese bourgeoisie *had a vested interest in* the imperialist companies and foreign banks, with the result that its Right wing had strong positions in the economy and in the administration. Another section of the bourgeoisie *wished to* invest its capital in national industry *but encountered all manner of obstacles and restrictions on the part of the colonial authorities and the foreign monopolies.* This section of the bourgeoisie developed slowly. *Its economic position was unstable and its influence on the political life of the country, negligible.*

"On assuming power the bourgeoisie, *being closely linked with imperialism, not only preserved*—

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the domination of the imperialist monopolies in the economy but expanded it."¹⁴⁵

In all such revisionist analyses, it was implied that, without the presence of "imperialist monopolies," the "bourgeoisie" would follow a "normal" course of "classical development." The feverish search for "progressive" flashes from this "bourgeoisie" embodied the need to "prove" the importance of alliance with it.

In today's world, however, such an idea leads to and depends for its "validity" on cases like that of Brazil.¹⁴⁶ The truth to be faced about any "national bourgeoisie" in neo-colonies seems to the writer to be this: it is first of all useless to imagine what "would be" without imperialism, because the very nature of the colonies and their "neo" forms has been precisely the outcome of the actual distorting and destroying *presence* of imperialism. Secondly, if the *main* enemy is imperialism, and is defeated, then the imperialist-swollen and imperialist-nurtured colonial elite could be (even simultaneously) overwhelmed by the people.

Any ex-colonial country from which imperialism has really been ousted (say, China) has seen and acted on the need to consolidate victory by politically crushing beyond resurrection possibilities its own "national bourgeoisie." Events may or may not signal its destruction by this course. As Chairman Mao has been wont to emphasize, revolutionary development is a matter of "five or ten generations."

What is quite clear, in any case, is that with only the tiniest of exceptions, this elite's ties have been and can only remain exclusively with outside imperialism. Thereby, it has become a conveyor belt, analogous to the metropolitan labor aristocracy, for removing ever-larger super-profits from colonial labor-power, while managing to horn in on a share of the swag departing the "home" country.

The purpose of definition in science is to follow development accurately in order that any action taken, based on such development, should issue in the desired results. That such does *not* occur through the erosion of definition, History amply testifies.

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Section F: Revisionism Muffs the Role of the Colonial Proletariat

Modern revisionist discussions of the proletariat in colonial areas have sought out and emphasized only those characteristics which enabled them to equate the colonial worker with his Western counterpart – at a "lower stage of development," of course.

Marx, Engels and Lenin left guidelines for understanding "proletarian development." But the Modern Revisionists chose to apply them whole-cloth to conditions for which they were never intended. For example, speaking to audiences of Africans, one revisionist describing Western conditions in the 19th century and their pertinence to colonial areas, said:

"It is significant that the level of wages of workers employed in factories did not differ much from wages of those employed in agriculture. At times they were even lower.

"A very high degree of exploitation of the proletariat in the 19th century played quite an important role in the process of accumulation of capital. The fact that the proletariat was not organized...was a favorable factor...(for) the employer.

"These problems are somewhat different in the developing countries today. This does not mean that that proletariat is not exploited...On the contrary, in many developing countries the degree of exploitation continues to be high...especially (in) those countries which have a low level of social organization, or where the economy is almost completely monopolized by foreign capital.

"In countries having a relatively high level of organization of society, the degree of exploitation of labor (working time, conditions of work, etc.) is undoubtedly lower than it was *in the corresponding period* in the history of the highly developed countries."¹⁴⁷

First, this "classical" explanation of capital accumulation omitted, before an African audience, as do most bourgeois economics, any mention of its main source, the slave trade and subsequent colonialism. Such an "explanation" could only mask super-exploitation in colonies, as also does the implication that not all countries "having a low level of social organization" were→

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"almost completely monopolized by foreign capital." No wonder such a man could refer to "a degree of exploitation" in "developing" countries which "continues to be high!" His low-level confession that "these problems" were "somewhat different" in the "developing" countries today is almost immediately contradicted by reference to "the corresponding period in the history of the highly developed countries:" i.e., equating "developing" countries in our era to Western economies of the 19th century.

This view of colonial areas is not only mechanical; it is criminal, because of the "advice" and "theory" which, as a result, Revisionism offered to leaders of "developing" countries.

Moreover, this entire outlook has been successfully challenged:

"It is generally held that economic development occurs in a succession of capitalist stages and that today's underdeveloped countries are still in a stage, sometimes depicted as an original stage of history, through which the now developed countries passed long ago."¹⁴⁸

Certainly just such a picture was presented above. But,

"even a modest acquaintance with history shows that underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that neither the past nor the present of underdeveloped countries resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed countries."¹⁴⁹

Nor was this all:

"It is also widely believed that the contemporary underdevelopment of a country can be understood as the product or reflection solely of its own economic, political, social, and cultural characteristics or structure."¹⁵⁰

This belief, held at both the metropolitan and colonial ends of the political scale, was wide of the mark:

"Yet historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries. Furthermore, these relations are an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole."¹⁵¹

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Other cherished "explanations" fell before the axe of reality:

"...underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself...

"...the satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest...

"...the regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past."¹⁵²

In the light of these arguments, revisionist "analyses" of the colonial working class also came up wanting:

"Though the leadership of the Indonesian revolution is the the working class, its principal mass supporters are the the peasantry. In view of the small number of the working class in Indonesia, the method of struggle typical to the working class...can never become the main form of struggle...of the Indonesian revolution.

"The Chinese revolution has provided...the lesson concerning the main form of struggle...in colonial or semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counter-revolution."¹⁵³

Revisionist misjudgement of the colonial working class also included its assessment of the role trade unions should play in such places, together with their allegations of the role the unions really did play.

The following picture from Asia described a condition which the author witnessed in Ghana as well:

"In (Indonesian) cities...actions by the workers that had political significance gradually disappeared...true...there were apparently big actions by workers...such as the take-over of the enterprises belonging to the Dutch, British and Belgian imperialists. But the actual results of these→

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actions were beneficial only for a handful of bureaucrat-capitalists and could by no means improve the living conditions of the workers concerned.

"Besides, since the Party leadership considered the former imperialist-owned enterprises...controlled by the government as a national property, further actions by the workers were restrained. On the contrary, far too many activities were organized directly by the trade unions or through the Enterprise Council aimed at increasing production, raising the working efficiency of the enterprises, improving the economy, etc., which did not improve the living conditions nor heighten the revolutionary spirit of the workers."¹⁵⁴

This description of trade unions in "newly emerging countries" showed clearly that at no point did they – as in China, Vietnam or Korea – place socialism as the target of all stages of their revolutions. In fact, the press in such places constantly assured readers that socialism was already attained in the conditions prevailing at each given moment. Yet, the position merely mirrored earlier Eastern European "analyses:"

"A special (because of the single-party system, which caused African conditions to differ from Asian – HE) responsibility in this respect falls on the African trade unions which are playing a key political role in a number of new African states. Their strength and activity are decisive for raising living standards."¹⁵⁵

If so, experience (in Ghana, at least) proved that African Unions did not – certainly after independence – play any such role; they followed the post-independence Indonesian pattern: restraining any real worker activity which might have "raised living standards," and concentrating on raising, instead, productivity, production, and the profitability of state enterprises which the new elite had turned into organs of primitive accumulation for themselves.

In many of the "number of new African states" referred to above, it had yet to be shown (outside of statistical averages which, we have seen, made the situation look good because they included the siphoning activities of the new elite) that

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improved conditions for working people could be attained through implementing revisionist theory.

Somewhat later, the same writer said:

"Frequently...the national bourgeoisie in the new African states (try) to use...nationalism to divert workers from their own class interests...even utilizing 'socialist' slogans to mislead the workers. In certain territories the national bourgeoisie...strives to subordinate the working class by bringing the trade unions under the control of the government and the ruling party. And when these efforts fail, then the national bourgeoisie...violates workers' trade union and political rights in the name of the 'national interests'."¹⁵⁶

Experience would suggest "invariably" in place of "frequently;" would remove the phrase "try to;" and would comment on one point: IF the government and ruling party had been in the hands of workers and peasants, it would have been criminal *not* to bring the trade unions under their control. The point at issue was not "to control or not to control;" in balance was the *kind* of government and Party that were to rule. The revisionists blurred precisely this point in their relations with "revolutionary democrats."

Under revisionist auspices, trade unionists from various colonial areas, discussing "the role and place of the trade unions in the community and in the struggle for social progress," have revealed how deeply revisionism had penetrated their ranks:

"Paramount among the tasks of...the trade union movement is the noble objective of all mankind – defence of peace. The international proletariat should...fight resolutely for peaceful co-existence through general and complete disarmament, work to wipe out the remnants of the Second World War, and particularly for a settlement of the West Berlin problem and a peace treaty with Germany...Only along the road of peaceful co-existence can a genuinely new world be created."¹⁵⁷

Millions of colonial people starving and dying – and this anti-colonial "revolutionary" offered a fight to settle the "West Berlin problem"!

Another contribution, from South Africa, exuded anarchist↵

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overtones in its suggestion of a role for trade unions in "post-revolutionary" ex-colonies:

"The trade unions should be given the chance of assisting in molding the future of their countries, of taking part fully in the governments in managing industrial and agricultural enterprises."¹⁵⁸

Where these particular goals have been tried at all, they have actually tied the unions to the "national bourgeoisie," ensuring neocolonialism. For instance, in Yugoslavia, whenever the "national bourgeoisie" gained control over the former state apparatus, it straight-jacketed trade unions under its "guidance." Only in the Far East, where the class struggle, expressed in the dictatorship of the proletariat, first broke the former state of the "national bourgeoisie" did attempts to implement the above principles become possible without using the population as milch cow.

The concept of peaceful co-existence, combined with complete failure to understand Lenin's analysis of the state's role (both directly related to understanding and carrying forward the class struggle), resulted in a revisionist influence which hamstrung trade unions in colonial areas, delivering the workers and peasants of "newly emerging" countries to foreign imperialism by subordinating them to "their own bourgeoisies."

Modern revisionist alternatives offered to colonial peoples.

First,

"The extreme weakness of the national bourgeoisie in Africa is one of the factors which make it possible for Africa to take a *non-capitalist path of development*. And...compells the new African states to take the initiative in building industry and stimulating economic growth."¹⁵⁹

Or,

"...about *the non-capitalist way for the backward countries*. This is...a Leninist theory...Today, the question of the non-capitalist way arises for many↵

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economically backward countries. *Capitalism or socialism?* This is how the matter stands at present."¹⁶⁰

Just what was meant by this "non-capitalist way" which applied to "backward countries" in solving the dilemma "Capitalism or socialism?" Interpretations come, among others, from Canada, which approvingly presented "the analysis of Soviet experts on the spot" – meaning "from Africa itself:

"THE TRAGIC EXPLANATION of what is taking place in many African lands today...was expressed vividly by David Dacko, President of Central African Republic, speaking of himself and other leaders:

'Don't we live in gorgeous villas, drive sleek limousines, eat regularly? Aren't we, the elite, responsible for the peoples' unrest, the people who are dying because we fail to solve the problems that doom them to poverty?'

That was in 1962. Dacko prophesied darkly:

'IT IS PRECISELY AGAINST US THAT THE MASSES WILL RISE.'

"This has happened."¹⁶¹

To which "mass risings" were these Canadians referring? They explained:

"...don't make the mistake of thinking that the new 'army governments' were set up by the USA, or other Western powers, as puppet rulers. The West has a hand in these affairs. But the African armies take over because they are THE STRONGEST FORCES; in countries which haven't mobilized the people for governing.

"The soldiers come from the people. The officers often are under Western influence. Together, they gain popular support in overthrowing 'the elite,' by promising to end scandalous waste."¹⁶²

So, the West, via its influence on officers, combined with the masses in a popular uprising – and if you didn't believe it, there it was in print, from Canada out of Moscow. History has replied fairly conclusively that no elite has thus been "overthrown" at all! This army of "soldiers from the people" has been even better than—

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the elite "overthrown" by them at picking popular flesh, as Indonesians recognized:

"In view of their class origin as sons of workers and peasants, the rank-and-file of the armed forces (in colonial areas) might indeed constitute elements who would take the side of the people. But this could not in any possible way alter the position of the armed forces as a whole as an organ of the (bourgeois – HE) state."¹⁶³

That state, the Indonesians also made unequivocally clear, was the "instrument of violence of the oppressing classes." And the revisionist position was only an echo of the 19th century bourgeois English economist, J A Hobson, who warned the British of potential danger to their Empire because all their colonial conquests had been made by "native" troops.¹⁶⁴

"Native" soldiers would, as the Indonesians later noted, "take the side of the people" provided that Marxist ideology in clear form had been transmitted to them so that they could disrupt the old army, destroy it and become part of a new – people's – army under Marxist guidance. Experience in the Russian Revolution had proven this point, as it also suggested that such a transformation must depend to some extent upon the existence of a revolutionary situation in the area concerned (otherwise, the likelihood of spontaneous military support has not shown itself at all dependable).

But such "details" did not concern the revisionists:

"No doubt whatever, the African masses ARE TURNING TOWARD SOCIALISM, and no force on Earth can prevent them from discovering how they can win it.

"Wherever in Africa Capitalism develops, it will TEACH THE AFRICAN PEOPLE how urgently they need the only system that can advance them: Socialism.

"Military coups help Capitalism NOT AT ALL, and in some lands are, in fact, strongly PRO-SOCIALISM."¹⁶⁵

Alas! Capitalist-engineered coups all over the world, especially its "under-developed" section, *have* helped that system keep going. We could challenge the author of the above pipe-dream to describe "Capitalism" *in Africa*. We could dare him to—

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demonstrate *where* the "African masses" were in fact at this time "turning toward socialism."

It is a Left truism that eventually "no force on Earth can prevent (the masses) from discovering how they can win it." But one force on Earth was certainly giving such prevention a serious try: modern revisionism.

Dismissal of military coups as of no assistance to capitalism; designating "some of them" as "pro-socialism" exhibited a lamentable inability to distinguish between words and deeds. In effect, such dismissal absolved imperialism from gross and often-boasted interference in colonial peoples' affairs. To admit interference, of course, would have entailed exposing imperialist realities, in place of the occasional denunciation in the UN, stage setting for such play-acting.

What such an attitude unfortunately suggested was that revisionism could *profitably* view "some" military coups as "pro-socialism."

A good place to examine the tripe dished up by "Communists" of the "Third World" was *Afro-America*, Uncle Sam's internal colony. Here, two pronouncements by the same Afro-American Communist spokesmen were published: in 1963 and again in 1966.

In 1963, this man said:

"In a recent statement, Gus Hall, chief spokesman of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., said: 'The most dramatic and far-reaching of current developments in the United States is the heroic struggle of our Negro citizens for equality and justice now taking place in the South.'¹⁶⁶

Further on in the same statement, he remarked:

"Then there is the growing awareness that there exists in the world a great country – the Soviet Union – whose success in securing to its many diverse ethnic and national peoples conditions of full equality...is a progressive...alternative to the prevailing racist patterns in the U.S.A."¹⁶⁷

At a time when Korean, Vietnamese, Chinese and Cuban revolutionaries were already demonstrating varied solutions to precisely—

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the same problem, a spokesman of a colony in the name of Communists talked of "a" great country of socialism!

Parliamentary prospects of "peaceful evolution" were held up before the American readership in both articles:

[1963]: "Gus Hall said recently that the relationship of forces within the nation and...the South, as well as within the Federal Government itself, are such that with determined, sustained struggle and further involvement of the trade unions and the masses...'a death blow can be dealt to the whole system of segregation everywhere'.

"With the right to a political life secured to the masses of the South, the popular base of the electorate will be strengthened by an influx of 3 to 5 million Negro working men and women. These new voters...may well contribute to a basic transformation in the relation of forces within the Democratic Party, and they constitute the requisite force for the ouster of the Dixiecrats from Congress and for breaking the stranglehold of reaction over the South."¹⁶⁸

[1986]: "Throughout the country, South and North, Negro-Americans...the MINORITY must have the right to ITS JUST SHARE OF THE POWER, to proportional representation at all

levels of the three branches of government...as well as an equal share of the police authority...

"The struggle of the Negro for full access to the political arena in the Southern states and the Northern ghettos is a struggle...to place in public office genuine representatives of the people chosen by and from the Negro people, the labor movement and the progressive forces generally."¹⁶⁹

It does seem a shame that the long-suffering Negro people of the USA should have been urged to carry on a "heroic struggle" only to wind up with a "basic transformation in the Democratic Party;" or that a self-styled "Communist" should have wanted them to imagine that such an unlikely event could or would "break the stranglehold of reaction over the South." By 1966, he had abandoned the "basic transformation in the Democratic Party," and, in the name of the Communist Party, was glorifying as "decisive" a "struggle" to "place in public office" representatives of a people whose very sufferings made the monopoly-controlled

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USA (including its governmental apparatus) super-exploiter par excellence of the whole world today!

As to socialism, supposedly dear to Communist hearts, the closest the 1963 piece came to such a reference was this:

"The nation's problems cannot be solved without solving the Negro question and the Negro question cannot be solved without profoundly affecting the nation's social system."¹⁷⁰

By 1966, two references read as follows:

"The freedom struggle of the Negro people...as a vital front of the anti-monopoly struggle...is geared into the tasks related to the fulfillment of the historic goal of the working class, that is, to effect the transformation of society from capitalist to socialist...

"Now, as at no other time in its history, the Communist party of the U.S.A. has the opportunity and duty to disclose the socialist alternative to the young generation, to bring to the Negro militants the science of Marxism-Leninism to help illumine the way to lasting victory for the masses in the struggle for freedom, equality and justice."¹⁷¹

Here, the arrogant implication was that the CPUSA was the sole possessor of the "socialist alternative" which it had been solicitously keeping under wraps until such time as it paternalistically deemed the moment propitious for unveiling – and then, only to "Negro militants" who presumably would have collected its accolade for the "title."

The fact was that 70-75% of Afro-Americans were workers, while none belonged – or has, to the present, made his way into – the big monopoly upper crust of American society.

As a result of their struggles for "legality" and "freedom, equality and justice," Communist influence declined significantly among Afro-Americans. New leaders began emerging; they did not pretend to want socialism.

Early in August 1967, when 162 delegates from 27 Latin American and Caribbean nations met in Cuba to discuss continental revolutionary strategy, Stokely Carmichael, former

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chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee of Afro-America (himself, a West Indian), stated his view of goals for American black people:

"...we must develop revolutionary urban guerrilla warfare to win black freedom...We have...to use aggressive violence in order to own the land, houses and stores inside our communities and control the politics of those communities...

"...black power is...joining hands with the oppressed people outside the U.S., fighting to smash the imperialist structure of the U.S. which oppresses us on the inside and you on the outside...The capitalist system produces racism. They go hand in hand. We are fighting both racism and exploitation."¹⁷²

As to who had "disclosed" to his generation the "socialist alternative," this young man was also specific:

"Carmichael said he and other black activists owed a debt to Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung. He described Che as a 'superb tactician' whose recent call for 'many Vietnams' was of the utmost importance to the U.S. movement...Mao, he said, 'inspired us and gave us a broader political understanding and awareness that has helped us form our political ideology and hook up with the third world.'"¹⁷³

If we really want to clarify the "alternatives open to colonial peoples," a few questions seem pertinent: Into which available territories could the "newly emerging state" (or industry, or "bourgeoisie") export its surplus capital – assuming for the moment it could raise any sizeable enough to match that which alone built capitalism and made its rulers into an owning class capable of erecting individually-owned industry? Or, as suggested by the revisionists themselves, could such funds have accrued to the "new states" if the latter had been "above classes?" Or even if they were "substituting for the capitalist class" there?¹⁷⁴

Again: if it were indeed "ridiculous" to imagine the new states cutting off entirely their connections with outside imperialism¹⁷⁵, whence were they to accumulate the capital needed to industrialize? The Revisionist answer was in "socialist aid" (to be examined shortly).

The conclusion seems obvious: colonial areas did not have the choice of the two alternatives suggested by the revisionists (capitalist or socialist – or even "non-capitalist"). *They could remain colonies in varied new forms, or they could seek a way to build or work toward socialism.*

Section G: The Subjugated World and Foreign Aid: Imperialist*

Modern revisionism could not make practical, workable suggestions for liberating colonial areas because they had debauched Marxist principles to such an extent that they could no longer accurately analyze class forces in such areas.

Nonetheless, revisionism freely dispensed advice to colonial revolutionaries, backing such advice with the enormous prestige of Lenin and the revolution he had successfully led. The result had been failure after failure of liberation at a cost of uncounted and historically unnecessary colonial casualties.

None of their policies was excepted.

From the 1960s, when the sweep of political independence in the super-exploited "Third" world gained momentum, foreign aid became a pivot of relationships between that world and industrialized countries.

To understand the position of foreign aid in the interchanges between the Revisionist countries in the latter category and their followers aspiring to, or even for short times holding, power in underdeveloped countries, it is necessary to remember that the revisionists, like imperialism's wise men, based their activities in colonial areas on the central notion that countries in those areas were "at a stage of development" similar to, but merely later chronologically than, that at which the "developed" world had been in the 19th century, imperialism's "take-off" moment.

Holding such a position, a revisionist in 1965, discussing how capitalism had built up its industry, could declare:

* See Chapter IV, Pp 62 ff, above for a dissection of imperialist aid to Yugoslavia.

"...with regard to foreign aid...Capital did not flow from one country to another in this form in the 19th century. There was no international credit organization for financing programs

of economic development...in the situation that prevailed at that time...Profit was the only factor determining the scope and form of the flow of capital."¹⁷⁶

The key question that ex-colonial countries wanted asked and answered was precisely how such countries were to reach "economic take-off." The imperialists, with no interest in any solution unfavorable to the continued functioning of their parasitic system, had plenty to say about this, mostly designed to make them "aid givers."

Imperialist opinion on what was required for getting ex-colonies off the ground economically have been summarized as estimating that

"to get...on the way out of their underdevelopment the countries of the Third World would require investment at an annual rate of \$75 billion...(others) suggest...an initial rate of \$50 or \$60 billion per year rising progressively to \$250 or even \$300 billion...many experts...believe that a rate of investment of from 3 percent to 6 percent of national income is essential for a growth rate of 1 percent. However this may be, the targets set by the Geneva Trade Conference and the United Nations General Assembly stand at only one sixth or one seventh of the amounts which the most cautious writers consider necessary to enable the economies of the Third World to 'take-off'."¹⁷⁷

The same capitalist pundits put the question even more bluntly:

"The needs of the underdeveloped world are so great that all forms of bilateral or multilateral aid will always be inadequate."¹⁷⁸

Although the revisionists claimed to hold the key for solving this enormous problem, their "answers" differed little from those of the imperialists; *both agreed that outside aid was indispensable*:

"Although economic expansion should be based primarily on internal resources, these will not be enough for the"

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underdeveloped countries, especially the smaller ones, to undertake rapid economic expansion on a large scale...Assistance will have to be sought elsewhere."¹⁷⁹

Their main disagreement lay over which section of the world should provide it:

"The external condition for the non-capitalist way is outside aid...

"And so the question arises: Where is the aid to come from – the socialist system or the capitalist system?"¹⁸⁰

Here, indeed, was the nitty-gritty.

One revisionist quoted suggestions (the truth, as it turned out) that most outside help for ex-colonies would have to come from Western sources:

"The economically underdeveloped countries, bourgeois economists affirm, are doomed to permanent backwardness because...possibilities for internal accumulation...are limited to what can be obtained by making people already poor do with even less. Most of the necessary capital will have to come from foreign *private* investments, loans and gifts."¹⁸¹

A Soviet follower from Italy raised questions which accepting outside aid would surely entrain for ex-colonies:

"Does the acceptance of capital investments and aid from the West in all cases signify a return to colonial...domination? Does the non-capitalist path necessarily imply rejection of capitalist investments, including private investments? The answer cannot be...abstract."¹⁸²

Now began the tussle over where outside aid for ex-colonies should originate:

"Experience has shown that...imperialist...aid, credits and loans are...a means of intervening in the internal affairs of the liberated countries...so as to keep these countries subordinate to foreign monopolies."¹⁸³

R Palme Dutt, India-born pundit of the British Communist Party, had made an overall evaluation of imperialist aid which filled out—

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this general characterization in considerable detail. According to him,

"new forms of capital investment, both private and public, and in some cases governmental grants or special credits, together with special 'economic cooperation' or 'technical cooperation' treaties (are) all loosely added together in imperialist propaganda and described as 'aid' to the underdeveloped countries.

" – military subsidies – the majority of U.S. 'aid';

" – subsidies to prop up counter-revolutionary governments like those of Chiang (Kai-shek – HE);

" – strategic 'infrastructure' construction, strategic roads, air bases, etc., also classified as 'economic aid';

" – disposal of unsaleable consumption goods surpluses on special credit terms, also called 'economic aid';

" – facilitation of private commercial penetration by undertaking at public expense initial unprofitable utility requirements, roads, transport, etc.;

" – private capital investment for profit;

" – genuine economic aid for the independent economic development of the ex-colonial country, especially industrialization."¹⁸⁴

Of these, he averred, only the last could be considered actual aid to recipients. But, compared to the total value of the other types, this was "only an infinitesimal part" of what imperialism dispensed.¹⁸⁵

A more recent source quoted eminent authority to the same effect:

"Over 80% of the (US – HE) foreign aid programme is spent on US products. (In other words the aid doesn't leave the US at all but is paid directly to exporters, a marvelous subsidy for the US corporations – paid for by American taxpayers!)"¹⁸⁶

Furthermore,

"Only one-half of one per cent of all foreign aid funds has been spent on technical assistance in the field of training, health, education and welfare. As US aid has been distributed to about 90 countries the small proportion—

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of aid funds used for these purposes clearly doesn't amount to more than a token gesture. Between July 1945 and June 1967 the largest share of foreign aid (39%) went to the richer, capitalist countries; only 30% went to the developing countries."¹⁸⁷

Other pitfalls of Western aid were described by Soviet followers. For instance, a couple of East Germans described how the Bonn government prevented real industrialization in newly-emerging countries of Asia and Africa.¹⁸⁸

A Frenchman, examining relations between imperialist countries and the "Third World," had divided foreign aid into "bilateral" (meaning aid between one imperialist country and one ex-colony) and "multilateral" (that between ex-colonies and "international" agencies like the UN). He described the relationship between the two types:

"Bilateral public aid is more than ten times greater than the multilateral public aid dispensed through international agencies. Almost all official donations fall into this class as do almost three quarters of public loans."¹⁸⁹

A United States trade magazine published a chart drawn up by a huge New York bank, with comments from an expert connected with a World Aid bank.¹⁹⁰ Discussing "International Credit Institutions," it listed three "wholly-US-owned" agencies: the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank); the Agency for International Development (AID), having a Dollar Loans Section and a Foreign Currency Loans section; and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).¹⁹¹ These fell into the Frenchman's "bilateral" category.

The accompanying chart showed, as had the anti-imperialist sources already quoted, that these three agencies all required loans to be spent within the United States (except that AID Foreign Currency Loans had to be spent "within the country in which the funds originated.")¹⁹² The Eximbank required all transport to be in US ships "unless waived by the (US) Maritime Administration."¹⁹³ AID required at least 50% shipment in American bottoms, paying freight only on cargo so shipped.¹⁹³ Only AID Dollar Loans were shown as carrying interest rates less than 6%,¹⁹⁴

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and they applied only when lending was to a country (i.e., to a government).¹⁹⁴

The *purposes* of this U.S. aid were made quite clear:

Eximbank: "To promote U.S. exports through dollar loans and assistance to exporters."¹⁹⁵

AID: The Dollar Loans Section aimed "To promote economic development of less-developed friendly countries."¹⁹⁶ Its Foreign Currency Loans Section was intended to promote "Business development and trade expansion" for "U.S. firms and their affiliates, branches, subsidiaries. For overseas market expansion for U.S. agricultural products. Firms of the host country are also eligible."¹⁹⁷

Commodity Credit Corporation: was set up to "promote exports of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities" by lending to "Export firms in the United States."¹⁹⁸

The French writer, quite naturally studying French "foreign aid" and its relationship to the "Third World," came to mostly the same conclusions, for while

"The United States is by far the biggest giver and lender (to the 'Third World' – HE)...in relative terms – that is, aid as a proportion of revenue or national product – France leads the list..."¹⁹⁹

"an estimate of 3.85 billion (francs)...or 1.14 percent of the gross national product."²⁰⁰

The French writer made some points about this type of French foreign aid which showed it to be the same nature (and value) as that of the U.S.:

1. "...much of French aid to the North African countries is to be used for the compensation of French nationals whose property has been nationalized or taken over."²⁰¹
2. "...bilateral public aid is...an expression of class exploitation, since the tax-payers bear the cost while it serves the interests of...the monopolies. In the receiving country it strengthens the...power of the ruling class or group at the expense of any real improvement in the lot of the disinherited masses."²⁰²
3. "...the data presented indicates that bilateral public aid is declining in relative value...In fact, total U.S.↵

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economic assistance loans, which had been running \$1,300 million from 1962 to 1964, declined to \$1,100 million in 1965, a reduction of \$200 million."²⁰³

What, then, of "multilateral" or "international" aid? Of all imperialist aid the multilateral could possibly be thought to qualify as "disinterested." But, as the French writer pin-pointed it,

"International cooperation is often a pseudonym for twofold exploitation: of public funds for the benefit of private business; and of impoverished peoples for the benefit of local oligarchies..."²⁰⁴

"...international aid is relatively small: constituting about 1 percent of gifts and 20 percent of public loans from imperialist countries as a whole."²⁰⁵

The U.S. source put the same thought in its usual, more delicate, manner:

"International credit institutions have been created and organized with two fundamental goals in mind: first, to supplement private capital in the expansion of economic development and social improvement of less developed countries; and second, to stimulate world trade."²⁰⁶

The American article listed five "international" agencies, of which the French source declared three to be the main well-springs of most "international" aid:²⁰⁷

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, called "The World Bank;" the International Development Association (IDA); and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The French writer offered the "net cumulative commitments up to June 30, 1966" of the three as: World Bank, \$6,299 million; IDA, \$1,247 million; IFC, \$84 million."²⁰⁸

About the "parent," World Bank, the U.S. source recorded that it had 105 member countries which

"have subscribed to its capital stock according to their individual economic capabilities."²⁰⁹

As to the IFC "subsidiary," the U.S. chart described it as financing

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"only private enterprises contributing to economic development of less developed member countries."²¹⁰

Recording IFC's founding in 1956 under the cloak of the World Bank, the French source added:

"Its operations have been meager since its accumulated net commitments amount to \$84 million, of which a little more than two thirds is in loans and the rest in direct investment...in the IFC...four countries (United States, Britain, France, and West Germany) constitute a majority. It is not hard to imagine the political preferences that influence the allocation of loans and the placing of investments."²¹¹

"Developing" countries could borrow from the World Bank or from IDA, but the method of subscription ensured that domination went to that country with the largest "individual economic capability."²¹² The French writer specified:

"The statutes of the World Bank require a majority decision on all matters handled by the Bank. More than 50 percent of the votes are controlled by six countries, namely, the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and China (which...means Formosa). The position is little different for the IDA.

"There is nothing 'world-wide' about the bank but the name...the socialist countries...do not belong to it, nor do its operations extend to any socialist country but Yugoslavia, which might be considered a border-line case. So the World Bank is really the bank of that part of the world which calls itself 'free'...

"Over the last five...years its long-term interest rate varied from 5 to 6.25 percent. On June 30, 1966, the profits for the financial year then ending amounted to \$143 million (on a capital of \$2,243 million, which means the rate of return was 6.4 percent) and its reserves had reached the total of \$954 billion (42 percent of the capital advanced). The capital advanced was itself only one tenth of the subscribed capital so that, all in all, one might say that the Bank is a healthy and prosperous business undertaking."²¹³

The World Bank's first subsidiary, the IDA, was said by the American source

"To finance projects helping to build the foundation of economic growth in less developed countries."²¹⁴

The French author, noting that IDA had been established in September 1960, said it resembled the World Bank, but

"operates in a slightly different and more generous fashion. It gives long-term credits (50 years with amortization beginning only after the first ten) which are free of interest. The IDA receives a yearly commission of only 0.75 percent cent on the accumulated total amounts lent and not repaid. Consequently its net accumulated income, on June 30, 1966, after less than six years of operation, amounted to only \$9.81 million for a total capital advanced on subscription of \$993 million."²¹⁵

Evaluating the World Bank and IDA credits "combined and accumulated to June 30, 1966," he showed that their benefits were hardly confined to places like Africa, because in fact, "Europe received more than Africa" from both sources.²¹⁶

Analyzing international loans and credits by "the purpose for which they were applied," he found that

"there is no trace of loans or subsidies to balance current budgets, and few headings covering small amounts that could be diverted to meet wasteful luxury spending, and no visible sign of strings attached to aid...As a whole...it does appear to be more disinterested and more usefully applied than is bilateral aid...

"...however...International aid...is designed to support the broad policy and interests of the imperialist camp in a...general way...(it) is distributed by agencies...of imperialism cloaked in the garb of the United Nations; it is distributed solely within the bounds of the imperialist camp with the basic purpose of defending its frontiers."²¹⁷

He summed up his analysis of all "public financial aid given by capitalist countries to those of the Third World" with facts taken mainly from UN sources:

"In recent years this aid, including multilateral and bilateral aid, donations and loans, has amounted to about \$5 or \$6 billion per annum...even the most optimistic hypothesis does not offer any hope that such aid will be-

adequate to make a decisive contribution to the 'take-off' of...the Third World countries.

"Bilateral public aid, by far the most important...is given, received, and applied...(so) as to strengthen business circles in the country giving it, and the local oligarchies in the country receiving it. International public aid is dispensed by international agencies dominated by the imperialist countries. It is technically better applied than bilateral aid but is, nevertheless subordinate to one fundamental cause: anti-communism."²¹⁸

For foreign aid to ex-colonial countries, the trend in mid-1966 was that

"The activities of the World Bank and its subsidiaries are on the increase, in number and in volume, while the reverse trend appears to be affecting bilateral public aid."²¹⁹

Meanwhile, back in Africa, and only a year earlier than the French analysis, a Polish revisionist described the short-comings of Western aid, but at the same time, it was his opinion that

"Foreign aid...also has some positive features...not so pronounced as to determine the possibilities for development. But...a positive impetus in the material, moral and social sense."²²⁰

And what was his version of "positive features"?

1. "The tendency toward equal exchange which is becoming stronger."²²¹
2. "Establishment of economic relations with the socialist countries."²²²
3. "Technical and scientific assistance by the socialist and capitalist countries channeled through the United Nations."²²³
4. "Credit aid by the International Development Bank."²²⁴ It throws light on revisionist attitudes toward foreign aid to examine each of these points briefly:

1. Did the tendency toward equal exchange grow stronger?

Since the author himself neglected to define the term, it is assumed that he was referring to the price "scissors" between metropolitan and hinterland countries in the course of trade relations, and to the nature of such trade itself.

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When these are examined, as they have been by competent investigators, the statement is found to have been out of touch with reality:

"In 1964 the exports of the imperialist countries to the non-socialist world reached a total of more than three times that of 1948 (\$111.5 billion against almost \$35 billion). Over the

same period the exports of the Third World rose to less than twice the 1948 total (\$32.5 billion against almost \$17 billion)...

"...the exports of the Third World grew less in volume than those of the industrialized capitalist countries in the period from 1950-1952 to 1960-1962 (plus 50 percent against plus 80 percent)...

"The difference between the growth rates of exports by volume and by value can only be due to price changes which have been to the advantage of the exports of industrialized countries as against those of the underdeveloped countries...

"In 1962 the imperialist countries paid 108 monetary units for a ton of imports against 100 in 1950; they received 119 monetary units in 1962 against 100 in 1950 for every ton of exports: they were the gainers.

"On the other hand, the countries of the Third World which paid 108 monetary units for a ton of imports in 1962 against 100 in 1950, received only 96 monetary units in 1962 against 100 in 1950 for every ton of exports: they were the losers...

"(So)...the unit value of imports moved in the same direction for the industrialized and for the underdeveloped countries, but...the unit value of exports rose by 19 percent for the former and fell by 4 percent for the latter. During the period under consideration the prices of manufactured goods, the principal exports of the imperialist countries, rose considerably while there was a decline in those of the primary products which provide nine tenths of the exports of the Third World."²²⁵

Not only does the value of exports from the "Third World" to imperialist countries still continue downward; this downward trend was, as it had been for so long, a significant contributory factor in the continued subjugation to the minority imperialist metropolis of the majority living in earth's hinterlands.

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Totals of world exports, this author reported,

"of the advanced capitalist countries are over \$116 billion, 68 percent or about two thirds of the total of more than \$170 billion. The socialist countries provide over \$20 billion or 12 percent of the world's exports and the Third World almost \$35 billion or 20 percent.

"Turning to the question of which groups of countries receive the exports...: the imperialist countries deal mainly with each other (73.5 percent of their total trade), the socialist countries likewise (65 percent of all their exports), but the countries of the Third World, on the other hand, deal with each other only...20 percent of their exports while 74 percent of their trade is directed to the imperialist countries.

"In other words the first two groups depend on themselves for most of their trade but the third group depends on the imperialist countries for almost three quarters of its external trade."²²⁶

Trends between 1948 and 1964 in the trade between the imperialists and the world's subjugated areas disclosed that

"(a) in 1964, trade between the Third World as a whole and the imperialist group exceeded \$25 billion in each direction; but in 1964, the Third World showed a deficit of almost half a billion dollars, without taking import costs into account, whereas in 1948 the Third World had a small favorable balance."²²⁷

That is, in the years cited, the Third World "advanced" from a favorable to an unfavorable trade balance. Furthermore, the absolute dependence of the Third World on imperialist trade increased during the same period:

"(b) This trade amounts to 23 percent of the trade of the imperialist countries inside the capitalist sphere but 79 percent of the exports of the Third World within that same sphere. In 1948 the corresponding figures were 32 percent and 70 percent."²²⁸

That is, in a mere 17 years, the imperialist countries dropped almost one tenth off the relative amount of their own exports which they sold to the Third World, while the latter increased→

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its share of sales to imperialist lands by the same amount. The author made the point that these

"changes...are...typical of the imperialist countries in general, on the one hand, and the Third World as a whole, on the other."²²⁹

In a word, at a time when a revisionist was telling Africans about "a positive impetus in the material, moral and social sense"²³⁰ out of foreign aid, facts showed the exact opposite.

2. The above facts prove that "establishment of economic relations with the socialist countries," which began taking place after 1957, did not in any way arrest the downward trend in the Third World economies. One reason for this was offered by the author of the above quotations:

"The trade of the...Third World...with the socialist world is...6 percent of the Third World total..."²³¹

3. Has "technical and scientific assistance by the socialist and capitalist countries channeled through the United Nations" constituted as claimed "positive impetus" to the Third World's development?

This question will receive a detailed reply when, below, we examine Russian technical and scientific assistance to Cuba.

4. We have already dealt conclusively with the value of "credit aid" through what the Polish revisionist called "the International Development Bank."

It would appear deplorable that a self-styled socialist, present in Africa to teach Africans "socialism", should have been so careless with facts.

Yet, as we have seen, most Africans, including (and perhaps especially) followers of European Revisionism on that continent, did know – in their own flesh and bones – the real nature of imperialist foreign aid.

For that reason, many such Africans became fervent advocates of socialist aid.

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Section H: Modern Revisionism and Foreign Aid: Socialist

Out of bitter experience with Western foreign aid, both Europeans and Africans who saw themselves as spokesmen of socialism warned newly-freed "Third World" countries against embroiling themselves – at least exclusively – in foreign aid from imperialist sources:

"...accepted in some...new African states is that African economy cannot be developed without Western capital and...advice. Accordingly, some African states conclude that they must...offer inducements...to attract Western investment...often given priority over loans...For many small African states it is very easy for the Western monopolies...to dominate the economy.

"For this reason, it seems to me, the new African states have to be particularly vigilant as regards the character and scope of their economic relations with the imperialist countries."²³²

The same man assured these "new" countries that

"...African states...lose valuable sources of accumulation through the unequal exchange...that takes place between them and the Western powers. The more these states...extend their relations with the socialist world, the better will they be able to challenge the unequal trading relationships between themselves and the imperialist countries."²³³

Here was one voice in a swelling chorus which, during the 1960s, looked to socialist foreign aid to perform overnight miracles on lop-sided economies inside historically-non-viable states, with emphasis on Africa.

Spokesmen from Western Europe's Left, from Eastern Europe and from the underdeveloped world explained both generally and precisely what they expected from such aid for their countries:

For example, a socialist-oriented Iranian had declared unequivocally that

1. "Aid from the socialist world...alone...is based, on complete equality and non-interference in internal affairs."²³⁴

The English Communist quoted above suggested what was—

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to become a commonly-expected advantage from socialist aid, namely, that it

2. "can be of great assistance...indirectly in compelling Western powers to make loans for genuine African development which they would otherwise be less ready to make."²³⁵

A South African declared such to be already the case:

"Indeed...the socialist camp has compelled the imperialists to modify their attitudes to aid, to conceal their aims and to offer assistance on less onerous terms than previously."²³⁶

Even five years later, revisionist followers in Latin America were still insisting on this point:

"The imperialist powers...have had to react to...increasing aid from socialist countries by restyling their own 'aid'...for example...socialist...low...interest for loans...has (forced)...the imperialist countries to compete in this respect.

"Thus, the United States and other imperialist governments have recently lent money to certain countries bearing low rates of interest and with long-term repayment."²³⁷

This source had made a comprehensive analysis of socialist aid to the "Third World," and had given it unqualified praise. Contrasting it with that from imperialist sources, the Latin Americans had stated:

3. "Socialist aid is directed to developing those sectors of the economy and primarily those branches of industry most needed by and most advantageous to the country concerned...and thus to reshaping the economic structure of the (ex-colony's – HE) economy, making the countries more economically independent."²³⁸

The Rumanian quoted above had, earlier, made what was soon to be interpreted as the same claim in slightly different form:

"Socialist aid helps to develop and strengthen the state sector in the underdeveloped countries."²³⁹

But the South African freedom fighter had believed more specifically that

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4. "the aid from the socialist countries...provide(s) the basis for a planned leap forward in industrialization...and in a more rapid accumulation of domestic capital for independent national development."²⁴⁰

As to brass tacks, the Latin American analysis of a few years later said that

5. "Socialist assistance is given in various forms, such as long-term credits at low rates of interest, the building of basic industrial enterprises and training of specialists from the countries concerned...(It) take(s) into account the utilization as much as possible of local resources – natural and manpower. This saves foreign currency and develops internal production."²⁴¹

On a world level,

6. "The socialist states...By buying (the developing countries') raw materials...saved their prices from falling even lower than they actually did, and thus prevented them from falling prey to...rapacious...imperialist purchases of raw materials. Between 1955 and 1962 the socialist states increased their purchases of natural rubber by 420,000 tons while the USA and Western Europe reduced...by 340,000 tons. Developing trade with the socialist countries is thus another way in which the less developed countries can benefit."²⁴²

In general, this same source alleged that socialist foreign aid

7. "...breaks the monopoly which the imperialists had in the past over the means and instruments of production, scientific and technological knowledge and personnel, and production experience. This enables the new state to break away from the imperialist stranglehold...(because it) strengthens (ex-colonies') position in their relations with the imperialist states."²⁴³

One spokesman from the "Third World" got so carried away with these heady visions that he declared:

"...our country should utilize...economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries...which fully conforms to our needs and interests. To"

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achieve economic independence the 'neo-colonial' aid of the American type should be rejected and mutually advantageous contacts with the socialist world, established."²⁴⁴

Amidst this extravagant chorus, a few more cautious revisionists admonished the new states against looking to any aid for too much:

"The liberated peoples should understand that their economic development will not come as a gift...The people will have to set about developing the liberated countries themselves. For, even the disinterested aid of the socialist countries, a highly important factor in the young states' evolution, can only be utilized fully if the masses rally to reach the great goals of economic reconstruction."²⁴⁵

Another Eastern European, who otherwise unqualifiedly praised socialist aid, suggested that the size and effectiveness of socialist aid might be a function of the state of development of the socialist economy.²⁴⁶

The truth of this thought can be supported:

"The communist countries continued in 1970 to account for only a small share of the total trade of the less developed countries. Communist states took roughly 4,6 percent a total LDC (Less Developed Countries – HE) exports of \$59 billion in 1970 and accounted for about 4.9 percent of LDC imports of \$65 billion during the year."²⁴⁷

What this actually amounted to was that

"the Soviets have extended an average of somewhat more than \$400 million yearly since the initiation of their aid program in 1954...Cumulatively, the communist economic aid programs...total \$13.2 billion. Of this,...the Soviets by the end of 1971 accounted for 58%, with...\$7.6 billion. The East(ern) European countries...have provided one-quarter of the total with...\$3.4 billion."^{248*}

* Assuming Western aid to have commenced in 1946 and to have maintained a steady rate of "\$5 or \$6 billion per annum" (See Jalée, op. cit., Pp 83,4), Western aid would be a maximum of 8-10 times socialist aid, which began 10 years later.

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To put the subject into perspective,

"the Western (U.S. and West European) sphere of influence in Africa is for the present still greater than Russia's and China's combined."²⁴⁹

Of course, these figures rested upon a rather narrow selectivity. When Kwame Nkrumah had declared his country "Non-Aligned," he had intimated that the word meant a willingness by his government to accept aid "equally from all sources." But the Finance Minister of Nkrumah's last

government declared to the writer after the February 1966 military coup that, at maximum, aid to Ghana from socialist sources had never exceeded 20% in loans nor 14% in investment funds.²⁵⁰ This was the general experience; but for a few countries,

"the importance of trade with the communist countries was much greater (than that shown in Quotation 2 above – HE). Combined the communist states took nearly 60 percent of Egypt's exports and over 20 percent of those of Sudan, Cambodia, Ceylon, India and Syria. On the import side, Egypt obtained more than 30 percent of its purchases from communist states, and Mali, Iraq, and Syria each took over 20 percent."²⁵¹

What made it so difficult for committed "Third World" people to heed words of caution about socialist aid was that ex-colonies actually receiving such aid were depicted at discussions about its effects by anti-colonial spokesmen under revisionist influence as "practically over the hump to economic viability." Glowing testimonials came, for example, from two Indonesians as early as 1962:

"...aid rendered (to Indonesia) by the socialist countries in the form of credits...have helped to strengthen our economy and to ensure its progress."²⁵²

In one place where circumstances had forced a new government practically to follow advice about accepting no aid from imperialist sources, a similar eulogy by Communist spokesmen carried even more weight for their "Third World" confrères:

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"Cuba's economic progress since the revolution (i.e., by 1962 – HE) would have been impossible had the government been headed by the national bourgeoisie. The latter was tied to imperialism by a thousand threads and was subordinate to it...Only a government...not afraid of socialism...which relied on the socialist countries for support could have overcome the difficulties, withstood the pressure, frustrated the intrigues and continued to advance."²⁵³

Here, indeed, was a proving ground: a newly-freed country assertedly building socialism by relying on foreign aid overwhelmingly derived from socialist lands: A sober statistical evaluation of the outcome of this experience appears to be available only from imperialist sources; criticism and self-criticism by parts of the socialist world itself²⁵⁴ was too generalized to permit such an analysis.

But a U.S. journal recently examined the development of Soviet-Cuban relations, and incidentally demonstrated the illusions with which the Cuban government and Cuban communists had approached acceptance of Soviet aid.²⁵⁵

This examination, stripped of its tendentious editorializing about Soviet "intentions" and hearsay about Cuban reactions, offered many facts – taken in general from Russian sources – throwing light on the above allegations about socialist aid. It provided a factual context for judging the

effect of socialist aid to other, non-free or non-socialist-oriented ex-colonies. Here, the information it contained will be applied to all the above claims, one by one.

1. *That aid from socialist countries was based on complete equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of ex-colonial recipients.*

First, this claim (which will be additionally, indirectly, evaluated by studying other specific claims) did not take account of the fact that, over the 1960s, the Soviets' own attitude toward aid changed. This process was reported by a West German. As context, he noted that

"Western capital and credit aid for developing countries is denounced by the Soviet Bloc in general as a 'form of—

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neo-colonialism,' 'capitalist policy of penetration,' and a 'form of export of capital'."²⁵⁶

However, because revisionist practice began more and more to erode the boundaries between the "Soviet Bloc" and the "U.S. Bloc," the writer was able to show that the "Soviet Bloc" was hedging:

"Now they simply say: 'there are two kinds of countries...that can give aid to developing countries, the socialist and the imperialist.' For the first time, Western aid is not written in quotation marks here.

"They even admit that the UAR, Algeria, Guinea and Mali were able to use Western aid 'in their own national interests' and that 'the socialist countries simply are not yet in a position where they can satisfy all the needs of these countries'."²⁵⁷

The writer then continued to quote this "Soviet expert on the developing world," as he rationalized existing imperialist-weighted aid programs implemented by the leaders of such countries, who

"are forced to meet a major part of their needs with the help of the imperialist states. In their relationship to these states, they now have, thanks to the support of world socialism, the opportunity to emerge as independent equal partners. Furthermore, by permitting the imperialist monopolies to invest their capital in one or another branch of the economy, the economically backward countries can now set conditions themselves and thus use the aid received to hasten their development."²⁵⁸

The idea that the new, weak, floundering, still-imperialist-dominated economies could emerge as "independent equal partners" with the arrogant and brutal imperialists was fostered by other revisionists. For example, a British Communist:

"Capital...in Africa...is largely being pumped out to the West. One way of stopping this drain is by the various measures directed against the foreign monopolies in Africa."²⁵⁹

Such pipe-dreams were predicated on the belief – or reliance on the existence of such a belief – that, despite imperialism's

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continued hold on these "dismantled" economies in politically independent ex-colonies, the new states could – without a working class vanguard or mass agrarian backing – control anything with a few mere bits of legislation.

With the few crucial exceptions of China, Vietnam and (North) Korea, all newly-emerging states accepted, and still accept, most of their aid from the West. Many had or may still have laws "controlling" that investment in the "interests" of the "new" state. Such laws have been, and continue to be, circumvented by the "new" civil servants with an ease which would be admirable were it not so destructive. Such circumventions, often supplemented by coups d'etat, have made mincemeat of the idea of "legislative control."

As to "permitting" imperialists to invest in newly-emerging economies: such investment has always been deliberately withheld from *progressive* new governments. The others, to attract such investment, were not averse to selling their countries back to imperialism, piece by piece, after a modicum of "independence". An example was Ghana under the "National Liberation Council" and the Busia regime, where socialist technicians were sent home, socialist-sponsored projects were abandoned, and Ghanaians training in socialist lands were called home and left idle (see below).

The Westerner commented:

"With this revision of their position...Western credit aid...is supposed to serve a socio-revolutionary policy and to speed up non-capitalist development."²⁶⁰

And so it did: for "non-capitalist" economies have begun to "develop" – straight back to colonialism. With this revision, not only did the "Soviet Bloc" adapt to the desires of less-than-revolutionary leaderships in newly-emerging countries; its position also happened to dovetail most accomodatingly with *imperialist* desires.

What really happened was that socialist foreign aid, which was given amidst the deterioration from socialism of most of the countries dispensing it, simply began more and more to resemble

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imperialist aid, as described by revisionism's own spokesmen from all over the world:

a) Eastern European countries did not refrain from using their "aid" as a lever in the internal affairs of recipient countries. While not yet drawing such countries into outright military blocs as imperialism did,²⁶¹ there was obvious pressure to start integrating newly emerging countries into the Comecon, as shown for example by the formation in December 1970 of

"a Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. The (TASS – HE) report commented that 'the new commission will deal with...especially draft proposals for organizing co-operation between planning bodies, industries and departments'." ²⁶²

b) As "part" of their aid (e.g., in Cuba) the Soviet Union placed its own personnel at strategic economic levels in aid-receiving countries:

"It has been reported that Soviet advisors and technicians are working at all levels of the Cuban economic structure to help correct critical shortages and develop fundamental areas of the economy." ²⁶³

c) Socialist foreign aid from Eastern Europe buttressed the positions of internal reaction, helping to "keep these countries subordinated to foreign monopolies." 264

d) Nor has socialist foreign aid, at least not that from Eastern Europe, thus far built much else but small and medium industry with exceptions in India and perhaps a few elsewhere.²⁶⁵

e) While 80% of foreign aid (or more) went for U.S. products and only 0.5% of all Western foreign aid funds were spent on technical assistance,²⁶⁶ Moscow and her satellites increasingly dealt in foreign aid on a similar basis, as we shall see. "Circumstances" can be pointed to as responsible in Cuba's case. But the point is not that this happened; rather, that it had been boasted that it could not.

f) In interest rates, in contrast to the major portion of imperialist interest at 6% (a small exception being the IDA),²⁶⁷

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"Most Soviet aid commitments...generally in the past have carried 2.5 per cent interest and a repayment period of twelve years. During recent years, the USSR has also extended credits with 3 per cent interest amortized over a period of five to ten years. Sometimes these credits require a down payment of 15 to 20 per cent. Overall, the East European countries provide more of their aid on harder terms than does the Soviet Union, and it is more often of commercial-type credits." ²⁶⁸

But interest is part of surplus value. The appropriation of surplus value is exploitation. These are Marxist basics. So, the Soviet Union and countries it dominates have been *exploiting* the "Third World" – only "not so much as" imperialism! A case of a "little bit" of pregnancy?

2. *Socialist aid was of indirect as well as direct benefit, because it forced imperialism to make its terms "less onerous than previously" and thus more advantageous to the "Third World" recipients.*

This stance apparently resulted from two types of evidence: first, that, over the 1960s in a few individual instances, socialist countries had stepped in and built heavy industrial projects being dropped as political pressure by imperialism (Aswan dam, Egypt; steel mill, India)²⁶⁹ and second, the founding in late 1960 of the International Development Agency (IDA) which made a small proportion of "international" loans at very small interest rates and longer amortization periods.²⁷⁰

But the point is: none of the "Third World's" examples can be shown to have favorably affected general, overall economic, political or social conditions in ex-colonies. Furthermore, claims by revisionist followers about imperialism's "rethink" on aid-giving *were not documented* beyond the few isolated examples above – because *that is all there was*. Imperialist aid – regardless how dispensed – remained *in its overall effect* as siphon, drawing wealth from "hinterlands" into "metropolises."

What was unfortunate was that people calling themselves→

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spokesmen for socialism should have made such allegations – and been believed (as Indonesians were to testify at about the same time that some of these very claims were being reiterated from Latin America).²⁷¹

3. *Socialist aid was directed toward developing industry branches in newly freed economies "most needed by and most advantageous to the country concerned" and "most strategic," thus "reshaping the economic structure...making the countries more economically independent;" specifically, by "developing the state sector."*

At this point, the few exceptional examples of Soviet aid replacing imperialist aid for "heavy industrialization" were usually trotted out. First, in India, where the Soviet Union constructed a steel mill at Bhilai after the West had "at first refused to help."²⁷² As a result, later, it had to agree "to construct other steel plants."²⁷³

It is known how imperialism uses plants which it builds in ex-colonies. What of those constructed by the Soviet Union? A recent self-styled "independent socialist" source had this to say:

"Soviet foreign aid, especially important in India, at first expected...to help build a strong public sector and to combat the effects of private investment...has provided an infrastructure for the development of monopoly capitalism and has exacerbated the harmful effects of Western aid. Since 1965, the Soviet Union has sent very large quantities of weapons to India and...to Pakistan. More recently, the Soviet Union has begun to invest in privately owned Indian factories which use Soviet raw materials, to manufacture goods with cheap Indian labor, and to re-export them to the Soviet Union or to Third World countries...industrially less advanced than India.

"...Soviet aid seems in general to have been used to control certain Indian industries, to provide profits on the sale of capital goods to India, to use Indian labor cheaply, to make of India a base in order to capture its internal markets and those of other, less developed countries, and to enhance political control through combined economic and military loans."²⁷⁴

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Harsh words? Indeed! But harsher and more menacing still, the realities in which they were rooted! Witness a recent news note:

"The Soviet Union is quietly expanding its contacts with India's private consumer industries. In 1971, the two countries signed a pact that supplied Russian cotton to Indian textile mills to make towels and clothes for the U.S.S.R.; India reportedly made \$23 million on the deal. Now, the Indians are negotiating...for more such contracts, with Russia offering stainless steel for cutlery, raw wool for blankets and steel for making screws...the Russians...driving a stiff bargain...are demanding the right to choose the Indian manufacturers and are requiring...New Delhi...to guarantee production according to Soviet specifications and timetables."²⁷⁵

"INDIA made \$23 million"? Another illustration, together with the request to "choose the manufacturers," of how – specifically – the new elite is encouraged and supported by "socialist" aid!

Taking now the Cuban example: which branches of that economy were, in fact, "developed" by Soviet and Eastern European aid? If any at all, simply one: sugar cultivation. That such was not the "aim" is testified by the following list of exchanges between the two countries between 1964 and 1968:

"The Soviet Union claims to 'fully or almost fully' fill Cuba's needs for oil and petroleum products, mineral, fertilizer, sulphur, asbestos, cotton, saw-timber, trucks and special

automobiles, and metal cutting lathes. Cuban imports of petroleum and petroleum products from the USSR rose from 2 million tons in 1960 to 5.7 million tons in 1969. Machinery imports from the Soviet Union rose from 54.8 million rubles in 1961 to 213.9 million...in 1969. The following figures for USSR imports (*sic*) to Cuba in 1968 are indicative of the critical types of goods supplied: 287,500 tons of fertilizer, 3,203 trucks and 377 special automobiles, 4,619 tractors, 9,741 agricultural machines and 251 combines, 159 metal cutting lathes, 6,900 tons of cotton, 480,900 tons of grain, 294,900 tons of flour, 51.7 million cans of meat, 43.8 million cans of milk, and 100,600 tons of fats."²⁷⁶

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Cotton, grain, flour, meat, milk, fat and fertilizers have long been among imports required by other newly-freed "agricultural" (read "monocultural") "Third World" countries – who usually, however, get them from Western sources. Trucks, tractors, and "special automobiles" were also in evidence in Ghana, a portion (but by no means all) of them from places like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as well as the Soviet Union.

"...in 1970...The Soviets...increased their imports of raw materials, especially cotton...On the export side, machinery and equipment, more than half designated for complete plant deliveries in support of Soviet aid programs, continued to dominate the trade."²⁷⁷

In Ghana, before the military coup of 1966, anyone traveling from Accra or Kumasi to the North could see in fields beside the road rows and rows of green or yellow tractors (the green ones were said to be from Yugoslavia and "useable;" the yellow, from Czechoslovakia and "useless") sitting in the savage sunlight. Many of them ("the yellow ones") could not operate in the arid soil packed down in the Ghanaian North. Occasionally, too, such a traveler might find difficulty in passing on the narrow winding roads enormous lorries laboring toward Tamale from the South, supposedly money-savers because of their enormous pay-load capacity; but, in fact, gobbling pricey petrol at the rate of only 6 miles to a gallon.²⁷⁸

That is, in fact, partly due to lack of research before offering goods, and partly due to the level of development of their own economies, the Eastern Europeans very early set up a pattern of aid for "Third World" countries not too distinguishable in nature (disregarding intent) from that of imperialism, with the added fact that much of the socialist goods, if sometimes shoddy due to lack of know-how, objectively did not in a good many cases serve the purpose for which they had been sold.

As to "reshaping" the "new" economies:

"In spite of the rising Cuban trade deficit and increasing political difficulties...between 1964 and 1968...the island has grown increasingly dependent upon Soviet deliveries of petroleum and other critical commodities."²⁷⁹

While parading as Cuba's "benefactor," though in reality entrenching monoculture in the island's economy just like many "outside imperialists," the USSR gained for itself a number of advantages out of its aid to Castro:

a) Moscow's subsidization of Cuban sugar, resulting in the large Cuban debt mentioned below*, gave Moscow a say in the island's economic life, an advantage obviously *used* in proclaiming the "failure" of Castro's industrialization program and forcing him (though *this*, of course, was never publicly stated) back into ever-deepening monoculture, the essence of colonialism.²⁸⁰ After Castro's return in 1964 from his prolonged Moscow visit, it became clear that

"Henceforth Cuba was to...deliver large quantities of (sugar) to the Soviet bloc in order to *offset the economic burden which the Cuban economy had become for the Soviet Union and its East European associates.*"²⁸¹

b) The USSR became "an increasingly significant exporter of sugar" and "benefactor" to even more "Third World" countries:

"From a total of 242,900 tons exported in 1960, the Soviet Union has expanded its sugar exports to 1, 374,000 tons in 1968 and 1,080,800 tons in 1969...the greater part...in recent years...to non-Communist countries of the developing world – notably Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. Finland and Yugoslavia are also important...customers, while Soviet-bloc countries receive only some 15 to 20 percent...Comparing data on Soviet imports of Cuban sugar with the amounts of sugar exported by the USSR...one finds that the Cuban shipments to the USSR more than covered the latter's exports."²⁸²

c) By resale of Cuban sugar on the world market, Moscow was enabled to earn that hard currency of which Cuba itself was in such dire need:

"From the Cuban viewpoint...Moscow and Havana (were)→

* See Pp 334 ff.

competing for sales on the world market, the former on the strength of Cuban sugar deliveries."²⁸³

So, in Soviet-Cuban relations via socialist foreign aid, the Cuban economy ran into the same type of increasing difficulties as with imperialist aid. Monoculture under socialist sponsorship turned out to be – still monoculture; i.e., no basis for a viable economy.

Aims do not (by themselves) a new economy make. With the purest intentions, aid from socialist countries did not develop the economies of the recipients in a manner "most advantageous to the country concerned." That was because such aid was (A) insufficient really to challenge imperialist aid;²⁸⁴ and (B) it too often was offered without investigation into the requests for it, or without considering local factors.²⁸⁵ And its merchandise deficiencies deplorably suggested that even the aid itself – much like imperialist aid – consisted of surplus goods 'unsalable' in the country of origin for which an unsuspecting new market had been found. Objectively, *at any rate*, this was the case.

Moreover, Marxism would hold people claiming to practise the tenets of scientific socialism accountable for objective results, and give them only minimum credit for "good intentions." A failure by Marxists is basically and usually a failure of analysis. As such, it is to be criticised – and corrected.

4. *Socialist loans and credits were supposed to "provide the basis for a planned leap forward in industrialization" and a more rapid accumulation of domestic capital for independent industrialization.*

The claim that socialist aid "builds basic industrial enterprises" was high-lighted ironically by the story of Cuba's short-lived ill-fated industrialization program of 1960 onward:

In December 1960, an agreement with the USSR granted Cuba credits totaling \$60 million. This agreement also committed the Soviet Union

"to assist Cuba in its newly-initiated industrialization—

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program – especially in the construction of an iron and steel mill and an oil refinery, and in the development of Cuban petroleum and ore deposits and electric power resources."²⁸⁶

Cuban leaders expected quick miracles from this proclaimed support. Che Guevara himself, then Minister of Industries in Havana, predicted that

"within a year, industrialization will have eradicated unemployment throughout the country."²⁸⁷

Regino Boti, President of Cuba's central planning body and also at the time Economic Minister, said (August 1961) that Cuba's economic growth rate would rise to a level of 10-15 percent in each of the ensuing four years, and that Cuba would "be the most industrialized country in Latin America."²⁸⁸

However, the industrialization program was unable to fulfill such hopes (although its course probably made Wall Street happy), for

"by the end of 1963 the experiment was patently a costly failure which the Soviet Union was no longer willing to underwrite...The Soviet Union...learned the hard way just how ill-prepared Cuba had been for diversified industrial development. A 1968 Soviet study frankly recognized this fact."²⁹⁰

So, the reality was that numbers of local enterprises were built (or "reconstructed"), but any "planned leap forward" in industrialization was admittedly a disastrous failure insofar as Cuba was concerned.

Many of the mistakes in the "leap forward in industrialization" program did undoubtedly, and admittedly, lie in the Cuban planning end. Che Guevara confessed at an Algerian Conference that the Cuban leaders did not closely examine the facts of their own situation, expected Russian aid to perform undefined miracles, and rebuffed Russian warnings about the manner in which they were trying to achieve their aims.²⁹¹ But this fact does not let the Russians off the hook: in their role as "Big Brother," they boasted a responsibility they cannot duck.

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5. Socialist aid was supposed to emphasize long-term credits at low interest rates, which allegedly built "basic industrial enterprises;" and that aid also assertedly stood out for its lavishness in training local specialists. It was also supposed to utilize "as much as possible" local resources, thus "saving foreign currency and developing internal production."

By 1964, as revisionist followers in the Third World documented,

"the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (most of the European socialist states) had offered economic aid and technical assistance for the construction of 1, 223 industrial enterprises and other projects in the less developed countries:

"With Soviet help alone some 600 factories and plants and 90 educational establishments are being built: Soviet credits carry an interest rate of from 2 to 2 ½ percent."²⁹²

Specific instances of the value of socialist foreign aid included Afghanistan, where

"more than one-third of investment in the first Five Year Plan for 1955-61 was made up of Soviet aid. In India, Soviet aid accounted for about 12 per cent of Government investment in India's third Five Year Plan (1961-1966), while in Indonesia such credits comprised about 15 per cent of all state investment in industry for 1961-63...The Soviet Union is helping the United Arab Republic build some hundred projects, including the massive Aswan High Dam...basis for many new industries..."²⁹³

Finally,

"The Socialist countries also train the local specialists and technicians to operate the projects when completed. By 1963 socialist specialists had trained 50,000 skilled workers, and at the beginning of 1964 there were some 10 thousand students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America studying in the socialist countries."²⁹⁴

As before, the acid test of all these claims came in Cuba.

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Some inkling of specifically what Soviet-Cuban aid relations emphasized came out in the agreements signed between them:

a) *February 1960*: signed by then-deputy Soviet Premier Anastas Mikoyan during a Havana visit; included grant of \$100 million "at low interest"

"for the purchase of Soviet machinery and materials required in the 'construction of plants and factories'."²⁹⁵

b) *December 1960*: Granted \$60 million credit; included promise to assist the newly-initiated industrialization program by constructing certain specified plants and developing specific Cuban resources.²⁹⁶

c) *February 1963*: revolved entirely around Cuba's sugar crop. USSR raised its price "to bring it into line with rising world market prices."²⁹⁷ It was a fact that

"the Soviet Union has paid a price for Cuban sugar in excess of the prevailing world average price in every year since 1960 except 1963."²⁹⁸

d) *January 1964*: (followed Castro's trip to USSR) Greatly increased amount of sugar the Cubans were to deliver to Moscow from 1965-70 at a fixed price (6.11 cents per lb.)²⁹⁹ (Soviet payments would be entirely in goods.³⁰⁰) But this placed Cuba in the position of having to obtain hard currency by producing even more sugar than required for Russian deliveries, and to sell it on a world market more or less controlled by the arch enemy to the North. It was this agreement that brought about the Cuban decision to try to produce ten million tons of sugar in 1970.³⁰¹ The USSR also promised aid in mechanizing sugar harvesting and in improving and expanding Cuban sugar mills.³⁰²

Here again, the purest of intentions foundered on sordid realities: as with other commodities the Soviet Union sold to Cuba,

"the Soviet supply of mechanized sugar harvesting equipment failed to yield expected results. It...was unsuited to Cuban conditions."³⁰³

e) 1969, 1970, 1971: all revolved exclusively around Cuban sugar as a barter item.³⁰⁴

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On one part of the socialist claim to superiority in aid, the Soviet Union did make good:

"...most of the (Cuban) planners have been trained by Moscow. Furthermore, in an attempt to ease its critical shortage of technicians, managers, and skilled workers, Cuba has sent large numbers of its citizens to the USSR for training. During...1960-65...3,000 Cuban agricultural workers, 200 shipping and fisheries officials and 500 Cuban students attended Soviet technical schools. By 1968, some 2, 600 Cubans had attended Soviet universities, and some 700 more were studying there in 1969. A 1971 Soviet newspaper account made mention of 3, 500 Cuban technicians who had studied in Soviet technical schools and 5,000 Cuban skilled workers who had received on-the-job training in Soviet industry."³⁰⁵

These figures, impressive, offered hope. But again, the objective situation dogged the real results:

For example, in Cuba, what happened to youngsters who returned from such training? Did the training – unlike the Soviet sugar harvester – "suit local conditions"? Could returned trainees, with that training, surmount the monocultural nature of Cuba's economy? Or was their training so designed as to deepen it?

"Although annual sugar output has gradually increased since 1963...labor productivity in Cuban sugar production has actually decreased."³⁰⁶

In what way were the industrial enterprises built with socialist help *used*? Whom did they benefit? What happened to them when industrialization "failed"? Answers for Third World countries, like Ghana, may or may not be instructive.

First, while progressive governments like Nkrumah's were in power, most such trainees had been abroad, studying. As the many coups in Africa began, all such students were recalled from the socialist world; their funds were cut off. The ensuing reactionary changes at home in the management of such state enterprises as were allowed to continue existing left new technicians with socialist training in their overwhelming majority high and dry. They were often subjected to various forms of pressure and intimidation.³⁰⁷

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Training as such, regardless of source, would undoubtedly have served well any continuingly-progressive governments in the "Third World." Deplorable were the false expectations generated

about what results might be expected of it, aside from the lack of political realism about "enemy" plans.

Indonesians who survived the September 1965 coup there had been forced to conclude that their own people and proletariat had had little to say about any aspect of the home economy, including how socialist aid would be integrated into the home front.³⁰⁸ They noted that, wherever aid to their country had originated, and whatever industry it benefited, the only Indonesians who had actually bettered their own conditions out of it had been the small comprador elite and top bureaucrats who, together, fattened on ALL outside dealings.³⁰⁹ Other newly-freed countries which tried to "go socialist" using the "peaceful electoral path" and "socialist aid" had the same experience in one or another form.

6. *Socialist aid, by taking into account "as much as possible" local natural and manpower resources, allegedly saved foreign currency and developed internal production.*

Insofar as Cuba's monocultural sugar crop was concerned, the Soviet Union most assuredly did use it "as much as possible." By omitting the context in which such utilization occurred, this boast about socialist aid was ambiguous and hence, misleading.

Moreover, did such utilization actually "save foreign currency" or "develop internal production"?

In January 1964, the

"long-term trade agreement signed with the USSR...pointedly provided for a schedule of Cuban sugar deliveries totaling more than 24 million tons for 1965-70...Since *Soviet payments for Cuban imports were now to be made entirely in the form of goods*, Cuba's ability to obtain convertible currency apparently hinged solely on its success in producing sufficient sugar to meet Soviet-bloc commitments and still have a surplus for sale on the world market."³¹⁰

And how did sugar production fare?

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"Shortfalls in Cuban deliveries to the Soviet Union resulted not only from fluctuations in annual sugar production but also from Castro's resolve to meet Cuban commitments to other Communist states and the need to sell sugar on the world market to obtain hard currency...

"...the annual trade agreement for 1969...targeted a total trade turnover between the two countries of almost 1,000 million rubles for the year...the 1969 agreement provided 'long-term credit to Cuba to cover the differences in the volume of reciprocal supply of goods and services.' Actual trade in 1969 amounted to only 770 million rubles. A likely cause of the discrepancy was Cuba's production of only 4.7 million tons of sugar for the year instead of

the targeted 9 million tons*...Although Cuba produced 8.5 million tons (of a ten million-ton target – HE) of sugar in 1970, it was able to deliver only three million tons of its five million-ton obligation under the 1964 trade agreement with the Soviet Union."³¹¹

Under pressure to build its monoculture, even the single crop was not "developed." So, did it matter one whit if the drive for ever-more-intense monoculture was accomplished by utilizing "as much as possible of local resources – natural and manpower"? The end result was a still-economically-helpless Cuba which, having been *expelled* from "the imperialist stranglehold," was soon in hock to Moscow and the Comecon.

7. By buying "Third World" raw materials, socialist aid assertedly kept prices on them up, and thus prevented the monocultural countries "from falling prey to...rapacious...imperialist purchases...Developing trade with the socialist countries is thus another way in which the less developed countries can benefit" themselves.

The Cuban economy – under monocultural conditions – categorically *could* not – and *did* not – develop.

"Cuba failed to deliver (to the USSR – HE) the promised quantities of cane sugar, while at the same time the

* This account predictably neglected to mention that 1968 and 1969 were years of natural disaster, weather-wise, for Cuba. ³¹²

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(agreed-on – HE) 6. 11-cent price proved consistently higher than the average world price in every ensuing year."³¹³

The result of this Soviet support to Cuban sugar production was an apparent gain for the Cuban economy:

"...according to Soviet figures and the average annual world market sugar prices, the net subsidy to Cuban sugar for 1960-70 amounted to a cumulative total of \$1,168 million...over what the USSR would have paid for deliveries if it had paid the prevailing average world market price in each year."³¹⁴

However, the entire subsidy was more than swallowed up by Castro's growing debt to the Soviet Union:

Soviet sources placed the cumulative Cuban trade deficit for 1960-1970 at 1,508 million rubles, "with the 1971 deficit estimated at another 400 million." This made a total verifiable debt of some \$2,000 million by 1972.³¹⁵

So the sugar subsidy from Moscow covered only a little over half of what Moscow drained out of Cuba; Cuba suffered a net loss.

Cuba also maintained economic ties with other Comecon countries in Eastern Europe. From such countries, she obtained long-term credits, such as \$40 million from Czechoslovakia in 1960 "for industrial construction;" \$20 million from the GDR in 1968 "to buy hydraulic equipment;" \$30 million from Rumania in 1968 "for oil-drilling equipment;" and an unknown amount from Bulgaria, also in 1968, "for refrigeration equipment."³¹⁶ In 1970, more credits were given by Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and the GDR.³¹⁷

"These credits have been necessary, at least in part, because of the consistent deficit which Cuba has been running in its trade with the Comecon states (exclusive of the USSR). The deficit had amounted to a cumulative total of \$177 million through 1967...As in the case of trade with the Soviet Union, the bulk of Cuba's exports to these countries is accounted for by sugar, although they also include tobacco, nickel, and alcohol...Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic pay

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significantly less for Cuban sugar than does the USSR – their respective costs being 5.15 and 5.53 cents a pound, as compared to 6.11 cents for the Soviet Union."³¹⁸

So, not only Soviet, but all Eastern European socialist aid ran Cuba into debt and tied her to spending much of the credits on goods from the lending countries.

The claim that socialist purchases of raw materials buoyed up world market prices for their "Third World" vendors is somewhat imponderable, yet possible to illuminate indirectly: the big Western manipulators of – for instance – the world cocoa market managed to run cocoa prices up and down at will in the face of Socialist raw materials orders, as proven by the drastic decline in such prices until Nkrumah's ouster, and their immediate rise thereafter:

"...in 1965...Cocoa prices collapsed. The World price of cocoa had been £247 a ton in 1957 at the time of independence. In 1961 it was down to £177. In the summer of 1965 it dropped well below £100."³¹⁹

"...the average New York price for (cocoa for) June 1967 was 24.25 cents (per pound – HE) against 22.63 and 11.61 respectively in June 1966, and 1965."³²⁰*

"Cocoa prices...a ton c.i.f....after a peak of £560 a ton in 1954...fell steadily until...below £100 in 1965; since then prices have recovered dramatically and today (1969 – HE) they are around £400 a ton."³²¹*

The claim that socialist purchases of natural rubber more than covered the imperialist decline therein offered this fact as if it were a "benefit" to rubber-producing areas. But was it such? Did

the peoples of monocultural countries benefit from, or were they robbed by, such purchases? Who, inside ex-colonies, did benefit from them? Wasn't it the new local elites who became elite by pushing their own snouts into the international super-profits trough at the expense of "their own" people? And since imperialist purchases of such raw materials constituted by far the bulk thereof, are we not impliedly by this claim invited—

* The ouster of Kwame Nkrumah's government by the military coup in Ghana took place on February 24, 1966.

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to see *them* (where *not* decreased or cut off deliberately for political motives) as a "help" to the primary-products producers? Imperialists most assuredly make that claim.

So long as monoculture is not broken (and breaking it would obviously require long-term subsidization by industrialized countries if or when primary producers made such a decision), it seems to this writer that only a deepened monocultural trade and "development" pattern could evolve from trade or aid, regardless of their source or the intentions of the donors.

8. *Socialist aid is said to break "the monopoly which the imperialists had in the past over the means and instruments of production, etc." in ex-colonies and this "enables the new state to break away from the imperialist stranglehold."*

Certainly, if Uncle Sam proved unable to swallow Cuba, it was at least in part due to Moscow's powerful patronage. On the other hand, of what value was it to a newly-freed ex-colony when its best friends began "unintentionally" choking it to death?

In addition, socialist aid apparently did nothing to prevent those military coups which have not yet ceased to plague "Third World" recipients of Eastern European aid. Such aid, on the contrary, appeared a factor putting such states under greater, not less, imperialist pressure. This is not to be taken as implied opposition to such a method of coming under that type of pressure. What is opposed is the pretense that the opposite happens.

In sum,

"In the five years preceding the Cuban revolution of 1959, the United States purchased about 50 percent of Cuba's average annual sugar production of 5.1 million tons. See International Sugar Organization, Sugar Year Book 1960, London 1961, p.38."³²²

"Whereas the islands trade with the Soviet bloc in 1959 amounted to only \$16 million, or roughly 2 percent of total Cuban trade, the figures rose to \$905 million and 72 percent in 1961 and \$1,056 million and 82 percent in 1962. For the same years, the United States' share dropped from 68 percent to zero."³²³

"Cuba's trade with non-Communist countries increased to 25.7 percent of her total volume in 1963, as compared with 17.6 percent in 1962. But the ultimate result was a further sharp decline in Cuban sugar deliveries to the USSR and a marked rise in Cuba's trade deficit with that country."³²⁴

Point 1: Cuba's trade with the socialist bloc in Europe was essentially a rescue operation performed after the USA, with political malice, cut off all trade with that island.

Point 2: By 1963, the extent of Western involvement in the Cuban economy was – at least, trade-wise – of a reverse order to what had been achieved by that most "non-aligned" of other Third World Countries, Ghana, by 1966 (i.e., 20% of Ghana's trade was with the East rather than the West, as in Cuba). Surely, one should have looked to the Cuban example to break the Ghanaian pattern.

Some will contend that the fact that Cuba is still in existence as a socialist-oriented ex-colony proves that socialist aid did break the "old" pattern. On the other hand, perhaps only the timetable had altered.

"...Havana's renewed access to its natural markets and primary source of supplies – i.e., the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the United States – offers the only practical means of reducing its economic vassalage to the USSR and of slowing down the process of Cuba's progressive integration into the Soviet bloc."³²⁵

Point 3: The "imperialist stranglehold" in Cuba was not so much "broken" as deliberately removed. Furthermore, a new and obvious noose soon seemed to have been substituted for it around Cuba's economic neck, if Cuba's increasingly heavy dependence on Moscow for strategic goods and the size of her debt to Moscow were any criteria.

If such had been the path actually traversed by Eastern European "socialist" governments in dealing with the Third World, that fact did not signify that *real* socialist aid would forever bring similar results.

With the evolution of China as a major socialist power, a

notable change in approach to aid for "Third World" countries has begun to evolve on the world scene. Chinese aid to the ex-colonial world must be mentioned and examined, even if briefly, because (at least, thus far) it differs in major respects from that of the Soviet Union.

First of all, China's eight principles for dispensing such aid were enunciated by Chou En-lai at Conakry, Guinea, in 1965:

- "(1) That aid is not one-way but an act of mutual benefit.
- "(2) That China never asks for special privileges in the country where she is giving aid.
- "(3) That no interest is charged and payment is optional.
- "(4) That there is to be no dependence tie – either industrially or in terms of repayment.
- "(5) That there should be no long gestation period, i.e., involvement in large investments that will not yield a return for many years.
- "(6) That there should be no second best – the donor must apply the best technique and resources to aid at its command.
- "(7) That no mystique should be built up – the object must be to pass on knowledge, so that when a project is over the recipient not only can maintain it but also reproduce it.
- "(8) That there should be no privileged status for Chinese technicians who must accept the same working conditions as those amongst whom they work."³²⁶

There is now considerable evidence that Chinese aid to the Third World does in fact begin to fulfill early boasts by Third World followers of revisionism about what socialist aid would do for them.³²⁷

On point six, the writer was told by a Ghanaian editor, after the military coup of 1966 had unsealed many lips regarding the realities Ghana had encountered in dealing with the socialist countries, that only two socialist countries had supplied Ghana with first-class goods: China and Cuba. "As for the rest," he added, "their obsolete goods and cast-offs were considered good enough for Africa."³²⁸

On Chinese aid points, two and eight, the editor of a Czech

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magazine beamed at Africa (for which this writer did a few pieces on Ghana) furnished evidence in 1965. In the course of a day's sight-seeing in the Ashanti Region (during which the editor in question insisted upon learning the writer's views on China), the following somewhat heated exchange took place:

EDITOR: "The Chinese are unfair. They allow their technicians to live in these countries just like the natives. Czech engineers cannot do that."

WRITER: "Oh? But I thought that was what socialism was all about!"

EDITOR (indignantly): "You cannot expect a European with a high standard of living to take a big cut in standards in order to help these countries."³²⁹

What this Czech editor was complaining about could hardly be classed as "unfairness" on China's part:

"Chinese aid is interest-free with repayments in local goods spread over a 10 to 20 year period after a grace period of around ten years. In contrast, the grace period applicable to Soviet and East European assistance is usually only one year, commencing a year after completion of the aid project or delivery of goods. Most Soviet and East European assistance is also repayable in local goods, although occasionally some of the East Europeans may ask for partial settlement in convertible currencies."³³⁰

Such evidence was beginning to become widespread. Another imperialist source, discussing "China's African Diplomacy," was forced to concede:

"Chinese financial aid has been allocated (in Tanzania – HE) largely to the planning of rural development projects, the construction and furnishing of industrial plants, and the building of railroads and other elements of the infrastructure...not solely to a few show projects. It has been used to fund such diversified undertakings as the construction of fresh-water tanks in Zanzibar; the building of a bookshop, bank and post office complex at the University of Dar es Salaam; and efforts to control the tsetse fly in the bush of mainland Tanzania...

"...figures alone do not tell the story of the value of—

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Chinese aid from the Tanzanian standpoint...China's responsiveness to Tanzania's internal needs...has evinced itself in...technical assistance in specific realms where there has been a gap between local requirements and local resources. Medical personnel offers a good illustration."³³¹

Of course, up to the present, Chinese aid has not been large (and so still could not have the influence on imperialism that earlier proponents of Eastern European aid beleieved in) due to China's own economic evolution: her total aid commitments in 1970 were set at £700 million (\$1,820 million),³³² in actual cash to Tanzania alone: £50 million.³³³ A U.S. estimate set \$2.2 billion as total PRC aid extended since 1956, over half of it after 1969, and most of it to African countries.³³⁴

Any concrete example of a socialist country actually fulfilling its proletarian internationalist obligations on however small a scale helps to dispel the idea, so dear to imperialists, that good

relations between real socialist countries and subjugated areas can never be established and maintained.

Also, China's example, thus far, has begun to push the Soviet Union into stepping up aid and trying to appear "purer" than China:

"In the contest for spheres of influence, the Russians have the advantage and are ahead of the Chinese – due to superior Soviet resources...

"During the past 10 years, Peking aid to Africa was only one quarter as much as the total Soviet aid. But the Chinese are gaining ground. About one half of Peking's overseas aid now goes to Africa...

"Additional African nations are thinking about establishing relations with China – especially since the beginning of Sino-American rapprochement."³³⁵

Using Soviet-Cuban relations in considerable detail, we have tried to show that what really happened vis-a-vis the actual value and results of "socialist foreign aid" was that

"...the USSR...found itself...encouraging Cuba (in)...a policy which not only contradicts past Soviet prescriptions→

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that rapid industrialization is the key to overcoming underdevelopment but also casts the USSR, ironically, in the same exploitative role...(as) 'imperialist' United States...played in its prerevolutionary economic relationship with Havana. Soviet spokesmen...note that Cuba's experience 'is significant...for developing countries'...

"Cuba's prerevolutionary dependence on the export of sugar to the U S is described by the Soviets as ' one of the prime elements...which the North American imperialists foisted upon the Latin American countries...'

"After the Revolution...an ambitious program of industrial diversification...quickly resulted in severe economic setbacks as well as a growing trade deficit with the USSR, which...came to view a return by Cuba to its 'historically – determined specialization', i.e., sugar monoculture, to be an acceptable 'optional model' for the island's future development. What had been pictured as a 'sin' when Cuba was trading with the United States was now represented as a desirable phenomenon according to the principles of 'proletarian internationalisms' and 'socialist division of labor'..."³³⁶

In a word, European socialist aid programs, as actually implemented in newly-emerging countries, came more and more to resemble those of imperialism. Instead of showing the newly-

freed peoples and leaderships the need to smash the old bourgeois- and imperialist-dominated state apparatuses, they helped to build popular trust in them, welding old chains the closer.

For, as "national democratic" leaderships followed – or tried to follow – Eastern European advice on how to build a stable economy free of "imperialist stranglehold," relations between imperialism and newly-emerging lands, far from loosening (as claimed), in fact grew closer (except in name, in some places): Even diplomatic relations with socialist countries were often broken off under imperialist pressure, such as military coups (especially in Africa), with China the chief target:

"By the mid-1960s, the Chinese had been expelled from Burundi, Dahomey, the Central African Republic and Ghana."³³⁷

However, once the new, openly-imperialist-oriented elites

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realized that Eastern Europe (talk aside) differed little from the West and could at the same time be used as a front against their own peoples, such relations were resumed (those with China being picked up only following the U.S.-China summit, and its sequel, "Nixon-Brezhnev").

Moreover, neither the socialist countries nor those of the newly-emerging ex-colonial states have as yet been in a position in which well-intentioned Eastern European advice to cut off all Western aid could be followed.

In imperialist-controlled "new" states, there has run – like the glitter of fool's gold – through all the hopeful exhortations from Eastern Europe either a naive faith – or reliance on the existence of such a faith – that "things were progressive" simply because a given state apparatus had been "re-manned;" that "the 'new' bourgeoisie" (which was in fact only a rapacious elite) would or could lead national revolutions "for the benefit of the people."

However, neither "various measures...against the foreign monopolies" nor the acceptance of a portion of foreign aid from socialist sources had – or could honestly have been expected to have – brought a single one of these economies out from under foreign domination. Rather, to Western foreign domination have been added burdens of heavy indebtedness and increasing material dependence on Eastern European states which themselves soon began turning more and more frequently, and on a growing scale, to investments in their own economies by imperialism.³³⁸

Nor can it be said that, on any lasting basis so far, socialist foreign aid has resulted in any significant improvement in the living conditions of the great majority of Third World people. On the contrary, these conditions continue to deteriorate.³³⁹

The fact was that, in all such areas (with – again – the significant exceptions of China, Vietnam and North Korea), the "new parliamentarians" turned out to be none other than a new elite. That is why, in practice, in the "underdeveloped" lands, they worked up – not any "new democracy" but – only an unending succession of deals between representatives of outside imperialism (or Eastern European State monopolies) and themselves,↵

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the new Ministers, leaving mass living standards to continue sliding downwards while, with their own ostentatious salaries, sending statistics for their area comfortingly upward.

In this way, the "imperialist stranglehold" *increased*, even as socialist aid also increased even though (including genuine socialist aid where given) socialist aid remained too small to affect the overall situation – if, indeed, it could affect it favorably under existing monocultural set-ups in the real newly-emerging states:

"...although the task of planning what to produce in a developing country may seem easy, it was not the same in our country of monoculture with all the problems that that fact posed..."³⁴⁰

Again, after almost three decades of "extending their economic relations with the socialist world," an increasing number of African (and other subjugated-continent states) have not, as prophesied by Eastern Europeans and their followers in the West or in ex-colonies, been able to "challenge the unequal trading relations between themselves and the imperialist countries." Socialist advice on how to use Western foreign aid (or, for that matter, the European socialist variety) has thus far helped neither the cause of national liberation nor that of socialism.

In fact, if we enquire which former "Third World" countries may be said, to this, day, to have "broken from the imperialist stranglehold," only China, North Korea and North Vietnam come to light. Did these "newly-emerging" ex-colonies *depend* on foreign aid? They were cut off from the imperialist type by political malice. They received socialist aid, yes. But they integrated it into their own development programs, and they used it to follow their own analyses of their own situations, a course in the evolution of which the Soviets waxed wroth enough in 1960 to snatch away all aid in the teeth of agreements. In a word, through "recognizing necessity," these above-named ex-colonies raised to a philosophical level the doctrine of "self-help" and "self-reliance."

Without its presently-inexhaustible sources of super-exploitable colonial labor power, secured by foreign investments and realized↵

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through grossly under-priced raw materials, imperialism might conceivably be conquerable.

So, by assuring the leaders of "developing" countries that they could control imperialist aid if they would just run it first through the newly-manned state machines, Modern Revisionism objectively and materially *aided* imperialism to retain virtually full domination over the economies of most ex-colonies, despite their "political independence."

Finally, we are *not* saying that socialist aid was "no good" for ex-colonial states. We *are* saying that certain "socialist" aid deteriorated along with all revisionist ideological and practical back-sliding, from proletarian internationalism to a condition not too unlike that of imperialist aid.

We are *not* saying that even the good that did come out of such aid – like the training of many skills among workers of the Third World countries, or the building of genuinely helpful small and medium enterprises in the "Third World" – should have been rejected. We *are* saying that the overweening boasts about what it would accomplish in ex-colonies played into the hands of imperialism and disarmed the ex-colonial peoples and their leaderships ideologically by the Never-Never quality of the implied predictions.

We are *not* saying that the deterioration of socialist aid from a type of proletarian internationalism to one resembling imperialist aid came from the "evil intentions" of the donors, even should such evil intentions have been present. We *are* saying that erosion of ideology inevitably and invariably leads to erosion in practice. It was not "intentions" which destroyed the quality, meaning and results of socialist foreign aid to ex-colonies; what destroyed them was failure to face the economic realities of monopoly-controlled, imperialist-created and imperialist-guided economies in ex-colonies; namely, their monocultural and heavily-imperialist-tied natures.

"We did not base ourselves on statistics nor on historical experience; we treated nature subjectively as if we could persuade it by talking to it, leaving aside the experiences"

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of other countries...the first plan was... based solely on... arithmetic...but impossible to work together as a whole."³⁴¹

"We copied mechanically the experience of fraternal countries...However...we learned in practice from our mistakes...that you cannot force planning beyond the limits of economic conditions."³⁴²

"...we continued to let spontaneity reign and failed to analyse many decisions, above all political ones, which must be taken every day in the process of governing."³⁴³

X | INTRA-SOCIALIST RELATIONS BREAK DOWN UNDER REVISIONIST INFLUENCE: THE GROWTH OF RACISM AND CHAUVINISM IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST WORLD

In an earlier work, this author studied the student incidents of Eastern Europe and attempted to show how they arose and what they meant.¹ Now, it has become pertinent to explore Eastern European relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Effects of the emergence of – or the display of already-existing – racism in Eastern Europe can be studied by discussing

A. Relations of Eastern Europe with the colonial areas of the world: racism and chauvinism in Eastern European literature in Ghana under Nkrumah; anti-China activities by Eastern Europe; and open interference in the affairs of emerging countries under revisionist leadership.

B. Relations between fraternal countries inside the socialist world itself: violation of the right of self-determination, including the right of separation from the "mother" country.

Section A: Eastern Europe and Colonial Areas

1. *Racism in Eastern European Literature and Art in Nkrumah's Ghana.*

If examples that turned up in Ghana under Nkrumah were any criteria, literature from Eastern Europe in the subjugated continents was very revealing of Europe's universal, inherited and persisting racism.

For example, SPUTNIK, a Soviet magazine "written especially for West Africa," carried – aside from news of developments in the Russian homeland – stories, presumably for children, about Africa. One, a cartoon strip, is reminiscent of American characterizations of the Negro during the 1920s and early 1930s.*

The USSR Embassy in Accra also issued a weekly mimeographed—

* See Appendix II.

Bulletin, from which examples of chauvinism have been culled by this author, far too numerous to use in toto here. Selecting one, we can offer insight into official Soviet thinking on the key subject of racialism and its effects on Africa:

"What is the nature of ethnic prejudices? Are these prejudices rooted in the distinguishing features of individual psychology or in the structure of social conscience?

"The problem arises only when these actual or imaginary differences (between various national traditions and customs) are turned into the principal quality and developed into a hostile psychological principle with regard to some ethnic group. Such is precisely the way in which racist conceptions come into being, conceptions which dissociate peoples, *at first psychologically, and then theoretically*, provide a grounding for the policy of discrimination. This is precisely what ethnic prejudice means."²

In this bombastic swamp, the employment – not once, but twice – of the word "precisely" was somewhat less than "precise." First, the author offered only two possible sources of "ethnic prejudices," namely, individual or social "conscience." That is, racism for him had an *ideological*, not a material basis: segregation? job discrimination? other manifestations of super-exploitation and its enormous contribution to Western prosperity? Nary a mention!

Second, racism, for this Russian pundit, was present "only" when it was overt and visible: "turned into the principal quality" was his "precise" manner of offering thought. That is, if no "ethnic group" were present to receive the "hostile psychological principle," presumably "ethnic prejudices" did not exist. Presumably the experiences of African students encompassed something sprung from thin air. Idealist hog-wash!

Third, it was apparently the Soviet view that "racist conceptions" act to "dissociate people" "at first psychologically and then theoretically." Materialism, anyone? Centuries of slave trading, of robbing the treasures and peoples of ancient and flourishing civilizations in the now-subjugated continents? Not mentioned! For the Revisionists, "in the beginning was the word." For them, ▯

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psychology came first; theory, second; and then, a "policy of discrimination" grew up out of people's MINDS.

The language itself proved conclusively that, in obscurantist jargon at least, the Russians had successfully "overtaken and surpassed" America. Was the bombast intended to prove on what a "lofty plane" this "Comrade" Vladimirov operated? "Translation errors"? The Russians had English-speaking friends in Nkrumah's Ghana: surely, they could have asked their advice?

2. *Revisionism's anti-China Activities Become More Brutal.*

Early in 1967, an incident in Moscow revealed the increasing brutality of anti-Chinese activities in the USSR. At about 7 o'clock in the evening, "160-170 toughs" jumped off "four tarpaulin-covered lorries and two automobiles" in front of the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet capital and

proceeded to smash the news photo display cases, to do which they had to violate Embassy territory.

Chinese Embassy personnel who tried to reason with the "toughs" were allegedly bodily attacked:

"Thirty-one persons of the Chinese Embassy protecting the display cases from attack were punched and kicked...The fascist thugs did not even spare the Embassy's women staff members...

"The dozen or so Soviet police...supposedly...'guarding' the Embassy...not only tried to stop the Embassy staff from going to reason with the criminals but actually joined in with the latter."³

What was in these display cases inside Embassy territory? The usual pictures of Chairman Mao? Photos of the great proletarian cultural revolution? Surely, such photos could not have brought about so much trouble? Right! What had caused the ruckus were

"some photos about the Soviet revisionist ruling clique's bloody suppression in Red Square on January 25 of Chinese students returning from Europe...The exhibition lasted only six days, three hours and forty minutes...Over a thousand (Soviet) people turned up every day to see them...sometimes lining up in three rows in front of the display cases..."⁴

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3. *Open Interference in the Affairs of "Emerging Countries."*

Interference in the internal affairs of "emerging" countries was bound to follow from the kind of thinking which could have given rise to such incidents. The former "comrade" had become a "Big Brother" who "knew better" what was "good for" other peoples, and who felt quite adequate to "see all, know all and do all" for those deemed not yet "ready" to do things for themselves.

In the Far East, the example of Indonesia has already shown how acceptance of Revisionist theory resulted in relations between the Communist Party and the "national bourgeoisie" to the almost-sole advantage of the latter.⁵ "Soviet assistance" also helped entrench that "bourgeoisie" in its hold on the so-called national democratic government.⁶ After the military coup in September 1965, the Soviet government continued its "aid" to the new fascist rulers who were murdering millions and millions of Indonesians and who had the open support of the CIA and the Pentagon.⁷

In the Middle East, the eruption of the six-day war between the UAR and Israel in late May 1967 resulted in instantaneous exposure of Soviet interference in emerging countries.

According to the United Nations correspondent of a New York radical weekly, a usually-extremely-mild reporter of events inside the UN building, this war resulted in badly deteriorated relations between the USSR and the Middle East:

"The military and political elements of the 6-day Arab-Israeli war are not easy to disentangle...But...when the conflict was only 48 hours old, the Soviet Union felt herself militarily let down by the Arab world and the Arabs in turn were faced with what they regarded as almost political abandonment by the Russians, who had been currying Arab favor for a long time and who invested vast sums of money – in arms – for defense of these same states...

"Soviet surrender to the Western will not only was an appalling retreat from a political position that the Arabs had counted on, but it was disclosed in the glare of the TV-saturated Council chamber without first conferring with the UN representatives of the Arab states.

"Two nights later, the Arabs came back with an eye-for-an-eye approach: the Soviet ambassador was obliged to hear,↵

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for the first time, of Egypt's acceptance of the UN ceasefire proposal, right there in the brightly-lit Council chamber."⁸

A Ghanaian story, slightly later, which simply catalogued specific pacts and agreements between the USSR and the UAR, Syria and Iraq, suggested the background to this incident. Introducing the listing, it postulated

"After the death of Stalin, a new attitude towards the emergent states, and towards the Middle East in particular...in Soviet foreign policy...

"The result was a series of economic, technical and military agreements with the Soviet Union on which the Arab states grew increasingly dependent..."²

The UAR, the article declared, had made four major arms deals with the Soviet Union, starting in 1955 and extending to 1968.¹⁰

By 1961, there was heard what was already becoming an increasingly-voiced complaint from monocultural "newly-emerging" countries: that the Soviet Union "misused" the monocrops it bought from them.¹¹ Prominent among these charges had been one involving Ghanaian cocoa.

Two items regarding Syria were of interest: in 1954,

"the arrival in Syria of Mark IV tanks from Czechoslovakia"

and a July 1966 military agreement with the USSR, which

"makes Syria virtually a Soviet base."¹²

In Iraq, where on July 14, 1958 a military coup led by Colonel Kassem allegedly relied on "communist support," and was followed by "Soviet offers of assistance," a new pattern in "Third World" relations with the Soviets began emerging:

"1963 – Kassem's government overthrown. Iraq begins to withdraw army trainees from Russia."¹³

Despite the subsequent massacre of Iraqi communists and Kassem supporters,¹⁴ three more deals, all military, were made by the Soviet Union with its former ally's successor, Colonel Aref.

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A year later, the Soviet Union was replacing "12 MIG 21s lost by Iraq during hostilities" in the Arab-Israeli war.¹⁵

Such deals have shown that, despite the tenets of proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union's revisionists had long since elevated the cash register to the pinnacle of their foreign relations, including those with "developing" ex-colonies. Four instances of Soviet revisionist interference in Africa will be cited here:

First, there was a letter to Soviet Trade Unions from an Angolan Union in the Spring of 1965, charging the Soviet bodies with interfering in Angolan trade union affairs.¹⁶ The union which authored the letter was affiliated to the organization of continental African trade union unity, the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF). The second Angolan union involved in the affair was not. Unions of Africans not affiliating with AATUF often acted under persuasion by or pressure from the U.S. AFL-CIO and/or British-dominated ICFTU.

This writer does not pretend to decide for Angolan workers which trade union movement they should recognize. The letter is reproduced* to prove that the revisionist-led Soviet trade unions *did* try to make such a decision for Angolans.

Second, a 1966 statement at Cairo¹⁷ by representatives of eight nationalist organizations expelled from a Soviet-guided Seminar described the Seminar itself as

"gross interference in and an attempt to stamp out the national liberation movement in Africa."¹⁸

Third, a story of U.S. origin claimed "changed Soviet-African policy:"

"Assistance toward revolution may be given (by the USSR) when requested; but, as recent events in Congo and Cameroun have shown, it may be refused if victory looks difficult and the operation would sabotage the (Soviet) trade offensive."¹⁹

Commenting that

"Soviet policy in Africa today seems to be aimed at the conquest of cash registers rather than of hearts and minds,"²⁰

* See Appendix IV.

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the journalist made some significant points:

1. "The fickleness of Sekou Toure's international alignments together with Guinea's impressive inefficiency, disillusioned the Soviets. Their technicians...anticipating that Africans would be 'primitive,' struck attitudes fiercely resented by their erstwhile allies."²¹
2. "Any country doing serious trade with Sovexport could expect a relatively handsome technical assistance offer, as many 'reactionary' West African states have seen."²²

Whatever the real causes, it was not only in Guinea that "Soviet technicians...struck attitudes fiercely resented by their erstwhile allies." It was not only in Africa that "reactionary states" were rewarded for trading with the USSR by handsome support, while their peoples groaned under local and foreign heels.

Finally, again illustrating Soviet revisionist interference in Africa, another item from the anti-socialist post-coup Ghana press reported "fifteen huge transport planes from the Soviet Union" having landed "military supplies" at Kano airport in Federal Nigeria, for use against Biafra, the newly-proclaimed state.²³

Without going into the relative "merits" of the sides, a matter which the Nigerian people appear to have settled in their own way, this item showed the Soviet revisionist habit of pushing its own decisions for colonial areas by action which materially favored one or the other side before the issue had been clarified by the people of the area themselves. Anti-communist Uncle Sam breathed no murmur against this massive arms deal.

Section B: Violation of Self-Determination inside Socialist Europe

The world unity of socialists has always been considered a principle. But it was envisioned as a unity on principle, as well, based on the universal tests of Marxism-Leninism, chief of which was *proletarian internationalism*, of which the material basis was the inalienable right of self-

determination for every nation, up to and including its right to separate from its "mother" country if its people made that decision.

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Lenin had described in detail what he had had in mind when talking of and championing self-determination for all nations:

"If we demand freedom of secession for...ALL...oppressed and unequal nations without exception, we do so not because WE FAVOR SECESSION, but ONLY because we stand for FREE, VOLUNTARY association and merging as distinct from forcible association. That is the ONLY reason."²⁴

It might not be amiss here to recall that, in the early – revolutionary – days of the Soviet Union, the right of actual separation from the "mother" country was exercised by Finland.

With the advent to power after Stalin's death of Krushchov and his henchmen and successors, there was set up in Eastern Europe an organization known as the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON). In it, the Soviet Union and a number of other socialist countries (mainly European) became linked in trade, planning and production.

According to USSR Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai S Patolichev,

"The states of the socialist community account for some 70% of our foreign trade...

"Trade with socialist countries will be marked by a substantial growth of export of machines and equipment from the USSR and a bigger import of consumer goods from fraternal countries."²⁵

Here, surely, was an example of "growing unity" in the European socialist camp. Indeed, such was precisely the proud boast of the Soviet leadership on occasions when it discussed economic progress in the socialist community – as, for instance, in a Prague-issued document about European socialist progress in the economic domain. Although China, Albania, Vietnam and Korea were included in the accompanying 30 statistical tables, the figures covered mainly Europe.

This survey made the following point:

"It is in the nature of the socialist system for relations of fraternal co-operation and mutual assistance to be established and steadily deepened between the socialist countries. A highly important aspect of these relations is their economic—

links, the substance of which is steadily extending international division of labor on the basis of the principles of socialism, of proletarian internationalism."²⁶

Splendid, ringing sentiments! Let's consider some of their fruits. In 1966,

"COMECON has come under increasing attack from many of its members, who realize that Russia has been buying them cheap for 17 years."²⁷

A year later, the same U.S. weekly described how

"Last week...when the representatives of the Warsaw Pact...met, they argued vociferously and unproductively...the Warsaw Pact, somewhat like its NATO equivalent, is now an artifact, rather than a fact."²⁸

These "vociferous" arguments reportedly revolved around several frictions:

As predicted ("Rumania's next target on the list of Communist sacred cows may well be the Warsaw Pact"²⁹), Rumanian Foreign Minister Cornelious Manescu may have been mounting just such an attack when he

"sent an underling to Warsaw, went off for a leisurely wee of discussions in Brussels, where he boldly proclaimed that a bloc like Eastern Europe has become an 'anachronism left over from...the cold war'. "³⁰

The "underling" allegedly took to the meeting a Rumanian decision "to break the European deepfreeze on diplomatic relations with Bonn, which is aggressively seeking new ties to the East."³¹ And reasons might not have been far to seek:

"Rumania's trade with the West has risen a significant 13% in the past decade: from 20% in 1955 to more than a third of total last year. During that span, trade with Russia fell from 69% to 41%, nearly as much as with Rumania's Red neighbors...Rumania has been buying from a horde of hungry Westerners...Italy's Orlandi...Pepsi...Japanese ships...France's Pechiney...Sweden's ASEA...Chatillon of Milan...Italy's Carle & Montanari..."³²

In fact, the story suggested, "understandable alarm" in the GDR had caused the latter to invite the meeting to East Berlin, to which, however, Rumania had "refused" to send any representative; so the site wound up in Warsaw.³³

And the GDR's "attack" on Rumania's West German policy,³⁴ had "ired" and "embarrassed" the Soviet leadership, which reminded Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian delegates that only

Soviet intervention had saved them from "harsh Allied treatment" after World War II, during which their former regimes had fought on the Nazi side.³⁵

In addition, Hungary was "upset" at the GDR and Rumania for "creating a commotion" over Rumania's recognition of Bonn, because that "commotion" was making it difficult for Budapest to take exactly the same step.³⁶

Czechoslovakia was pictured as forced to "re-examine" her own asserted "intention to open diplomatic relations with Bonn" because of the "signs of tension in the (Warsaw) alliance."³⁷

Finally, Poland was feeling "reduced and abandoned" because, aside from the GDR, she was the only other Eastern European socialist country not anxious to join the "general movement toward Bonn!"³⁸

Was this story an exaggeration, a slander against socialism, as Soviet apologists would like to claim against class-conscious imperialist mouthpieces who seize on facts for their own purposes? Or was it a close-up of reality?

Consider an editorial in an Albanian paper:

"The chauvinist policy pursued by the...Soviet Union has engendered among its followers sentiments of narrow nationalism, discontent, various kinds of resistance and opposition. Each revisionist group...seeks to form its own alliances at the expense of the others'...Moreover...many cliques have replaced the ruble with the dollar and established...relations with the West...this struggle (is) completely unprincipled...the laws of capitalist society which they have restored...are operating, with the result that nationalist feelings have been aroused and endless quarrels and unceasing rivalries have taken place."³⁹

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The Albanian editorial also traced the situation back to causes:

"Johnson's 'bridge-making' and his policy of contacting and infiltrating the East European countries were soon accepted by the revisionist cliques of those countries. This...rendered it no longer necessary to use Kruschov as a middleman, thus bringing about a further exposure and division of the revisionists."⁴⁰

One cannot help recalling at this point Lenin's discussion of a similar phenomenon in his own day:

"these phoney unity-builders (who) have precisely since March 1912 displayed increasing disunity among themselves!!"⁴¹

Elsewhere, he had added,

"...if...unity is possible with the Liquidators WITHOUT the 'Leninists' and AGAINST the 'schismatists'...why have not you, uniters, united among yourselves?"⁴²

The reason was clearly documented for our day by the Albanians:

"...the line of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union...is a line of world domination by the two powers, of dividing up spheres of influence...of suppressing the revolution...of all countries...and of bringing about a capitalist restoration in the socialist countries and fortifying bourgeois rule in others."⁴³

An ingenuous (and, surely, involuntary) corroboration of Albania's diagnosis of U.S.-USSR friendship was issued in Ghana, when a Ghanaian (or Ghanaian-quoted) author admitted:

"Countries...in the non-nuclear range...powerful enough to think in terms of making nuclear bombs in the future for their own defense are of course very ready to talk about...the possibility of Russo-American world domination through a non-proliferation treaty, about the fact that a non-proliferation treaty is not in itself disarmament and ought to be accompanied by real measures of disarmament on the part of the nuclear powers."⁴⁴

Which countries fit the description? Aren't they the industrialized satellites of the two super-powers? And don't the latter control—

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their economies, and hence their policies? Of course, they are "very ready to talk about" super-power "world domination."

When the end result of revisionist activity in the socialist countries themselves is considered, the words from the Albanian newspaper, above, were simply too tame. The example of Yugoslavia easily vindicated such a pronouncement:

"The special road of building 'socialism' by relying on U.S. aid advertised by the Tito clique is nothing but a road...of degeneration from an independent country into a semi-colony."⁴⁵

"Tito's clique has turned Yugoslavia into a true American colony, where law of Yankee imperialism reigns supreme."⁴⁶

But Soviet leaders soon began proclaiming that Yugoslavia was their "example," and that they were consciously leading the great Soviet Union down the identical path!

What, specifically, WAS that path?

It has been stated many times in these pages and elsewhere that Modern Revisionism was "restoring capitalism" to once-socialist countries. Now it is time to ask: was that description specific enough?

Palmiro Togliatti had postulated a labor aristocracy in colonies as well as "at home."⁴⁷ We have shown that this is generally untrue: even by definition, a genuine labor aristocracy must arise in *metropolitan* areas, because the main source of those super-profits which create it lies in *colonial* labor-power, so that only a few individuals AS individuals among such workers can join it. However, in colonies, we have seen that there has been a group which plays the role of labor aristocracy: the comprador-elite, which from the hinterlands joins the metropolitan labor aristocracy in helping the bourgeoisie siphon off more super-profits in return for "their share." And, we have noted, in Yugoslavia it was just this – comprador-elite – type of super-profit-siphoner that was being created by revisionism.

Such a line of reasoning suggests that *not capitalism in general, but specifically a new form of colonialism was being "restored" in Eastern Europe*. And it was specifically a type of colonialism previously exposed as appertaining to Afro-America and to Japan.⁴⁸

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The type of deals soon being concluded all over Eastern Europe between revisionists in power and Western monopolies bolstered that side of the "new form" of colonialism whereby the new elite created and sustained itself. In a large number of these, the new industries opened in socialist countries – by Coca Cola, Fiat, Renault, Krupp, etc. – were *owned* (sometimes, but not always, in partnership with the new elite) by Western Big Business while* labor was supplied by the socialist country at rates at least distinctly lower than those of the country in which the Western Business was located.

Therefore, when the first profits started flowing back to the West out of such factories, genuine old-fashioned exploitation had been reintroduced into Europe's lands of socialism.

On the other hand, these new relations between Eastern Europe and the West did result in a growing industrialization of the Eastern European countries involved.

This situation can be made clearer from remarks by a Belgium quondam pro-China Marxist, discussing what was happening in a number of industrialized capitalist countries which, he noted,

"are also the object of the aims of American imperialism, and by every means. Look at Belgium, look at all of Western Europe. Look at...France"⁴⁹

The wealth of detail in this author's analysis of imperialist activities in Western European countries* allows us to note very similar processes inside Eastern Europe's once-socialist countries. Though they were during the early 60s just at the beginning of this development, could

they avoid a similar outcome? There was evidence that the "lackeys and puppets" of Eastern Europe were – perhaps out of necessity – rougher customers than the apparently supine Western European oligarchs who had had time to get rich in the accepted Western manner over centuries of capitalism:

"There is no such thing as a quick buck in Eastern Europe...Once a deal is finally made...many firms find themselves accepting barter goods that are barely marketable...Other firms find that their Communist customers will buy a product, copy it and then produce it themselves...some"

* See Appendix V for detailed analysis of imperialist penetration into Western Europe.

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cautious US Government officials believe...Communists will never allow their economies to become dependent on capitalist imports...but even these hardliners might be converted to reluctant admiration by Communist bargaining tactics...'The hardest-boiled capitalist couldn't match the way they shave your profit by demanding extra options after they've agreed on the basic price'."50

But postponement was not avoidance. If Eastern Europe's new oligarchies could not avoid the Belgian-type outcome, then – even should the present hinterlands under China's guidance achieve genuine economic independence, even on a significant scale – imperialism would nonetheless still be able to totter along again for some while (painful to the super-exploited), nurtured from a source of super-profits at one time snatched from them – but which they never gave up hopes of regaining, and were soon beginning to succeed without so naming the process, in regaining.

And a possible portent of the future may have been contained in one further comment by the Belgian:

"American imperialism considers that the other imperialist countries – including its allies – must be its second reserve area.

"The consequences of this situation are important.

"The countries of this 'second intermediary zone' thus acquire a double character. On the one hand, in so far as (they are) imperialist countries, they remain countries exploiting and oppressing the peoples and nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

"But on the other hand, the peoples of these industrialized capitalist countries, under the American rule, are more and more exploited, super-exploited, by American imperialism.

"And it is this aspect of the double character of these countries of the 'second intermediary zone' which takes on ever more importance and which tends to predominate over the first and ever more so as American imperialism is always substituting itself for the old colonialists."⁵¹

Should we seek this same process in reverse in the countries of Revisionism? Had they, too, while succumbing as "colonies of a new type" to outside imperialism, also become super-exploiters?

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and oppressors of the "peoples and nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America"?

Since the Modern Revisionists had already offered socialist labor-power to dying imperialism, it should not surprise if they soon joined Western powers in super-exploiting colonial areas. But the point was (not only the new contradictions developed with imperialism in trying to encroach on its territories, but also) that once again, imperialism's demise, for which it has long been so ready, so over-ripe, was being put off.

It seems to this writer that Modern Revisionism's full criminality against the world's colonial peoples must – and will ~ be judged in this light.

XI | THE SINO-SOVIET "DEBATE"

This treatise has been talking about Modern Revisionism, which (it will be shown, point by point, below) is simply a new form of Social Democracy.

In this context, and in this only, have we considered Revisionism. If Chinese sources were quoted; if Albanian writers had to be called upon, this was not the fault of the writer, who is all for letting the chips fall where they may. All the while, thus far, Sino-Soviet differences were not systematically or explicitly compared.

But the modern revisionists are literally and figuratively staking their lives on their positions in this "Debate." Yet, their "peaceful co-existence" is only one side of a coin of which anti-China activity is another. At the same time, the Chinese have described themselves as defending in the grand revolutionary manner the practice of Marxism-Leninism of the type espoused and lived by Lenin.

Within these reasons, we shall, therefore, now deal briefly within its relationship to Modern Revisionism with the "Debate" itself, even at the risk, via our very brevity, of greatly underplaying its significance for world revolution.

The story of this controversy has been gone over in political detail by those involved in it. For example, in its opening sentence, an Albanian source offered its own background for the world "argument:"

"All counter-revolutionary forces – the imperialists headed by the United States, the modern revisionists headed by the traitorous Soviet leaders, and the reactionaries of all countries – are wildly attacking the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung...

"...what are their motives?...since Stalin's death...China's great proletarian cultural revolution...developed under...the Chinese Communist Party on the basis of"

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Comrade Mao Tse-tung's teachings, is a new hard blow against the Kruschovites' hostile schemes because this great revolution...is striking, with revolutionary firmness, at the revisionists...hiding within the Chinese Communist Party and eliminates any possibility of degeneration into revisionism."¹

But the statement raises questions: HOW did Modern Revisionism reach its pinnacle of power? WHO supported it; who opposed? What was this "Debate" all about? Why were Modern Revisionism's worst attacks directed specifically at *China*? What about Mao? The "Red Guards? The "great proletarian cultural revolution"?

Too often, it was forgotten how Kruschov and his cohorts had come to power. When they "took over the reins" inside the Kremlin, no counter-blow was struck; and most decidedly, the Soviet masses were not "in on it" in any way. Evidently, Stalin's death had caused a lot of wavering and indecision inside the Soviet Communist Party. So, what really happened in the Soviet Union, citadel of world revolution, back in 1956, was a *palace coup*, during which power and revolution were both taken over *by representatives of the class enemy*.

In a speech in China during the Spring of 1966, an Albanian Communist official called attention to serious consequences then becoming clear:

"One of the most outstanding peculiarities of modern revisionism lies in the fact that it is a revisionism *in power* in several socialist countries and, above all, in the Soviet Union... What is to be regretted most is the fact that it embraces the most veteran party, the party which has had the greatest experience and highest authority in the world; that it contaminated the leadership of the earliest and most powerful socialist states... This is one of the main reasons why modern revisionism has spread so far and so wide and why it has become so dangerous."²

Moreover, when it was considered who supported, and who opposed, Modern Revisionism, its real role stood out.

The writer is of that generation in this world born and brought up with the Great October Revolution. In "those days," the Soviet Union was referred to as "the workers' Fatherland," and young

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Communists everywhere learned that their main duty, *in order to practice proletarian internationalism*, lay in defending the existence of that Fatherland. In the U.S. Communist Youth organization, we used to sing a song, the refrain of which ran:

"Fly higher, and higher – and hi – gher;

"Our emblem is the Soviet star;

"And every propellor is roaring, 'Red Front!'

"We're defending the USSR."

To carry out this belief, we braved the pressures, scorns and reprisals of a grim and plenty-powerful society. But defend the USSR *we did!* So did the British workers, whose general strike in 1926 frustrated new anti-Soviet intervention. So did workers everywhere around the then-still-capitalist 5/6 of the world. And as we acted in such a way, we learned to take courage in the face of newspaper lies, ravings, and stool-pigeoning by asking ourselves one question: "To what class

does this defamer of the workers' Fatherland belong?" He was a class enemy! So, then we knew where we stood; and we were able, secure in that knowledge, to hold our ground.*

Those of us who lived through that practical political education recall it vividly today. For, by applying precisely the same tests, we again know where we stand. How? We see People's China today in precisely the same position as the USSR was when it alone was the workers' Fatherland. We understand quite thoroughly why Wall Street, the Pentagon and their lap dogs hate China: China represents the beginning of the end of colonialism forever.

So, when we note who today defends the *colonial* workers' Fatherland, and who betrays it, our past experience forces us, however reluctantly, to conclude who is friendly to revolution and who are its enemies.

Of course, if the world "chieftain of reaction" becomes your "friend," then you must needs endow him with the character of the Dove of Peace. Logical. But still, we have had to draw conclusions—

* The fact, to which the existence of this volume testifies, that on occasion we wrongly identified "the class enemy" is another story, of which the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution furnishes the theme.

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— and therefore, we have been forced to abandon our former naive faith in the infallibility of a leadership simply because it sits inside the Kremlin.

Moreover, even as we sadly watched that leadership's rapid deterioration into the very depths of sycophancy, we nonetheless recognized that the Real World, that hard school, was still moving forward.

What, then, did we get out of the so-called Sino-Soviet Debate?

We heard many who deplored the "name-calling," the sharpness, the increasing polarization which it evoked. But we had to recognize that, in the light of both detractors and supporters, its subject was simply whether or not there should be a world revolution to relieve that two-thirds of mankind who still suffer the miseries of colonialism.

In our day, imperialism is ripe for plucking — and the hands to pluck it also exist. The Sino-Soviet "Debate" had seemed to this writer at first to be arguing about whose casualties are to pay the price of this necessary operation.* Those in the Kremlin, as we see it, have been saying, in as many ways as such a thing can be said, "Let's YOU bear the brunt of this; we have paid all we intend to pay." The Modern Revisionist position on the primacy of "peace" as a world issue has merely implied in a back-handed way that "War" is only "War" if people in industrialized places are dying of it. Of early deaths, infant mortality, high disease rates and the like as casualties of

class war; or the likelihood that they themselves might again have to lay their lives on the line for freedom for ALL the world's peoples – of all this, their "solution" has been that *colonial peoples are expendable*.

Modern Revisionism has made a cult and fetish of "reform" as the way to "get to socialism" politely and without mess. They have tried to attribute to Chinese Marxists and their supporters a "position" rejecting ANY reform and advocating ONLY violence and holocaust. But as far as we can see, the very same accusation↯

* Later, it became clear that the "Debate" is really about whether to have the "necessary operation" at all, or not: to rebel or to knuckle under to imperialism.

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could also be leveled against Lenin. Didn't he take a similar position under the conditions of his own day?

"Unlike the anarchists, the Marxists recognize struggle for reforms, i.e., measures that improve the workers' conditions without destroying the power of the ruling class. But the Marxists wage a most resolute struggle against the *reformists* who, directly or indirectly, *confine* the aims and activities of the working class to the winning of reforms...for as long as there is the domination of capital, the workers are condemned to remain wage slaves, notwithstanding individual improvements."³

Imperialism, of course, often has been forced to cough up concessions so that it could silence any effective opposition internally while it went about its main business of hog-tying the colonies of other imperialisms, won in the anti-Fascist military victory, for which it claimed it had paid the highest share of the total price, and which it therefore felt it alone should cash in on. One "concession" coughed up during that conflict, and already discussed⁴, was Afro-American upgrading during World War II. In that case, what became clear was that imperialism gives; but what it gives for a while it sooner or later takes away.

Innumerable quotations from the fountainheads of Modern Revisionism have shown without a chance for contradiction that the struggle for reforms alone has dominated their "new principles." And, in implementing those "principles," they invariably have been found on "the other side of the barricades" when struggles for freedom necessarily have graduated to revolutionary violence.

Some of the touchiest points in discussing the Sino-Soviet "Debate" have revolved around the Red Guards of China, the person of Mao Tse-tung, and the "great proletarian cultural revolution" which the Chinese Party said was being carried out by the whole people of China.

Every organ of imperialist "information," every two-bit puppet dancing on imperialism's political, economic and military strings in no-matter-what remote nook of this green earth has

raised the anti-China banner around any or all of these three points. A veritable smog of verbiage about them has polluted the international—

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air. One did not have to be a political sophisticate to pin-point the object of Uncle Sam's affection: it always has been, is, and will remain as long as the old boy clings to this life, his precious "system," defence of which is now almost his sole, if bloody, preoccupation.

In this light, what were the Red Guards doing? Plainly, they must have been dislodging from positions of influence all the "friends" and supporters Uncle Sam still thought he had inside places like China. About 90% of Chinese in office who upheld any revisionist position, whatever name they called it, were simply kicked out of office.* Amidst all the noise and upheaval that greeted this activity in "respectable" circles, nobody could point to large-scale deaths in the process. Nuns discommoded, officials or their henchmen man-handled a bit here and there, foreign officials imprisoned or kicked out – such was the best the "opposition" could dig up. Yet the squeals from Uncle and his hired chorus were of anguish.

But how did these Red Guards, most of whom seemed refreshingly youthful, know which of their plenty-subtle officials and other "persons in authority" needed to be tossed out? We can't pretend to judge whether their decisions were infallible (or permanent) – that seems unlikely. But – for the first time in history, including the history of revolution – these youngsters did make it possible consciously to create a situation (instead of waiting for History's slow inexorability to evoke it) wherein ideas seized hold of the masses, so as to become "a material force." In fact, the way it looked from here, China's youth managed this historic feat backwards: it was the masses who seized hold of ideas!

WHICH ideas? Simply those of the man who qualified as the "bête noire" of international imperialism and its would-be prolongers, although to world revolutionaries he became the "beloved—

* Under the topic, "National Factionalism," a document taken from SURVEY OF MAINLAND CHINA PRESS (U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong), No 4190, June 4, 1968, entitled "Whither China?" and authored by "The Sheng-wu-lien of Hunan" (i.e., the Hunan Provincial Proletarian Revolutionaries' Great Alliance Committee) which reached the writer via correspondents in Sweden) claimed that "the 'Red' capitalist class (of China) gained almost overwhelming ascendancy (over—

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leader and mentor." Many of us still living could remember when Lenin, and then Stalin, had been in the same boat that Mao was in. Before him, only Lenin and Stalin had been as cordially

hated by reaction – that is, by the enemies of subjugated peoples and of socialism. Only Mao has become as beloved by the lowly all over the world as was at least Lenin before him.

This fact is as obvious as today's weather. What, then, could be said of those who, pretending to be "revolutionaries," joined the chorus of hate against a man whose words, ideas and thought were able to release the energies, abilities and creativities of millions of human beings in an entirely new way?

While the support of the masses and their participation were needed to make the Russian revolution, experience in the USSR has by now revealed, through the outcropping of Revisionism, that the clue to the future, whenever Revolution seizes power, lies in enabling the next generation also to grasp, understand and practise revolution. A revolution, time has revealed, is not finished, once power has been seized: it has just begun.

Chairman Mao of China has been responsible for bringing out precisely this revelation. Let revisionists, liberals and fascists weep over "the mistakes of the Red Guards" as they for the first time carried forward a mighty revolution! WELL may such enemies weep: for, mistakes or no, the Red Guards were moving in a direction which, attained, would ensure the political doom of all these very same mourners.

The fact of the matter was, as far as this writer was concerned, and however paradoxical it might sound, that Modern Revisionism had *one accomplishment* greatly to its (involuntary) credit: it specifically gave rise to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in People's China!

the Cultural Revolution) in February and March (1968)." (P 6). "The (means of production and power) were seized from the revolutionary people and returned to the bureaucrats... Intoxicated by his victory...Chou En-lai – at present the general representative of China's Red capitalist class – hurriedly tried to set up revolutionary committees in all parts of the country." This succeeded only partially and temporarily, according to this account. Ibid.

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Whoever denounced the fountainhead of that new advance of humanity, under whatever excuse, was in the same category as those who had denounced Lenin and those who had decried Stalin: they feared revolution; they were against revolution; they wanted to destroy revolution. They equally detested every one of revolution's manifestations: proletarian dictatorship, the vanguard party, and tested theory.

XII | HOW THE USSR COULD BETRAY

Lenin had noted that there was not

"only one variety of opportunism: the frank, crude, cynical variety. The others act in a stealthy, subtle, 'honest' manner. Engels once said that 'honest' opportunists are the most dangerous for the working class."¹

This quotation had ironical overtones when betrayal of revolution was discussed, nor is it being quoted here in any liberal sense: whether or not the CPSU leadership was "sincere" couldn't matter less, objectively. What this quotation is intended to convey is what the Albanian source was talking about: the misuse of Soviet prestige earned by its revolutionary past. Still, all revolutionary pasts, confronted with betrayal, arouse surprise. Even Lenin had asked:

"how was it POSSIBLE for the most prominent representatives of the Second International to betray socialism?"²

To his own question, he had replied:

"...the fact that the opportunists formally belong to workers' parties does not by any means remove the fact that, objectively, they are a political detachment of the bourgeoisie, channels of their influence, its agents in the labor movement."³

He was quite specific about how the answer to the question should be sought:

"This question must not, of course, be examined from the standpoint of the personal biography of this or that authority...what interests the socialist movement at present is...the study of the historical origin, the conditions, the significance and strength of the social-chauvinist TREND. 1) Where did social-chauvinism come from? 2) What gave it strength? 3) How must it be combated?"⁴

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Today, nearly fifty years after Lenin's death, these are the depths to which the Soviet leading clique has also descended. People are still trying to find out HOW? Albania's spokesmen suggested one answer:

"it was precisely because of...the lack of vigilance, of courage and steadfastness of the old revolutionary cadres, that renegades like Kruschov, Mikoyan and others...long...hidden in the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, managed to usurp the leadership of the Party and State...and put into effect their anti-Marxist...line of action."⁵

The Indonesians had come to the same conclusion, for the Albanian hosts of those making the self-criticism had noted:

"The Political Bureau, in its self-criticism, has stressed that the source of the mistakes and weaknesses of the Party in the past can be found in the ideological weaknesses, especially in subjectivism, with the petty-bourgeois class as its social basis."⁶

These subjective weaknesses also fell into a particular historical context, one which magnified them, fertilized them and made them the seriously "productive" errors that they were.

To understand Modern Revisionism, it has to be remembered that all conditions extant in Lenin's day, visible within national boundaries, have since escalated to the international level. Many insights follow from that realization.

Summarizing the causes for the spectacular collapse, when confronted with its first major international crisis, of what had been a workingmen's international, the "Second" or "Socialist," Lenin had summarised:

"...this collapse, which signifies the complete victory of opportunism, the transformation of the Social-Democratic parties into national-liberal labor parties, is only the result of the entire historical epoch of the Second International."⁷

Lenin had then analyzed that "historical epoch." Today, surely the collapse of Soviet leadership has been hardly less striking—

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than that of the Second International. And obviously, this disintegration was every bit as much as the earlier one "only the result of the entire historical epoch" of the Soviet Union's existence and evolution.

What, then, was that "entire historical epoch"? Why had it, not so differently from that of the Second International, also "engendered and fostered opportunism"?

If, as Lenin had declared, the material roots of revisionism lay in its class basis, it might be helpful to review Lenin's description of the bases of revisionism in his era:

"Firstly, chauvinism and opportunism in the labor movement have the same economic basis: the alliance between a numerically small upper stratum of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, who enjoy crumbs of the privileges of 'their' national capital, against the mass of the proletarians, the masses of the toilers and the oppressed in general. Secondly, the two trends have the same ideological and political content. Thirdly, taken as a whole, the old division of Socialists into an opportunist and a revolutionary trend...characteristic of

the...Second International...CORRESPONDS to the new division into chauvinists and internationalists."⁸

That was then.

Owing to the growth of imperialist parasitism in the time since, that "numerically small upper stratum of the proletariat" of which Lenin wrote has been greatly augmented, becoming a majority in the U.S. and approaching that status in Europe.* An alliance between this "upper stratum" and the petty bourgeoisie had, in Lenin's day, furnished soil for opportunism; today, that soil has deepened and spread far and wide.

So, the class base of opportunism in the imperialist system has, in our own era, greatly expanded. It still operates on exactly the basis Lenin had described only, now, at the international level.

We have seen in this text that opportunism and chauvinism peacefully co-exist" in our time: Lenin's second premise remains qualitatively unchanged.

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XVIII through XXIII.

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Considering Lenin's third point, has there occurred a "division" of "Socialists" today? What else is the "Sino-Soviet Debate"? This text has dissected the ideological roots that nourish such a development, disclosing that, today, the division among "Socialists" may still be described as "opportunist-chauvinists vs. internationalists." But *today's* division has encompassed the entire globe in a new and deeper way than in Lenin's time.

What objective conditions "engendered and fostered" this particular split? What historical conditions evolved into our time from what Lenin had described as

"the transition from the completion of bourgeois and national revolutions in Western Europe to the beginning of socialist revolutions."²

to bring us to the present?

If Lenin's day had marked the beginning of the socialist revolution, do we not live during its development? And has not the core of that "development" been contained specifically in the surge of anti-colonial liberation?

Here is a hint of the first question to which we want an answer.

Section A: Where Does Modern Revisionism Come From?

Consider Lenin's words about the revisionists of his time:

"The inevitability of revisionism is determined by its class roots in modern society. Revisionism is an international phenomenon...everywhere essentially similar, notwithstanding the vast differences in the national conditions and historical factors in the present state of all...countries."¹⁰

Elsewhere, he had added:

"Everybody agrees that opportunism is not an accidental thing, not a sin, not a slip, not the treachery of individual persons, but the social product of a whole historical epoch. But not everybody ponders over the significance of this truth. Opportunism has been reared by legalism."¹¹

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In the time intervening since Lenin's day, there has been, first of all, the period 1918-1945, the period of Socialism's victory in the USSR and its defiant persistence as the only socialist land on earth. From those years, the world revolutionary movement drew experience and lessons. Defense of that land, and the lessons of that defense formed the core of the movement's next tactics in advancing world revolution. Most decidedly, however, the USSR's triumph enormously increased imperialist pressures against world revolution, with its spearhead then in the "workers' fatherland." This was equally true in the ideological sphere.

The year 1945 marked not only the military victory of anti-Fascism, but an equally significant event the victory of a "little" Asian colony, Indo-China, which became the second country and the first in the colonial world to throw off successfully the capitalist yoke, when "Uncle" Ho Chi Minh led his people in founding the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. *With that founding, the new aspect of the current era had been established.*

World War II victory had had a profound effect on the world revolutionary movement. First, up until the "Allied" entry into the war on the Soviet Union's side, all Western Marxists had confidently expected the imperialist rulers to UNITE so as to unleash total war against the USSR. For decades, they had steeled and exhorted their supporters into defending the cordon-surrounded USSR. When Hitler had let loose his panzer "blitzkrieg," most Western Communists fully expected the "infant" socialist land to succumb. The initial, militarily-dictated huge retreats of the Soviet armed forces staggered a good many more. Even when the Red Army revealed at Stalingrad that it was unbeatable, the Western Left continued to look for the "Allies" to bolster Hitler, not Russia. This context was significant not only because it implied certain errors in critical analysis; it also furnished considerable background for what happened as a result to the World Left in so many places:

Failure of so many of the world's Marxists (notably in the West and in Eastern Europe) to adhere completely to Marxism-Leninism→

to see clearly what an alliance with the bourgeoisie can and can not do led to a general relaxation of "revolutionary vigilance." The "sensible sections" of international finance were so suavely represented by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, flower of his class. As later occurred in colonial areas, the weight of tradition proved too heavy for the working class' representatives. They allowed themselves to be over-awed by the polished smoothness of their sudden new "allies." And the latter, class-conscious to their finger-tips, with their several hundreds of years' experience in governing, took full advantage of the revolutionary let-down.

Again, the cause for this phenomenon was found in the relationships of class forces existing during the epoch that followed World War II.

Lenin had made a very significant point:

"There has never been, and never can be, a class struggle in which PART of the advanced class does not remain on the side of the reactionary forces. That applies to civil war, too...

"...The split-away of the TOP STRATA of the working class, corrupted by a middle-class way of life and opportunism and BRIBED by 'soft jobs' and other bourgeois sops, began to take shape on a world scale in the autumn of 1914 and reached its final development* in 1915-1918. By disregarding this historical fact and blaming the Communists for the split in the movement, Kautsky only proves, for the thousandth time, that he is a lackey of the bourgeoisie."¹²

Not much imagination is needed to substitute for the word "Communists" the word "Chinese;" and for "Kautsky," "Kruschov." Moreover, on the international level at which the world bourgeoisie (rocked by all its internal contradictions, nonetheless) now mainly operated, the "sops" it dispensed explained how it penetrated that section of the world revolution where the proletariat had won power: the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its successors;—

* We have shown in *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XVIII through XXIV, "The Modern Labor Aristocracy," that 1915-18 was far from the "final development" of the "TOP STRATA" of the world working class.

the endless, extravagant, calculated and broadly financed flatter and ego-build-up of socialist countries' individual leaders, including the innumerable top-level *secret* talks of the ilk of Camp David and Vienna; the feverish operations of the UN, etc.

So, the current era has been characterized by specific developments in the "world labor movement," too: the growth of the labor aristocracy into a majority of the strategic American working class; the continued "sops" now by no means "crumbs," except by comparison with the ruling class' take to the still-growing "top stratum" of the workers and to top individuals in the socialist world, all have contributed to the ideological softening described above. And moribund imperialism, with cunning born of desperation, has turned that softening to good account.

How did the world bourgeoisie get away with it? Why didn't the revolution's leaders-in-power see what was going on and alert their cadres? Why did the error persist for so long?

Lenin had called attention to "the rapid acquiring of new content by old forms," which, he said, the leaders of the Second International forgot or did not know about. Still talking of those leaders, he had added:

"The principal reason for their bankruptcy was that they were 'enchanted' by one definite form of growth of the labor movement and socialism, they forgot all about the one-sidedness of this form, they were afraid of seeing the sharp break which objective conditions made inevitable and continued to repeat simple, routine, and, at a first glance, incontestable truths, such as: 'three is more than two.' But politics is more like algebra than arithmetic; and still more like higher mathematics than elementary mathematics. In reality, all the old forms of the socialist movement have acquired a new content, and, consequently, a new sign, the 'minus' sign, has appeared in front of all the figures; but our wiseacres stubbornly continued (and still continue) to persuade themselves and others that 'minus three' is more than 'minus two'!"¹³

Could any words more succinctly sum up the current situation in working class ranks throughout the world? Today, the "wiseacres" who presume to lead the USSR are "enchanted" with definite and—

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one-sided forms of "peace," regardless of their shape. The euphoria of Potsdam and Teheran blinded them to the chill mist which poisoned the air over Fulton: the honeymoon was over when Winston Churchill, with a candor really deserving only of thanks, made his famous address which was popularly considered to have opened the Cold War.

Now, it has been seen that Marxists in industrialized countries had been largely absorbed into the Western labor aristocracies, from which cozy retreat in their sophisticated but still "Marxist" jargon they very soon began espousing that aristocracy's position in all spheres.¹⁴

The question here is: the extent (a) of the influence of such Western Marxists on Eastern European socialist centers in the latter's interpretation of the alleged role of capitalism's working classes and in bringing about the resulting tacit acceptance of unconsciously pro-colonialist

attitudes; and (b) to which Eastern European socialism began to benefit materially from contacts with some of the "former" colonies of imperialism.

The first question involves analyses of capitalism perpetrated by the economists of the Western Left, postulating growing poverty as the main characteristic of imperialist countries and announcing, therefrom, the "revolutionization" of the Western working class.* Such analyses were translated regularly in Soviet theoretical magazines whence, in various languages, they found their way from the U.S., Britain, France, etc. into the entire World Left. Likewise, for many decades no voice challenged these positions: so, like some evil vaccination, they "took" with a vengeance.

The second matter refers to such facts as that raw material prices, though set by the imperialist-controlled world market, offered *extra* profits to purchasers even when as with cocoa from Ghana Eastern Europeans paid an increment over the world price. There was also the whole question of what happened to those raw materials when they came into revisionist hands after 1956 as trade between the socialist countries and (at least) Africa really began growing: reports of Egyptian cotton being—

* See *Labor Aristocracy*.

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"dumped" and undercutting the Egyptian crop; of Ghanaian cocoa being sold at a loss by Soviet purchasers; of the USSR diamond marketing organization saving the De Beers diamond empire of South Africa by refraining from flooding the Western market with plentiful and excellent Soviet diamonds; the fate of Cuban sugar (examined above), etc. At one time, even mention of such shenanigans was inhibited by loud cries from the Kremlin or its controlled centers of "anti-Sovietism." Today, the results of such revisionist performances have made it imperative that such stories be documented and published far and wide.

Also included in the second part of the question above were deals that were more and more being concluded with investors from huge monopolies, whereby the latter operated factories in socialist countries from which not only were super-profits to flow into capitalist citadels from socialist labor power, but such investment was also to permit socialist countries to share in the subsequent flooding of colonial markets with goods thus cheaply produced under socialism, a possibility already discussed by Africans. This would place certain former socialist countries about mid-way in the imperialist hierarchy of the world imperialist system! Such a position always fosters "ambition."

Against this background, it is possible to gauge an Albanian judgement:

"Revisionism today, as an offering of imperialism, constitutes in fact 'the second imperialist front' against socialism and freedom-loving peoples."¹⁵

"...the Soviet leaders...are pursuing in Europe a policy of 'appeasement,' of 'not aggravating matters,' leaving free play to American imperialists and inciting them to escalate their aggression to the East, against Vietnam and especially against China."¹⁶

There was also a Chinese evaluation of the situation:

"(Old-line) revisionism...the product of imperialist policy...arose as a result of...buying over and fostering a labor aristocracy. Modern revisionism has arisen in the same way. Sparing no cost, imperialism...is buying over leading groups in socialist countries and pursues through them its desired policy of 'peaceful evolution'."¹⁷

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The Albanians, too, confirm our above analysis:

"Kruschovite revisionism is a direct continuation of the old revisionism of Bernstein and Kaustsky, of Trotsky and Bukharin, of Browder and Tito. Revisionists, no matter under what guise they appear, are all members of a family of renegades from Marxism-Leninism and socialism. Their social role is one and the same they are the conductors of the bourgeois ideology, its agents and flunkies in the communist and workers movement...all of them...turn their backs on the class struggle, on the socialist revolution, and on the dictatorship of the proletariat. What singles them out from one another are the forms, maneuvers, tactics and methods they use in fighting Marxism-Leninism, the slogans and arguments with which the revisionists try to cover up their treason."¹⁸

Modern Revisionism started on its counter-revolutionary road by destroying Marxist-Leninist theory: they deny the need to expel and refuse to associate with distorters of that theory; deny the need for the vanguard party until the achievement of world communism; repudiate the irreconcilability of class antagonisms in all class societies; scorn certain intricate consequences of the command to expropriate the expropriators; conceal the role of the state, with consequent erosion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, required according to Lenin during the entire transitional era of socialism triumphant; placed war and peace as the main issue of the day, thus abandoning the subjugated peoples to centuries of colonialism; and misread the nature of imperialism to the point of declaring colonialism "collapsed."

In place of Marxism-Leninism they have "created" alleged "new ideas" an amorphous, vague jumble of hackneyed bourgeois concepts, worn thin by decades, even centuries, of repetition by the present imperialist ruling class in its struggle to overthrow the feudal system. With these bourgeois notions, Modern Revisionism planted and cultivated a great crop of revolution-blocking illusions which, though they can never stop permanently, nonetheless do retard, the overthrow of imperialism.

With revolutionary theory watered down, Modern Revisionism was free to, and did, abandon the great doctrine of the class—

struggle in practice, especially its essential expression in the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The overall form this abandonment of class struggle took was "peaceful co-existence." And, immersed in the resulting "class peace," the proletarian vanguard party, so long fought for and defended by Lenin, became expendable. In its stead, there arose the "party of the whole people." The ensuing practical effect was to loosen, and then destroy, the ties that should bind the masses, the party membership and the leadership.

Politically, "peaceful co-existence" became "peaceful transition," or "the parliamentary road," which amounted to destruction of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or socialist state. What emerged with special significance in the practice surrounding "peaceful transition" was this:

With the central or principal contradiction inside the imperialist world today embodied in that between imperialism and the super-exploited continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, material conditions have so conspired that the only actual trials of "peaceful transition" have occurred in colonial-type areas. And what they accomplished was effectively, however temporarily, to side-track the inevitable liberation of these areas at great extra blood cost.

In the first land of socialism, the Soviet Union itself, abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat had taken the form of "the state of the whole people." In practice, that turned out to be a "new form" of bourgeois democracy.

Internationally, Modern Revisionism denied the class struggle and its indispensable proletarian dictatorship by practising *class collaboration* in the form of "U.S.-USSR friendship," one practical aspect of which had been the stress on peace at any price. Such "peace" has involved endless unprincipled compromises, concessions, bargainings, plots and alliances with today's main class enemy. Modern Revisionism also has advocated so-called "peaceful competition" in the economic sphere, which amounted to elevating the cash register into the niche formerly occupied by the bonds of brotherhood.

As a result, Modern Revisionism also *jettisoned proletarian*—

internationalism, substituting a petty-bourgeois nationalism which sometimes it called "humanism," sometimes, "democracy." Under that umbrella, it rehabilitated counter-revolutionary traitors, while in its relationships with fraternal parties it used what one such party dubbed "the baton method," trampling their sovereignty, interfering in their internal affairs and economies. This was accomplished by exerting political, economic and even military pressures, including blockades, military provocations, ruptures in diplomatic relations with socialist

countries, and in openly calling for counter-revolution inside countries where the leadership refused to follow the "baton." And, against all parties or organizations which dared oppose all or any of its practices, Modern Revisionism launched public attacks by issuing slanders and lies.

Finally, Modern Revisionism having itself deserted revolutionary goals tried to persuade (or force) others to do the same: where capitalism still existed, Modern Revisionism supported and sustained it; where it had been overthrown, Modern Revisionism tried by every means to restore it.

In sum, Modern Revisionism had defected to the camp of reformism and to the present moment lived and still lives in perpetual fear of revolution. It exhibits all the features of reformism described by Lenin:

- a) Class collaboration;
- b) Repudiation of the dictatorship of the proletariat;
- c) Repudiation of revolutionary action;
- d) Unconditional recognition of bourgeois legality;
- e) Lack of confidence in the proletariat;
- f) Confidence in the bourgeoisie¹⁹

and its lack of faith in revolution has resulted in its abandoning the world's subjugated peoples to continuing colonialism, with all the brutalities and enormous costs in human casualties inherent in that system, even to its own participation in new forms of super-exploitation.

Have not all these charges been documented from A to Z in these pages? Have not each of Modern Revisionism's "new principles" been shown to be, not revolutionary in the least, but much more akin to what Lenin had characterized as

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"the dreams of a petty bourgeois that the acute struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie can be avoided. For revolution is one continuous and moreover desperate struggle."²⁰

It would appear that our investigation of revisionism has fully bolstered a quondam description by Friedrich Engels, wherein he had characterized opportunists of his own day as

"a band of careerists who have understanding enough to realize the inevitability of the social revolution, but who could not possibly entrust this gigantic task to the raw proletariat alone... Fear of revolution is their fundamental principle."²¹

Or, elsewhere, as

"these overweening bourgeois who would graciously deign to emancipate the proletariat from above if it would only be sensible enough to realize that such a raw, uneducated mass cannot alone emancipate itself and cannot achieve anything except by the grace of these clever lawyers, writers and sentimental old women."²²

Section B: Source of Modern Revisionism's Strength

By the word "strength," the concepts "tenacity" and/or "spread" are intended. For, the inner contradictions of revisionism itself give it an overall *weakness* in the historical view. Within this context, however, on what basis has this counter-revolutionary system hung on so long and spread so far?

First, as suggested earlier,²³ the prestige of the successful October Revolution, backed and enhanced by the world-wide reputation and record of both Lenin and Stalin as Marxist-Leninist helmsmen, undoubtedly if only through the USSR's misuse of both prolonged the schism.

Second, based on the might of the Red Army, Stalin's military victory over all Nazism and imperialist ruling circles could hurl against the workers' fatherland greatly increased Soviet prestige.

Third, the international revolutionary tradition of solidarity with that fatherland, in which whole generations of revolutionaries the world over had been reared: to defend, and if need be, to

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give one's life to preserve the world's first successful workers' revolution made it difficult to admit that "the fatherland" could betray.

Fourth, Lenin had pointed, in his own time, to a central factor:

"The gigantic strength of the opportunists and chauvinists comes from THEIR ALLIANCE with the bourgeoisie, with the governments and the General Staffs."²⁴

If this had been true for the epoch in which Lenin spoke, what could be said of the era of Camp Davids, Viennas and Glassboros?

Aside from relating Kruschov revisionism to that of Kautsky & Co., Kapo of Albania made the following accusation:

"Following in the tracks of old revisionism and of the present social-democracy which, together with bourgeois ideology and anti-communist propaganda, makes up their spiritual nourishment, Kruschovite revisionists with the Soviet leaders at their head have, in fact, wiped away all distinction between friends and foes, they have joined with the imperialists against socialism."²⁵

Moreover, discussing the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, held in Bucharest, another Albanian source declared:

"...the Kruschovite revisionists (are) doing their uttermost to restore capitalism in the countries (where) they have usurped power, while the old Communist Parties of Western Europe, plunged...in the quagmire of revisionism, *play the already-discredited role of social-democracy* in the 'traditional opposition' to the interest of the bourgeoisie. Now the main objective...of the imperialists towards Eastern Europe is no longer military...but ideological and political...finding...ways...to build 'bridges' between capitalist and revisionist Europe in order to speed up the economic, political and cultural integration of the latter into the former."²⁶

These Albanians elaborated:

"These renegades play now the same vicious role in the service of U.S. imperialism as the socialist traitors played in the service of English and French imperialism when—

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the latter...set up the ill-famed 'sanitary cordon' against Soviet Russia following the October revolution."²⁷

A Belgian Communist suggested what had become of such "socialist traitors":

"The reformist social democratic parties today are everywhere in full decomposition, this being the consequences (sic) of the deepening general crisis...of capitalism."²⁸

Manifestations of this deterioration were listed in the Albanian source:

1. *Arms deals*: "...the large quantity of armaments...delivered to the Indian reactionaries to use against the great socialist country in Asia."²⁹

2. *Another attempted "cordon sanitaire" around China*, through the "renewed Soviet-Mongolia Treaty...recently signed," which it was charged was now "assuming an anti-Chinese...instead of...anti-Japanese character it had before."³⁰

3. Simultaneously, "the chiefs of revisionism are paving the road for Japanese imperialists to penetrate into Siberia, a fact without precedence not only in the history of the Soviet Union but also in that of Russia of the Czars."³¹

4. The same Japanese penetration of Siberia was, the Albanians added, also directed against North Korea.³²

In a word, Modern Revisionism in our day has been playing a role very similar to the one played by Social Democracy in Lenin's time.

Section C: Comparison of Social Democracy and Modern Revisionism

We will now show that Modern Revisionism is Social Democracy in the form in which it has penetrated into the socialist world.

Criteria for judging whether or not an ideology or trend qualifies for the designation "social democratic" have been described elsewhere.* They are:

1. **The material base**: Social Democracy is based on—

* See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter II, "Social Democracy Defined."

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the labor aristocracy in metropolitan areas. It is virtually non-existent in colonial areas. But a comprador elite in such places "plays the same role," that of siphoning off part of imperialism's super-profits at the expense of continually-worsening conditions for the colonial masses.

The Modern Revisionists have been creating an elite which qualified as semi-colonial, in that it was dependent on its rulers' links with outside imperialism, while helping imperialism to carry away from within its own midst ever-greater super-profits. In this, it assumed many features of the elites of those smaller countries of Western Europe today into which U.S. imperialism has penetrated. In all places, starting with Yugoslavia, this process has advanced rapidly in the socialist world, historically speaking, though whether its full impact has yet been achieved remains to be seen.

If the superiority of socialist economy has hitherto raised the Russian worker, for example, to an international rank of seventh in real wages,³³ it can be confidently predicted that this ranking will soon be lowered (as has already happened in Yugoslavia) when profits siphon off the fruits of Russian labor power (though, naturally, Russian *statistics* will probably rise in reflection of the bloating of elitist incomes). So, on this basis, no large labor aristocracy might be expected to develop in former socialist countries under conditions likely to arise there.* Benefits already

accruing to the Eastern European technocrats should become eroded, though those retaining them should become richer if fewer as imperialist penetration spreads. The cream of the crop would be expected to go to the new elite.

But the creation of this elite and its resemblance to that of some colonial or tied Western European areas placed Modern Revisionism in the company of Social Democracy, at least insofar as its material base was concerned. The colonial elite, as we→

* However, any aristocracy is a *relative* phenomenon in its natural habitat. Thus, the sentiment expressed should be seen as international in level. Locally, to maintain the contention that they are "building communism," the top USSR elite would be forced to spread visible material improvements over a wide segment of Soviet population. They appear to be doing so.³³

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have seen, had ties with the West's labor aristocracy. And, sure enough, Modern Revisionism was busily creating exactly this tie, with the rapprochement of its World Federation of Trade Unions to the ICFTU. Moreover, the siphoning off of colonial super-profits by the "new" revisionist methods appeared to be wisely and widely shared with a relatively large section of the Russian population at present, though that segment did not yet rival the Western variety either in size or in living standards. That was being worked on.³⁴

2. The *essence of Social Democracy is class collaboration*, allegedly as a by-product of "policy in labor's interests." Such class collaboration is made possible because Social Democracy denies and negates the Marxist doctrine of class struggle, especially the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This has been counterparted in Modern Revisionism: its "abolition of classes," its "party of the whole people," its "state of the whole people," its policy of "peaceful co-existence" which has been shown to be class collaboration with international imperialism. All evidence of real class struggle inside its borders was attributed to "individuals". Naturally, because its policies were presented as being in the interests of "the world's people," of "humanity," and the "working class."

3. *Reformism* is an invariable feature of Social Democracy: making the Status Quo work better.

Modern Revisionism has been claiming that capitalism now *was* "working better." It was allegedly endowed with a "sensible section" among its ruling classes who "understood" realities and could be expected to surrender to "history." This was given as the excuse for working with imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism though (of course!) one works only with "sensible" imperialists.

4. *A more than causal tie between Social Democracy and Fascism* has been shown to be one expression of Social Democracy's more general doctrine of class collaboration, including its acceptance of Fascism's anti-communism, racism and chauvinism.

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Modern Revisionist support for the Indonesian fascists has brought clearly into the open this aspect of its resemblance to Social Democracy. Support for U.S. imperialism has also been shown to be support for *international* fascism. Its literature in Africa has exposed its racism; its activities in "Comecon," its chauvinism.

5. Social Democracy is always characterized by some sort of demagoguery, which refers to Karl Marx and Lenin in areas where workers are tending in a revolutionary direction; but, elsewhere, eschews socialism in favor of a pro-labor stance.

Modern Revisionism has operated mainly inside the socialist countries and in colonial areas, in both of which places the "mantle of Marx and Lenin" was indispensable. Every one of Revisionism's misdeeds has been perpetrated to the accompaniment of copious references to these two socialist "patron saints."

6. The major role of Social Democracy is *specifically to support, sustain and defend colonialism as the source of super-wages* for its client, *the labor aristocracy*. This also results objectively in protecting *super-profits* for the imperialist ruling class, from which super-wages derive.

The overall position of Modern Revisionism, which colonial revolutionaries have described as "betraying Liberation," has been to advise, pressure and threaten colonial countries and/or organizations not to "provoke imperialist atomic war" by fighting for freedom with guns. The doctrine of "peaceful evolution," applied in various forms to colonial areas, has qualified Modern Revisionism as a supporter, sustainer and defender of colonialism; this was how its doctrines operated, objectively, regardless of its lip-services to "principle." Even its postulation of the "collapse" of the colonial system has served and continues to serve that same purpose.

It has also been highly instructive that the only current actual trials of the "peaceful road to socialism" have occurred in colonial and semi-colonial areas: British Guiana, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, UAR and Indonesia, to name some—

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outstanding examples. In "advanced" Western countries, the Revisionist-riddled Communist Parties could, up to now, proceed only on "theory." "Success" has been deemed "close" in some Western countries, such as Italy, Finland and Sweden; but the example of Greece (a semi-colonial country) has also been particularly illuminating.

In fact, the location of such trials of Revisionism's "peaceful road to socialism" has by no means been accidental; rather, it has shown the close tie between Modern Revisionism and colonialism: the results in every case have received a smashing answer from imperialist violence.

Beyond doubt, then, *Revisionism's main effect has been to prolong the era of colonialism*. What better service could it have performed for its "ally," that "sensible section" of world imperialism? What does it matter that the deed was done in the name of "preventing thermonuclear war at any cost"?

7. The test of the mass base was shown not to determine whether a doctrine was social democratic but to define the specific role of Social Democracy wherever it might be operating. Where the super-exploited were far away, the mass base usually developed; but if there were no mass base, one of two consequences has been likely: either the super-exploited were living amidst their super-exploiters, in which case *racism* took over Social Democracy's role; or the area was a colonial one, which could not develop a mass base for Social Democracy because it could not evolve a significant labor aristocracy.

It has been shown that Modern Revisionism has been spreading its "goodies" over a fairly wide area and perhaps this is must be so in all Eastern European formerly-socialist countries. Certainly, the Soviet Union's estimated 37 million elite³⁵ is a "mass base." Quite rightly, too: for the super-exploited in the "Third World" are far away. No wonder the leading revisionist cliques have refused to print Chinese statements in full, while at the same time issuing great niagaras of accusations and charges against China (even descending to the banning of sale of PEKING REVIEW in the USSR:³⁶) The truth might swell the small opposition.

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The fact is that, on every count by which an ideology or trend can be judged, Modern Revisionism has become today's Social Democracy. Moreover, it is the new Social Democracy *in power* in the most venerable socialist land in the world.³⁷

Surprise, if any, should abate after the first hearing: for Lenin had long since analyzed how Social Democracy could and did enter the world labor movement in his own day. And it should not be forgotten that it was also in his own day that the Russian proletariat, an important section of that "world labor movement," led by the Bolshevik Party headed by Lenin, had breached the capitalist system and defended the power it took over on one-sixth of the earth's surface.

It has often been forgotten and/or ignored that, during the period when Soviet power was being consolidated, the imperialists had done the Russian proletariat the favor of practically hermetically sealing it from their corrupt and corrupting system though not, as they had hoped, from the world labor movement. But the military victory against Fascism had broken that seal. Travel restrictions had been lifted on both sides of the borders; propaganda and all kinds of "delegations" were exchanged: capitalist influence found easier and easier access to that portion of the world where the working class had power.

And here in the ideological sphere, included in the *lies* that had been told to Russian workers of how workers under capitalism were living in abject poverty must be noted: because, after World War II with the rupture of the hermetic seal, with the removal or breaching of the "cordon sanitaire," Russians began to visit capitalist countries. There they saw workers living better under capitalism than they were living (as yet) under socialism.

What, then, *is* Modern Revisionism *except* "capitalist influence"? Revisionism goes wherever revolution goes. Lenin had made that plain enough. So, although in this case it had taken the euphoria of an alliance with "sensible" members of the world ruling class during World War II to do the job, it could have been expected, and must continue to be expected, that as long as imperialism exists on earth sooner or later, Revisionism, ▯

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that indispensable agent of imperialism, *must* penetrate into working class ranks.

The reasons that Modern Revisionism has been able to do so much damage have been many, and have been suggested above. But chief among them has been the fact that Marxist-Leninists especially in industrialized Western areas dropped their guard, their revolutionary vigilance and their grasp on theory. And, through the resulting gap, agents and influences of the desperate imperialist system have poured.

Lenin had warned and warned again that the influence of the old established system is always stronger than that of the new vigorous system "for a long historical period" just because of history's weight and the ramifications of the Status Quo: ruling class possession of the instruments of force and education, and international ties.

Therefore, Revisionism today is not something new; it has always been related to Social Democracy; i.e., to opportunism. And today, it continues so, simply marking the fact that, now, opportunism has penetrated into the socialist world; i.e., that section of world revolution where the working class first gained power.

Section D: How Is Modern Revisionism to Be Combated?

The fact that the world revolution has now been penetrated by opportunism should not necessarily be accepted, nor allowed to continue. For, augmenting the danger to world revolution, it has developed into the greatest opportunism of any in history. Only the fight to dislodge it can again move the world revolution forward. How?

To this question, Lenin left many answers, but answers in a context, which consisted of his judgement of the people being combatted:

"...the...Kautskyites have, in the most shameless way, BETRAYED the proletarian revolution...and, IN POINT OF FACT, have sided with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie...the...Kautskyites are...disintegrating, dying parties¬

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whose leaders are abandoning the (old opportunists) and going over to the...Left wing (of opportunism HE), and this Left wing combined in an unprincipled and cowardly manner the hoary prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie about parliamentary democracy, with communist recognition of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government...IN WORDS, but in deeds they remain petty bourgeois democrats..."³⁸

Many of Lenin's scorchingly scornful words about the revisionists of his day are still strikingly applicable to their political descendants:

"They are just as much traitors to socialism as the (right-wing Trade Union 'leaders'). They represent that upper stratum of workers who have been bribed by the bourgeoisie...for in all the civilized, advanced countries the bourgeoisie... either by colonial oppression or by financially extracting 'gain' from formally independent weak countries is robbing populations many times larger than the populations of 'its own' country...to obtain 'super-profit' part of which is used to bribe the upper stratum of the proletariat and convert it into a reformist, opportunist petty bourgeoisie that fears revolution.

"...the wavering...followers of Kautsky...are people without ideas...without a policy, without honor, without conscience, the living embodiment of philistine bewilderment, standing for socialist revolution in words, but actually incapable of understanding it when it began and, in a renegade way, defending 'democracy' in general, that is, ACTUALLY defending BOURGEOIS democracy." ³⁹

In these pages, we have at least laid the groundwork for confirming that the Modern Revisionists are of a similar ilk. Hence, Lenin's exhortations about fighting revisionism have obviously not as yet been superseded:

"...how is social-chauvinism to be combatted? Social-chauvinism is opportunism which has ripened to such a degree, which became so strong and brazen during the long period of

comparatively 'peaceful' capitalism, so definite in its political ideology, and so closely associated with the bourgeoisie and the government, that it is¬

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IMPOSSIBLE to tolerate the existence of SUCH A TREND WITHIN the Social-Democratic Labor Parties. Socialism...has passed out of the comparatively peaceful stage that was confined within narrow national limits (and)...entered the stage of revolutionary action; and there can be no doubt that the time has come for a complete rupture with opportunism, and its expulsion from the workers' parties."⁴⁰

Although the general pattern Lenin suggested was clear enough, it has until today apparently not been possible to implement his advice. Yet, Lenin clearly understood that there would be differences among genuine revolutionaries in applying theory, in defining revolutionary concepts and situations, etc. But what he earnestly believed about such differences was that they were, as compared with those among the opportunists,

"of another kind...differences that have a single, common, granite-like, fundamental basis: recognition of the proletarian revolution, struggle against bourgeois-democratic illusions and bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism, recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government."⁴¹

Lenin's position has found specific support in our epoch among colonial anti-revisionists. For example, consider the words of eight nationalist representatives of African countries, expelled from the late-1966 Russian-controlled Cairo Seminar:

"The struggle against modern revisionism...should be welcomed 'because it shows up the Soviet revisionists for what they are: allies of imperialism for the retention of imperialism, and enemies of armed revolution and thus of human progress'."⁴²

Not very long ago, a most important apparent difference of opinion arose within the anti-colonial arena on this crucial matter. Premier Kim Il Sung, leader of the remarkable (North) Korean socialist nation, was quoted to the following effect in 1967:

"On the major question of which side North Korea backs in the ideological dispute, Kim Il Sung was categorical:

'As far as we are concerned, we will not take any "side." If anyone asks us which "side" we are on we¬

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will answer that we are on the "side" of Marxism-Leninism, on the "side" of revolution. Communists should not take a prejudiced view of the activities of fraternal parties and should not be too inquisitive about them'.⁴³

In a previous section of this interview,⁴⁴ Premier Kim indicated that he and his Party saw signs of approaching U.S. aggression quite similar in "border provocations at the demilitarized zone" between North and South Korea to those of 1950 which had preceded massive invasion by "UN" forces. Had this motivated his statement?

This writer has long been an admirer of the resourceful Korean people and the impressive achievements they have built up under the leadership of their Workers' Party and Kim Il Sung. In less than two decades, almost solely by the efforts of a fully-mobilized people, they built their nation from U.S.-created rubble to a modern country, fully electrified, tax-free and culturally advanced. These facts lend weight to any remarks a man like Premier Kim might utter.

The facts about Modern Revisionism and its role notably in colonial areas of the world have been presented. It is against these realities that the statement of even so impressive an anti-colonial leader as Kim must be measured. And, under the circumstances, his remarks must be compared not only with Lenin's own words, but with experience since Lenin's day, and in the light of Lenin's advice.

Who was right? Could both be correct, each for his own time? Has Lenin's analysis of revisionism and how to combat it gone out of style for our time? Do the components of the "fundamental basis" of Communist context, within which all their differences, according to Lenin, are to be settled,* apply to today's revisionists?

Do modern revisionists "recognize" the proletarian revolution? No. They have abandoned it in favor of a nebulous and deadly "peaceful road" to socialism and done so while paying lip-service to "revolution."

Do modern revisionists "struggle against bourgeois-democratic illusions and bourgeois-democratic parliamentarism"? No. They—

* See quotation covered by Footnote 40, above.

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propagate both, having quit the revolutionary path for the "peaceful" road to human liberation; they have turned their backs on proletarian internationalism, in places supporting outright fascism.

Do modern revisionists recognize "the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government"? On the contrary, they have subverted and destroyed proletarian dictatorship in Eastern Europe and have turned the Soviet government into a "state of the whole people."

In a word, they have contravened every one of Lenin's test components for distinguishing between Marxists and revisionists.

Can we, then, follow the strange advice of Premier Kim, and repress our "inquisitiveness" about treason to that "single, common, granite-like, fundamental basis" of real revolution about which Lenin was adamant? What could have been happening in North Korea to have evoked Premier Kim's peculiar sentiments? Have not real Communists always welcomed and advocated the utmost "inquisitiveness" about communist practice wherever it occurred, in the form of criticism and self-criticism, those motors of democratic centralism?

How could it correct to claim that the "actions of fraternal parties" were the "property" of those parties *alone*? In today's more-and-more economically-integrated world, do not the activities of all parties belong to the entire world revolutionary movement? What, indeed, is the meaning, the content, of the very word "fraternal" in the light of modern revisionist deeds? In today's world, could there really be separation between "fraternal" parties, countries or peoples? Could we ignore the repercussions on all other parties, countries and peoples of the actions of any single one of them?

In an earlier epoch, Lenin had virtually replied in advance to Premier Kim's advice when he said,

"The war of 1914-15 marks such a great turn in history that the attitude towards opportunism CANNOT remain as of old. What has happened cannot be wiped out, it is impossible to obliterate from the minds of the workers, or from the experience of the bourgeoisie, or from the political lessons of our epoch in general, the fact that, at the moment of crisis, the opportunists proved to be the nucleus—"

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of those elements within the workers' party that deserted to the bourgeoisie. Opportunism to speak on a general European scale was in its adolescent stage, as it were, before the war. With the outbreak of the war it grew to manhood and its 'innocence' and youth cannot be restored. A whole social stratum consisting of parliamentarians, journalists, labor officials, privileged employees, and certain strata of the proletariat, has sprung up and has become GRAFTED with its own national bourgeoisie, which was quite able to appreciate and 'adapt' it." ⁴⁵

If the years 1945-49 were inserted in place of 1914-15, would it not have to be said today that "opportunism speaking on a general (world) scale was in its manhood" during the years between those two dates; and that, with the end of World War II, it had gone from "manhood" to "middle age," balding, losing teeth; or even to "senescence," with its youthful fantasies and tottering performances? Could its "hair" or "teeth" ever be restored? Could workers and colonial revolutionaries ever forget the role played by those they had trusted?

On the contrary, Lenin's characterization of how to combat revisionism in his own day remains in force: the comparatively "peaceful" stage of "co-existence" with erstwhile "Allies" of World War II had come to at least the beginning of its end with Churchill's Fulton speech. Events in colonial areas, especially in Vietnam, have left little argument to bolster further adherence to "peaceful development." The process whereby socialism "entered the stage of revolutionary action" has by no means been completed; it continues to develop.

But that means that there is still no room for opportunists in working class ranks; rather, as Lenin had urged,

"It is necessary to proceed to the building of a revolutionary organization this is demanded by the changed historical situation, it is demanded by the epoch of proletarian revolutionary action but it is possible to proceed in this direction only OVER THE HEADS of the old party, by DESTROYING it."⁴⁶

Rereading quotation 1, above, we sense that Lenin's words therein offer further "dialogue" with Kim Il Sung of Korea, above. ▯

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This can be seen by *applying* Lenin's thought to the epoch in which we live:

ARE the masses, today, "abandoning the old opportunists" and "going over to the...Left wing" of opportunism?" Are not the accepted old "Labour Parties" in places like England and Scandinavia, in Austria, finding themselves voted out of office? Perhaps this is not yet "mass abandonment;" but it shows at least a modicum of disillusionment and a certain mass hesitation with serious consequences.

We have dwelt in the foregoing text on the rise of "respectability" among Western "Communist" Parties (and some of them like New Zealand's or Belgium's have been unable, even when starting from an avowedly "Marxist-Leninist" position, to sustain their positions). We have illustrated Revisionism's equation of the words "class struggle" with purer-and-purer economism both among the West's growing labor aristocracies and in Eastern Europe and now ask whether or not (as, for instance, in Great Britain) the West's "Communist" Parties do not play a "hidden" role, actually acting as "midwives" to that economism. If conversations on buses, in shops, etc., in England are significant, there seems little doubt among "ordinary workmen" in that island that "Communists are behind all big strikes," a statement made over and over to the writer during major economic actions by electricity, garbage and mine workers and by postmen.

Finally, does what Lenin called "the new Left" not, in our own time, still combine "in an unprincipled and cowardly manner the hoary prejudices of the petty bourgeoisie about parliamentary democracy, with communist recognition of the proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet government...IN WORDS, but in deeds they remain petty-bourgeois democrats"?

Not only do the modern revisionists of the West, of Eastern Europe and of the mis-named Third World *maintain* that "hoary prejudice" for parliamentary democracy; they have raised it to the position of a sacred cow, wandering the by-ways of revolutionary principle, dropping the dung of its costly errors wherever it goes. With old Social Democracy, representing the¬

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interests of the bourgeoisie by fostering and coddling the labor aristocracy, now discredited, the modern revisionists are eager to step into their place and thus are required to "recognize" Lenin's principles of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet government "IN WORDS;" but, in deeds, they have stuck with parliamentarianism. In deeds, they have repudiated, and continue to repudiate, revolution and to espouse unprincipled compromise with the class enemy.

While he lived, Lenin had postulated that

"The wheel of history cannot be turned back or stopped we can and must go fearlessly forward, from the preparatory legal organizations of the working class, which are captive to opportunism, to revolutionary organizations that know how NOT to confine themselves to legality, that are capable of safeguarding themselves against opportunist treachery, organizations of the proletariat which is entering the 'struggle for power,' the struggle for overthrowing the bourgeoisie."⁴⁷

Today, those who wish to emulate rather than emasculate Lenin now face the task of evaluating his advice by studying the realities of our own epoch: HOW are we to put such advice *into practice*? Can it be *realized*? Above all, we have the mission of shredding and destroying that gargantuan worship of legality which the modern revisionists have tangled into the web of modern revolutionary thought. One thing is sure, just as Lenin admonished: we most certainly can accomplish that mission ONLY "OVER THE HEADS of the old party."

Such is our legacy from the modern revisionists; those in the West who are sincere in desiring the release from bondage of that two-thirds of humanity on whose super-exploitation we still live well must discover how, in each area where we find ourselves, to translate into living action this general principle. Only so, can *the world* move forward into the socialist-to-communist epoch.

The reader will no doubt be happy to know that, whatever the outcome of our postulates, questions and conclusions, we have at¬

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long last reached the end of what we wished to say about Modern Revisionism and Social Democracy. We pride ourselves that it has been based on the record. We are firm in our belief

that, whatever twists and turns History takes, Lenin so much the Man of Our Time whose day is still far from done still speaks to our own experience when he said,

"Life will assert itself. Let the bourgeoisie rave, work itself into a frenzy, go to extremes, commit follies, take vengeance on the Bolsheviks in advance, and endeavor to kill off...more hundreds, thousands, and hundreds of thousands of yesterday's and tomorrow's Bolsheviks. In acting thus, the bourgeoisie is acting as all classes doomed by history have acted. Communists should know that the future in any case belongs to them; therefore we can (and must) combine the most intense passion in the great revolutionary struggle with the coolest and most sober estimation of the frenzied ravings of the bourgeoisie."⁴⁸

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX I

*Do cars belong in socialism?**

Makes some people SAD to hear that USSR is going ALL OUT FOR CARS...which many believe are THE CURSE of our civilization. Do you wonder if their planners really know what it's like to live in A CAR-CHOKED WORLD? Well, NN dug into the problem. Here you get THE FACTS that give you a big advantage when you argue with those who rely on press mis-information.

You could count over 200 MILLION cars stinking up the world's roads today. They kill 200,000 people each year, injure 7 millions. In USA alone, more than 1, 500,000 human beings have been killed by cars. In Europe it is now 10 times more dangerous to go by car than by train or plane.

No end in sight. Just think: car factories in USA turn out 12,000 MORE vehicles daily...while that nation has only 6,000 babies born per day!

LOOK AT OUR PHOTO ABOVE [not reproduced] . See all the bikes? Who rides them? The leading atomic scientists of the USSR. Instead of driving cars a few miles to the biggest nuclear accelerator in the world (at Serpukhov), they ride bikes. No pollution. Good exercise.

And now, we're told, they'll scrap their bikes and get into cars as fast as the new Soviet factories can turn them out. Papers here tell us the USSR is determined to catch up with USA in automobiles.

IT'S FOR LAUGHS!

You know, *how many passenger cars Soviet workers made in 1970?* This is it: 344,300. And they've got a population of 250,000,000.

So the bikes will be in the picture quite a while.

NOTHING LIKE FACTS TO HELP YOU THINK STRAIGHT. For example, back in 1928 we in North America already had millions of cars, traffic-jammed cities. That year *capitalist countries (mostly USA) turned out 5 MILLION new cars. In the Soviet Union...840 cars.*

* NORTHERN NEIGHBORS, September 1971.

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Come right up to now: *year 1970. Total output of vehicles in USSR reached 916,000. But that included trucks, busses. Passenger car production you saw above...they made only 344,300. In a WHOLE YEAR.*

Yes, it's true, their new Plan calls for a big rise in car output. *By 1975 they'll deliver 2,100,000 new vehicles, including 1,200,000 passenger cars.*

But *we in Canada* – with only ONE-TENTH the Soviet population – make 750,000 more passenger cars a year, and we're "saturated" with cars as it is.

And *USA output runs to 9 MILLION cars per year.*

STRANGE, YOU SAY, but in spite of such one-sided comparisons it's a fact that SOCIALISM WAS BUILT BY CARS AND EXISTS ONLY THANKS TO CARS.

Meaning, of course, *truck and busses*. The USSR is SO VAST, with such ENORMOUS SCATTERED POPULATIONS, that vehicles literally mean life and progress.

Since World War II, Soviet passenger traffic, on streets and roads, soared 50 times over. Last year their busses alone carried 26 THOUSAND MILLION RIDERS.

You have it, all right. Their situation is totally different from ours. *In Socialism, THE VEHICLE IS PUBLICLY OWNED, and operates for PUBLIC TRANSPORT.*

They will fulfill their Plan for increasing output of "individual" cars, but *even when they do THE CAR AS WE KNOW IT WILL NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN TRAVEL IN SOCIALISM AS FAR AS YOU CAN SEE AHEAD.*

For a long time most of their small cars will go to rural doctors and others whose need is urgent.

THE TRUCK IS THE "HERO VEHICLE" OF SOCIALISM.

Back in Czarist days they made none. *First Soviet plant to make trucks, with Soviet engines, started up in April 1921. By November 1924 (42 months later), daily output was to...10 TRUCKS!*

The *big Gorky plant came on line in 1931*. With other new factories, Soviet workers greatly increased truck production. AND JUST IN TIME. Without trucks, the Red Army could not have defeated the Nazi invaders.

Remember the siege of Leningrad? Truck drivers, over a frozen road (Lake Ladoga) under fire, evacuated 514,000 people, kept the city alive with freight.

In the war as a whole Soviet drivers carried 100 MILLION TONS, driving a total mileage equal to 90,000 times around the Earth at the equator.

Even then, 25 years ago, for all their crude looks, Soviet trucks stood up to fantastic punishment.

THEY HAVE DOZENS OF TRUCK AND CAR FACTORIES NOW.

But *do you think they'll catch up to USA in output of passenger cars?* DO THEY WANT TO?

Facts are conclusive.

Today in USA they have about 425 cars per 1,000 people. To equal that, the 250,000,000 Soviet people would have to make 100,000,000 cars (and more).

Even if none of their cars wore out, IT WOULD TAKE THEM 100 YEARS TO CATCH UP TO USA!

See for yourself...they plan no such "victory".

BUT WHAT ABOUT TRUCKS AND BUSSES?

Already, Soviet workers produce far more busses than any other country, including USA, and they plan very substantial increases in the 5-year Plan.

As for trucks: you know they are building the world's largest truck manufacturing plant...There seems little doubt that *they will overtake USA and Canada put together, in truck output, by about 1975.*

BUT YOU NEED TO LOOK AT THAT CLOSELY.

Highways and cities of Socialism are definitely NOT going to be choked by trucks. Their planners will never tolerate the RIDICULOUS MIS-USE OF HIGHWAYS which *we suffer, with tremendous volume of heavy freight pounding over our roads instead of our railways.*

Example: *10 million workers staff the truck transport network of the USA today, but they haul LESS THAN A HALF of the freight handled by 600,000 railwaymen.*

In *Socialism*, they can't possibly find 10 million workers to fill wasteful jobs in unplanned, inefficient trucking. *The big¬*

majority of their freight will continue to go by economical rails. At the same time they plan a very big increase in speedy freighting by means of CARGO-AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS.

ARE THEY LOOKING FARTHER AHEAD?

Definitely. Long, long before they "choke" on cars, Soviet people expect to be using radically new forms of transport. Undoubtedly, electric powered. Quite possibly "automated" driving, with the driver simply dialing his destination. Sooner than we think.

APPENDIX II

Adventures of Little Kofi

from SPUTNIK (Moscow), Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1967.

This happened in African country. Kofi's father asked him to take scroll to a neighbouring village. Kofi had walked along that road and through that jungle for scores of times. But what happened this time... Well, judge for yourself.

(During the Nkrumah regime, German Democratic and Czech papers which ran similar cartoon stories were raked over the coals by the regime-controlled newspapers, and the Czech magazine actually apologized and withdrew the offending publication.

At that time, the Soviet Union refrained from similar affronts. But the response of Ghanaians to its later release of similar material was still the same: "And how does this differ from *American* cartoons of black people?"

Answer: it comes from a self-styled *socialist* country!)

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1. "See that you don't lose that scroll. And come back as soon as you can. Make it snappy, son," the father said.
2. When I go a little further off, I shall take a look at this mysterious scroll.
3. My, a lion is after me! I'd better run fast.
4. A liana on the river bank saved me from the lion. But I couldn't hang like that for too long and finally screwed up my courage and pushed myself off the tree.
5. It is better to fall into water than into the lion's jaws. Father taught me to swim well.
6. Well, that's what I call out of the frying pan into the fire! What does this guy want of me? No, my dear crocodile, I have escaped from the lion and I shall escape from you, too!

7. The lion's roar set all the jungle astir. These stupid beasts probably thought I was to blame for that.

8. I have come off clear, but now my father will give me hell—the scroll has slipped out of my hand.

9. An alarm was sounded in the village—it was high time I had got back. My friends hurried to the rescue.

10. The rescuers expected to see anything but this.

11. The scroll which my father gave me and which I was careless enough to drop made us all friendly. It turned out to be an issue of **SPUTNIK** the only Soviet magazine specially for West Africa.

APPENDIX III

Partial list of military coups in the "Third World," 1952-1967

[1952]: Batista to power in *Cuba*. His military government given immediate U.S. aid until his ouster in 1959.

[1954]: *Guatemala* – armed intervention forced elected President Arbenz to hand over power to pro-Yankee Colonel Castillo Armas.

[1959]: U.S. hostilities against *Cuba*.

[1960]: U.S.-trained Cubans help crush "insurrection" in *Guatemala*.

July 5: Army mutiny in *Congo*(Leopoldville). (Patrice Lumumba appeal to UN for "help.")

July 11: *Katanga*, under Moise Tshombe, secedes from *Congo*(L).

Sept. 5: Joseph Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba in *Congo*(L); Lumumba refuses to resign; murdered, and body found much later.

Sept. 14: Joseph Mobutu, Army Commander of *Congo*(L), assumes total power.

[1961]: Coup d'etat in *El Salvador*, CIA assistance charged.

[1962]: *Brazil's* President, Quadros, forced to "resign."

Dec. 20: Senghor in *Senegal*, already president, arrests all progressives and assumes dictatorial power.

[1963]: *Jan. 3*: Nicolas Grunitzky takes power in *Togo* through a military coup.

October 28: President Hubert Maga in *Dahomey* ousted by Army Commander Christophe Soglo.

[1964]: Military coup in *Brazil* topples Goulart, who is trying to institute a mild and timid land reform.

[1965]: Another great year for coups:

June 9: Colonel Houari Boumedienne, Army Chief of Staff in *Algeria*, ousts President Ben Bella.

Sept. 30: Military coup in *Indonesia* temporarily by-passes Sukarno, but levels his government, following up with unprecedented blood bath of "Communists."

Nov. 25: Mobutu in Congo(L) dismisses President Kasavubu. Now Congo (Kinshasa).

Nov. 29: President Sourou Migan Apithy returns from a trip to Nkrumah's Ghana to his government in *Dahomey*, to meet an overthrow by Colonel Christophe Soglo.

Dec. 22: New coup in *Dahomey* deposes Congacou as President, with Soglo taking over.

1966: Even longer list of upsets:

Jan. 1: Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa ousts President David Dacko, an "African Unity," vaguely pro-Nkrumah man, in *Central African Republic*.

Jan. 4: President Maurice Yameogo, struggling with serious "labor unrest" in *Upper Volta*, is overthrown by Lt. Col. Sangoule Lamizane.

Jan. 5: Federal Prime Minister Abubakar Tafwa Balewa and two Regional Prime Ministers of *Nigeria* kidnapped and murdered by "army officers." Major-General John Aguyi-Ironsi takes over.

Feb. 24: Army takes over *Ghana* in absence of Kwame Nkrumah.

August 1: Ironsi kidnapped and murdered in *Nigeria*. Replaced by Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon.

Nov. 29: Army officers in *Burundi* oust King Ntare, making Michel Micombero "Prime Minister."

1967: *Jan. 13:* Ousting in *Togo* by Colonel Etienne Eyadema of Nicolas Grunitzky.

Mar. 2: In *Sierra Leone*, removal of Sir Albert Margai by Lt. Col. Juxon-Smith, who sets up a National Reformation Council following election victory by Siaka Stevens, who would thereby automatically have become Prime Minister. Stevens and British Governor arrested.

APPENDIX IV

"Dear Comrade:

"It is with great surprise that we have learned of the continuous recognition of the so-called General Union of Angolan Workers, UGTA, headed by Messrs. Emmanuel Davidson DIUTALA and Andre KASSINDA, by the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions.

"The Executive Committee of the UNTA* has therefore decided to delegate Comrade Thomas Edward to deliver to you our protest letter and not to take part in any of your May Day Celebrations. We, however, cherish good memories of all you have done for us and the past good relations that existed among Angolan Workers and the peoples of the Soviet Union and we shall continue to be grateful to the people and workers of your great country for the friendly sympathy they have shown to our people.

"As regards the activities and the truth about the Angolan trade union movement, needless to re-emphasize matters since we have more than once informed the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions of the existence of the two trade union organizations; one representing the voice of the popular masses on the one hand, and on the other, those which do not exist at all. But contrary to the realities, we remark that the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions has not up till now understood the trade union situation in Angola and continues to encourage division among the Angolan trade union movement. This act constitutes a gross violation of the principles of the National Liberation Movement.

"Following this unfortunate attitude of the leaders of the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions, the Executive Bureau of the National Union of Angolan Workers, UNTA, meeting in an extraordinary session on the 25th and 26th of April, 1965, has arrived at a decision to suspend at all levels all friendly relations with the Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions up to the time that the Council will find it worthwhile to conduct thorough research into the realities about the Angolan Trade Union Movement. It is certain that this suspension of our relations does not affect in any way the fraternal relations already existing among the peoples of our two countries, but only our trade union movements.

* National Union of Angolan Workers.

"In this regard, we would ask you to suspend action on your letter of 24th April, 1965, promising to send some medical material to our organization.

"Please accept, dear Comrade, our best wishes for the success of your activities with the UGTA.

"For the Executive Committee, signed, Bernard Dombelle, Secretary in Charge of International Relations."

(See Reference Note 16, Chapter X, for details.)

APPENDIX V

"American...international enterprises are not limited to strengthened (sic) the colonialist and neo-colonialist exploitation... The industrialized capitalist countries are also the object of its greed...

"Generally, there is found in these industrialized capitalist countries, a financial oligarchy, "understanding" and docile, which accepts subordination in the hope of safeguarding its privileges of class and caste against the victorious thrust of the revolutionary movements of national liberation and proletarian revolution. There are also to be found collaborators, lackeys and puppets.

"Thus, in the name of 'defense of the "free" and "white" world' against communism and the 'coloured' peoples...is instituted the economic, political and military control of the industrialized capitalist countries, themselves imperialist, by American imperialism...

"But the American takeover means super-exploitation, interventions and vexations.

"During the last five years (1959 through 1963 – HE), two thousand American firms set up branches in Europe...often constituted by giant subcontracting firms, which bring about the ruin of local enterprises.

"In Belgium, out of the total of foreign investment forecast...in 1964, 83% were...American and West German... American capital invested in Belgium during recent years represents 60% of foreign capital invested.

"Already in the movements of capital income, seen in the balance of payments of certain Western European countries, is noted one of the consequences of this American takeover.

"For Italy, the column 'Exit of foreign capital income' went from 141 million dollars in 1961 to 243 million dollars in 1964, the outflow caused by 'capital income' exceeding the return of 'capital income' by amounts...between 1961 and 1964 from 52 million dollars to 98 million...

"For the Germany of Bonn, from 1961 to 1964, the receipts of German 'capital income' abroad went from 217 to 270 million dollars, the outflow of 'foreign capital income' climbed

from 537 to 678 million dollars; the deficit balance in the column 'capital income to and from abroad' rose from 320 million dollars to 408 million...

"Thus, clearly appears the tendency to the rapid increase of-

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exploitation of the workers of these countries of Western Europe by foreign capital, mainly America.

"This movement of 'capital income' is, moreover, only one aspect of American super-exploitation...

"The other aspects...certainly far exceed in size the official figures given above.

"They are:

" – the hidden incomes of American enterprises;

" – the incomes (also hidden) of hidden American investments;

" – the unequal terms of commercial transactions to and from the United States;

" – the profits from American manufacturing licenses;

" – the burden of the part of the public debt placed – openly or indirectly – in the USA;

" – the profits from the purchase of American war materiel;

" – the net profit due to the usage of the paper-dollar with enforced gold parity; represented nevertheless, for example, by the 23 million in 'foreign monies' and the 15.6 billion Belgian francs in the column 'International Agreements', carried to the credit of the National Bank of Belgium and totalling more than 23% of its theoretical 'assets';

" – the charges caused by war expenses, consequence of subordination to the USA.

"In the case of Belgium, with the closing down of coal mines, the ruin of textile firms and metal-working factories, the general threat to the Belgian economy, it can already be observed that the American takeover, approved by big Belgian finance capital...has the character of a semi-colonialization."

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"Income differences are of course only one, albeit important, index of the advantaged status of the (Russian)─

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white-collar intelligentsia. In addition to their basic salary rates many of them, especially those employed in industry, receive various bonuses and special supplements which serve to widen the gap between their economic position and that of other groups. Similarly, they tend to enjoy certain less measurable, but no less valuable, advantages such as high-quality accommodation, opportunities to travel abroad, use of official cars and state property, and other perquisites of office."

71. through 76[72 73 74 75]. *ibid.*

76a USSR overall population: 1959, 208,827,000;
1970, 241,720,000.

(*A Family of Peoples: The USSR After 50 Years*. Jessica Smith, ed. New World Review Publications Inc, New York, 1973, p. 156.)

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Cf U.S. labor aristocracy more than 50% after 1950.

(See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters XVIII and XIX.)

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165. through 170[166 167 168 169 170]. *ibid.*

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266. Voznessenski poem, LE MONDE, *op. cit.*

267. and 268. *ibid.*

269. The first Khan, who subjugated Russia in the 13th century. Explanation by LE MONDE.

270. and 271. Note 264, above.

Chapter V

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2. CPSU Program, p. 39.
3. Lenin, "Renegade Kautsky," loc. cit., p. 409.
4. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism," August-October 1916, loc. cit., p. 322.
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6. ZERI I POPULLIT editorial, July 1966, op. cit., p. 33.
7. "The Degeneration of the Yugoslav Economy..." loc. cit., first article.
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266. Note 246, above.

267. *ibid.*

268. PKI Self-Criticism, *loc. cit.*

269. Note 5, above.

270. PEKING REVIEW, June 12, 19 and 26, 1964, op. cit.

271. Note 1, above.

272. TIME Magazine, November 11, 1966, op. cit.

273. VESNIK U SREDU (Yugoslavia), December 6, 1961, Note 5, above.

Chapter VI

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2. *ibid.*, p. 41.

3. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," loc. cit., p. 377.

4. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers of Europe and America," January 21, 1919, loc. cit., p. 482. See also, Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (Moscow ed.), p. 42; also, Lenin, Lenin, "Greetings to the Italian, French and German Communists," October 10, 1919, loc. cit., p. 523.

5. Lenin, "Greetings to the Italian, French and German Communists," loc. cit., pp. 520-521.

6. Lenin, "Renegade Kautsky," loc. cit., p. 397. Also, *ibid.*, p. 393.

7. Note 1, above, p. 57.

8. Note 5, above, p. 521.

9. Note 6, above, p. 394. Also, Note 2, above.

Section A

10. CPSU Program, p. 10.

11. *ibid.*, p. 19.

12. *ibid.*, p. 39.

13. *ibid.*, p. 19.

14. *ibid.*, p. 91.

15. Lenin, "Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and Proletarian Dictatorship Presented to the First Congress of the Communist International," March 4, 1919, *loc. cit.*, p. 487.

16. *ibid.*, pp. 488-489.

17. Lenin, "Theses of Report on the Tactics of the Russian Communist Party to the Third Congress of the Communist International," June 13, 1921, *loc. cit.*, p. 570.

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19. CPSU Program, p. 11.

20. *ibid.*

21. *ibid.*, p. 40.

22. *ibid.*, p. 91.

23. "Renegade Kautsky," *loc. cit.*, p. 392.

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25. Lenin, "Theses on Proletarian Dictatorship," PRAVDA, March 6, 1919, *loc. cit.*, p. 494. See also, Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," Marx, Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 32-33. Quoted by Lenin in "Renegade Kautsky," *loc. cit.*, p. 388.

26. "Renegade Kautsky," *loc. cit.*, p. 394.

27. *ibid.*, p. 395. See also, *The State and Revolution* (Moscow edition), p. 51.

Section B

28. "Shameful Failure of the Political and Economic System of Titoite Yugoslavia (Tirana, Albania. 1966), p. 10.

29. *ibid.*, p. 15.

30. and 31. *ibid.*

32. Pamphlet written by "Soviet Bolsheviks" inside the USSR. Reprinted in *INDONESIAN TRIBUNE* (Tirana), December 1966.

33. through 43[34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43]. *ibid.*

44. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (International Publishers. New York. 1939), p. 285.

45. Note 32, above.

46. through 51[47 48 49 50 51]. *ibid.*

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52. Han Suyin, interview with James Aronson, then-editor, NATIONAL GUARDIAN (New York), February 4, 1967.

53. *ibid.*

54. Regular monthly column, Scott Nearing, long associated with U.S. Left and founder and current "angel" of MONTHLY REVIEW, September 1967.

55. Note 52, above.

Section C

56. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," *loc. cit.*, p. 376.

57. Lenin, "Renegade Kautsky," *loc. cit.*, pp. 441-442.

58. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," *loc. cit.*, pp. 539-540.

59. China Policy Study Group, "The P.L.A. and the Cultural Revolution," BROADSHEET (official organ), June 1967.

60. through 65[61 62 63 64 65]. *ibid.*

66. Lieut. Gen. Van Tien Dung, Vietnamese People's Army officer, "Some Major Experiences of Our Successful People's War against U.S. War of Destruction," Supplement, VIETNAM COURIER (Hanoi), July 3, 1967, p. 3.

67. "How you can help those who worry about Vietnam: Why People WIN Wars," NORTHERN NEIGHBORS (Canada), September 1966. See also, "How You Can Understand the Armed Forces of Socialism," *ibid.*, June 1967.

68. PKI Self-Criticism, *loc. cit.*

69. and 70. *ibid.*

Section D

71. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," *loc. cit.*, p. 372. See also, Engels, Introduction to "The Civil War in France," *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. I, p. 484. Cited in Cheng Chinszu "The Great Lessons of the Paris Commune in Commemoration of Its 95th Birthday," series, PEKING REVIEW, April 1, 8 and 15, 1966.

72. PEKING REVIEW, series, just cited.

73. through 75[74 75]. *ibid.*

76. In Ghana, the writer was "introduced" to other very similar evidence, and also personally heard eye-witness confirmation of the Indonesian view of what had happened to some of the PKI leadership: Not long after the Indonesian coup, the All African Trade Union Federation, for whom the writer was then working, sent a trustworthy African representative to—

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Indonesia "to watch and report back." This man personally told the writer that he had been among a crowd which stood across the street from D. N. Aidit's house when it was ransacked by Army men who entered empty-handed and came out again and again bearing refrigerators, motorcycles and other consumer goods usually considered luxuries in colonial areas.

In Ghana itself, prior to the anti-Nkrumah coup of 1966, an Afro-American maintenance worker employed by an African firm was sent to do repairs on the house of A.Y.K. Djinn, then Minister of Trade. He reported to the writer that the place had become a warehouse for consumer goods like sugar cubes, tinned milk, tennis shoes, cloth, etc., to the point where there was room for sleeping inside the place itself only for the Minister, his wife and children being relegated to the servants' quarters at back. The man was eventually dismissed by Nkrumah, but his activities were typical. The writer furthermore attended a cocktail party given for staff by John K. Tettegah, then Secretary General of the All African Trade Union Federation headquartered in Ghana: the luxury of this place was startling and partly explained how this man was able to maintain two families. Yet he, upon being released from jail by the new junta, promptly denounced Nkrumah for corruption, like all the rest who, for whatever reasons, had been exposed by the "National Liberation Council" dictatorship.

As noted by the Indonesians, the source of all this corruption was a failure to understand, recognize and carry out Marxist principles by smashing the old bureaucracy. We say this, because Nkrumah at least claimed to be following such principles and Sukarno and his cohorts mouthed the word "socialism" a bit frequently. The above observations suggested to this writer that the only alternative, if the old bureaucracy is not smashed, is the rise of a new bureaucracy, aping the old one.

77. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

78. through 82[79 80 81 82]. PEKING REVIEW, series, see Note 71, above.

Chapter VII

Section A

1. Lenin, "The Stuttgart Congress," September 1907, loc. cit.

2. Lenin, article in SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT No. 33, loc. cit., pp. 214, 215.

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3. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," September 1917, loc. cit., p. 358.

4. See Note 1, above, p. 93.

5. CPSU Program, p. 26.

6. *ibid.*, p. 38.

7. *ibid.*, p. 48.

8. *ibid.*, p. 53.

9. *ibid.*, p. 54.

10. and 11. *ibid.*

12. *ibid.*, p. 56.

13. *ibid.*, p. 100.

14. *ibid.*, p. 128.

15. Anti-revisionist underground pamphlet, as in *INDONESIAN TRIBUNE*, December 1966.

16. through 19[17 18 19]. *ibid.*

Section B

20. Chao Yi-min (chief delegate from China to World Congress of Peace, Helsinki, July 12, 1965). Quoted in "Two Diametrically Opposed Lines in the World Peace Movement," PEKING REVIEW, July 23, 1965.

21. PEKING REVIEW, November 11, 1966.

22. H.M. Basner, "Straws in the wind of coexistence," GHANAIAN TIMES, May 23, 1962.

23. through 27[24 25 26 27]. *ibid.*

28. Professor E.H.S. Burhop FRS, "Disarmament The Way Ahead," speech at cited Conference, November 1963.

29. through 31[30 31]. *ibid.*

32. James Milne, "Co-existence, Trade and the Future of Britain's Economy," speech at cited Conference, as Note 28, above.

33. *ibid.*

34. Professor J. D. Bernal FRS, Chairman, WCP Presidential Committee, "Cooperation and Action," keynote speech, at cited Conference, as Note 28, above.

35. *ibid.*

36. "The 'Eighteen' Nation Committee on Disarmament," PAX ET LIBERTAS (England), (international organ, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom), April-June 1962.

37. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," *loc. cit.*, pp. 303-4.

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38. *ibid.*, p. 302. See also, Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International," *loc. cit.*, p. 240; and "How the Bourgeoisie Utilizes Renegades," September 1919, *loc. cit.*, pp. 509, 510.

39. Sidney Lens (labor writer), report from Saigon in PEACE NEWS (London), October 16, 1964.

40. See Note 15, above.

41. "WAR: How can an intelligent person look at the problem of war today?" NORTHERN NEIGHBORS (Canada), April 1966.

42. "Must there be WARS to start REVOLUTIONS?" *ibid.*, March 1966.

43. Observer, discussion of then-proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, PEKING REVIEW, November 18, 1966.
44. through 47[45 46 47]. *ibid.*
48. See Note 41, above.
49. *ibid.*
50. From the author's notes, taken down on the spot, November 1963.
51. *ibid.*
52. ZERI I POPULLIT, July 21, 1966.
53. through 60[54 55 56 57 58 59 60]. *ibid.*
61. Basil Davidson, "Warsaw Pact and NATO: Will They Survive?" Reprint from unnamed source in DAILY GRAPHIC (Accra, Ghana), March 22, 1963.
62. through 65[63 64 65]. *ibid.*
66. See Note 52, above.
67. Hysni Kapo, *op. cit.*, see Note 2, Chapter I, above.
68. WORLD CONSTRUCTION (U.S.A.), July 1967.
69. See Note 67, above.
70. PEKING REVIEW, May 6, 1967 (discussion of Malinovsky charges).
71. and 72. *ibid.*
73. RENMIN RIBAO commentator report. Reprinted, PEKING REVIEW, March 10, 1967. (Discussing an item in SOVIET DAILY NEWS, Ethiopia, USSR Embassy Bulletin, February 21, 1967.)
74. UPI Report, Washington, D.C., cited in *ibid.*
75. and 76. *ibid.*
77. Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi), February 28, 1967.
78. *ibid.*

79. "U.S. Does Not Want to Keep Suez Closed," DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), December 2, 1967.

80. See Note 70, above.

81. *ibid.*

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82. *ibid.*

This has been typical of Soviet dealings with most underdeveloped countries, as witness the following information from a U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research study dated May 15, 1972, issued by the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D. C.:

"By the end of 1971, the Soviet Union had delivered to the LDCs (less developed countries HE) only \$3.6 billion of the \$7.6 billion of economic aid offered during the nearly two decades of its foreign assistance program (i.e., since 1954 HE). This calculates to a draw-down ratio of approximately 47 per cent."

83. PEKING REVIEW, June 24, 1966.

84. *ibid.*

85. *ibid.*, November 18, 1966.

86. *ibid.*, December 23, 1966.

87. *ibid.*, February 24, 1967.

88. through 90[89 90]. *ibid.*

91. *ibid.*, January 1, 1967.

92. *ibid.*

93. NEWSWEEK, October 18, 1965, *op. cit.*, see Note 58, Chapter V, above.

94. *ibid.*

95. David Lawrence, "Russians in Vietnam: War or Involvement?" Weekly column, New York HERALD TRIBUNE (Paris), October 8-9, 1966.

96. "Scuffling in Hanoi," NEWSWEEK, December 22, 1969, p. 57.

97. Jorgen E. Petersen, New York correspondent, EXPRESSEN, Sweden's largest newspaper, "Hanoi Edging toward Talks?" GUARDIAN (London), November 17, 1967.

98. *ibid.*

Chapter VIII

1. Boguslaw Jasinski, Polish lecturer, Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, Winneba, Ghana: "Why Developing Nations Cannot Go Capitalist Way." Second article of a series. THE SPARK (Accra, Ghana), June 18, 1965.

2. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," *loc. cit.*, pp. 295, 297.

3. Chapter IV, pp. 76 ff., analysing the fate of former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's "Seven Points" of acceptable

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conduct for socialist countries wanting "improved relations" with the U.S.A.

4. CPSU Program, pp. 25-35.

5. *ibid.*, p. 26.

6. *ibid.*, p. 31.

7. *ibid.*, p. 57.

8. *ibid.*, p. 36.

9. Howard Selsam, *op. cit.*, "Preface to the Second Edition."

10. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Socialist International," *loc. cit.*, pp. 245-6.

11 *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapters IV through VI; also Chapters XVII and XVIII.

12. CPSU Program, p. 35.

13. Lenin, "The Stuttgart International Socialist Congress," August and September, 1907, *loc. cit.*, p. 91.

14. See Note 11, Chapter VI, above.

Chapter IX

Section A

1. CPSU Program, p. 26.
 2. *ibid.*, p. 28. See also, p. 34.
 3. 'Paths of Development for Newly-Emerging Countries," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (English edition, PROBLEMS OF PEACE & SOCIALISM, Prague), April, May, June and July 1962. Excerpts from a Conference sponsored by the journal.
 4. Jack Woddis (Britain), *ibid.*, April 1962.
 5. Josi½ Cademartori (Chile), *ibid.*, June 1962.
 6. CPSU Program, p. 26.
 7. See Note 3, above.
 8. P. Tlale (South Africa), May 1962. See Note 3, above.
 9. A. Avanesyan (Iran), July 1962. See Note 3, above.
 10. R. Palme Dutt, "Neo-Colonialism & British Imperialism," a "preliminary contribution to an exchange of views on 'The Disintegration of the Colonial System and New Forms of Colonialism'," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, September 1962.
 11. Belal Abel Aziz (Morocco), April 1962. See Note 3, above.
 12. S. Nader (Lebanon), June 1962, *ibid.*
 13. A. Avanesyan (Iran), July 1962, *ibid.*
 14. Hutomo Supardan & Oei Djun (Indonesia), June 1962, *ibid.*
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15. Pierre Jali½, *The Plunder of the Third World; and The Third World in World Economy* (Monthly Review Press, New York), pp. 23-27; pp. 15 ff., respectively. Published 1968, 1969, resp. Also Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism & Underdevelopment in Latin America* (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969), pp. 258 ff.

16. See Note 5, above.

17. Jalil^{1/2}, *Plunder*, Chapter III, "The Trade of the Third World." Also, Frank, *Capitalism*, pp. 201 ff. See also, "Wage Gap Widens on world-wide Front," a Reuters despatch in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR for August 26, 1963, p. 4. It reported the following facts from "a new study by the Organization for Economic Development (OECD)":

LOCATION	Average Annual Revenue per Inhabitant in Dollars		Total Population in Millions	
	1962	1970 (est)*	1962	1970 (est)*
Industrialized Countries	1,900	2,500	471	517
Developing Countries	130	150	1,432	1,734

18. Jalil^{1/2}, *Third World*, pp. 61 ff.

19. Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev, interview, loc. cit.

20. CPSU Program, p. 45.

21. *ibid.*

Section B

22. V. G. Wilcox, General Secretary, New Zealand Communist Party, "Contradictions & Revisionism," N. Z. COMMUNIST REVIEW, June 1965. Cited, PEKING REVIEW, August 13, 1965.

23. Russell Warren Howe (African Affairs correspondent, BALTIMORE SUN, Maryland, USA), feature article, "Change in Russia's Policy toward Africa." Reprinted, GHANAIAN TIMES, August 25, 1967.

24. See Note 3, above.

25. Analysis of October 1966 Cairo Seminar of non-aligned countries, sponsored by WORLD MARXIST REVIEW. PEKING REVIEW, November 25, 1966.

26. "The Socialist World System and the National Liberation—

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Movement," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, March 1963.

27. Mahjemout Diop (Senegal), *ibid.*, p. 67.

28. Tewfik Takali (Morocco); Mohammed Ennafaa (Tunisia), *ibid.*, several places.

29. Or at least no excerpts were quoted by the editors (equally significant).

30. Raymond Barbis (France), who stressed that African countries, thanks to the USSR, achieved independence "peacefully", *ibid.*, p. 52, p. 62, p. 63; Idris Cox (Britain) who spoke (p. 63) about varying concepts of "African socialism," all of which he evaluated for Africans. Keynote speech: Academician Arzumanyan (USSR), *ibid.*, p. 51. Summary (pp. 69-71) by A.M. Rumyantsev, Chief Editor, *WORLD MARXIST REVIEW*. Cox also spoke about the "future of socialism in Africa," including "an African road to socialism."

31. See Note 25, above.

32. Kurt Mueller, *op. cit.*

33. See Note 25, above.

34. "The USSR and the National Struggle," *NEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION* (Ghana Embassy, Accra), July 11, 1965.

35. Anna Louise Strong, *LETTER FROM CHINA*, July 5, 1965.

36. Wilfred Burchett (Asian analyst), "Vietnam: the Waterloo of U.S. Invincibility," *NATIONAL GUARDIAN* (New York), August 12, 1967. First of three articles.

37. For example, Palmiro Togliatti, "Social Democracy and the Colonial Question," speech to Comintern, 1928. Cited throughout *Labor Aristocracy*.

38. *ibid.*

39. See Note 34, above.

40. *ibid.*

41. *ibid.*, p. 2.

42. V. Tyugamenko, "Present National Movement," *SPUTNIK* (Moscow), July-August, 1965.

43. See Note 3, above.

44. Blas Roca, General Secretary Cuban Communist Party. See Note 3, above, *loc. cit.*, May 1962.

45. Belal Abdel Aziz, *ibid.*, April 1962.

46. Abdelkader el Ouahrani, *ibid.*, April 1962.

47. *ibid.*

48. Paulino G. Alberdi (Argentina), *ibid.*, April 1962.

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49. Hutomo Supardan and Oei Djun (Indonesia), *ibid.*, June 1962.

50. *ibid.*

51. P. Tlale (South Africa), *ibid.*, May 1962.

52. Jack Woddis (Britain), *ibid.*, April 1962.

53. and 54. *ibid.*

55. See Note 42, above.

56. CPSU Program, pp. 56-7.

57. A. Avanesyan (Iran), see Note 3, above, July 1962.

58. Han Suyin, interview, NATIONAL GUARDIAN (New York), February 4, 1967. See also, Appendix III for partial list of actual coups.

Section C

59. PKI Self-Criticism, *loc. cit.*

60. Kurt Mueller, *op. cit.*, article of July 25, 1967.

61. *ibid.*

62. "The Cairo 'Seminar,' Spreading Revisionist Fallacies," PEKING REVIEW, November 23, 1966.

Part of ROUND THE WORLD feature.

63. and 64. *ibid.*

65. See Note 60, above.

66. and 67. *ibid.*

68. Statement of Egyptian Security Police (NZZ). Quoted in *ibid.*

69. through 71[70 71]. *ibid.*

72. See Note 60, above.

73. *ibid.*

74. Quote inside quote: Alexander Sobolev, address at Cairo Seminar. Cited by Kurt Mueller, *op. cit.*

75. See Note 60, above.

76. Jack Woddiss (Britain), see Note 3, above, April 1962.

77. See Note 74, above.

78. See Note 60, above.

79. through 82[80 81 82]. *ibid.*

83. See Note 60, above.

84. Abdelkader el Ouahrani (Algeria), "The Struggle for National Independence and Disarmament," *WORLD MARXIST REVIEW* (Prague), June 1962, pp. 19 ff.

85. "The Peoples Fighting for Independence Want Disarmament," *ibid.*

86. *ibid.*

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87. "The Newly Independent Peoples Are Not Interested in the Arms Race," *ibid.*

88. "Complete and General Disarmament Would Strengthen the National Liberation Movement," *ibid.*

89. See Note 67, Chapter VI, Section C, revisionist position on imperialism's weapons' superiority.

90. See Chapter VI, Section A, revisionist theory about the peaceful transition to socialism.

Section D

91. Any hapless member of KNII's staff who stepped out of line (as dictated by KNII's Eastern European "guidance") found himself effectively ostracised: isolated socially with minor exceptions; not assigned classes to teach (despite a contract with the Ghana government). Pat Sloan, an English Communist and friend to Kwame Nkrumah, invited to Ghana and given his contract directly by Nkrumah, was one such "hapless member of KNII staff." He also wrote for the short-lived SUNDAY PUNCH, a Ghanaian muck-raking paper that started, with a trial run December 8, 1965 and ran seven issues before the coup. It was at PUNCH headquarters that the writer heard Sloan describe these conditions and developments at KNII.

92. Boguslaw Jasinski, op. cit., Article I, Column 2.

93. ibid., Article I, Column 3.

94. ibid., Article I, Column 7.

95. ibid., Article II, Column 3.

95a "The Gap Widens on world-wide Front," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, August 26, 1963 (Reuters), p. 4.

96. Boguslaw Jasinski, op. cit., Article 1, Column 3.

97. ibid., Article I, Column 4.

98. ibid., Article I, Column 4.< span>

99. ibid., Article II, Column 2.

100. *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XXIV, "Effect on Western Marxists of Wrong Estimate of Labor Aristocracy."

101. Sekou Touré, *½ Guinee Revolution and Social Progress*, p. 23.

102. Jasinski, op. cit., Article I, Column 7.

103. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism," October 1916, loc. cit., p. 332.

104. Jasinski, op. cit., Article I, Column 7.

105. ibid., Article II, Column 1.

106. See Program of Communist Party of Great Britain, statement—

on colonialism. Reprinted, GHANAIAN TIMES (Accra, Ghana), January 31, 1964, as "Down with Colonialism!"

107. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

For example, see Pedro Motta Lima (Brazil), remarks at Conference in Note 3, reported loc. cit., June 1962:

"Through their trade unions, peasant leagues, student and cultural organizations and political parties, the people of Brazil are fighting to uphold the constitutional system. Defending democratic legality as the way out of the present crisis, the progressive forces consider it imperative to pursue peaceful lines of action."

108. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

109. Ktut Weda, "Cast away Illusions about the 'Peaceful Road'." Discussion of PKI Self-Criticism, INDONESIA TRIBUNE, February 1967.

110. See Note 92, above.

111. Kurt Mueller, op. cit.

112. See Note 48, above.

113. See Note 12, above.

114. See Note 49, above.

115. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

116. See Note 57, above.

117. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

Section E

118. Keesing's "Contemporary Archives, 1965-66, P. 21190.

119. *ibid.*

120. News of the abortive January 8 coup came to the writer from a fellow-inmate of the Accra YWCA who monitored French radio where it was announced. Its reality was confirmed the next day by Kwamina Essilfie, then editor of the short-lived SUNDAY PUNCH. The author also personally witnessed the expulsion of Asian Marxists, including standing with a daily crowd

across the street from the Chinese Embassy, watching personnel packing lorries with Embassy furniture, preparatory to departure. That was October 1966.

121. Kaye Whiteman (Assistant Editor, WEST AFRICAN REVIEW), "Is There a 'Chinese Menace' in the Congo?" PEACE NEWS (London), September 4, 1964.

122. through 128[123 124 125 126 127 128]. *ibid.*

129. Ian Tickle, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," GHANAIAN TIMES (Accra, Ghana), September 14, 1967.

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No clue appeared as to WHO "Ian Tickle" was. However, for what it is worth, an Asante (Twi) word for *tickle* is "nunu." Nunoo, Nuno, etc. is a very common Ghanaian name among Ga people around Accra.

130. through 135[131 132 133 134 135]. *ibid.*

136. Occasionally, Eastern European personnel did manage to "go too far" in the "new circumstances," and got themselves evicted, just to show the upstarts who was bossing the show. See, e.g., GHANAIAN TIMES, June 7, 1967: "*Safeguarding our freedom*: Ghana expels 4 Communists." Two Russians (NOVOSTI and PRAVDA correspondents) and two Czechs (JIRI PRAVDA correspondent and Embassy commercial attache) were "bundled out" on the usual "espionage" charges. But their Embassies and Bulletins remained.

137. Kurt Mueller, *op. cit.*

138. V. Tyugamenko, *op. cit.*, cited in *ibid.*

139. *ibid.*

140. Mueller, *op. cit.*

141. PKI Self-Criticism, *loc. cit.*

142. CPSU Program, p. 45.

143. PKI Self-Criticism, *loc. cit.*

144. Jack Woddiss, see Note 3, above, *loc. cit.*

145. See Note 12, above.

146. Ruy Mauro Marini, "Brazilian Subimperialism," also Eduardo Galeano, "Brazil and Uruguay: Euphoria and Agony," MONTHLY REVIEW (New York), February 1972.

Section F

147. Boguslaw Jasinski, op. cit.

148. Professor Andre Guilder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment," MONTHLY REVIEW (New York), September 1966.

149. through 152[150 151 152]. *ibid.*

153. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

154. *ibid.*

155. Jack Woddis, see Note 3, above, loc. cit.

156. Jack Woddis, "The Role of the African Working Class in the National Liberation Movement," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (Prague), April 1962.

157. Khachatur Ara (Secretary General, Federation of Trade Unions Iraq), Article 2, "Trade Unions and the Struggle for Socialism," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (Prague), April 1962.

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158. Moses Mabhida (Vice Chairman, South African Conference of Trade Unions), *ibid.*

159. See Note 155, above.

160. See Note 9, above.

161. "What's Gone WRONG in AFRICA?" NORTHERN NEIGHBORS (Canada), April 1966.

162. *ibid.*

163. See Note 153, above.

164. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Chapter VIII, "The Parasitism and Decay of Capitalism," *Selected Works in Three Volumes* (Progress Publishers. Moscow. 1970), Vol. 1, p. 748.

165. See Note 161, above.

166. James Jackson (quondam Editor, New York DAILY WORKER), "The Democratic Uprising of American Negroes," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (Prague), September 1963.

167. *ibid.*

168. James Jackson, "Negro Oppression as a Function of U.S. Capitalism," THE SPARK (Accra, Ghana), January 18, 1966.

169. *ibid.*

170. See Note 166, above.

171. See Note 168, above.

172. Jack A. Smith, interview with Stokeley Carmichael, NATIONAL GUARDIAN (New York), August 12, 1967.

173. *ibid.*

174. See Note 147, above.

175. See Note 156, above.

Section G

176. Boguslaw Jasinski, *op. cit.*

177. M. Edouard Bonnefous, "Les Milliards Qui s'Envoient" (Fayard. Paris. 1963). Quoted in Pierre Jalić^{1/2}, *Pillage* (New York and London, MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS, 1968 translation from French, Paris. 1965. Maspero. *Le Pillage du Tiers Monde*), p. 60.

178. *ibid.*

179. K. Dobrev (Bulgaria), see Note 3, above, May 1962, *loc. cit.*

180. Z. Mazyar (Iran), see Note 3, above, July 1962, *loc. cit.*

181. B. Zacharescu (Rumania), *ibid.*

182. Romano Ledda, April 1962, *ibid.*

183. *ibid.* See also next reference.

184. R. Palme Dutt, "Neo-Colonialism and British Imperialism," in "Exchange of Views on the Disintegration of the Colonial System and New Forms of Colonialism," WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (Prague), April 1962.

185. *ibid.*

186. Felix Greene, *The Enemy: Notes on Imperialism and Revolution* (Jonathan Cape. London. 1971). Cited in a review of the book printed in LIBERATION STRUGGLE, "an anti-imperialist monthly...with a special focus on Africa," (London), issue No. 5, May 1972.

187. *ibid.*

188. Paul Friedlander and Hartmut Schilling, "West German Imperialism Bulwark of Colonialism." In Exchange cited in Note 184, above.

189. Jaliğ½, *op. cit.* (see Note 171, above), p. 61.

190. Alfredo E. Hernandez, Director, Project Analysis Division, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D. C. "International Credit Institutions," WORLD CONSTRUCTION (U.S.), July 1967.

191. through 198[192 193 194 195 196 197 198]. *ibid.*

199. Jaliğ½, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

200. Gilbert Mathieu, LE MONDE, October 22-23, 1964. Figures on bilateral aid, deduced by Jaliğ½ from this article by subtracting one billion francs in private aid (because not accepted by Jaliğ½ as genuine aid) and 145 million francs in the "multilateral" category. In *op. cit.*, p. 61.

201. Jaliğ½, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

202. *ibid.*

203. U.S. Government Printing Office, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* 1966 (Washington, D.C.), p. 852. Cited in Jaliğ½, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

204. Jean Lacouture, LE MONDE, October 24, 1964. Cited in Jaliğ½, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

205. Jaliğ½, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

206. See Note 190, above.

207. Jaliğ½, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

208. *ibid.*

209. See Note 190, above.

210. *ibid.*

211. Jalil¹/₂, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

212. See Note 190, above.

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213. Jalil¹/₂, *op. cit.*, p. 65-7.

214. See Note 190, above.

215. Jalil¹/₂, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

216. *ibid.*, p. 67.

217. *ibid.*, pp. 67, 68 and 69.

218. *ibid.*, p. 83.

219. *ibid.*, pp. 83-4.

220. Boguslaw Jasinski, *op. cit.*

221. through 224[222 223 224]. *ibid.*

225. Jalil¹/₂, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 44-5.

226. *ibid.*, p. 30. 227. *ibid.*

228. *ibid.*, pp. 30-1. 229. *ibid.*, p. 32.

230. Jasinski, *op. cit.* 231. Jalil¹/₂, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

Section H

232. Jack Woddis, See Note 3, above.

233. *ibid.*

234. Z. Maziyar (Iran), *ibid.*, July 1962. See also B. Zacharescu (Rumania), *ibid.*

235. Jack Woddis, op. cit.

236. P. Tlale (South Africa), *ibid.*, May 1962.

237. "Study Corner," THUNDER, April 1967 (Georgetown, Guyana). Theoretical organ of the Guyanese People's Progressive Party under then-Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan.

238. *ibid.*

239. B. Zacharescu, loc. cit.

240. See Note 236, above.

241. THUNDER, op. cit.

242. and 243. *ibid.*

244. Belal Abdel Aziz (Morocco), see Note 3, above. Loc. cit., April 1962.

245. G. Hansen (GDR), *ibid.*, July 1962. See also Romano Ledda (Italy), *ibid.*, April 1962.

246. K. Dobrev, op. cit., *ibid.*, April 1962.

247. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research Study, May 15, 1962 (Washington, D. C), p. 30. Hereinafter referred to as "BIR Research Study."

248. *ibid.*, pp. ii and 7.

249. "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa," PLAIN TRUTH (Texas, USA), May 1972. Note that, if an annual RATE of aid were applied to that from BOTH sources (Western and Eastern), and for the same number of years (using certain simplistic assumptions), then socialist aid would be *greater* than Western.

250. Interview with Kwesi Amoaka-Ata, last Finance Minister under Nkrumah, by the author (Accra, Ghana), October 18, 1967.

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251. BIR Research Study, p. 30.

252. See Note 49, above.

253. Blas Roca (Cuba), General Secretary, Cuban Communist Party. See Note 3, above, loc. cit., May 1962.

254. Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara, "Socialist Planning in Cuba," AFRICA LATIN AMERICA ASIA REVOLUTION (Paris), Vol. 1, No 6, Talk, July 14, 1963, at Algiers, to an international seminar on economic planning.

255. Leon Gure and Julian Weinkle, "Cuba's New Dependency," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (Washington, D. C.) U.S. Information Agency, March-April 1972.

256. Kurt Mueller, op. cit.

257. V. Tyugamenko, op. cit., cited in ibid.

258. ibid.

259. Jack Woddis, op. cit.

260. Mueller, op. cit.

261. BIR Research Study, p. 16:

"In conjunction with the Soviet military assistance program at least 2,500 military personnel from thirteen LDCs (Less Developed Countries HE) were being trained in the Soviet Union in 1971. This brings to approximately 26,000 the number of personnel who have received such military training in the USSR since 1955. In addition, nearly 16,500 Soviet military personnel were present in the following LDCs in 1971:

Country	No of Military Personnel
Afghanistan	150
Algeria	1,000
Ceylon	100
Egypt	12,500
Guinea	100
India	150
Iraq	400
Somalia	300
Sudan	500
Syria	800
Yemen (Aden)	180
Yemen (Sana)	100
Other	200
TOTAL	16,480

262. Radio Moscow, TASS International Service, December 9, 1970. Cited in Gure and Weinkle, op cit. Their footnote 30 on their p. 78.

263. THE MIAMI HERALD, April 14, 1971; LATIN AMERICA (London), May 7, 1971. Cited in Gure and Weinkle, op. cit. Their footnote 65 on their p. 78.

264. Kurt Mueller, op. cit.

265. Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India*, pp. 175-178. Cited by Kathleen Gough, "Imperialism in South Asia," MONTHLY REVIEW (New York), March 1972.

266. Felix Greene, op. cit.

267. Alfredo Hernandez, op. cit.

268. BIR Research Study, p. 10.

269. See Note 237, above.

270. Jali¹/₂, op. cit.

271. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

272. THUNDER, op. cit.

273. *ibid.*

274. Mohan Ram, op. cit.

275. "The Russians are coming to India," weekly feature, INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE, NEWSWEEK (New York), August 21, 1972.

276. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 73.

277. BIR Research Study, p. 30.

278. These things, the writer saw with her own eyes. Information on countries of origin of the tractors and the petrol inefficiency of the monster Russian lorries came from the writer's ex-husband, George Edwards, a one-time U.S. Communist Party organizer who went to Ghana in early 1962 to "help build socialism in Africa." He is a man knowledgeable in construction, who had contact with contractors and builders in Ghana from all over the world, as well as with Ghana government officials in the construction side of Nkrumah's effort to rehabilitate his country.

279. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., pp. 72-3.

280. Guevara, op. cit.

281. Gure and Weinkle, p. 69.

282. *ibid.*, p. 76.

283. *ibid.*, p. 77.

284. Jalil^{1/2}, op. cit., p. 30. See also BIR Research Study, p. 30.

285. Guevara, op. cit.

286. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 70.

287. *ibid.*, pp. 70-1.

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288. *ibid.*, p. 71.

289. V.V. Volksi, ed., *Cuba: Ten Years of the Revolution* (Nauka. Moscow. 1968), p. 126. Cited in Gure and Weinkle, op. cit. Their footnote 22 on their p. 71.

290. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 71.

291. Guevara, op. cit.

292. THUNDER, op. cit.

293. and 294. *ibid.*

295. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 70.

296. *ibid.*

297. *ibid.*, pp. 71-2.

298. *ibid.*, p. 72.

299. *ibid.*

300. HOY (Havana), October 14, 1964, Cited in Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., their footnote 28 on their p. 72.

301. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 72.

302. and 303. *ibid.*

304. *ibid.*, p. 74.

305. *ibid.*, p. 78.

306. *ibid.*, pp. 72-3.

307. See GHANAIAN TIMES: "Ghana to review 1000 grants in Soviet Union..." (October 5, 1966); "Africa is short of medical and health workers;" and "More Doctors Needed in Africa" (April 7, 14, 1967, respectively); "Re-Testing of Soviet-Trained Doctors Will Assess Their Background," by Kwesi Mould (October 19, 1967); "More Soviet Trained Doctors Arriving," by S Asante-Fosukwe (October 20, 1967); "NLC to Decide on 17 Doctors," by Kwesi Mould (October 25, 1967); "ALL DOCTORS WILL TRAIN LOCALLY" (November 1, 1967).

See also, GHANAIAN TIMES: "Report on 56 Soviet-trained air crew submitted" (June 2, 1967), p. 8. The key sentence in this despatch reads:

"The 56 were among the 78 engineers declared redundant by the Ghana Airways Corporation last November."

The despatch also noted that "several western countries" had expressed "interest" in retraining these students.

308. PKI Self-Criticism, loc. cit.

309. *ibid.*

310. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 72.

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311. *ibid.*

312. Guevara, op. cit.

313. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 76.

314. *ibid.*

315. *ibid.*, p. 75.

316. *ibid.*, p. 74. See also, *ibid.*, p. 70, Footnote 15:

"For the purposes of this paper, the Soviet ruble is considered equal to \$1.11 (US)."

317. *ibid.*, p. 77.

318. *ibid.*

319. Basil Davidson, *Which Way Africa?* (Penguin. England. 1964), p. 172.

320. "Cocoa Consumption Goes Up," *EVENING NEWS* (Accra, Ghana), July 19, 1967.

321. W.R. Feaver, "World demand doubles in 15 years." In "Cocoa: a special report," *THE TIMES* (London), September 19, 1969.

322. Gure and Weinkle, *op. cit.*, p. 70, their footnote 12.

323. *ibid.*, p. 70.

324. *ibid.*, p. 72.

325. *ibid.*, p. 79.

326. *PLAIN TRUTH* (Texas), May 1971, *op. cit.*

327. See for example, Yale H. Ferguson, "Moscow and Peking in Latin America," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM* (USIA), (Washington, D. C), May-June 1971.

328. Kwamina Essilfie, editor, *THE SUNDAY PUNCH* (Accra, Ghana). In private conversations after the February 1966 coup in Ghana.

329. Dr Joseph Klansky, then-newly-appointed editor, *SOLIDARITY* (Prague), and the writer at Kumasi, January 13, 1965.

330. *BIR Research Study*, p. 10.

331. George T. Yu, "Peking's African Diplomacy," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM* (USIA), (Washington, D. C.), March-April 1972, pp. 19-20.

332. *PLAIN TRUTH*, *op. cit.*

333. George T. Yu, *op. cit.*

334. *BIR Research Study*, p. ii.

335. *PLAIN TRUTH*, *op. cit.*

336. Gure and Weinkle, op. cit., p. 69.

337. PLAIN TRUTH, op. cit.

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338. See for example Michael Gamarnikov, "Industrial Cooperation: East Europe Looks West," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (USIA), (Washington, DC), May-June 1971.

339. Jalil^{1/2}, *The Third World in the World Economy* (Maspero, Paris. 1968; English translation, MONTHLY REVIEW Press, New York, 1969), pp. 75-6; 117.

340. Guevara, op. cit., p. 85.

341. *ibid.*, p. 86.

342. *ibid.*, p. 82.

343. *ibid.*, p. 85.

Chapter X

1. See *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XXV, "Relationship between Western and Colonial Workers."

Section A

2. V. Vladimirsky, "African Problems: Ethnic Prejudices & Racialism," NEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION (Accra, Ghana), Embassy Bulletin, May 7, 1967.

3. "All China Denounces New Atrocities by Soviet Revisionist Ruling Clique," PEKING REVIEW, February 10, 1967.

4. *ibid.*

5. Chapter IV, "Revisionism & the Attitude to Class Struggle," Section C, pp. 67 ff, above.

6. and 7. *ibid.*

8. Betty Pilkington, story on "6-day war" in Middle East, NATIONAL GUARDIAN (New York), June 17, 1967. For later news, London TIMES account of July 1972 expulsion of 20,000 Soviet military advisers, technicians, etc. (July 19, 1972); also, report in Keesing's "Contemporary Archives," August 5-12, 1972, P 25397.

9. "Russia and the Mid-East," GHANAIAAN TIMES (Accra, Ghana), July 21, 1967. Reprinted from Federated World Features (FWF).

10. through 13[11 12 13]. *ibid.*

14. London TIMES: February 9, pp. 3, 7; February 11, p. 10; February 12, p. 10; and February 18, p. 8. 1963.

15. See Note 9, above.

16. Unpublished letter to B Averianov, Head, International Department, Central Council, Soviet Trade Unions, from the National Council of Angolan Workers (UNTA), April 26, 1965. This letter was given to the writer in the summer of 1965 by—

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John Tettegah, then Secretary General of the All-African Trade Union Federation, where she was then employed. Full text, Appendix IV.

17. Statement issued November 10, 1966, by representatives of eight nationalist organizations expelled from Cairo Seminar. Cited in Kurt Mueller, *op. cit.*

18. *ibid.*

19. through 22[20 21 22]. Russel Warren Howe, African Affairs Correspondent, "Change in Russian Policy toward Africa," BALTIMORE SUN (Maryland). Reprinted, GHANAIAAN TIMES (Accra, Ghana), August 25, 1967.

23. "Soviet, Czech Arms for Nigeria," GHANAIAAN TIMES, August 21, 1967.

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24. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism," *loc. cit.*, p. 320.

25. "Trade Partners: 100 Countries," interview with Patolichev in SPUTNIK (Moscow), February 1967. "Soviet Magazine especially for West Africa."

26. "The Economic Advance of the Socialist Countries, an Economic & Statistical Survey." 19-page supplement to WORLD MARXIST REVIEW (Prague), p. 48.

27. "The Third Communism," TIME Magazine, March 18, 1966, p. 48.

28. "EASTERN EUROPE: Pattern of Disintegration," TIME Magazine, February 17, 1967.

29. *ibid.*, March 18, 1966.

30. *ibid.*, February 17, 1967.

31. *ibid.*

32. *ibid.*, March 18, 1966, pp. 47B, 48.

33. through 38[34 35 36 37 38]. *ibid.*, February 17, 1967.

39. "Brezhnev's Proposed Meeting of 'Communist Parties' Is Khrushchev Revisionists' New Anti-Marxist-Leninist Counter-Revolutionary Plot," editorial in ZERI I POPULLIT (Tirana, Albania), December 13, 1966. Reprinted PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1967.

40. *ibid.*

41. Lenin, "Concluding Remarks to the Collection *Marxism and Liquidation*," April 1914, loc. cit., p. 183.

42. Lenin, "Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity," May 1914, loc. cit, p. 198.

43. ZERI I POPULLIT, op. cit.

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44. Ian Tickle, op. cit.

45. "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" loc. cit., p. 29.

46. Booklet, "Shameful Failure of the Political and Economic System of Titoite Yugoslavia," (Tirana, Albania, 1966), p. 5.

47. Togliatti, "Social Democracy and the Colonial Question," 1928, loc. cit.

48. *Labor Aristocracy*, Chapter XXVIII, "'Reformism' and Racism in the United States."

49. Jacques Grippa (then-Secretary, Communist Party of Belgium). Lecture at Brussels Free University, December 13, 1965. Reprinted as pamphlet, "American Imperialism Has Taken over from Hitler" (Brussels. Belgium. 1965), p. 13.

50. "East Europe: Traders in Wonderland," NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1972, p. 52.

51. Grippa, op. cit., p. 19.

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1. Editorial, ZERI I POPULLIT (Tirana, Albania), December 29, 1966. Reprinted PEKING REVIEW, January 20, 27; February 3, 1967.
2. Hysni Kapo, op. cit.
3. Lenin, "Marxism and Reformism," September 1913, loc. cit., p. 167.
4. See above, Chapter IX, Section E, "Revisionism Muffs the Role of the Colonial Proletariat."

Chapter XII

1. Lenin, "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International, loc. cit., p. 287.
2. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International," loc. cit., p. 257.
3. *ibid.*, p. 263.
4. *ibid.*, p. 257.
5. Hysni Kapo, op. cit.
6. Editorial Note introduction by INDONESIAN TRIBUNE (Tirana, Albania) editors, January 1967, to PKI Self-Criticism.
7. See Note 2, above, p. 273.
8. *ibid.*, p. 260.
9. *ibid.*, p. 273.

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10. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism," loc. cit, p. 120.
11. See Note 2, above.
12. Lenin, "How the Bourgeoisie Utilizes Renegades," September 1919, loc. cit., p. 549.
13. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder," excerpts in loc. cit., p. 549.

14. Chapter IV, Section A, "The New Elite in Eastern Europe; Elitism in the Western Left; and Section C, Part 2, "Abandonment of Proletarian Internationalism," above.

15. Hysni Kapo, op. cit., p. 8.

16. *ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

17. "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" op. cit., p. 47.

18. Kapo, op. cit., p. 20.

19. Lenin, "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International," loc. cit., p. 284.

20. Le in, "Renegade Kautsky," loc. cit., p. 247.

21. Friedrich Engels, letter to Sorge, January 18, 1893. Cited by Lenin, "Opportunism and the Collapse of the Second International," loc cit, p. 288.

22. Engels, letter of November 11, 1893, cited in *ibid.*

Section B

23. Kapo, op. cit.

24. Lenin, See Note 2, p. 262.

25. Kapo, op. cit.

26. Tirana pamphlet, "A New Plot of the Kruschovite Revisionists against the Interests of the Socialist Countries." Reprint of ZERI I POPULLIT editorial of July 21, 1966 (Tirana), p. 21.

27. *ibid.*, p. 29.

28. Grippa, op. cit., p. 20.

29. through 32[30 31 32]. See Note 28, above. But see also Kiichi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM (Washington, D. C), May-June 1972, pp. 1 ff. for a description of the protracted nature of these negotiations and the Japanese reluctance to accept hard Soviet terms.

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33. Chapter IV, Section A, Part 2, "The New Elite in the Soviet Union," above.

34. William Pomeroy, op. cit.

35. *ibid.*

36. As of May, 1967. See PEKING REVIEW, May 12, 1967, p. 28.

37. Kapo, op. cit.

38. Lenin, "Greetings to Italian, French and German Communists," October 1919, loc. cit., p. 518.

39. Lenin, "Letters to the Workers of Europe and America," January 1919, loc. cit., p. 483.

40. Lenin, See Note 2, above, p. 265. And see also, Lenin, "Letter to the German and French Workers," September 1920, loc. cit., p. 560. Also, Note 38, above, p. 519.

41. See Note 38, above, p. 519.

42. Statement of eight nationalists expelled from the October 1966 Cairo Seminar on Colonialism, November 10, 1966. Quoted in PEKING REVIEW, November 25, 1966. See also, PKI Self-Criticism, loc. ci .:

"A firm stand against modern revisionism in all fields can be effectively maintained only when our Party abandons the line of 'preserving friendship with the modern revisionists'."

43. Wilfred Pomeroy, (Asian Analyst), interview with Marshall Kim Il Sung, THE NATIONAL GUARDIAN (New York), July 29, 1967.

44. *ibid.*, previous installment, July 22, 1967.

45. Lenin, See Note 2, above, p. 266.

46. See Note 2, above, p. 269.

47. *ibid.*

48. See Note 13, above, p. 548.